John Duncan

[Supply, December 7th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, other than the partisan ending to the member's speech virtually everything said is something we subscribe to. As long as the treaties are done right in terms of content, what the member is saying is absolutely correct. We do need to define aboriginal rights and we do need to solve the problems of uncertainty.

There was an earlier reference to the Charlottetown accord. Of any identifiable ethnic or racial group in Canada, once the voting was over on the Charlottetown referendum the natives on reserves more than any other group resoundingly defeated the Charlottetown accord in the referendum. We need to remember that because I do not believe that is in the public consciousness. There are some important reasons why that happened which I am certainly sensitive to. I am not sure everyone in the House is sensitive to those reasons.

There is a 31-member treaty negotiation advisory committee. One of its members was referred to in the previous member's speech, the member from the council of forest industries. Many of the members of that treaty negotiation advisory committee and also some of the members of the regional advisory committees who were referred to by several speakers are the biggest critics of the status quo process. It is important to recognize those items.

[Supply, December 7th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I have been looking at my watch and I thought we had at least three minutes left in the 10-minute question and comment period for the hon. member for Peterborough.

[Supply, December 7th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I listened to the hon. member's speech with interest, as we both sit on the aboriginal affairs standing committee.

The member and other members in the House are misreading our motion. We are saying there should be no final agreement in the next few months because the next few months is the length of time that we expect the provincial government that is currently in place to be there. That is all we are asking for. We are not asking for everything to be thrown out. We are not building a brick wall.

The member talked about 500-year-old grievances. To me that is very indicative of how little people not from the western part of Canada understand about British Columbia and other parts of western Canada. Five hundred years ago was long before contact with Europeans and certainly long before any grievance.

As for the statements that were made about negotiating positions, I concur with the member. That is what negotiating is all about. All of us in our life enter into all kinds of negotiations.

The B.C. treaty process has been in effect since 1993. It has been given a chance to work. The member talked about giving it a chance to work. It has been found lacking. We are asking for some changes. The public is asking for some changes. This will be complementary to the process.

I do realize the Nisga'a have been negotiating for 20 years with the federal government. That is one added rationale why the next two or three months should not have all the importance attributed to them. I fail to understand that. To me it reinforces the point we are trying to make that we should not do a last minute rush on an agreement that will set a precedent for the 47 other negotiations going on in British Columbia.

There was a reference in the member's speech to the royal proclamation. Once again British Columbia is different. The jurisprudence is that the royal proclamation has no implications or ramifications for British Columbia because of the time of the royal proclamation and the age of British Columbia, when it came into Confederation and so on. It has no ramifications in British Columbia.

The member talked about British Columbia as a population that consists of natives and white people. That is so far from reality. British Columbia is probably the most multicultural, pluralistic society in North America. I would not be surprised if it was the most multicultural and pluralistic of almost anywhere other than some parts of South America.

There is every hue of colour and every culture on earth represented in British Columbia. That is significant because we are very used to respecting, working with and living with other cultures, which is pluralistic. We are trying to create a pluralistic society, not one divided.

There was more than a suggestion in the member's speech that we are trying to prevent the parties from coming together. What nonsense. There was a total misrepresentation of the Calder decision. I suggest the member read the Calder decision, not somebody's summary that is a misrepresentation of what that decision actually was and what it said.

As someone who spent 20 years in the resource industry, the forest industry in British Columbia, some of the statements made about the condition of the forests and the logging in the province I find quite distressing. I do not believe the depth of knowledge is-

[Supply, December 7th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member talked about the motion somehow being cynical.

Under normal circumstances a government in the last several months of its mandate does not enter into major binding commitments. If it does so, it is at the peril of the arrangements being cancelled. There is a clear precedent for that in the province of British Columbia and there is a clear precedent for that federally. This administration should know that better than anyone. This administration cancelled the EH-101 project. This administration tried to cancel the Pearson deal.

The province of British Columbia should voluntarily back off. However it has indicated that it wants a deal by January. The likelihood is that there will be an election between March and June. This is totally inappropriate for a precedent setting agreement. There are 47 other agreements being negotiated and this would become the precedent. As I mentioned earlier, $10 billion is the early price tag put on this business.

There was discussion about the Nisga'a framework agreement entered into by Mr. Weisgerber in 1991. I talked about it earlier in my speech. I quoted section 7.1.1 which is often used to say there was no openness in the agreement and that Mr. Weisgerber had agreed to it. I do not have to defend Mr. Weisgerber. However I can read what the agreement says. To me it does not say what it has been interpreted to say. I will read it again:

The parties will together develop and implement a process of public information and consultation and will attend meetings with such selected individuals, organizations or groups as they may agree will assist in the process of public consensus building, and the parties may separately carry out such additional consultation and communication initiatives as they see fit, including initiatives to obtain a broad range of input and consensus.

Those are hardly cloaked in mystery, secret or non-transparent negotiations.

There is a further interpretation by the member that somehow our motion is suggesting there should not be any negotiations. That is not what we are saying at all. We are saying there should not be no conclusive negotiations, no conclusive agreement during this latter part of this current mandate at the provincial level.

It is a very simple, limited request. The member is misinterpreting it.

[Supply, December 7th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, there is one further area I would like to explore with the member and I will do it very quickly.

There is a lot of concern and a lack of support for the way the negotiations are occurring. There is a lack of confidence in many people because the negotiations are run provincially by an aboriginal affairs department and federally by the department of Indian affairs. People consider it a total conflict of interest which is lopsided.

Could the member comment on that, please.

[Supply, December 7th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member talked about a substantial absence of treaties in British Columbia. That is correct. The assumption is often made that because there is a substantial absence of treaties and largely a reserve system in place, there is somehow an overriding legal obligation on the part of governments to enter into treaties.

A legal counsel for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development confirmed to me very recently that the current federal government position is that there is no legal obligation or imperative on the part of the federal government to enter into treaties in British Columbia. That is certainly consistent with what I had thought. It is also consistent with the position of the provincial government.

This means to me that government should only be entering into this process if there is something in it for all parties. This is the quid pro quo or trade-off I mentioned in my speech. My first question for the member would be whether that indeed is his interpretation as well.

There was some discussion about an independent commission. I assume the member is talking about the B.C. Treaty Commission. There was some debate about the B.C. Treaty Commission recently in the House when we debated Bill C-107, which is the enabling federal legislation, albeit quite tardy.

The terms of reference of the B.C. Treaty Commission actually leaves it rather toothless. In most areas of endeavour the commission can suggest but it is not very much of a decision maker. The commission is called the keeper of the process. Some things as basic as readiness guidelines for some of the participants in the negotiations were not foreseen at the time the enabling legislation was put together. For example, regional advisory committees do not have readiness guidelines that fall within the terms of reference of the B.C. Treaty Commission. This has been pointed out by many parties as a shortcoming. Therefore, it has no mandate.

What has happened in some circumstances in B.C. is that negotiations have pushed ahead by either the federal and/or provincial negotiators without the regional advisory committees actually being ready. This is quite a handicap and of course creates consternation at the local level. My second question would relate to that area.

The third and final area I would ask the member about would be the role of municipalities which he mentioned. Municipalities are recognized nowhere in the B.C. Treaty Commission terms of reference. There is a separate provincial memorandum of understanding. They are kind of a sidebar arrangement with the province. The municipalities through the Union of B.C. Municipalities are saying that their actual costs already, early in the process, are at least double that which the provincial government is compensating them.

I would say the door is not open. The door is ajar. It is a very unsatisfactory situation. There must be a much better way to approach this subject. Does the member have some suggestions in that regard?

[Supply, December 7th, 1995]

Madam Speaker, the hon. member talks about the finality of these agreements. In many cases there is a major disagreement in the aboriginal political leadership concerning this concept. One of the concerns that I have about the finality of these agreements is that there is a word that is no longer used within hearing of the minister of Indian affairs. That word is extinguishment.

One of the first agreements that came before the 35th Parliament, in terms of aboriginal agreements, was the Sahtu agreement in the western Arctic. There is certainly extinguishment within that agreement. When the major native spokesman for the Sahtu was at the committee hearings, he was asked about that clause. He said that was a natural quid pro quo or a trade-off for the other things that the Sahtu were receiving in exchange for an extinguishment of the aboriginal interest in lands outside of the settlement area.

That is fine and dandy but the expectation has now been delivered by the current government is that no, that is not the case any more and we are quite prepared to reopen all of these old negotiations. The government is raising expectations at a time when it has not even fulfilled bottom line expectations. It keeps raising the ceiling on something that does not have a foundation at this point.

This is most inappropriate and it is certainly not something on which the public has been well informed, nor is it something that I believe the public wants to accept. It is like a never-ending set of negotiations and everything once negotiated can be reopened at any time. That is not appropriate.

The second question dealt with equality. This is probably demonstrated most clearly in the fact that the taxation exemption is becoming more and more of a problem in more and more locations across Canada. I are not talking about just British Columbia in this case.

While other Canadians are taxed to the max there is a portion of the native population that is insulated from most forms of taxation. These are the people living on reserves. Perhaps this cannot be changed overnight but we have to move in that direction.

Another major concern is that the governments be democratic and accountable with checks and balances that go far beyond the checks and balances of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The lives of many people living on reserves are being regulated by one department. That becomes very problematic. If we had multiple jurisdictions that would be fine.

We are finding that what resonates with the public is a municipal style of self-government as being an appropriate model. We have an example in the Sechelt Band, in my riding.

The final question posed deals with the cost and the negotiating mandate. The negotiating mandate provincially and federally, the way it sits right now, is a cabinet secret known only to the federal and/or provincial negotiators. Public ratification of that negotiating mandate is a major shift in thinking that has gone on and something that is being asked for more and more and something we promote.

[Supply, December 7th, 1995]

Madam Speaker, I am anticipated to be at the aboriginal affairs standing committee to finalize a report on co-management. Am I subject to a 10-minute question and answer period? If so, could we do that first?

[Supply, December 7th, 1995]

moved:

That the House urge the government to not enter into any binding trilateral aboriginal treaty or land claim agreements in B.C. in the last year of the current provincial government mandate in order to respect the views of British Columbians on this issue as expressed by both major provincial opposition parties.

Madam Speaker, the Reform Party had concerns about this matter before today. For example, on October 30 I asked the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development a question. On November 27 I asked a similar question of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. I have also pursued this same subject in committee.

The question I put to the minister on October 30 concerned the polls in British Columbia which now rate aboriginal issues as the number one issue. Among the provincial political parties, there certainly is a growing divergence of views on aboriginal issues. We now have an NDP administration which is in the waning days of its mandate.

The question I put to the minister was whether he would assure the House that he will not entertain completion of any comprehensive agreement, such as the Nisga'a claim, until there is a new provincial administration with a fresh mandate. The response from the minister included the fact that the Reform member was asking not to do anything until the non-Nisga'a government changed in British Columbia and he certainly was not prepared to do that.

In addition, there is a major divergence of opinion on costs which was a supplementary to that question. The provincial government says that the cost of settling claims in British Columbia will be about $10 billion and the federal government says it will be about $5 billion. This divergence of views is something of which we should take note. We are talking billions not millions.

On November 27 my question for the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans dealt with the apparent intended agreement on the Nass. I say apparent intended because everything is based on leaks. We do not have open negotiations. We do not have transparency. The only things we know are based on leaks. However, there apparently is an agreement to include some of the Nass fishery in the Nisga'a agreement. I wanted the minister's assurance that the Nass River commercial fishery would not be entrenched in a treaty which would then get further entrenched constitutionally, and be unchangeable, socially divisive and the very opposite of free enterprise. Once again, I received no substantive response from the minister.

This is no longer an emerging issue in British Columbia. This is an established issue. The transformation happened over the last three years. It is considered to be an issue which has gone off the track. Public concerns are driving a re-examination of all of the basic assumptions underlying the treaty or land claims process in British Columbia.

I can give a thumbnail summary of some of these concerns. This issue has tremendous long term implications and ramifications; socially, financially and in other ways. The issue has parallels with B.C. concerns about what many call the disunity bill that the House has been debating very recently and where we have seen closure adopted. There are many parallels here. It invokes, for example, special status, whereas the public is demanding the principle of equality.

The whole question of public ratification of the government's aboriginal initiative has not been sought. This has all been done within a cloistered environment. Neither the provincial nor federal governments has involved the public in establishing the goals and objectives of the treaty process in British Columbia.

At this time I should give a background to the negotiations going on in B.C. We have the Nisga'a negotiations which have been going on for many years. There is a framework agreement which was signed in March 1991. There are many who say that the openness associated with this agreement was really closed off in 1991. That is a very self-serving analysis of the agreement by some of the bureaucracy and by some government parties.

Clause 7.1.1 of the agreement states:

The parties will, together, develop and implement a process of public information and consultation and will attend meetings with such selected individuals, organizations or groups as they may agree will assist in the process of public consensus building.

It is a real stretch to suggest that any of that in terms of the Nisga'a negotiations has occurred. The Nisga'a agreement is the closest to completion in the province and is a major focus of today's opposition motion.

There are some major concerns which are front and centre with the Nisga'a negotiations. One is the Nass River fishery which I have already mentioned. This is a public resource. Last week there were five British Columbia aboriginal fishery test cases argued in the Supreme Court.

There is an outstanding class action suit from commercial fishermen involving the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. The outcome, if anything, would appear to rule against an aboriginal right to a commercial fishery.

This is not so much an issue of allocation of commercial licences. It is an issue of treaty entrenchment leading to constitutional entrenchment and protection of a commercial aboriginal fishery which would be in many people's minds and in my mind socially divisive and the antithesis of free enterprise.

Another major concern deals with costs. If we look at the costs involved in the Nisga'a agreement, once again we are dealing only with leaks. We never know where these leaks originate. They may be self-serving leaks, they may not be. This is one of the problems with the lack of transparency.

I put out a press release in November. I talked about some of the statements which have been made very recently on the Nisga'a offer and which were reported in the popular press. Back in March when I was doing a series of town hall meetings in British Columbia, I had taken the known offer of the day and extrapolated it to British Columbia using the Nisga'a example as a precedent. I said that the total compensation package would work out to $8.5 billion. At that time the Reform Party was accused of extrapolating figures from various sources in order to scare the British Columbia public.

In October the minister of aboriginal affairs within the province of B.C. said publicly that the cost of land claim settlements in British Columbia would be $10 billion. According to the leaks, the Nisga'a offer had grown between March and October. This is consistent with what I was saying back in March.

According to the latest leaks in the Nisga'a offer we are talking about a turnover of 2,200 square kilometres of land, a significant forest resource, $175 million cash and 30 per cent of the Nass River fishery. I might point out that other bands also have claims on part of the Nass River fishery.

When we talk about this total cost package of $10 billion as stated by the provincial minister, at the same time the director general from the federal ministry said that he was baffled by the number and said that the cost of the settlement was closer to $5 billion. Either he knows something we do not know or I know not what. Maybe he is only talking about the federal component. According to the way I calculate it, it is about a 50:50 split provincially and federally. That is a very significant difference and one that should concern the public and the government.

Against the backdrop of these Nisga'a precedent setting background negotiations, we also have the B.C. treaty process. We talked about that in the House not too long ago with Bill C-107 the enabling legislation from the federal end to set up the B.C. Treaty Commission.

The Nisga'a negotiations are not part of the B.C. treaty process in terms of the treaty commission. They predate it and are not subject to the same terms of reference. The B.C. Treaty Commission has only been in place since 1993.

An estimated 77 per cent of the British Columbia bands are currently involved in the process. There is a total of 196 bands in British Columbia. The other 23 per cent of British Columbia bands are not part of the B.C. treaty process and they have no other option. They either go with this process or they are left out. This is problematic for that other 23 per cent.

In July 1993 the federal and provincial governments announced the establishment of a treaty negotiation advisory committee. They have also set up regional advisory committees in each treaty negotiation area to represent public and local interests. There is much public and participant unhappiness about the consultation process and about the ratification process at this time.

If a band enters into the B.C. treaty process it receives 80 per cent funding repayable upon completion of negotiations. In effect this is a loan. The Nisga'a negotiations on the other hand are 100 per cent paid for by the federal government.

I have other concerns. The municipal level of government is not recognized in any of this. There is simply a sidebar arrangement through the provincial negotiators. Right now their intervenor funding or advisory funding or whatever we want to call it is capped at $250,000 a year. It comes from the province.

The municipalities have many concerns about this. Some of the municipalities are dealing with multiple claims. Their costs are far and away exceeding the compensation they are receiving. They are

caught up in this process, not through their own doing but they cannot afford not to be there. Their interests are certainly affected.

There are no readiness guidelines to the regional advisory committee boards. They are not in the terms of reference of the treaty commission. This has also proved to be very problematical.

Interim agreements have been negotiated at the provincial level. This has also compromised the B.C. Treaty Commission process. This was identified by the B.C. Treaty Commission in its 1993 annual report. That is as far as it can go. The commission can identify it but it cannot deal with it unless one or the other or both levels of government agree to do something about it.

Governments have lost their mandate in those parts of the province most familiar with and closest to the settlement process. There has been some movement toward openness and other things to which the federal Reform has contributed. We have done some things to open up the public process. In March we had an aboriginal town hall series in the province. We covered eight communities in 11 nights province wide. In a separate exercise we set out through a 10-month process new aboriginal policy initiatives. They were very well received in British Columbia and were considered to be very refreshing.

Much of what we were saying in March was common sense, bottom up thinking which had not been reflected before in B.C. political circles. Now much of what we have said is mainstream political dialogue in British Columbia. Issues being talked about are an end to the Indian taxation exemption and certainly a focus on not entrenching commercial activities in B.C. treaties.

We have done more as a federal opposition party to open up this process than the B.C. Treaty Commission and both levels of government combined. The treaty commission is hampered by its mandate and the governments are still locked into an agenda they foresaw three years ago.

The layers of bureaucracy surrounding this process are leading to inevitable massive gridlock. Unless the governments obtain a publicly ratified negotiating mandate, the public will never accept the terms and conditions which are being negotiated. This will foster further disharmony and misgivings.

We are not objecting to a fair, open and complete conclusion to the process, but we do have a problem with the status quo arrangement. People are begging for leadership to break the binds of the status quo and they are not seeing it forthcoming. We are trying to fill that void. The manner and the approach currently being pursued is intrinsically wrong. It is neither enlightened nor receptive. Therefore, people conclude they are being manipulated and that the process is entrenched and resistant to change, despite mounting opposition.

One might ask what the provincial opposition parties are saying. I can talk a little bit about a B.C. Liberal government. It is talking about instituting a series of public hearings and free votes in the legislature; initiating public consultation on a principal framework for treaty negotiations; and developing a set of guidelines that would have to be approved by the legislature with the approval of MLAs who would be free to vote without following party lines.

A second step would be to set up new negotiating teams that would include local non-Indian representation. The next stage would be to send any agreements to public hearings. The final stage would be to take this back to the legislature through another free vote of MLAs.

The B.C. Reform Party is saying many things about this whole process. It does say we must offer to negotiate treaties because it is the right thing to do. The goal of treaties should be to lift the yoke of the Indian Act off the backs of native people. Further, they must own their own reserve lands and govern their own affairs within the context of the Constitution and B.C. laws. Treaties negotiated should not aspire to the false promise of native sovereignty. The principle of equality is central to our support for treaty talks.

A Reform government would insist upon renegotiating the cost sharing agreement as a precondition for B.C.'s ongoing participation in land claims negotiations. It would reject constitutional entrenchment of the inherent right of self-government, would reject a third order of government enshrined under the Constitution, would reject formal recognition of aboriginal title, and would define the meaning and scope of aboriginal rights, title and self-government. That is what treaty negotiations are all about. It would seek a clear negotiating mandate from the people, not the politicians.

If treaties confer special rights, they must first pass muster with the majority. Any deal that purports to accord special status will not pass public scrutiny in their opinion. Treaties should be aimed at removing barriers based on race, not at entrenching new inequalities.

In conclusion, given the importance of the issue, the costs of the issue, the social implications and the permanence of this, there is absolutely no way an outgoing government should be binding the public. I urge in the strongest possible terms for government to respect this position.

[British Columbia Treaty Commission Act, November 28th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to speak on Bill C-107, an act respecting the establishment of the B.C. Treaty Commission.

I noticed at the beginning of the previous speaker's speech he talked quite a bit about the Nisga'a negotiations. I would like to point out that the Nisga'a negotiations are not part of the B.C. treaty process under the B.C. Treaty Commission as they predate it and are not subject to the same terms of reference.

There has been a high degree of increased public awareness of the ramifications of the B.C. treaty negotiations in the last two years in British Columbia. It has now risen to be the number one issue in the public mind in British Columbia.

The opposition political parties at the provincial level are adopting treaty policies very different from what has gone on up until now and very different from the federal government. There are concerns about the costs and the length of time the negotiations are going to be taking. There are concerns regarding the negotiating mandate of the two senior levels of government. There are also concerns regarding the consultation and ratification process for any negotiated treaties.

As we talked about the Nisga'a agreement earlier, this is a precedent setting agreement outside of the B.C. treaty process and at this point it will not necessarily be adopted by an incoming B.C. government. We are in the circumstance of having a government that is currently in the last year of its mandate and the other two major parties vying for government have made that statement.

Against this backdrop of a precedent setting negotiation which has largely been cloaked in secrecy and mystery, that is the Nisga'a negotiations, we do have this B.C. treaty process. The terms of reference for the Nisga'a negotiations certainly allow for a much greater degree of openness than has been demonstrated to date. In an overall context, this is not a good start.

Some of the history of the B.C. Treaty Commission is that in December 1991 British Columbia accepted all the recommendations of a task force. Those recommendations led to Canada and B.C. beginning formal negotiations on the roles and responsibilities of the two governments within treaty negotiations, including cost sharing. This was culminated in March 1992.

In September 1992, Canada, B.C. and the First Nations Summit leadership formally supported the establishment of a B.C. treaty commission and signed a B.C. treaty commission agreement. In April 1993 commissioners were appointed on an interim basis by provincial and federal orders in council and by First Nations Summit resolution.

In May 1993 the provincial legislation received royal assent which was pending federal legislation. The Governments of Canada and British Columbia then successfully concluded cost sharing negotiations in June 1993. This allowed for the treaty commission to open its doors in December 1993.

Virtually all of these actions, save the very last, occurred prior to the last federal election in October 1993.

Currently an estimated 77 per cent of the British Columbia bands are involved and signed up in this process. There are 196 bands in British Columbia. As I mentioned earlier, the Nishga negotiations are completely outside of the B.C. treaty process. All the remaining bands in British Columbia that are not a part of the B.C. treaty process have no option: they either go with the B.C. treaty process or there is no other negotiating option for them. Those are the terms of reference. This is problematic for those 23 per cent of B.C. bands that have concerns and do not want to enter into the process.

There is one major omission, which is not mandated by the act, by Bill C-107, which we are discussing today, and that is the consultation process. There has been a separate set of agreements. In July 1993 the federal and provincial governments announced the establishment of a 31-member treaty negotiation advisory committee to advise ministers in the treaty negotiations. That committee is not referred to in any way, shape, or form in Bill C-107; it has no recognition. In addition, regional advisory committees are being struck in each treaty negotiation area to represent local interests. There is much unhappiness about the consultation process and about the ratification process at this time.

I would like to point out that in the term of this 35th Parliament we have had previous legislation dealing with aboriginal issues. We have had the Yukon self-government and land claims agreements. We have had the Sahtu agreement in the western Arctic. We have had the Pictou Landing compensation agreement in Nova Scotia for environmental damage at the reserve level. We have had the Split Lake compensation agreement in Manitoba. And now we have this enabling legislation, which has been very late in following the provincial legislation and the agreement.

The reason I mentioned all of that is because each of these bills, every piece of aboriginal legislation that has come before the House in this 35th Parliament, predates the last federal election in terms of when the agreements were reached. There has not been one piece of legislation from this department in this Parliament.

In preparing to look at Bill C-107, one of the necessary steps is to talk to legislative counsel. Legislative counsel advises that no legislative changes are possible to Bill C-107 because neither the federal nor provincial governments can make unilateral changes, and the B.C. Treaty Commission agreement, the tripartite agreement between the federal, provincial, and First Nations Summit, which was signed in September 1992, and also the provincial enabling legislation override the ability to make changes. The only way a change could be made is if those agreements were also changed. This is really a reverse onus on this Parliament in many respects.

I have some concerns about this bill, many of which are quite basic. Who would enter into an agreement in which there is no satisfactory amending clause? Who would enter into an agreement in which there is no satisfactory cancellation clause? In both cases this bill comes up lacking. The agreement leads one to assume a lot.

If a band enters into the process, it receives funding that is 80 per cent repayable upon completion of negotiations. In effect, they are being given a loan to set off against the eventual settlement package. The agreement is silent in terms of what happens to these moneys should the band or the tribal council not complete negotiations. The act is also silent about those bands that do not enter into the process and may not want to enter into the process. There is no alternative open to them.

The First Nations Summit organization and their appointment of representatives is open to any band, whether they are participating or not. I find this a little strange. It is a very fluid thing. They are not elected. It is very difficult to pin down. And the compensation packages for the summit commissioners have no transparency whatsoever in terms of the arrangements for these appointments or the compensation for these appointments.

Clause 22 of the proposed act states that nothing in the act prevents the three parties from amending the agreement of September 1992. I mentioned this earlier. This is very problematic, because this very agreement has been shown to compromise Parliament's ability to amend the very act we are being asked to pass at third reading. Therefore this is an unacceptable reverse onus, in my view.

I have other concerns. The municipal level of government is not recognized in the act. They are simply a sidebar arrangement through the provincial negotiators. Also, funding of recognized interests beyond the bands is not addressed in the act. There is $15.3 million a year going into funding of the aboriginal negotiating parties. Right now, through the provincial government the municipalities are receiving $250,000 per year. They have many concerns about that.

From their meeting last month, the Union of B.C. Municipalities is certainly expressing great displeasure about what this process has done. They have a responsibility to take part to represent their interests. They have no choice but to get involved, because they are very much impacted. The ten regional groups that now represent municipal interests in the treaty talks are capped at a $250,000 funding level. According to the Union of B.C. Municipalities, the

municipalities are having to fund this thing out of local taxpayer funds to make up the difference.

The federal and provincial governments have spent more than $30 million on the negotiations since they began in 1993. Some of the municipalities in the lower mainland have competing aboriginal claims. Rather than having to deal with one set of claims, they have to deal with multiple claims over the same piece of ground. This is becoming very expensive for the municipalities. It is an unfair burden and one that should be addressed in this bill. The bill is silent on the municipal role.

There is no reference in the bill to readiness guidelines for the regional advisory committees. They are not in the terms of reference of the B.C. Treaty Commission. This has proven to be very problematic as well.

We have readiness guidelines for the other parties, but not for the advisory groups at the local level. Because the readiness guidelines are not there, there is a tendency for senior governments and the negotiating parties to set a few people in place at the local level and then carry on with negotiations. As the keeper of the process, the B.C. Treaty Commission should have terms of reference that also include readiness guidelines for the consultation groups. That is not addressed. It is not there. And because it is not there this is not happening.

It was identified in the 1993 and 1994 B.C. Treaty Commission annual reports that there was no federal enabling legislation for the B.C. Treaty Commission. As as result, the B.C. Treaty Commission had major concerns. I asked what the reason was for the lengthy delay in bringing forth the federal legislation. Apparently it is related to summit concerns over the wording of one clause in the bill. I have to ask, how can one party's concern over one clause hang up or protract this legislation for more than two years?

The province has negotiated interim agreements, which have compromised the B.C. Treaty Commission process. The B.C. Treaty Commission made that statement in its 1993 annual report. The bill does not empower the B.C. Treaty Commission to deal with that kind of concern.

In summary, Canada and British Columbia have budgeted $77.6 million over the period from 1994-95 to 1997-98 to the process. Given the weaknesses inherent in the bill, I will not be able to support the legislation.