Mr. Speaker, six long years ago our country entered into an international effort to go to Afghanistan. We moved in with a UN-backed, NATO-led mission. Our goal there was to remove al-Qaeda, which was using Afghanistan as a training base prior to 9/11 and at 9/11. We also went there to remove the Taliban.
We did not go there to make Afghanistan a safer place for Afghan people. We did not go there to save Afghan lives, as some of us wish we could have. Had we been there out of the goodness of our hearts, we would have entered into other countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where, every single month, month in and month out, 32,000 people are dying of preventable causes and where 5 million people died in the largest genocide that we have seen since the second world war.
We went to Afghanistan for our own self-interest. Our troops, as members have said today, are acting in a courageous manner and in a way that makes us all proud. I can say on behalf of all of us here that we are indebted to their sacrifice and their courage. We honour their bravery. We in the House of Commons say to them that they are our best and finest Canadians.
Our job here obviously is to have this debate to ensure that the conditions for success are there for this mission, to ensure that we are able to put forth those conditions. In doing so, we are truly supporting our troops.
What is our goal? Our goal is to enable the Afghan people to provide for their own security. Our goal is to enable them to deal with the four pillars of Afghan security: Afghan police, Afghan army, the correctional system and the judiciary. Those four pillars of paid, equipped and trained personnel are absolutely integral if the Afghan people are to have their own security, the same kind of security that we ourselves enjoy in our beloved country.
Unless we provide security, unless we enable them to build all of those four pillars, it will be like a chair without its four legs. The chair will usually fall down or be weak. Our job is to enable the Afghan people to have those four pillars of their own security.
I will be splitting my time, Mr. Speaker, with the member for Scarborough Centre.
We have spent a lot of time with the Afghan army but we have neglected the Afghan police, the correctional service and the judiciary. We do this at our peril.
What we are proposing is that the government take to Bucharest the demand on the part of NATO to fund, train and equip all four elements of Afghan security, those four pillars. If we do that, and if we set up targets, timelines and guidelines, then the Afghan people, the Canadian public, our forces and our allies will all know what our targets are. Importantly, the Afghan people will understand very clearly when we are leaving. As their numbers increase, our numbers can decrease and therefore the Afghan people will know that we are not there as occupiers but as those who are there to enable them to be the masters of their destiny.
Those four pillars have to be dealt with. The Prime Minister should take that to Bucharest. Our allies, I am sure, would find the wisdom in that solution. Unless we do that, we have a never-ending open-ended obligation and that would be irresponsible.
Second, we have to deal with the political implications. One thing did not happen early on. The dominant tribe in Afghanistan is the Pashtun, of which there are many tribes and sub-tribes. They have been the traditional rulers in the 300 year history of Afghanistan. The Pashtun have dominated. Although Mr. Karzai is a Pashtun, he is not considered to be a true member of the tribe, for many reasons. They are not going put up with the Tajik-dominated government that they had. As a result, they have taken up arms.
Our goal is to make sure that we are able to reconcile this in a country driven for decades by feudalism, tribalism and war. Our job is to give them a manner of tribal reconciliation between the Tajik, the Hazara, the Pashtun and others. If we do that, then there will be a chance for peace, but if we fail, then there will not be peace in Afghanistan.
Third, Mr. Karzai rejected Paddy Ashdown as the supra-representative. That was a mistake. Unless there is a supra-representative there who is able to coordinate the activities on the ground and, quite frankly, knock some heads together, the corruption that is a cancer within the government of Afghanistan will continue and this will erode the efforts of the international community in perpetuity.
We will never win, the Afghan people will never win and security will never come to Afghanistan unless external forces are able to work with Mr. Karzai and, quite frankly, take a very tough, hard line to rein in the corruption that is destroying the ability of any of us to work with that country and to enable the people to have the security for which they yearn.
Fourth, there is the issue of poppies. Maybe a limited narcotic substitution program can take place with the opium being redirected to the legal production of narcotics, but that would be very limited. A second option is the use of artemisinin, which is the drug of choice for treating malaria. Ironically, artemisinin grows in the same kind of soil that poppies grow in. In some areas, the poppy crops could be transplanted and transported, allowing artemisinin to be grown.
However, the reality on the ground is something very different. It is stark and brutal. What is a farmer going to do when the drug lords come to him, put a gun to his head and tell him that if he does not grow poppies his women will be raped, his house will be burned down and he will be shot? He is going to grow poppies. That is the stark reality on the ground because of the absence of security in large parts of the country.
What we need to do is something that is entirely in our court. Unless there is a demand strategy, unless we reduce demand in our country and in the west, there will always be production of illegal drugs. We have failed to adopt the very intelligent work being done by Dr. Julio Montaner and others at the Centre for Excellence in Vancouver and by others in our country who have intelligent, effective drug and harm reduction strategies.
Unless the government is able to work hard with the provinces to implement a national drug strategy, there will always be people in our country who are buying heroin and other drugs. Those who buy heroin actually are putting money into the hands of those insurgents who are killing our soldiers, so congratulations: buy heroin and it supports the murder of our soldiers.
Therefore, it is our responsibility to have a demand reduction strategy in our own house. Regardless of what the United States feels, we need to do it. It is our responsibility. It is our responsibility to our troops.
The other big issue, obviously, is international assistance. It is a dog's breakfast in Afghanistan. Groups are tumbling over each other to try to provide care, but in effect we have a very ineffective international development assistance regime. We know it. We have heard it.
What could we do to rectify the situation? Let us take a leaf out of the UNAIDS mandate, which decided to use a three ones approach: one implementing mechanism, one framework and one mechanism to oversee it. If we use that three ones approach, we will streamline the mechanism and we will be able to have an effective aid and international development strategy on the ground in Afghanistan.
We also need to take a leaf out of the books of groups such as the Peace Dividend Trust, which very effectively and intelligently is ensuring that moneys going into Afghanistan are not being deployed to international workers and contractors. Rather, those moneys are being used to build up capacity within Afghanistan, by Afghans, for Afghanistan. By doing so, this is able to provide the long term sustainable security and development the country needs. It is within our purview to do that.
I see that my time is up, so I will close with this. At the end of the day, our goal is to communicate to our troops, the public and the Afghan people some very realistic solutions. We also have to be realistic in terms of our expectations. Afghanistan is not the democratic republic of Afghanistan but the Islamic republic of Afghanistan, and while some may wish to change Afghanistan into a pale replica of us, that is not going to happen.
Whatever we do has to be within what the Afghan people want. It has to be what is wanted by the Afghan people. It has to be congruent with their goals and objectives for their future. It has to be sustainable. Unless we do that, there will be war without end.
Lastly, there is confusion among some about the differences among insurgents, the Taliban and al-Qaeda. They are very different groups. Also, the Taliban is not a monolithic structure.
We have a responsibility to provide an effective series of solutions for our troops and for the Afghan people. I hope the government listens to what our party and other parties are offering in the debate taking place tonight. We are offering effective solutions that the government can take to Bucharest, particularly the four pillars approach, which is essential to the long term success of Afghanistan by Afghanis for their nation.