Leon Benoit

[Agriculture And Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, February 13th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the purpose of my speech on Bill C-61 is threefold. First, I will outline what is contained within this bill and what it intends to achieve. Second, I will outline three areas of concern I have with this bill and offer some constructive alternatives to those concerns. Third, I will outline the positive aspects of increasing the monetary penalties for offences dealt with by the courts.

At this time I am not speaking either for or against the bill which leads me to wonder whether I am becoming too much of a politician. For the most part I will be asking questions of the minister. I hope the answers will explain some parts of this legislation which will help me in preparing to deal with this issue in committee and in later debate in this House.

First, I will outline the purpose of this bill. Industry associations have pointed out the need for more equitable enforcement of regulations and more equitable treatment between imported and domestic products. This bill is an attempt to apply consistent standards to both imported and domestic products and to promote the competitiveness of the agriculture and agri-food sector.

To address these concerns the food production and inspection branch has proposed an administrative monetary penalty system to decriminalize certain federal regulatory offences. This bill permits the minister of agriculture, if he is requested to do so, to conclude compliance agreements with those who commit regulatory violations.

The rationale behind these monetary penalties is to use the threat of a financial penalty to obtain compliance rather than to simply punish. The system is based on negotiating solutions to regulatory violations. Monetary penalties range from $50 to $15,000.

Bill C-61 gives the department of agriculture more options and greater authority to enforce relevant regulations. Currently most violations of regulations under these acts are treated as offences and are prosecuted through the courts.

The new system is intended to streamline the process by implementing a ticketing system at ports of entry into Canada and monetary fines for other infractions. Only the most serious infractions will end up being prosecuted through the courts as offences. One important result of this bill could be lowering the number of cases going to court. The end result of a cost saving to taxpayers is of course very important.

Bill C-61 adds to the enforcement options of certain legislation administered by the department of agriculture by allowing a system of administrative monetary penalties to be imposed for these regulatory violations. Under this legislation a violation would result in a ticket or a monetary fine.

For example, a violation could include the failure to meet certain sanitary regulations at a meat processing plant, or the mislabelling of an agricultural product. However, an offence which is considered a more serious infraction of the regulations for imported and domestic products would remain subject to prosecution through the courts. An example of an offence would be taking an animal out of quarantine and marketing it, thus endangering consumers.

Under compliance agreements administrative monetary penalties may be reduced or cancelled if the violator agrees to the actions necessary to ensure future compliance.

Monetary penalties are subject to review by a board of arbitration or a review tribunal. The system of administrative monetary penalties would apply to the following acts: the Canada Agriculture Products Act; the Feeds Act; the Fertilizers Act; the Health of Animals Act; the Meat Inspection Act; the Pest Control Products Act; the Plant Protection Act; and the Seeds Act. Certain monetary penalties already exist within the Departments of Transport and Employment and Immigration. They are also used in the United States and Europe.

I will outline three areas of concern that I have with this bill. I agree with the overall intent of this bill. Reformers favour streamlining a regulatory process to make it work more efficiently and reduce costs. Currently most regulatory violations are prosecuted through the courts. For the most part this a cumbersome and ineffective process. Because there are limited alternatives in the current system to enforce compliance with the law outside of criminal prosecution, minor violations and violators are often ignored.

I have three main areas of concern and I also have three questions, the answers to which could alleviate these concerns. Are the penalties set high enough to be an effective deterrent, particularly to large companies? Why have the ministerial powers been so dramatically strengthened? Why is it the sole

discretion of the minister to appoint and expand the board of arbitration and the review tribunal?

My first area of concern is the size of penalties. Are the penalties set high enough to be an effective deterrent? I agree with the goal of compliance instead of punishment, and this is positive because it will reduce the burden of the courts, but will it also increase the likelihood of violations since the consequences will not lead to criminal action?

Corporations may deliberately engage in minor infractions which are by regulation subject only to monetary penalties and not to court action. The company will therefore simply pay the penalty and in accordance with the changes made in clause 23 have its record wiped clean after five years.

For example, corporations knowingly emit more pollutants into the air than is acceptable under Canada's environmental regulations. Because the benefits to the company outweigh the costs, some companies would rather break the law, pay the minimal fine and continue operating at a maximum profit level.

A solution to this problem would be to ensure that repeat violators will be prosecuted in court. For example, a two strikes and you are out system could be implemented. This means that after a company has received a monetary penalty twice for a violation a further violation would automatically be deemed an offence and court action would be taken.

In order to strengthen the effects of regulatory violations, I would propose that the five year period for retaining records of violation as outlined in clause 23 of Bill C-61 be extended to ten years so a record of infraction takes longer to wipe away.

The second area of concern is that the ministerial powers have once again been substantially strengthened. Clause 5 allows the minister to decide what constitutes a violation subject to monetary penalty and what constitutes an offence subject to the courts.

For example, under the Fertilizers Act the minister can decide whether a violation has occurred which is subject to a maximum fine of $15,000 or whether an offence has occurred which is subject to a maximum fine of $250,000. That is a lot of power in the hands of a minister without precise legislation to guide.

In the case of a violation clause 6 allows the minister to decide who will receive a notice of violation and to determine the form and the content of that violation. Clause 7 allows the minister to make regulations that set penalties for each violation or not to impose a penalty at all. Under clauses 9 to 13 the minister may also make exceptions which would allow a penalty to be reduced or increased.

All of these situations create an opportunity for political favouritism. Companies that are friends of the government could be let off lighter than those that are not friends of the government. If clear guidelines are in place to alleviate this concern, I would ask the minister to provide them to me. If his answer is that an alleged violator can take recourse through a board of arbitration or a review tribunal, this offers me no comfort.

Let me explain by discussing my third area of concern, how appointments are made to these two boards. It is clear there is too much ministerial involvement in appointing and expanding the board of arbitration and the review tribunal.

Monetary penalties are imposed on the basis of absolute liability which means a penalty can be imposed without proving fault. The briefing from the food production and inspection branch of the agriculture department cites essentially regulatory nature of the violations, the relatively modest levels of the penalties and the absence of the probability of imprisonment as factors to support the use of absolute liability. In the real world, though, these penalties are large enough and can be used effectively to punish enemies of the minister.

This legislation states that if an alleged violator objects to the penalty assessment he has received, a review by an appropriate government official and by a tribunal may be requested. This is outlined in clause 9(3) which states a person may request to enter into a compliance agreement or a review by the minister or a review by the tribunal.

The practices of departmental review and review by a board of arbitration and review tribunal were in place before Bill C-61. However, clause 28 of this bill eliminates the ceiling for membership on these minister appointed boards.

Under the existing Canada Agriculture Products Act both the board of arbitration and the review tribunal can only consist of a minimum of three and a maximum of five members, all appointed by the minister.

Clause 28 of this bill allows the minister to appoint an unlimited number of members to these boards. The current process is already open to government patronage. Lifting the ceiling on the number of members to the board of arbitration and review tribunal only allows for more patronage to occur.

Here is another chance for the Liberal government to add to that list of patronage appointments that was presented in the Globe and Mail last week. Is this the intent of this section of the legislation?

I do not believe that there are legitimate reasons for the minister to have sole discretion in appointing members to the board of arbitration and the review tribunal. This direct and deliberate patronage can be avoided by vetting all appointments through the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food in an open and thorough process.

Even though this is a Liberal dominated committee, at least it would provide the opportunity for open and honest discussion, the opportunity to critique the qualities of those considered for the appointment.

With respect to the elimination of the ceiling for membership on the board of arbitration and the review tribunal, if the government has a legitimate reason for removing the maximum number of members for the board, for removing the level that was set previously, I would like to know what the reasons are. I ask the minister to provide me with this list of reasons. Next week or sooner would be fine.

As stated in my introduction, the third aspect of my speech will deal with what I consider to be a positive aspect of this bill, that the monetary penalties for offences dealt with through the courts have been strengthened.

For cases involving a gross offence, the department still retains the option of criminal prosecution through the courts. In such cases administrative monetary penalties will not be imposed.

Fines proposed for indictable offences have been drastically increased. For example, clause 52 increases the maximum penalty for an offence under the Fertilizers Act from $500 to $50,000 and for an indictable offence from $2,000 to $250,000, a substantial increase. Strengthening these penalties may increase the deterrent to breaking Canadian regulations. Reducing regulatory infractions through deterrence is a positive goal.

[Young Offenders Act, February 10th, 1995]

Maybe that was the Liberal look. He said no and sat down. I believe that it is important that we discuss all options and I believe that we should look at the option of corporal punishment in our criminal justice system generally as a deterrent and in our penal system, including for young offenders.

In closing, I would like to make one more point and comment on how corporal punishment was removed from the criminal justice system. An ominbus bill I believe in 1971, a part of this omnibus bill was not debated, only spoken on by two speakers and that removed corporal punishment as a deterrent in our criminal justice system.

As a result of this bill under a Liberal government back then corporal punishment was removed without debate, without the consideration it deserved. I believe that now we should have the debate in this House and among Canadians to see if other Canadians feel the same as people of my constituency. This issue has been brought up again and again. Then maybe we will see that there will be or is a place in our penal system, including under the Young Offenders Act, for corporal punishment. Let us find out. Let us have an open debate.

[Young Offenders Act, February 10th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I have noticed there are really two main themes in this debate on the Young Offenders Act.

The first theme seems to be that we should deal with the root problem, the cause of youth crime. The other theme is that filling the jails is not going to be the deterrent that we should use to prevent crime, that filling the jails is not the only answer, is not the whole solution to the problem.

I would like to talk a little about these two issues. First I agree absolutely with those who have said that we must deal with the root cause of youth crime. I do not think members would find anyone who would argue with that position.

If we look at the legislation that this government and past governments over the past 20 to 30 years have passed, we find that the role of the family has been weakened by laws, including changes to the criminal justice system and the tax system. These changes have certainly done nothing to get at the root causes of crime, in fact just the opposite. The weakening of the role of the family and the increasing of the role of the state have weakened and added to developing the root cause of crime. It has allowed crime.

The other thing I would like to talk about is the issue of filling our jails as really not being a good deterrent to crime. Jail is part of the answer and jail does provide a deterrent but I too am concerned if we only look at filling the jails as deterrence to crime, including of course crime committed by young offenders.

We have to look at all possible options as deterrents. For example, we have to seriously look at boot camps and other types of set-ups where there is strong discipline. This could be used with young offenders.

Let us also look at something that was removed as an option for deterrence from the Criminal Code in 1971. I am talking about the use of corporal punishment not just with adults but with young offenders. We have to examine the possibility of bringing back corporal punishment as a very effective deterrent.

Before I was involved in politics the first time in 1975 I heard from a constituent who told me about his personal experience in the use of corporal punishment.

This gentleman was at a coffee table in a local restaurant when we were talking about how the criminal justice system had to be improved and how criminals were not being dealt with very well, not firmly enough. One person got on to the suggestion that we reinstate and use corporal punishment in our system again.

One gentleman who had been saying nothing until this point said: "I am going to tell you something that I have never told anyone before. When I was a young man I committed a violent crime". We never asked what the crime was. It was not important in the discussion.

"As a result I received a prison sentence of about two years and I received the lash". This gentleman said that because he received the lash going in and going out of prison that he believed a deterrent had been provided that kept him from a life of crime. He believed that if it had not been for that corporal punishment, he would have been a lifetime criminal.

When members opposite talk about the harshness of corporal punishment in our criminal system, I would like to ask them this question. Which is more harsh? Which is more kind and gentle, using corporal punishment to prevent a life of crime or not having sufficient deterrents and having an individual become a lifelong criminal?

This gentleman who had received the lash said that he believed it kept him from a life of crime and he also believed that was far less harsh than the alternative of being a lifetime criminal and living every day, every year of his life knowing that he would go back to crime again and again.

Therefore when we are talking in this House about being kind and gentle, let us look at it from a factual and real point of view. I ask again, which is more kind and gentle?

I heard a very similar story from another gentlemen in my riding at an Elks meeting a few years later. This gentlemen had personally received the lash. He received the lash going into jail. He had a longer sentence. He said if he had his choice he would have stayed in jail for life rather than receiving that corporal punishment. This came directly from the person involved. He would have stayed in jail rather than receive the lash on his way out.

I think that says a lot about using corporal punishment as a deterrent. There are many different degrees of corporal punishment that could be used. Certainly with young offenders I think the degree of corporal punishment should be far less.

I know from personal experience throughout my life as a young person growing up that pain was a terrific deterrent. I believe that pain through corporal punishment should be seriously considered in this House as a deterrent to prevent young offenders from reoffending.

When I asked the parliamentary secretary a question in the House last year whether his government had even considered

corporal punishment as a deterrent, the parliamentary secretary stood up, looked at me in a scoffing manner-

[Canadian Potato Marketing Act, February 6th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on this private members' Bill C-266, an act respecting the orderly marketing of potatoes.

My speech has four main points. First, I will explain what this bill is about very briefly. Second, I will explain why this bill has failed in the past and will not be supported again in this House as we have seen from the speeches so far, in particular from the governing party. Third, I will outline the Reform Party's posi-

tion on supply management and supply managed products. Finally, I will put forward some viable alternatives to government involvement through new supply managed industries.

The stated purpose of this bill is to ensure the orderly marketing of potatoes having due regard to the interests of producers as well as to consumers. It would establish a corporate body to be known as the Canadian potato marketing commission.

The commission would be composed of five to nine members who would not receive pay from government. The commission would operate in a somewhat similar fashion to that of the Canadian Wheat Board. It would act as a sole marketing agent for all imported potatoes and for potatoes produced in Canada.

The commission, using a permit book system as the wheat board does, would pay producers to sell potatoes to the board. What we would have is a single desk buyer as we have with the Canadian Wheat Board.

Payments made to the consolidated revenue fund to offset any expenses the commission may have must be approved by Parliament. I was encouraged to see at least in the proposal there was the recognition that when we come to an expenditure of taxpayers' money in order to have proper accountability it should have approval by Parliament and not just by governor in council, the cabinet or the minister. That is what this bill is about.

This bill has been attempted before and has failed. The member for Mackenzie has attempted to pass the same bill. Bill C-246, an act respecting the orderly marketing of potatoes, received first reading on May 30, 1989. Bill C-252, an act respecting the orderly marketing of potatoes, received first reading June 19, 1991. Now here we go again with Bill C-266, an act respecting the orderly marketing of potatoes. I wonder if this member is trying to make an argument in favour of term limits for politicians so that we get new ideas into this House, ideas that change with the changing market conditions.

The fact this is the third time in six years the same member has put forward the same bill certainly indicates one thing: he holds an ideology; he sticks to his ideology regardless of whether or not producers agree with that ideology. Hon. members opposite have presented an overview of the state of the potato marketing industry and the general lack of support on the part of farmers and processors for this type of a bill.

An attempt was also made in 1980 to establish a potato marketing agency for eastern Canada. Public hearings were held, reports were submitted and the idea failed. The national potato agency task force presented its report for a program for the marketing of potatoes in Canada to the minister of agriculture and the chairman of the National Farm Products Marketing Council on November 17, 1986 but nothing came of it.

In February 1988 the National Farm Products Marketing Council submitted a report on the inquiry into the merits of establishing a national marketing agency for potatoes. On April 28, 1988 Judge Teitelbaum of the Federal Court of Canada trial division at the request of a group of potato processors issued an order quashing the report. The conclusions and recommendations contained in the report were never implemented.

In the past there was never enough collective enthusiasm to implement a potato marketing agency. In the present it is not an idea whose time has come. In fact it is clearly an idea whose time has gone.

With the passage of the Uruguay round of GATT, the free trade agreement and NAFTA, the existing government co-ordinated marketing agencies have come under fire. In recent news stories we have heard some of the results of Canada putting tariff levels at the rate they are in other supply managed industries. There is a lot of pressure particularly from our largest trading partner, the United States, to have a rapid reduction in the tariff protection in the present supply managed industries. I am surprised the hon. member is proposing to put in place a new supply managed industry board under this type of situation.

On January 28 the Canadian Wheat Board was under fire because it requires end user certificates on imported American wheat. The Americans' response is to impose end user certificates on Canadian wheat entering the United States. If this threat were to become a reality the result would indeed cause a large problem for Canadian grain farmers who do ship Canadian grain into the United States. It would cause an increase in paperwork and another level of regulation which is totally unwanted and not needed by farmers.

The United States has also served notice that it plans to challenge Canada's new import duties on dairy and poultry products. I mentioned this a few minutes ago. The levels set under GATT according to the United States really go against the spirit and the terms of NAFTA. That is the argument the United States has been using. Again, the mood just is not there on the part of the United States and certainly on the part of Canadian potato farmers for a new supply managed industry, especially when that industry is potatoes.

In terms of the disputes with the United States, who ends up being hurt by these disputes? It is not the bureaucrats who are hurt; it keeps them employed. It is not the politicians who are hurt; it gives them the spotlight and keeps their names in the news for a little longer. In the end it is the farmers who lose from these disputes. We want to do nothing that will encourage trading disputes.

I believe that having this bill which is being proposed today in Hansard could be considered an anachronism, an error in time.

My wife and I went to see "Richard III" last Friday night in Edmonton and as you know, Shakespeare is famous for the anachronisms in his plays, but there is a new anachronism in this play. "Richard III" came out on stage crippled up in a wheelchair, which of course is a new anachronism that was built in by the writers of this version of "Richard III".

This piece of legislation is very much like using a wheelchair in a play that took place hundreds of years before wheelchairs existed, electric wheelchairs in particular. I believe it is totally out of place.

I want to talk a little bit about Reform's position on supply management in general. Reform believes that farmers should definitely have the right to work together collectively. They should have the right to strengthen any part of their industry or their business they feel can be strengthened by this co-operative work.

For example, I believe there is a very strong future for co-operatives in agriculture. I also believe we will see farmers with other business people in small communities in particular forming new co-operatives as a mechanism to work together for the common advantage of the farmers and the processors involved. I encourage this type of activity. I believe there is a future for various other types of joint ventures but not for new supply managed industries.

The greatest service this government can provide to producers who are in the supply managed industry right now is to be honest and open with the farmers. We know the world is moving more and more to an open and free marketplace. Knowing that, the greatest service government can provide for farmers is to say: "We are moving to a system of more competition. We know it is going to be more difficult even for present supply managed industries to compete, but at least we are acknowledging it and we want to help in any way we can without interfering in the move to an open market system".

Clearly, this bill is totally out of place and I am very pleased to see the support from the members opposite.

[Communications Security Establishment, December 13th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order 37(3) I rise to get a more detailed answer to questions I raised on December 5 and 6.

As a person who is concerned about the future of the Canadian Wheat Board I feel it is imperative to point out some of the activities of its government appointed commissioners during the advisory committee elections. I believe these activities point out problems with the board which could, if not immediately dealt with, lead to its demise over the next few years.

The real threat to the Canadian Wheat Board is not from outside but rather from within and result from its lack of accountability and its lack of willingness to change. The main issue to be dealt with is the complete lack of accountability of these appointed commissioners to western Canadian farmers.

This is a concern I have heard from farmers over the past several years. After all, farmers pay all of the operating costs of the Canadian Wheat Board out of their pockets. Why does it seem too much to ask for the commissioners that run the board to be directly accountable to farmers? The only way to ensure that the board of directors is accountable to farmers is by allowing farmers to elect them. There is no other way.

On Monday, December 5, I asked the minister of agriculture about the results of the Canadian Wheat Board advisory committee elections. I mentioned it was no surprise that less than 40 per cent of farmers eligible to vote turned out to elect these largely symbolic positions.

What was a surprise, however, was that leading up to the election, Lorne Hehn, the chief commissioner campaigned for a group of candidates that had a specific political agenda. In addition Richard Klassen wrote an "open letter to prairie wheat and barley growers". Their articles appeared in the Western Producer , Grainews , and many local papers.

Section 17(4) of the Canadian Wheat Board Act strictly prohibits these actions. It states: "It is the duty of the board to exercise direction and supervision over the administrative conduct of an election of members of the advisory committee". Therefore, the role of commissioners parallels that of Elections Canada in a federal election.

By promoting the point of view of one group of candidates the commissioners, I believe, violated the Wheat Board Act and the trust given to the people who hold these positions. On this basis I asked for the resignation of those who knowingly violated politically neutral positions.

In his response the agriculture minister said he would not ask for their resignations because he had no proof to justify these allegations. He also stated it was not unusual for a chief commissioner, from time to time, to defend the policies and practices of the wheat board.

The proof can be found in the chief commissioner's words and in the words of other commissioners. Not only did the chief commissioner openly offer his opinion in the November 17 issue of the Western Producer but he also stated that during the board's 60-year history it is entirely unusual for commissioners to defend the actions of the board.

Hehn states: "The events of recent weeks compel me to violate the long tradition of silence on controversial grain policy issues. I do so at the risk of being accused of meddling". Therefore, Mr. Hehn knowingly violated section 17(4) of the Canadian Wheat Board Act. This is a very serious offence and I am sure the chief commissioner was aware of the consequences.

Clearly, the politically neutral stance of the wheat board was violated by the chief commissioner and other commissioners. It is also clear that the actions of these individuals should be reviewed. Furthermore, it is clear to everyone that farmers must review and make decisions about how their marketing agency should be run.

I have three specific questions for the minister. With this evidence before him, will the minister acknowledge that the commissioners have violated the Canadian Wheat Board Act and the trust given to them? Will the minister ask for the resignation of all commissioners who campaigned during the period leading up to the advisory committee elections? Will the minister replace those political appointed commissioners with an elected board of directors? If yes, when? If not, why on earth not?

[Canada Grain Act, December 9th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, first of all, concerning the 40 per cent, I only referred to that to show that it is not regarded as a valid body that is being elected.

Does the hon. member feel that it is all right for the commissioners who are responsible to oversee the election, as Elections Canada is in a federal election, to actively campaign on behalf of one side in this election? It twisted the issue from an issue of dual marketing versus single desk marketing. They did it from their massive coverage in farm papers and local papers by twisting it instead to an issue of if you let the monopoly break the board will disappear, it will be destroyed.

I would like to ask the member if he feels it is all right that the commissioners campaigned in that way.

[Canada Grain Act, December 9th, 1994]

Out trying to protect his job.

We will see any monopoly and people involved in a monopoly out to try to protect their job and their personal interest. That is understandable except when this body is the body in charge of the administration of the election.

This should never have been allowed to happen. It was very improper behaviour on the part of those commissioners and I believe they should do what is right and step down because of that.

This kind of abuse is totally unacceptable in any kind of election, whether it is an important election or not. What this has shown is that there is a great concern on the part of these commissioners and those who supported maintaining the wheat board monopoly that things would not go their way. I think this is the reason that the commissioners, against all past tradition, have decided to get involved this time.

Because of this involvement the issue changed from the issue of dual marketing versus monopoly, which was never the issue in this election. The real issue because of the way this was presented by the commissioners and others was. Do you want the wheat board or not? All of the candidates involved in this advisory committee election want the wheat board. To my knowledge they all support the wheat board. Yet that was the way the issue was presented by the commissioners and by others and through the farm media.

This election was to determine whether farmers wanted the wheat board or not, except all of the candidates running wanted the wheat board. I believe probably 70 per cent to 80 per cent of farmers want the wheat board maintained.

That is not the issue that is important here with regard to the wheat board. The important issue is whether the wheat board should be run by an elected board of directors or by government appointment. That is the key issue, should farmers get some control over their organization, the Canadian Wheat Board. Farmers pay the total operating cost of the wheat board. The board supposedly exists for farmers. Why on earth will this

government and others not allow them to control their organization?

The advisory committee has no power and therefore is pretty much unimportant in this whole process.

[Canada Grain Act, December 9th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I felt I had to respond to the hon. member who has just spoken. My response is with regard to the Canadian Wheat Board advisory committee elections. I would like to talk briefly about the tradition of these elections, what has happened in the past, what the real issue was in the election this time and about some new abuses that came into the voting this time.

The tradition of the Canadian Wheat Board advisory committee elections is that there is a very low turn out at the elections, this year under 40 per cent. The reason is that this advisory committee really has no power whatsoever in terms of the operations of the wheat board. It has no power so people tend to stay away when it comes time to vote.

These elections in the past have been won in the garbage cans of post offices. There is no personal identification involved in the voting in these elections. There was not in the past, I am not sure about this last election. People who support a particular position strongly have gone to the garbage cans and picked out numerous ballots and mailed in a good number of ballots. I have seen this happen. I have talked to others who have seen it happen and have been involved in it. That is the type of process that has taken place in the voting in the past. To my knowledge this has not been taken out this time, but I cannot say that for a fact.

There were some new abuses added to the election process this time. This is very important to point out. The board of commissioners, the commissioners who are government appointed, not elected, is supposed to oversee the election process. Therefore it plays a role very similar to Elections Canada in a federal election.

In spite of that fact these same commissioners including the chief commissioner, Lorne Hehn, were out campaigning for those who were in favour of maintaining the Canadian Wheat Board monopoly-

[Canada Grain Act, December 9th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak at third reading of Bill C-51 which amends the Canada Grain Act.

The Canada Grain Act regulates grading and inspection of grain, maximum tariffs on handling charges including elevation, cleaning, drying and so on. The act also restricts in some cases transportation of grain. It is involved in licensing of businesses dealing in or handling grain and also in the security requirements of these companies.

The Canadian Grain Commission oversees the act. It is made up of appointed commissioners who seem, for some reason, to turn over to some extent after an election.

Today I will discuss the changes to the Canada Grain Act which are proposed in Bill C-51. I will discuss these changes under three headings: first, excessive power moved to the hands of the minister and to cabinet; second, maximum tariffs on handling charges; and third, bonding and licensing. As well as these three main areas I will speak briefly about a few other areas which I think are of particular interest.

I will begin with the excessive power moved to the hands of the minister and cabinet under the changes made in Bill C-51. In this bill an increased amount of legislative action is given to the governor in council which is the formalized constitutional body through which the federal cabinet exercises executive power. The executive instrument of the governor in council is known as an order in council which represents delegated legislative power as permitted under specific acts of Parliament.

This delegated legislative power gives cabinet, or really the minister, the ability to enact subordinate legislation by order in council or by regulation. Power delegated through enabling legislation is so common that the law is effectively formed by administrative bodies rather than by Parliament as it should be.

The legislator's role should be to pass the initial legislation authorizing certain agencies to devise, promulgate and supervise regulations as may be deemed necessary to give full effect to a particular act.

Too much power is continuing to be centralized in governor in council. In this bill, clauses 2, 4, 9, 15, 33 and 35 are examples.

How can the Liberals reconcile this with their red book promises of more open and more democratic government? Why are they formalizing control in cabinet? The argument that was presented when this question was raised is that the bill only legitimizes the authority that is there anyway.

If the government is serious about moving to a more open and less interventionist style of government, why did it not remove these powers rather than just formalizing what was there anyway?

This expansion of the scope and use of governor in council power which has occurred at the expense of the power of the legislature or Parliament is largely a result of the increasing complexity of modern government. However this delegated legislative power may involve matters of administrative routine right up to matters of major political and economic consequences. A wide range of issues are dealt with by the order in council power.

Such legislation is so extensive that Parliament can do little other than conduct random checks and investigate only some apparent abuses. The decisions made by cabinet or governor in council are based on informal procedures and the deliberations are secret. This amounts to little more than government by cabinet decree with no accountability.

In this bill there are an increasing number of areas for which the Canadian Grain Commission will now require governor in council approval. Conceivably the Liberal government under the revised act would be given the ability to covertly affect the interest of an individual farmer, a farm group or a grain dealer, for example, which is not operating according to its wishes. Dare I suggest this change opens the door to pay-offs for political favours or punishment for political foes. This is the type of thing the governing Liberal Party campaigned against during the election.

In two cases in this bill there is a movement toward less ministerial control. This bill states that the Canadian Grain Commission will have the power to set the salaries for the members of the eastern and western standards committees which have 26 members and the grain appeal tribunal which is made up of three members. This is in clauses 4 and 6 of this legislation.

Currently the salaries of members of these committees are fixed by governor in council at a $125 honorarium per day for non-government participants and $10 per sample for the grain appeal tribunal. The commission will now be setting the salaries for committee members in order to better reflect the reality and provide the Canadian Grain Commission with additional flexibility to make adjustments without having to go to order in council.

The second area I would like to talk about briefly this morning is the setting of maximum tariffs. Clause 14 and some following clauses eliminate over two years the requirement for the Canadian Grain Commission to set maximum tariffs charged by grain elevators. Instead the Canadian Grain Commission is provided with the discretion to decide whether or not it wishes to regulate this aspect of the grain industry while eliminating the requirement that elevator operators have to give advance notice to the Canadian Grain Commission of changes to elevator charges. Tariffs are fees charged for handling, cleaning, storage and drying of grain, that type of thing.

Removing these tariffs is a positive step. My concern though is with the grain companies that own primary, that is the country elevators, as well as terminal elevators. It is very common in the grains industry for companies to own the farm elevators that farmers ship directly to as well as the terminal elevators which are responsible for receiving the grain in port position and loading it on the ships. Those grain companies may lower the tariffs in the country elevators which is good, but they may at the same time raise the tariffs in the terminal elevators to make up for the cut rates in the country.

This would be fine if only these companies were dealing through their terminals. However these terminals are semi-public terminals by law which means that companies and individuals other than the owners are allowed to ship grain through the terminal.

I am afraid these changes may cause an increased rate at the terminal. The smaller companies which are provided an opportunity by law to deal through the terminals may be squeezed out of business. The rates could be raised beyond that which is reasonable.

Just to make this very clear, there is a provision in place which allows the Canadian Grain Commission to set a maximum in cases where the rate is raised too much. That provision is there and I will talk a bit about that in a minute.

The irony is that while I am concerned about this happening, the positive result from this type of action could be that the small companies may decide to improve the direct hit loading. That is simply loading directly from rail car to ships which started in the port of Vancouver and they may actually expand this to increase the competition. I see this as something positive.

The other positive thing that may result from this is more grain movement through the United States and through American terminals so that Canadian farmers have another option when there is a disruption in grain movement within Canada. That would encourage settlements by those in the grain handling industry, including the companies that own the business and labour. Settlement may be encouraged if they know there is competition so that they cannot stop the flow of grain.

I touched on my concern before about the Canadian Grain Commission or order in council maintaining the power to set the maxmimum tariffs. By getting rid of the maximum tariffs it gives the grain buyers more authority to penalize people who put grain in terminals and do not move it quickly enough. This is in clause 14 of the bill. I believe this is a good move. However, since we know that government wants to increase and not decrease the authority of the Canadian Wheat Board for example, cabinet just may choose to reverse these penalties in cases where the Canadian Wheat Board is affected.

Could the ability to invoke governor in council authority be used in the future by government to give even more power to the central selling desk of the Canadian Wheat Board to further regulate the grain sector? This is a legitimate concern.

With the present legislation the terminals do not have the power to penalize the Canadian Wheat Board for dumping grain for which they do not have an immediate buyer. All other shippers of grain must have a buyer ready before they can move the grain to port. The Canadian Wheat Board is the exception.

We have found over this past year that the Canadian Wheat Board moved grain into terminal position for which it had no buyer. This was the case particularly in Thunder Bay. Without the ability of the companies that own the terminals to raise the tariffs, this put them at a disadvantage because they could not move the grain due to the terminals being plugged with Canadian Wheat Board grain. At least now the law provides for them to raise this rate, but it also provides for the minister to say: "No, this is out of line. We are going to lower the rate".

That overriding power concerns me. I understand there is some need for that because in a business where there really is not enough open competition there could be a rise in tariffs which is not justified. There is a balance. It is tricky to find the balance, but I am just expressing some of my concerns.

The third area I want to talk about today is bonding and licensing requirements and the proposed changes under this piece of legislation. A major change in the bill involves the clear legislative removal of any responsibility on the part of the Canadian Grain Commission and therefore the taxpayers, above the level of the bond that is posted by the Canadian Grain Commission to a licensed company. In the past, courts have required the Canadian Grain Commission to cover losses above the bond level.

Companies buy bonds to protect the customers they do business with against losses up to the bond level if they go out of business. In the past the courts have determined that somehow the Canadian Grain Commission and therefore the taxpayers have a responsibility to cover losses above the level of the bond.

However in at least two cases over the past years taxpayers have also been forced to cover losses for companies which have not been licensed under the Canadian Grain Commission. Therefore, there is no responsibility on the part of the Canadian Grain Commission or the taxpayers. The Auditor General was very critical of the bailouts of these two companies which seemed to be politically motivated.

With the changes that are made in this area there is no doubt at all that farmers will not be protected above the level of the bond. The courts will not be able to determine that taxpayers should somehow be held responsible for farmers and grain companies through funds from the Canadian Grain Commission.

The Canadian Grain Commission does however monitor these bonds to try to determine whether the licensed companies are operating within the level of the bonds. This is a very difficult thing to do and it is very expensive. It is a function which does offer some degree of protection. At the same time while the monitoring is there, the grain commission is not responsible if the monitoring is ineffective. That is a concern.

Once again the Canadian Grain Commission has the power but does not take the responsibility for its mistakes. It has the power to refuse to licence a company, to require expensive insurance and bonding. It spends the money to perform these functions, but again the only protection is provided by the companies and the protection is only up to the level of the bond. It is important that farmers know this.

For this reason I believe that elevators and grain dealers should have the right to choose to opt out of this licensing and bonding requirement. This was the reason for my first amendment to Bill C-51, Motion No. 3, which was debated and defeated at report stage. That amendment would have allowed individual elevator companies, grain dealers, to choose to opt out of the licensing requirements under the Canada Grain Act.

It is very expensive and very difficult for some small companies to provide the bonding and insurance the Canadian Grain Commission may require. In those cases these companies could have chosen to opt out.

The protection we offered to farmers and people doing business with these companies is that on the premises there would be a sign very clearly stating that the place of business was not licensed under the Canadian Grain Commission. As is done in other areas with this type of body, on the front of every contract it would have been required to clearly state that the company you were about to enter into a contract with was not licensed under the Canada Grain Act. That was the protection for farmers.

As well, the amendment would have provided the flexibility so that when a company did opt out it no longer had to meet any of the requirements of the Canada Grain Act. This amendment would also have allowed companies, if they chose, to use the grading and inspection services that the Canadian Grain Commission provides, of course at a cost as is done now.

There are a few other points that I want to raise. One further clause in this bill authorizes the Canadian Grain Commission to suspend licences of primary elevators where overages exceed allowable limits.

Overage is just a difference between the amount of grain an elevator has in store compared to the amount it should have in store when looking at the records of shipments and receipts of grain. This is to offer some protection that in fact companies are paying their customers for what has been brought in and put through the facility.

Another clause confirms the authority of the Canadian Grain Commission to require operators to fully insure the grain in their elevators. It requires that prospective licensees provide specified financial data which demonstrates their financial viability.

What they are talking about here is a little bit closer monitoring of the bonds. While it is impossible to make sure that a company is operating within the bond level, it was pretty clear from what happened in the past when companies failed that the monitoring was not as good as it should be.

A further step in this bill involves movement of grain within Canada. This may surprise some people although people who are knowledgeable in the grain industry know this, the legislation seems to grant free movement within the eastern division or within the western division, a line drawn just west of Thunder Bay. This is in clause 25 of this bill. My question is: Why should there be any restriction to interprovincial trade and grain in this country? Yet, there is.

This legislation will allow free movement within the eastern division or within the western division but not between the two divisions. This seems absurd. To add further to that under the Canadian Wheat Board Act it is still against the law to transport grain from province to province even within a division. This seems absurd when you consider we are moving to more free and open trade with the world.

A further change requires that licensed grain dealers use the Canada Grain Act grade names in all of their transactions with farmers and grant the authority of the Canadian Grain Commission to act against companies which illegally use them. This has almost been a normal practice in the industry and this change only legitimizes what is already happening.

My concern is that dealers do not have the right to operate as unlicensed businesses. They may apply to the Canadian Grain Commission which may choose to grant them the right to operate without a licence but it is not a right. Of course my amendment which was defeated at report stage would have provided this as a right.

I believe that farmers and dealers in the industry want a change which will allow a dealer to operate as an unlicensed dealer and choose to deal in either ungraded grain or grain which has been graded by the Canadian Grain Commission. They want the choice. Because farmers are paying for the majority of the operating costs of the Canadian Grain Commission, they should be provided with the choice.

In conclusion, one witness in committee referred to the bill as the reregulation of the industry. The time has come for an open and honest evaluation of the role of the Canadian Grain Commission to determine what functions it should perform and how it should perform them.

The evaluation must determine what farmers want in areas that affect them and what others in the industry want in areas that affect them. The role of the Canadian Grain Commission should be to provide no more or no less than what is wanted by players in the industry.

[Violence Against Women, December 6th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, we have just heard a very touching story. It is upsetting to me because it shows that the proper laws are not in place to protect this person or that they are not enforced. Either case is totally unacceptable.

The member should let the justice minister know this is totally unacceptable and demand that either the proper laws are put in place or that the laws that are there are enforced. I would like the member to comment on that.