House of Commons photoLost his last election, in 2015, with 28% of the vote.
Lighthouses June 15th, 1994
Mr. Speaker, I have a supplementary question.
The local population knows the value of these lighthouse keepers to public safety. Lighthouse keepers are designated as an essential service. In making this designation the federal government has explicitly recognized the crucial role lighthouse keepers play in marine safety.
Could the minister explain how the government on one hand declares lighthouse keepers an essential service and on the other hand announces an intention to eliminate them?
Lighthouses June 15th, 1994
Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Transport. The commissioner of the coast guard has stated the annual savings associated with destaffing lighthouse stations on the west coast is $7 million.
On June 2, in an appearance before the Senate transport committee hearings, officials stated the total costs of servicing B.C. light stations at $3.4 million for salaries, operating, maintenance and direct costs.
How can the minister achieve $7 million in savings by cutting a portion of a $3.4 million program that would need major capital spending to implement?
Split Lake Cree First Nation Flooded Land Act June 14th, 1994
Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to speak to Bill C-36, the Split Lake Cree First Nation Flooded Land Act.
This legislation comes as a result of a Manitoba hydro project initiated back in the 1940s. This project flooded 11,800 acres of land on five Indian band reserves. This economic development project flooded 10 per cent of the reserve lands with negative consequences for the bands at Split Lake, Cross Lake, Nelson House, Norway House and York Factory affecting their traditional activities.
Negotiations in the 1970s to deal with the effects of the Lake Winnipeg regulations and Churchill River diversion projects led to an economic development known as the northern flood agreement. In 1977 this agreement was signed by the five bands, Canada, Manitoba and Manitoba hydro. This agreement turned out to be unsatisfactory in the ensuing 10 years due to ambiguities in such areas as reserve land compensation and social aspects including employment and environmental issues.
These uncertainties led to another agreement among the Split Lake Cree, Canada, Manitoba and Manitoba Hydro in June 1992. This agreement calls for compensation in dollars and lands and other benefits. Specific agreements with the other four bands are in the course of negotiation.
The Split Lake agreement requires the governments of Canada and Manitoba to recommend legislation implementing the agreement. That is why we are here.
Bill C-36 provides that moneys payable to the Cree pursuant to an agreement by Canada, Manitoba, Manitoba Hydro and the Split Lake Cree dated June 24, 1982 are not paid to the federal government and then administered under the Indian Act, but rather to a band trust for administration.
This bill also provides that the fee simple lands to be provided by the province to the Cree are not subject to becoming special reserves under the Indian Act. This act also provides that individual Cree as well as the band or its agents can bring certain claims against Manitoba Hydro. Manitoba arbitration law will apply in this regard.
The approval of the 1977 and 1992 agreements are not the issue here, only the exemptions and rights under the provisions.
I just mentioned that this is a unique situation concerning specific claims arising through unusual circumstances. Those circumstances are the flooding and therefore loss of reserve land for a hydro project.
Background briefing provided by the department is sketchy in some areas and this gives rise to some questions. For example, my party is concerned with the administration of the trust fund. We would like to be sure that generally accepted accounting principles are followed and that there will be accountability.
As well we ask if fee simple lands involved in a transfer replacement here are to be held by the band collectively. If they are, can they be sold and to whom? If they are sold, who will receive the proceeds from the sale? These are operative questions and we do not have the answers. Furthermore, concerning taxation it is unclear if the fee simple lands are subject to property taxation. It would be preferable to clear up these loose ends.
The Reform Party supports legitimate native grievances and Bill C-36 addresses a grievance. We trust checks and balances were put in place in negotiations with the input and participation of the province of Manitoba and Manitoba Hydro.
Sahtu Dene And Metis Land Claim Settlement Act June 13th, 1994
Mr. Speaker, it is again a pleasure to rise in debate on Bill C-16, the Sahtu Dene and Metis land claim agreement, this time in third reading.
The terms, provisions and conditions have been well canvassed on this side of the House and unfortunately our concerns with Bill C-16 still apply. Our pleas, both in the House and in committee, have fallen on deaf ears.
I want today only to make a few points beginning with a point which is general in nature but strikes at the very heart of my party's concern with federal land claims policy. The government's policy is based on a false assumption. In March 1993 a document was published by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development entitled "Federal Policy for the Settlement of Native Land Claims". Within that publication there is a glowing observation which states the evolution and development of the federal government's land claim policy has been closely linked to court decisions.
The first claims policy statement in 1973 was initiated by a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1973 Calder decision which acknowledges the existence of aboriginal title in Canadian law.
Further in the document: "The common law concept of aboriginal rights was addressed in the 1973 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Calder case. Six of the seven Supreme Court justices who heard the case acknowledge the existence of aboriginal title in Canadian law".
With respect to those departmental drafters, I do not accept these statements as properly reflecting historical fact. How can you base your federal land claims policy on these misinterpretations?
The Calder case was a claim by the Nishga people to aboriginal title over the Nass Valley in B.C. It was a claim to aboriginal title without precisely delineating what those words meant. When the claim was brought to the Supreme Court of British Columbia it was dismissed. It was then brought before the Court of Appeal of B.C. in which a three man court again dismissed the claim for aboriginal title.
Finally it was appealed before the Supreme Court of Canada where it was once again dismissed, with three judges finding that aboriginal title may have existed prior to colonial contact but that it was extinguished at the time of colonial contact. Three other judges ruminated and the seventh dismissed the appeal on technical grounds.
In the final analysis the Calder case did not decide that aboriginal title exists in Canada.
Even if the Calder had been ruled as aboriginal title it would have been title that was far less than a fee simple title. It was not ever proposed or put forward in the case that the aboriginal title amounted to fee simple ownership, unlike the transfer that Bill C-16 provides. Bill C-16 conveys 41,000 square kilometres in fee simple ownership, about three quarters the size of Nova Scotia, based on no court substantiation.
In the four agreements thus far, north of 60 degrees latitude, in other words in what Canadians have collectively known as the Northwest Territories and the Yukon Territory, the total fee simple lands amount to 505,000 square kilometres or about half the size of the province of Ontario. We should be very concerned over land claim agreements that remove from the public domain vast areas of public lands.
My party's other major concern with Bill C-16 is the constitutional entrenchment provision. The bill states that the agreement is constitutionalized. If our interpretation is correct this means that it cannot be amended other than by virtue of the amending formula to the Constitution which was agreed to in 1982. When we look at the 1982 amending formula it does not fit very well to these kinds of land claim agreements. There are, as the House knows, six amending formulae and none of them seems to apply to situations created by bills such as Bill C-16.
I question the validity of section 3.1.26 of the act which says amendments can be made because if the agreement can be so readily amended by order in council of the federal government and approval of the Sahtu Tribal Council, if it can be so easily amended in that way then how can we say this agreement is constitutionally entrenched? Those points fell on deaf ears in committee but again I make them.
In this same vein we again state our concerns with locking in such detailed and untried provisions as are in this document. Hundreds of pages of clauses and provisions are locked in and only time will tell if they are workable.
I would hope that in future these types of agreements that are to be constitutionalized be kept to land claim rights only. These are the ones that section 35 of the Constitution is really talking about. Maybe a 10 year clause should accompany these locking in provisions to allow for a shakedown of the agreement.
Bill C-16 allows for law making power and thus raises the issue of the charter of rights. The question is will those laws be subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I know the minister has said yes to the above, but with the greatest of respect that cannot be achieved by degree or by fiat.
My understanding is that the only way this legislation that is passed under self-government agreements can be subject to the charter of rights is for the charter itself to be amended to make certain that legislation passed by aboriginal governments is subject to the charter. That is what was proposed in the Charlottetown accord and that was and can be the only rationale.
In the absence of a specific provision in the charter of rights itself it is most unlikely that the charter applies to legislation passed by native self-government.
Finally, I am amazed by the layers of bureaucracy that this bill creates from renewable resource boards to administration panels, to planning and water boards, to an environmental planning board. We have it all. I submit that these functions are currently being performed by the department of Indian affairs or by the territorial governments.
Our final litmus is does it provide for the self-sufficiency of the Sahtu and the independence they seek? I fear as I do for the Yukon agreement that this litmus test will fail in the long term and even perhaps in the medium term. The intentions of both parties to the agreement, the Sahtu and the federal government, have been hijacked by bureaucratic solutions albeit with the best intentions.
There are built in disincentives to business, once again designed by bureaucrats. We have a precedent in the Indian Act
with all the built in disincentives to business within the Indian Act. Surely we could come up with a simpler design than this.
I have found my relationships with the Sahtu first class. I hope that they feel the same way and I wish them the very best with their challenge and their adventure. Much adversity can be overcome with the correct spirit and attitude. I know how important Norman Wells is to the area. I have talked to many of the players. This enterprise will continue. It is new industry that is the challenge. I certainly hope that I am proven wrong in my major assumptions.
Bills C-33 And C-34 June 1st, 1994
Mr. Speaker, yesterday we had the introduction of Bills C-33 and C-34 which would ratify land claims and self-government agreements in Yukon. Last week we were told the government wished to have these bills introduced later in June with the understanding that MPs would have time to prepare properly.
These bills represent the culmination of 21 years of mostly behind closed doors work without the involvement of federal parliamentarians. Today, 24 hours after tabling, Parliament is being asked to debate these bills at second reading.
This is an obvious abuse of power. The Liberal red ink book speaks of the integrity of Parliament. Surely assimilating over nine inches of text overnight with a rushed departmental briefing this morning does not speak well for the integrity of Parliament or the interests of all Canadians. This action is a travesty of Parliament.
Canadian Film Development Corporation Act May 30th, 1994
Mr. Speaker, I do not know exactly what the question was, but I do appreciate the fact that we both have the same bottom line on this bill which is we want to see Canadian culture improved as a result of the cultural industry in Canada. I certainly would not want anyone to think that was not the direction I was also heading in. I thank the member for his comments in that regard.
Canadian Film Development Corporation Act May 30th, 1994
Mr. Speaker, as a small manufacturer in the furniture business with about a 20 per cent success rate, the banks were very used to the manufacturing success in my business. That is the best example I can give.
Every business has a degree of risk, particularly manufacturing. I empathize with the member's comments in terms of the banking system and how the access to capital for small businesses is not forthcoming in the way we would like to see. However to single out this one industry with a bill wherein the rules of engagement afterward are not specified is not doing our homework.
As to who should do the refereeing, I gave an earlier example of federal bureaucrats administering the export development program. They are not insiders. That is my concern with having Telefilm Canada be the arbiters. They have all the baggage of the established cultural industry in Canada and will be potentially blind to new regional development or new blood that wants to come into the industry.
It was apparent in the briefing on the bill that this program would go to the strong and the established. It was not to go to fledglings or new entrants into the business. Who has the biggest concern with access to capital? I would say the opposite to the apparent intent of the results of the bill.
My suggestion on who should referee the whole process would be someone not within that group but someone perhaps associated with the regular bureaucracy that is used to this type of standard setting and this type of allotment.
Canadian Film Development Corporation Act May 30th, 1994
Mr. Speaker, as I have already expressed I have some concerns about the timing on this bill and why it is being presented in the way it is.
I am pleased to speak today on Bill C-31, an act to amend the Canada Film Development Corporation Act. Telefilm Canada is the better known name for the Canada Film Development Corporation.
A major stated purpose of this bill is to help the already well established producers develop a better relationship with Canadian financial institutions. My interpretation of this statement in simpler language is very different and I can summarize it in three statements.
First, this bill is all about access to capital. Second, the bill leaves the selection of winners and losers in the hands of the Telefilm Canada bureaucracy. Third, this bill assumes that the relationship between producers and banks is unhealthy. I would like to discuss each of these in turn.
This bill is all about access to capital. The problem is that the banks will not give anyone any money even though one has an order. This is certainly not unique to the film industry in Canada.
Second, the bill leaves the selection of winners and losers in the hands of the Telefilm Canada bureaucracy. This bill makes Telefilm Canada a guarantor for the loan for part of the presale agreement to a maximum of 85 per cent with an annual allotment of $25 million. Each application would be to a maximum of $1 million.
This will place the producers in the situation of having to sell their project twice, once to broadcasting or other companies and then to Telefilm bureaucrats. Broadcasters will soon find out which producers can sway bureaucrats and which cannot. This will tend to distort the whole marketplace. It is one more example of the Canadian disease whereby the government interferes in the free market. In this case it has the effect of backing the strongest players in the market by giving loans to the healthiest and most established companies that apply.
A director for Telefilm at the briefing on the bill stated that the money would help the 50 or so strongest Canadian producers and that it was not meant for new or fledgling producers. Over time this will have a tendency to preclude those with new and fresh ideas who are new to the marketplace and those from the non-established film centres. This will be counterproductive to Canadian culture.
Another major concern I have based on the briefing is that there are no specific criteria in place to evaluate the applications or proposals to Telefilm Canada. That is left open even after the bill.
Third, the bill assumes that the relationship between producers and banks is unhealthy. While this may be true in some instances there are instances where it is apparently not true, as in B.C. and Alberta examples where indigenous productions have increased dramatically in the last few years without federally guaranteed loans.
The bill is a response to a portion of one industry having some difficulty accessing capital. It is important to look at the bigger picture since this difficulty is a longstanding Canadian problem which the parliamentary standing committee on industry has been studying in this session with regard to access to capital for small and medium sized businesses.
Why is there so little Canadian investment? Can we achieve our goals with regard to Telefilm Canada through tax credits or through motivating the banks? Both these methods are preferable to the intent of the bill which will have bureaucrats backing the winners. There is nothing in the bill to preclude a grant from Telefilm Canada, a grant giving organization, and a guarantee against production. The government may be accepting more than 85 per cent, or even 100 per cent, of the risk.
It is very unlikely this type of legislation would be contemplated in Germany, one of our major trading partners. Both Canada and Germany have a strong national banking system, but I am told by German business people that if they have a legitimate order in Germany they will almost certainly get the money to produce the order. They have a very good system to ensure that capital flows to legitimate business propositions. It is a major strength of their country.
In one of my previous careers I was a Canadian manufacturer with some export sales. Selling with foreign purchase orders was preferable to domestic sales because the federal government guaranteed the major portion of payment upon delivery. A very positive aspect of the federal program was that the eligibility rules were clear and certain and applied whether one was a new entrant such as us or a long established enterprise.
Bridge financing can be a reasonable proposition if it follows the principles of equal access to all and encourages good ideas. We should be in a position where if we have a good idea we can go for it. It makes no sense to have a capped and artificial program limit of $25 million. If we want to get into this area as a country we have a lot of homework to do and the bill does not cut it.
In summary, the strongest and largest film producing areas are in Toronto and Montreal. There is concern within the industry about equitable distribution of funds for loan guarantees. The bill will tend to entrench regionalization for an industry that is thriving across Canada without federally guaranteed loans.
Canadian access to capital is a problem for many industries. It is my recommendation that we look very closely at the German example for constructive ideas we may want to adopt.
Canadians want a strong national identity. This is best achieved through a strong cultural community that is allowed to develop and grow with minimal government constraint. The bill entrenches bureaucrats as arbiters of culture in my view and is counterproductive to progressive Canadian culture. There are many examples where Canadian banks have provided loans for cultural program development. Let us build on this success and attack the problem, not the symptom.
I am opposed to the bill because it is ill designed and is counterproductive to the long term benefit of Canadian culture.
Canadian Film Development Corporation Act May 30th, 1994
Mr. Speaker, my question for the member for Halton-Peel relates to the fact that parts of the industry appear to be operating quite successfully without loan guarantees and other parts seem to require it.
Does that not imply somewhat of a defeatist attitude on the part of the industry in terms of why this bill is required in this format? We first heard about it last week and we are rushing it through this week. Is there some reason that the member is aware of why we are going through this rapid exercise here?
Canadian Film Development Corporation Act May 30th, 1994
May I clarify why there are no questions and comments.