Linda Duncan

[Committees of the House, November 5th, 2012]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the hon. member for his question and I have to say that it is an absolute pleasure to serve on the committee with him. He provided invaluable advice to the committee and this review.

Absolutely, what the member refers to came clear from every expert who came before our committee. This was not something that we singularly determined. It was raised by these experts on parliamentary procedure. They all recommended that we endorse the position of the Parliamentary Budget Officer and make him a full officer of Parliament. In fact, they recommended to embellish his budget because it is his very office that is created to assist us, the lowly members of Parliament, in the review of estimates and budgets, and plans and priorities.

[Committees of the House, November 5th, 2012]

Mr. Speaker, as I had mentioned at the outset, there were two previous reports in the last decade that included a total of 75 recommendations. When our committee reviewed those recommendations, it was with great regret we determined that very little action had been taken by successive governments, and that includes the previous Liberal government, the previous Conservative government and the current Conservative government.

We worked diligently to analyze all those recommendations and to pull out the key matters that needed reform. Interestingly, the very issues that we pulled out and recommended were close to identical to the ones that the President of the Treasury Board recommended that we look at.

We reviewed those matters and came forward based on what the experts recommended and the history of the countries within the western world and how they are proceeding into the 21st century to modernize their system of review of estimates and budgets, and plans and priorities, to actually make sure that those who are constitutionally obligated to vote on spending are actually informed in that vote.

[Committees of the House, November 5th, 2012]

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the motion of October 24, 2012, moved by my colleague on the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, the member for Markham—Unionville. He moved that the seventh report of the said committee presented to the House on June 20 of this year be concurred in.

The intent of this committee report is clear on its face and in its recommendations. The intent is to finally institute long-overdue and widely called-for reforms to strengthen the capacity of Members of Parliament to effectively deliver their constitutional duty to review and approve federal estimates and spending.

It is widely recognized that one of the primary responsibilities of Parliament, and consequently its elected members, is the approval of the funds required to meet the government's financial obligations. This is known as the business of supply.

Each year, the Crown delivers to the House of Commons its spending plans or estimates for parliamentary scrutiny and approval. It is important to recall that it is Parliament that has the sole authority to grant the supplies.

O'Brien and Bosc, in House of Commons Procedure and Practice, 2009, reiterates the powers of Parliament to review and approve spending and the duties of the government to enable a process to deliver that duty:

The manner in which Canada deals with public finance derives from British parliamentary procedure, as practised at the time of Confederation. The financial procedures adopted by the Canadian House of Commons in 1867 were formed by the following principles:

These principles are important. We have the government frequently referring to past matters. This is an important matter, the very point of the foundation of this nation.

The first principle states:

that although Parliament alone might impose taxes and authorize the use of public money, funds can be appropriated to Parliament only on the recommendation of the Crown (royal recommendation), in Canada represented by the Governor General;

The second principle states:

that the House of Commons has the right to have its grievances addressed before it considers and approves the financial requirements of the Crown;

The third principle states:

that the House of Commons has exclusive control over the business of public finance (taxing and spending) and all such business is to be initiated in the lower house;

The fourth principle states:

that all legislation sanctioning expenditure or initiating taxation is to be given the fullest possible discussion, both in the House and in committee.

That last principle is the very crux of the report and recommendations from my committee: that all legislation sanctioning expenditure or initiating taxation is to be given the fullest possible discussion, both in the House and in committee.

It is widely acknowledged that the various House of Commons standing committees are intended to play an important role in assisting the House with the scrutiny of planned and actual spending and performance, but therein lies the rub.

Unfortunately, it has long been acknowledged that Parliament does not effectively fulfill its role and standing committees are at best giving perfunctory attention to the government's spending plans. The information provided to members of Parliament in committees is simply lacking in the detail necessary to ensure an informed vote. That is one of our most profound obligations here as representatives of the people of Canada.

In fact, in some recent instances the committees have been denied the opportunity to review the estimates at all because of tight deadlines imposed by the government.

Three recent reviews of the estimates process have been conducted with the objective of addressing this long-standing record of failure: a 1998 review by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs; a 2003 review by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates; and the recent 2012 six-month-long review by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, hereinafter referred to as “the committee”.

A total of 75 recommendations were made to Parliament in the first two reports. In January 2012, the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, or the committee, determined that few changes had been made by successive governments to act on these recommendations, and many of the barriers remained to delivery of this parliamentary duty.

The committee decided to revisit the constraints with appropriate officials and experts and to identify and address the most critical problems. Our committee worked diligently and co-operatively over six months, producing a focused consensus report with 12 modest recommendations. The many experts who work in these matters who came before us from around the world encouraged our committee to work in a non-partisan manner and to try to work together on a consensus with some strong recommendations. I can attest to that, and it is clear in the face of the report that across parties we worked diligently and came forward with a very logical plan to improve the role of members of Parliament in these important decisions.

The stated objective of the report was improving members of Parliament and committees' access to timely, understandable and reliable information on estimates, as well as the support and capacity necessary to complete an informed and constructive report to Parliament. As reported, the end goal of the committee study and recommendations to the House was to enhance transparency and accountability, agreed key elements of good governance and supposedly the very foundation of the government of the day.

As mentioned previously, the committee worked diligently to forge a consensus report, one that was practicable and readily acted upon in a timely manner. That determination was formed in concert with leading experts from around the world who had familiarity with the experience in other jurisdictions and with our own parliamentary procedures. There was only one dissenting opinion.

Both opposition parties supported expedited action, on the advice of experts, for the appointment of the Parliamentary Budget Officer as an officer of Parliament, along with a requisite enhanced budget. Regardless, it was the consensus of the committee that the mandate and function of the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer merited study by our committee, including the option of reporting directly to Parliament as an officer of Parliament.

One would logically assume that as the committee is composed in the majority of Conservative members of Parliament and the review proceeded over a six-month time period that the recommendations that the Conservative members concurred in, along with those of us in the opposition party, had been vetted and received concurrence of their party. The government, in its response to the report, has in some instances supported recommendations and committed to action. In a number of instances, the Conservatives responded that the required actions are the prerogative of Parliament.

We just heard moments ago from the representative of the government that even in its response the government did not suggest that these matters be referred back to the committee. The government members simply stated that many of the matters that we were raising are the prerogative of Parliament to determine, which is precisely the reason why we wish the report to be concurred in, so we can move forward and begin taking action to improve our capacity in this place.

The government, in its response to the report, has in some instances supported recommendations and committed to action. In a number of instances, it responds that the required actions are the prerogative of Parliament. The government has outright rejected some of the other recommendations.

The President of the Treasury Board has committed to action by March 31, 2012, on at least two of the recommendations. An ongoing evaluation of accrual-based budgeting and appropriations would be completed and reported, as well as a model and timeline for transitioning estimates and related appropriations based on program activities. This would allow members of Parliament to review spending within a context of actual program delivery. We look forward to these changes. I know that all members of the House look forward to these reforms, and hopefully they will be expedited following the report in March of next year.

Where the government held that a number of the recommendations are simply within the purview of Parliament, it logically follows that the report be concurred in so that Parliament can proceed with the recommended reforms.

Regrettably, the government has also opposed a number of the key recommendations. Notable among those were changes to the timing and configuration of the tabling of the budget and estimates. This would have enabled members of Parliament to review proposed spending against the budget by also having access to information on actual programs and policies.

The suggestion was why not—like other jurisdictions including New Zealand, Australia and South Africa—simultaneously bring forward the budget, the estimates and the plans and priorities so that we can have a full debate on the substance of the proposals of the government. This, we were advised by experts, is the practice now followed in a number of other jurisdictions and is highly recommended as the more constructive and informed process.

What appears doubly odd in the refusal to accept the sensible recommendation is that it was the President of the Treasury Board who wrote to the committee at the outset of its study recommending consideration of exactly these reforms. The government also rejected the recommended review of the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer by the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates. I am now left deeply confused because just before I rose to speak, the government suggested that the matter can perhaps be referred to the committee. Therefore, perhaps there is a change of mind, and that review is useful.

The decision to reject the recommendations of the PBO is disconcerting for a number of reasons.

The PBO was created by the Conservatives with the stated objective of improving the flow of timely and accurate information to enhance the capacity of members of Parliament to deliver their duties to review government spending, which is precisely the objective of our review, precisely the task that was assigned to us.

The government of the day created that very position to assist us in that review. Of note, in 2004, the Standing Committee on Finance, following an extensive review, recommended the establishment of an independent budget officer reporting directly to Parliament. Despite 2006 election promises made by the Conservatives to create this independent budget officer, after winning the election the Conservative government enacted the PBO office but reneged on the commitment of an independent budget officer reporting to Parliament.

During the course of the six-month study, strong support was expressed by parliamentary experts for the creation of an independent office of the PBO, including his critical role in supporting and enhancing the capacity of MPs to effectively do their jobs.

As Professor Joachim Wehner at the London School of Economics and Political Science testified:

The first [change that could be considered] is to protect and enhance the role of the Parliamentary Budget Officer.

[S]ome adjustments are possible to the legal framework for the Parliamentary Budget Officer. In particular, this role could be strengthened...if he were a full officer of Parliament. Moreover, steps could be taken so that the Parliamentary Budget Officer has total access to all relevant information.... I see some scope for strengthening it also on the basis of international experience.

Those views were echoed by Robert Marleau, the former clerk of our House of Commons, who said:

The PBO should be the core staff of this committee. The PBO should be moved out of the library into the committees branch, and made a full-fledged officer of the House. Half of his budget should be spendable by this committee [of government works and operations] on studies, and the other half by other committees on estimates, as they apply for it.

This view was echoed once again in testimony by John Williams, well known to the House and now chief executive officer of the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption. He said:

I think the Parliamentary Budget Officer should be an officer of Parliament serving this committee, very much like the Auditor General serves the public accounts committee. Therefore, it would have the staff and the resources to do that program evaluation and also have the access to the documentation too.

We certainly know that is the question of the day, access to that information. Major concerns have been raised throughout the term of the current PBO regarding constraints on his ability to effectively deliver his legislative mandate due either to denied or delayed access to financial information and limited resources available to his job.

As far as I am aware at this date, numerous senior departments and agencies have yet to respond fully to the PBO request for information on spending, savings and cuts. I am advised today that the recalcitrant list of senior agencies and departments has now provided some information. I am advised by the PBO office that it is still not sufficient. Included among those recalcitrant entities were Finance Canada, Treasury Board, Privy Council Office, Citizenship and Immigration, Canada Revenue Agency and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.

As the end of the term of the current PBO is imminent, now is the logical point in time to openly assess the terms of his mandate and the adequacy of the resources allocated to effectively deliver the services needed by Parliament. The concurrence by the government in the committee report provides the opportunity for the government to finally deliver on its commitments to openness, transparency and good governance.

I therefore call upon the government to concur in the report so that the government and Parliament can work together to expedite the reforms necessary to finally effectively deliver their mandate. By simply concurring with this thoughtful report and committing to work with all members of the House, the government could finally, in truth, claim credit for removing the blindfolds and handcuffs on the democratic process.

[Committees of the House, November 5th, 2012]

Mr. Speaker, frankly, I am flabbergasted. This is the third review on this subject matter in over a decade. The committee spent a dedicated six months with experts from around the world and from the Parliament of Canada reviewing this matter.

I find it amusing, and perhaps the hon. member could clarify something for us. One of the recommendations was that the matter of the role and mandate of the Parliamentary Budget Officer be referred back to our committee for review and study. The government flatly rejected that. Could the member clarify whether the government is now changing its mind and deciding that in fact it is appropriate for the committee to review that matter?

[Public Works and Government Services, November 2nd, 2012]

ah nonMr. Speaker, once again the Conservatives have proven they are not fiscally prudent.

This time their poor money management has meant cost overruns of half a billion dollars, and Canadian taxpayers are on the hook. The Parliament Hill renovations were estimated at $770 million. The reported price tag has now ballooned to $1.2 billion only partway through the project.

Can the Minister of Public Works and Government Services explain how she made such a mess of the project and allowed these costs to escalate?

[Finance, October 23rd, 2012]

Mr. Speaker, the Auditor General said that the Conservatives have failed to report on long-term fiscal sustainability. He gave them a failing grade on fiscal transparency. He said that neither MPs nor Canadians had the relevant information to fully understand the long-term implications of budgets. According to the AG, even the Minister of Finance is not fully informed of the true costs before his budget is tabled and voted on.

When does the government plan to deliver its promised report on long-term fiscal sustainability?

[Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act, October 22nd, 2012]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the hon. member's question. He provides really difficult questions. Surely it is obvious. We simply look at the recent military mission in Afghanistan, where our armed forces are serving alongside soldiers from many other countries. Surely it makes sense when they are in the field of war that they be subject to the same kind of regime and processes for justice. Frankly, I cannot present any rationale for why we would be out of step with most of the democracies of the western world. I guess we have to put that question to the government.

[Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act, October 22nd, 2012]

Mr. Speaker, essentially, as many of the members in the House have been remonstrating, we are finding it hard to see why we cannot apply the same kind of system, to which we as civilians in this country have the right and privilege, to the members of our armed forces, who put their lives on the line and are actually sent to other nations to try to protect democratic institutions struggling to have a rule of law and a fair, just process. We have yet to hear any genuine defence from the Conservatives as to why they think that members of our armed forces should be made second-class citizens in access to due process. Surely they deserve and merit the same judicial processes, definitely in summary conviction, that we do as civilians.

[Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act, October 22nd, 2012]

Mr. Speaker, the issue about hope is not for the members of the opposition, but for the members of the armed forces. Can they possibly have hope that this time the government will do the right thing? This time, in the sixth iteration of reforms to this legislation, why in heaven's name have the Conservatives not simply taken it upon themselves to listen to the testimony, including by military personnel, and brought forward a full, encompassing reform package to the military justice system?

[Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act, October 22nd, 2012]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank all who have risen to speak to the bill, particularly my colleagues in the New Democratic Party who are making a valiant attempt trying to persuade the government that we should be respecting the hard work at committee and the consensus that was reached.

I have to say at the outset that I appreciate the optimism of the speaker before me, but frankly, my experience since the Conservative government gained majority control has been that the hard work done in committee seems to be for naught. I hope the government will take heed. However, I would think it is an indication that, since the government chose not to include the consensus amendments, it is going to be an uphill battle to get them back in. However, we look forward to being surprised.

Canadians would be shocked to discover that under the current law, and even with the passage of Bill C-15, many who have bravely served our country, supporting the democratic processes, due process and rule of law for this nation and others, may obtain a criminal record through a system that lacks the due process that is available in civilian criminal courts to other Canadians.

Bill C-15 is the most recent of more than half a dozen tabled iterations, which the government let die. From that standpoint, what is the rush? We should spend time in committee, and if the amendments were previously valid, then let us discuss if they are still valid.

The changes that were previously brought forward and that we continue to call for were put forward not just by opposition members but by Justice LeSage; a former justice of the Supreme Court of Canada; Professor Michel Drapeau, from the University of Ottawa; a noted author and military lawyer; members of the armed forces; and many legal experts and defence counsel for military members.

While some of the needed reforms are included in Bill C-15—and we have been clear about that—regrettably, many of the most important ones are not.

In 2003, retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio Lamer provided a report outlining 88 recommendations to reform the system of military justice and bring it into the 21st century. He was retained to undertake a review of the court martial procedures under the National Defence Act and he did issue a report, again, with 88 recommendations relating to military justice, the Military Police Complaints Commission, the grievance procedures and the provost marshal.

As one of my colleagues has stated, Bill C-15 is a step in the right direction, yet no rationale has been provided by the government as to why, at this point in time with this iteration, it has now thrown out the majority of the agreed amendments.

Retired Colonel Michel Drapeau, noted legal expert and author on military justice, has commented that the National Defence Act “requires more than tweaks and tinkering to bring it into the 21st century”.

However, this is what we have before us today. Yes, there are some amendments and, yes, they are worthwhile, but it is still tweaking and tinkering rather than bringing forward a bill that is appropriate for this century.

In this century, is it not time that the military courts and grievance procedures were amended to instill independence of the decision makers, judicial independence, trial by peers and penalties on par with those in the civilian courts for other Canadians?

I wish to echo the sentiments of the member for Windsor—Tecumseh, who clearly presented his rationale for opposing Bill C-15. As he stated in the House: “...I am never going to vote for a bill that would treat our military personnel unfairly”.

That is the stance of all my colleagues in the official opposition.

The member stated that the second reason he was voting against the bill was that, despite the efforts of the committee members in the last Parliament to agree on amendments, the experience under this majority government has been continually, where we seek all-party consensus, that the PMO overrides and rejects that consensus.

Many in the House have noted the many iterations prior to this bill. We had the Lamer report in 2003, outlining significant, thoughtful changes to bring military tribunals into this century. In 2006, we had Bill C-7, which died on the order paper. In March 2008, we had Bill C-45, which died on the order paper. In 2008, we had Bill C-16 on courts martial. That was given royal assent. We had a little tinkering and it was good that one change was made, but it did not do overall reforms as had been recommended by Justice Lamer. There was a Senate report on equal justice for court martials in May 2009. Again in 2010, we had Bill C-41. The government tabled one amendment, but it died on the order paper. Then we had Bill C-16 in 2011. It passed narrow provisions to improve the appointment and tenure of military judges, but again it was just a tinkering at the edges. In March 2011, the Minister of National Defence commissioned yet another review by Justice LeSage.

It is time for a full, all-encompassing reform of the military justice regime. It is not merely the opposition saying this; it has been senior judges, military law experts and representatives of the military. It has been said over and over again. It has been agreed to by all party members of the committee.

Despite the six iterations since 2003, including this one, little concrete action has been taken to expedite a more just and equitable trial process for military accused. As my colleagues have reiterated to questions from the other side of the House, we do agree that Bill C-15 does provide a number of measures, including greater flexibility in sentencing, more sentencing options including absolute discharge, restitution and intermittent sentences. These are good measures. It modifies the composition of court martial panels and changes the power of delegation of the Chief of the Defence Staff for grievance procedures. Good on the Conservatives for agreeing to make some of those changes.

Unfortunately, the bill falls short in key issues: in reforming summary trials, in reforming the grievance system and in strengthening the Military Complaints Commission. Only 28 of Mr. Justice Lamer's 88 recommendations to improve military justice, the Military Complaints Commission, the grievance procedures and the provost marshal have been addressed.

Many amendments tabled by the New Democrats and put forward by the armed forces and passed at committee have been excluded from Bill C-15—for example, the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff in grievance processes; changes to the composition of grievance committees and, as my colleague previously mentioned, to include 60% civilians on panel reviews; or to ensure that the persons convicted at summary trial are not unfairly subjected to a criminal record, particularly when we are dealing with minor offences.

Some of the critical reforms we brought forward previously and that have not been included provide the reasons that we cannot support the bill, including the reforms to the summary trial system; reforms to the grievance system; and strengthening the Military Police Complaints Commission. Again, these are matters that were tabled at committee and agreed to, but they are not found in Bill C-15.

Reforms to the summary trial system would include removing the criminal record for an expanded list of minor offences. In other words, there are a good number of offences where a young member of the military could be given a criminal record, where it is deemed inappropriate and would not happen in the civil system. Again, there is no right of appeal, no transcript, no access to counsel and often the judge is the accused's commanding officer.

As I mentioned, major reforms to the grievance system include reconstituting the panels with civilian members and strengthening the Military Police Complaints Commission to provide oversight.

In closing, it is a question of justice and equity for our dedicated military.