John Cummins

[Firearms Act, June 13th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the bill before us today concerns gun control. When the debate is finished, members on both sides of the House will be asked to say yea or nay. Should I vote in favour of the bill as some polls have suggested, or if on examining the content of the bill I find that on balance it has serious shortcomings not addressed by the pollsters' questions, do I then cast my vote against the bill? If I do vote against the bill, am I then voting against the wishes of my constituents?

I do not need to tell the House one of the most fundamental principles of my party is that Reform members of Parliament vote according to the wishes of their constituents regardless of their personal convictions.

The question of how a member should vote is worth examining in the context of the bill. It is a question that is fundamental to the public's perception of our role as members of Parliament. It is a question whose time has come because with today's technology, members of this place and the public at large could vote on any matter before the House without having to leave home.

What do Canadians expect of their elected officials? Do they simply want us to look at the polls or look at the bill? Do they want us to vote according to the polls or according to the bill? Certainly many polls would suggest Canadians support gun registration. However this bill is about more than gun registration. It raises important questions about fundamental legal rights, about fairness and even handedness in sentencing, important questions about the spending of limited government resources and basic questions about whether the bill meets its stated objectives of making our streets and homes safer.

Asking Canadians if they support gun registration and asking them if they support Bill C-68 are two distinct questions. No poll has adequately addressed the difference between the two. That is why Canadians have sent us to this place: to examine bills and make the distinctions the pollsters cannot or will not, to challenge the self-serving press releases of the government and to advance the real concerns of our constituents.

Canadians expect us to vote on the merits of the bill. I want to emphasize I do not have any reservations about gun registration as a policy. However I cannot support the bill because I believe it is fundamentally flawed. It does not advance the cause of justice or the safety of the citizens one iota.

I cannot support the bill because it diverts scarce public resources and energies to policies which will not truly enhance personal and community safety. Members cannot transfer support for gun registration to Bill C-68.

There is another side of the issue I would also like to address. Why has the government not devoted its energies and resources to measures that will truly lead to safer communities? Consider the tragic case of Christopher Stevenson. Members may recall Christopher was an 11-year old Ontario boy who was raped and murdered by a psychopathic pedophile and a nine-time child rapist, Joseph Fredericks.

Recently Dr. Jim Cairns who headed the inquest into Christopher's death warned that our children remain targets of dangerous sexual predators because governments are not moving in a meaningful way to protect them. The evidence presented at the inquest was that these offenders cannot be treated and the only way to protect society is through indefinite detention. Yet the principal recommendation of the Stevenson inquiry that repeat child sex offenders be jailed indefinitely has not been implemented.

Why has the government not enacted sexual predator legislation which puts the rights of the victim and the protection of society above all else? Why has the government diverted energies and resources of the Department of Justice and the House from addressing real solutions to the problem of violence in our homes and neighbourhoods?

These are the real questions. These are the questions members opposite must answer. These are the questions to which Canadians want answers.

[Fisheries, May 17th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the minister is quite correct. Mr. Fraser recommended the early signing of the native fishing agreements so that workable enforcement and management regimes would be established prior to the opening of the first fishery.

However, by allowing the native commercial fishery to start within days of signing the agreements the advantage of the early signing is lost.

Why are we proceeding at this time? Why is the minister giving up the advantage of the early signing? Why is he ignoring his commitment to implement Mr. Fraser's recommendation?

[Fisheries, May 17th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.

A key recommendation of the Fraser report was that the federal government not expand the native only commercial fishery. In his rush to conclude the AFS agreements by Monday, the minister expanded this native only commercial fishery to include early chinook salmon on the Fraser River.

Can the minister explain why he broke his commitment to follow John Fraser's recommendation not to expand the AFS commercial fishery?

[Budget Implementation Act, 1995, April 6th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, this morning, in addressing the issue of the budget, I would like to address it with specific reference to fish. I know that hon. members will be relieved to hear that the issue of fish in the budget will be addressed this morning.

Spending on fish will decline appreciably over the next three years. In fact, it will decline by $211 million in the next budget.

Our party believes that government spending is out of control and that serious cuts should be made. That being said, our party recognizes that there are certain responsibilities the government has, including a constitutional responsibility to manage Canada's fisheries resource in a responsible and reasonable manner.

We should not simply go into the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and willy-nilly cut the budget. We have to do it with great care and caution to ensure that this valuable resource, a resource that could in fact be the engine of the economy on both coasts of our country, is protected.

To begin with, I would like to look at a couple of points in the budget and discuss the impact they will have on the fisheries.

The budget indicates that the government will negotiate with the provinces to transfer authorities for freshwater habitat management and other related inland responsibilities. In other words, the government's objective is to transfer its constitutional responsibility for the inland fisheries resource to the provinces. At the outset, that may seem like a reasonable objective. The fact of the matter is, it denies a very critical problem in the country, that is, the difficulty that is faced by many resource-based communities in our country, communities where the resource extraction may be seasonal, where populations are growing, and where transportation routes are very difficult. That is a problem that we must address as a nation. It is a problem that exists not only in the more remote northern regions of the prairie provinces, but it is also a problem that is becoming more and more evident in the province of Newfoundland, for example.

Last spring, in the standing committee hearings on problems in Newfoundland, the same types of social problems that we have heard about for years, which are occurring and have occurred in the northern communities, in prairie provinces and in the territories, are appearing now in Newfoundland because of the loss of a very valuable fisheries resource.

The federal government, in trying to sidestep its responsibilities in this area, will help no one.

Another issue in the budget states: "to integrate the operations and fleet of the Canadian Coast Guard with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans in order to increase efficiency". We are all for increasing efficiency. The issue that must be determined is if we downsize both fleets and use one smaller fleet to cover both objectives, what will be the priority of that fleet? If the priority is maintaining navigation aids when there is an ongoing fishery, what happens to the enforcement in the fisheries resource? By the same token, if the coast guard vessels are going to be diverted to the fishery, what happens to the aids to navigation?

We have to look at combining these two operations, but we must make sure that our priorities and responsibilities are maintained. Simply cutting back on the number of vessels and personnel available is not going to do the job.

This government fell down badly on this point in this past salmon season. In the past the coast guard was given the authority on the west coast to enforce fishery law. This did not happen in the 1994 season.

One instance was reported to me where a coast guard vessel was returning from an operational patrol of Vancouver Island. It was called to the Tsawwassen ferry terminal by the B.C. Ferry Corporation because of illegal fishing activity by Americans in Canadian waters. When the coast guard vessel arrived it did not have the authority to arrest those vessels. All it could do was advise them to leave Canadian waters. They tried to contact the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, but no one was available. At that hour of the day the offices were closed and the only contact they had was with a fisheries officer far up river who said: "I'm monitoring a fishery up here, there is nothing I can do".

We must make sure that our priorities are clearly established if we are going to follow the route the government proposes.

There is a proposal to rationalize commercial fishing harbours, including implementing higher fees for use. I have nothing against paying our own way. My party strongly supports that principle. The last thing we want to do is impose fees on people when they are on their knees. That is the case on both coasts. It is an inappropriate time to increase taxes on the fishing industry when it is hardly able to make a living.

Much of the responsibility for that falls not only on this government, of course, but on previous governments.

The government also seeks to enter into partnerships with the fishing industry and others in the management of capacity, licensing and compliance, and it says it looks to industry to pay more for access privileges, contribute toward the cost of managing the fishery and pay higher fees for services. Again, this comes at a time when mismanagement by the federal government has seriously weakened the ability of the fishing industry to pay, not only on the east coast but also on the west coast.

The collapse of the fishery in 1994 was the direct responsibility and directly attributable to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. It was a devastation, the effect of which will take probably 12 years from which to recover on the west coast for that cycle of fish. Yet we are expecting fishermen to pay higher licensing fees when it will be very difficult for them to maintain payments on their boats, let alone absorb higher licensing fees.

The same can be said, of course, for the problems on the east coast.

The cut of $211 million from the budget of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans is something that must be done very carefully, as I suggested earlier.

The Department of Fisheries and Oceans has experienced serious budget cuts over the last two or three years. The effects of those cuts, particularly on the west coast, have been dramatic.

I want to quote the concerns expressed by fisheries officers to the minister on November 2, 1994. The fisheries officers were pointing out the difficulties they have experienced because of budget cuts. They suggested that budget allocations did not provide for the successful delivery of programs and untrained staff members were not able to carry out enforcement controls. The monitoring of the catch was affected and so on.

Three months before the opening of the 1994 fishery season, senior fisheries officials on the west coast were warning of a disaster if the level of enforcement was further downgraded. I will quote from a report by R.K. Carson, area manager, Fraser River division. He says:

The impact of a further-cut will have significant ramifications on the success of the implementation of the AFS agreements along the Fraser River. The reduced level of fishery officers and fishery guardians-will result in non-compliance with terms and conditions of agreements, licences, regulations and loss of control of this fishery. The resource will suffer and we could have another repeat of the `missing sockeye' problems that occurred in the 1992 season.

That is exactly what happened.

In a report by D. Aurel, chief, conservation and protection, New Westminster, it was noted as well that budget cuts would reduce the free trade officer's allotment in the fisheries. He points out that:

-a 1993 investigation into the illegal export of two million pounds of chum salmon has resulted in 15 charges pending against one fish processing company. These types of serious FTA violations cannot be investigated by one officer alone.

The list goes on. However, when we cut in a department like fisheries we must do it with care.

[Questions Passed As Orders For Returns, April 6th, 1995]

With respect to the Early Stuart and Early Summer sockeye migrations and the Steveston Field Unit of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and each of the other such Field Units on the Fraser River system and the area covered by each such unit, for the years 1993 and 1994, ( a ) what were the staffing levels at each such unit and what were the staffing levels during weekends and statutory holidays during these migrations, ( b ) did staffing levels allow staff to be on the fishing grounds to conduct complete pre-fishing opening and post fishery clean-up patrols, ( c ) did staffing levels allow for pro-active patrols on a regular basis and full coverage of the native fishery during the open times, ( d ) what level of fishing occurred prior to the opening and the closing of the fishery, ( e ) what was the nature of the monitoring of the mandatory landing sites, were the mandatory landing sites monitored at all times during fishery openings on a regular basis, were there occasions when fishermen desired to land fish at a site but there were no monitored landing sites available, ( f ) did the monitors at the landing sites count the fish as stipulated in the Aboriginal Fisheries Agreements, ( g ) what was the level of catch monitoring and enforcement for Ceremonial Licences, ( h ) what was the level of night fishing and the level and consistency of the monitoring of such fishing and ( i ) what was the number of persons charged with infractions of fisheries regulations?

Return tabled.

Question No. 91-

[Questions On The Order Paper, April 3rd, 1995]

With regard to the mandatory use of mefloquine by Canadian forces personnel, ( a ) what clinical or field studies did the Department of National Defence undertake or fund into the possible adverse effects including the impairment of judgment of the mandatory use of mefloquine by Canadian forces while in Somalia, both while the personnel were in Somalia and on their return to Canada, ( b ) what clinical or field studies did the Department of National Defence undertake or fund into the possible adverse effects including the impairment of judgment of the mandatory use of mefloquine by Canadian forces while in Rwanda, both while the personnel were in Rwanda and on their return to Canada, ( c ) what amount of alcohol was available on a daily basis to Canadian forces personnel in Somalia and later in Rwanda who had received the mandatory dosage of mefloquine, what adjustments or precautions were made to the dosages by those administering the drug and what advice was given to persons required to take mefloquine who might be expected to use alcohol during their tour of duty, ( d ) what screening and other precautions were taken by those administering mefloquine, and what advice was given to Canadian forces personnel in regard to self-administered recreational body building, locally grown stimulants and other such drugs that it could reasonably be expected that personnel might be taking concurrent to their usage of mefloquine, ( e ) what ranks and occupations in the Canadian forces were not subject to the mandatory use of mefloquine in either Somalia or Rwanda and why were they not subject to the mandatory requirement to take mefloquine and ( f ) why is the effective dosage of mefloquine taken by Canadian forces stronger than the equivalent dosage given U.S. military personnel and what are the possible adverse effects of such stronger dosages?

[Petitions, March 29th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I have one petition to present today and it says in part that the Minister of Transport has directed the Canadian coast guard to proceed with detailed plans for a program of unmanning all west coast light stations. The savings to the coast guard will be insignificant and the impact on the users of these services will be considerable due to the loss of local weather services, assistance in search and rescue and the manned presence on this remote rugged coastline.

Therefore, the petitioners humbly pray and call on Parliament to revoke this directive immediately and request a complete and thorough public inquiry in the province of B.C. into the need for the manned light stations on the west coast.

[Firearms Act, March 27th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, in Dartmouth last September NAFO established a total allowable catch of 27,000 tonnes of turbot for 1995. In announcing the NAFO agreement, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans assured Parliament that "Canada will have for the first time the right to board and inspect the vessels catching turbot and to ensure that the proper rules are being followed to conserve this important stock," something he has failed to do.

On February 1 NAFO met to allocate the 27,000 tonne catch. The practice for such decisions is to seek consensus because members have the right to object to decisions and withdraw. Against the advice of members who would later support Canada, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans forced a vote on a Canadian proposal for quota allocation. The resulting agreement gave Canada 60 per cent of the catch, up from about 10 per cent. The European Union got 12.5 per cent, down from about 75 per cent of the catch for the previous three years.

The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has made every effort to make his dispute over the allocation with the EU into an exercise in eco-aggression. As the Financial Times of London noted:

The fact that Canada had tried to garner such a large proportion of the quota-some 70 per cent against 12 per cent for the Europeans-somewhat tarnishes the country's claim that it had to intervene to save the fish from impending extinction.

Tony Pitcher, director of the Fisheries Centre at UBC said: "Canada's newly acquired 60 per cent share of turbot was a radical shift in allocation that came too quickly for some fishing nations to accept willingly".

In our desperate need to find a hero out of all this bumbling and blustering, we ignored the fact that the Estai had been boarded for inspection by Canadians 11 times since January 1994. On each of those occasions Canadian officials could have and should have inspected the holds and found evidence of baby fish being caught. They could have and should have waited until the net was hauled in and discovered the liner.

The only advantage to the bumbling and bluster has gone to the Spanish who can now fish without fear of inspection. With the arrest of the Estai , the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans lost the ability to board and inspect foreign trawlers fishing in the NAFO regulatory area beyond our 200-mile limit.

The size of the fish on the Estai should not have been a surprise. They were consistent with the catch reported by Spanish and Portuguese trawlers in 1993 and reported in NAFO scientific papers in 1994. Those papers report a shockingly steady decline in biomass from about 225,000 tons in 1984 to 37,000 tons in 1992 and that few fish larger than 46 centimetres were sampled in the 1993 catches. Considering that sexually mature turbot will be at least 60 centimetres long, it is questionable whether we should have agreed to fish turbot at all this year, let alone try to out-manoeuvre the EU for a larger allocation.

On the Flemish Cap we now have the worst of both worlds, neither NAFO inspection by Canada nor enforcement of the new regulations. On March 3, 1995 when the regulations were enacted we were told they were essential to deter overfishing by Spanish and Portuguese fishing vessels on both the nose and tail of the Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap.

The 1994 NAFO Scientific Council report cautioned that since the turbot is a single stock, it is necessary to regulate both the nose and tail and the Flemish Cap. To fail to do so, in the words of the report, could lead to the collapse of the fishery.

The March 3 regulation prohibited Spanish fishing on both the nose and tail and on the Flemish Cap. Since the regulation became law, the government has backed off, leaving the Flemish Cap exposed to unregulated fishing.

The test of the government's action is whether it advances the protection of turbot stocks in the NAFO regulatory area on both the nose and tail of the Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap. The question is, why did Canadian officials fail to carry out adequate inspections of the Estai and other Spanish fishing vessels?

[Fisheries, March 24th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, this minister's record of protecting Canadian resources is not great.

NAFO regulations give inspectors the right to wait until the net is hauled in and then inspect all areas of a ship. Why, while the minister has held office, did we inspect the Estai at least 11 times and only issue one citation?

[Fisheries, March 24th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.

Notwithstanding any objection to the quotas, NAFO regulations give Canada the authority to carry out inspections on any ship in the NAFO regulatory zone. Why has Canada stopped doing these inspections while fishing is going on?