Jennifer O'Connell

[Enhancing Transparency and Accountability in the Transportation System Act, November 21st, 2023]

Madam Speaker, if these common-sense Conservatives believe that they are going to do everything to help Canadians, then why would they not support the bill that would help address issues of accessibility and persons with disabilities? Why would these common-sense Conservatives not support measures that create more accountability to create a framework and to create standards?

That does not sound like common sense. That sounds like Conservative politics, which actually disadvantage Canadians. If the member opposite supports the measures in the bill for persons with disabilities, why is he voting against it?

[Enhancing Transparency and Accountability in the Transportation System Act, November 21st, 2023]

Madam Speaker, I am curious about why the members opposite would be opposed to transparency in the transportation system.

Is it because, when they were in office, their infrastructure plan consisted of fake lakes and gazebos? Are they suggesting that transparency in building infrastructure is not needed, so they can continue to build fake lakes and gazebos and pretend that this actually helps Canadians?

[Questions on the Order Paper, November 20th, 2023]

Mr. Speaker, with regard to part (a), the retrofit of the Laval, Quebec, immigration holding centre, IHC, to create a wing comprising 48 beds for detainees assessed to pose a higher risk will begin in winter 2023-24 and is expected to be completed by spring 2024, subject to contractor and supply availability. Additionally, improvements to the current infrastructure and supplementary personnel are expected throughout 2024. An amount of $800,000, paid for within existing budgets, is currently estimated for the completion of the retrofit to the Laval IHC.

With regard to parts (b) and (c), the British Columbia IHC is being retrofitted to create capacity for two beds for detainees assessed to be higher risk by the end of fiscal year 2023-24, at a projected cost of $250,000, paid for within existing budgets.

The Canada Border Services Agency, CBSA, is considering additional options to expand its higher-risk detention capacity across the country. As planning for these options is still under way, no timeline or projected costs can be provided at this time.

[Public Services and Procurement, November 9th, 2023]

Mr. Speaker, once again we see the Conservatives trying to attack instead of focusing on the facts. The fact is that any allegations of misconduct will come with consequences.

We welcome the investigations that are ongoing. The CBSA has put in place measures addressing these procurement issues, and we expect all contracts to be fulfilled following the law.

[Public Services and Procurement, November 9th, 2023]

Mr. Speaker, as I have said time and time again, we expect all contracts to be issued following the law and procurement regulations. Any actions of misconduct will come with consequences.

We look forward to the report and the investigations that are ongoing, but once again, our expectations are that contracts are fulfilled and issued following the law.

[Questions on the Order Paper, November 6th, 2023]

Mr. Speaker, on August 3, 2021, the Correctional Service of Canada, CSC, met with representatives from Corrective Services New South Wales, CSNSW, to discuss its experiences with the cellphone jamming of contraband cellphones. Following these discussions, CSC began looking into how it may introduce cell jamming technology. CSC has also held consultations with appropriate government departments, including Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Justice Canada.

On February 1, 2023, CSC met with representatives of the Canadian Telecommunications Association, CTA, which represents Canadian telecommunication carriers that provide services and products across the wireless sector. The meeting with the CTA was to discuss mitigation measures involving contraband cellular communication devices.

On June 15, 2023, CSC co-hosted a discussion with the CTA and representatives from all major telecommunications carriers from across Canada. CSC is engaging with this group as part of its efforts to seek a regulatory exemption to deploy jamming technology.

[Questions on the Order Paper, November 6th, 2023]

Mr. Speaker, to better protect the safety and security of our institutions, the Correctional Service of Canada, CSC, continues to explore new, innovative means of preventing and seizing contraband.

The following are instances over the past five years where CSC has sought external advice relating to drone mitigation and signal jamming.

As to signal jamming, on August 3, 2021, CSC met with representatives from Corrective Services New South Wales, CSNSW, to discuss its experiences with the cellphone jamming of contraband cellphones. Following these discussions, CSC began looking into how it may introduce cell jamming technology. CSC has also held consultations with appropriate government departments, including Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Justice Canada.

On February 1, 2023, CSC met with representatives of the Canadian Telecommunications Association, CTA, which represents Canadian telecommunication carriers that provide services and products across the wireless sector. The meeting with the CTA was to discuss mitigation measures involving contraband cellular communication devices.

On June 15, 2023, CSC co-hosted a discussion with the CTA and representatives from all major telecommunications carriers from across Canada. CSC is engaging with this group as part of its efforts to seek a regulatory exemption to deploy jamming technology.

As to body scanners, in September 2020, under contract, CSC worked with the former manager who oversaw the implementation of body scanners in the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services.

From September 2020 through to June 2021, this individual worked closely with CSC staff and provided first-hand knowledge of infrastructure requirements, operating procedures and training considerations. The contract consisted of the development of a statement of technical requirements and statement of work for the procurement of two body scanners for a pilot trial of body scanner technology at two CSC institutions. Following a successful bidding process, the two devices were procured and deployed at the two institutions. CSC is now working to implement body scanners at other sites across the country.

On May 17, 2023, representatives of CSC attended the St. Lawrence Valley Correctional and Treatment Centre, a part of the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, in Brockville, Ontario, to view a demonstration of its body scanner in operation. This demonstration had been organized by CSC through reaching out to the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services.

As to uncrewed aerial systems, or drones, on February 7, 2020, CSC sought the assistance of the vice-president of policy and legal affairs at DJI concerning the addition of geofencing to all facilities under CSC responsibility. This was the result of having procured six DJI AeroScope devices, which are radio frequency detection devices to counter drone incursions into CSC airspace.

On October 7, 2021, CSC held a meeting with representatives of the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, SPPS, to discuss issues related to drone incursions into prison airspace.

On June 6, 2023, a request for information was posted on CanadaBuys for the Correctional Service of Canada to receive industry feedback regarding counter uncrewed aerial system technology. Specifically, feedback was solicited about technological options and capabilities that would enhance CSC’s ability to counter the risks posed by drones, as well as contractual terms. CSC is currently in the process of reviewing all feedback received.

Through its networks and ongoing partnerships with various international and domestic correctional authorities, CSC has had discussions with other jurisdictions on various matters of shared interest, including their experiences with the use of drones to introduce contraband into prisons and penitentiaries. Examples of correctional authorities that CSC has discussed this subject with include provincial public safety partners such as Quebec’s Minister of Public Safety, and international correctional authorities such as the Government of Australia and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons.

As to cellular devices detection, in an effort to address operational risks related to the unauthorized introduction and use of cellular devices by inmates in federal custody, and to help disrupt criminal activity targeting federal institutions, CSC initiated discussions with the Connecticut state police in the summer of 2022 to learn more about their deployment of detector dog teams specializing in the detection of electronic storage devices.

CSC sent two experienced dog handlers to participate in the 234th Connecticut state police canine team training cohort, which occurred in the winter of 2023. This international consultation and partnership initiative helped CSC obtain specific information about canine training techniques related to the detection of electronic storage devices. CSC is one of the first organizations in Canada to acquire this canine expertise, and the two new detector dog teams have successfully seized several electronic devices.

As to infrastructure and design, on February 9, 2023, CSC sought to receive information from other correctional jurisdictions within Canada about the strategies they use to mitigate the introduction of contraband via drone. As CSC facilities are larger than those of provincial and territorial counterparts, some of the methods used are not operationally feasible for CSC. However, CSC continues to consult with our partners to determine the best approaches for keeping our institutions safe.

[Questions on the Order Paper, November 6th, 2023]

Mr. Speaker, with regard to part (a), the government is developing operational guidance required for applicants that have been subject to consultation with both government departments and external stakeholders. This public-facing information will address all aspects of the regime, including in support of the authorization regime.

With regard to part (a)(i), a broad range of government departments and agencies have supported the drafting of this guidance. They include the criminal law policy section, the centre for information and privacy law, and legal services of the Department of Justice; federal policing national security through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; the financial crimes and security division of the Department of Finance Canada; the charities directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency; the public international law bureau, international crime and terrorism policy division and Afghanistan division of Global Affairs Canada; the Canadian Security Intelligence Service; and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.

With regard to part (a)(ii), civil society organizations raised concerns regarding the collection of information as part of the application process required to facilitate the statutory security review requirement. The authorization regime will present a balance between clarifying permissible action and mitigating the risk of terrorist financing. Accordingly, this requires that certain information be collected from the directing officials of applicant organizations to enable the investigative agencies’ exercise of due diligence when reviewing applications.

Significant consideration has been given to managing and protecting personal information and limiting access to it for the purposes of the regime. Collection, use and disclosure authorities or limits are embedded throughout the legislative scheme for the regime. For example, the legislation contains safeguards with respect to limiting the use of this information for the administration and enforcement of the authorization regime under section 83 of the Criminal Code. The application will seek to collect sufficient information required to efficiently advise the Minister of Public Safety in their decision to grant an authorization, taking into account the risks and benefits of the activity.

With regard to privacy and transparency, the government is developing a multi-institutional privacy impact assessment, PIA, to identify privacy risks or gaps, ensure compliance with privacy laws and policies, minimize privacy intrusions and develop a mitigation plan to address identified risks. The PIA will be submitted to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner and a summary of the PIA will be made public.

Organizations also raised concerns about the upcoming requirement to table an annual report to Parliament on the regime. Once the authorization regime is operational, the extent of information that will be available and the level of involvement from stakeholders will be determined.

With regard to part (a)(iii), the deputy minister responsible for international humanitarian assistance or international development policy was not included in the consultations.

With regard to part (b), the authorization regime was designed to enable organizations to conduct needed activities in geographic areas that are controlled by a terrorist group. Organizations may conduct said activities with government funding or private donor funds. Once the regime is operational, the government will track the value of proposed projects and the associated source or sources of funds.

With regard to part (c), the annual report to Parliament on the regime is intended to provide statistics such as how many applications have been received, granted and refused, among other things. It is important to note that Bill C-41 received royal assent on June 20, 2023, and since that date, a humanitarian exception pursuant to subsection 83.03(4) of the Criminal Code has been in effect. This meets the immediate need for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan and avoids the necessary process that will be associated with the authorization regime.

With regard to part (d), to remove the burden on potential applicant organizations of having to determine themselves which geographic areas are controlled by a terrorist group, the legislation includes a provision that allows an eligible person or organization to seek such information from the Minister of Public Safety. Subsection 83.032(2.1) of the Criminal Code provides, “The Public Safety Minister must, at the request of an eligible person or an organization, provide to that person or organization information in writing about whether an authorization is required to carry out an activity or a class of activities in a given geographic area.”

The threat landscape is continuously shifting, and a complicating factor is that territorial control is often disputed and can change frequently between the control of internationally recognized governments, terrorist organizations and/or their auxiliaries. As such, the government will not be maintaining a list of geographic areas that are controlled by a terrorist group, and instead will respond to inquiries on a case-by-case basis.

[Royal Canadian Mounted Police, November 1st, 2023]

Madam Speaker, I trust the words of the RCMP commissioner. He has determined independently and said that due process has been followed, and he is satisfied with the result. There is no investigation. There are no criminal charges. There is no obstruction.

However, the obstruction we should talk about here today relates to the fact that the member for Cumberland—Colchester received over $7,000 for a trip to the U.K. For the member for Northumberland—Peterborough South it was $8,300. For the member for Battlefords—Lloydminster it was $7,900. For the member for Lakeland it was $7,700. For the member for New Brunswick Southwest it was $13,548. It was paid for by lobbyists.

Why will the Conservatives not let us talk about this at committee?

[Royal Canadian Mounted Police, November 1st, 2023]

Madam Speaker, I am happy to rise to answer this question once again. It is interesting to me that the Conservatives are so desperate to cover up and filibuster their spending scandal that they are trying to reinvent the past.

With respect to calls for a criminal investigation by the RCMP, I note the RCMP has made very clear in this matter that there is no criminal investigation, there are no criminal charges and there are no reports of obstruction because the matter is closed. The RCMP made that independent decision. The commissioner has even recently been equally clear that due process has been followed, and he is satisfied with the result.

It begs the question: Why would the Conservatives bring up an issue that has been resolved, with the RCMP commissioner saying himself that the matter is closed and there is no investigation? I think it is because at committee, the members opposite are refusing to tell Canadians that the Conservative members could have moved a motion 26 times to bring the RCMP commissioner to committee.

Instead, they waited to filibuster when the committee was interested in looking at the spending scandal of five Conservative members who went on a trip to the U.K., where they dined on porterhouse steaks, chateaubriand, Scottish smoked salmon and 1,800 dollars' worth of champagne in one sitting. At the Savoy restaurant, they spent $1,000 on a three-course lunch and $1,200 at an oyster bar for dinner. They had 10 bottles of wine in one of these sittings, with three of the bottles at $600 a piece.

What I find really interesting for Canadians to see is that the Conservatives are desperate to cover up the fact that they had lobbyists spending thousands of dollars to fly them to the U.K. to dine on chateaubriand and sip champagne. They do not want Canadians to look at this. They do not want the committee to ask questions about why lobbyists took them to the U.K. to spend tens of thousands of dollars on them and their champagne tastes.

What we have here is Conservatives who do not accept the independent advice of the RCMP, which has determined with regard to the SNC matter that the matter is closed and there are no criminal charges, no investigations and no obstruction. What we see is the true root cause of the Conservatives' filibuster. It is because they want to cover up their champagne-sipping tastes.