Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to rise today in the House and speak to Bill C-41. The government's trade agenda has provoked widespread public concern. Representing the views of so many Canadians, we have opposed to date all of the trade agreements negotiated by the government, save one.
Of these deals, the one with the greatest consequence to our economic future, and indeed our political future, has been the China FIPA. With respect to the China FIPA, business columnist and editor Diane Francis has said that the Conservative government demonstrated “the worst negotiating skills since Neville Chamberlain”.
Most recently, on CBC Radio, she said that trade deals are either “fair and reciprocal” or result in “colonization and hollowing out”. Francis concludes that the China FIPA is decidedly not reciprocal.
Of course, the NDP is waiting to see what CETA actually says. No breath is being held, however, in light of the unfortunate precedents set at the bargaining table by the government and its tendency to conflate increasing trade with expanding corporate rights and diminishing democratic rights and sovereignty, through the inclusion of investor state dispute settlement mechanisms.
It will be well understood by now that the Korea deal also includes an investor state dispute settlement mechanism. Certainly, an NDP government would not have included such a mechanism, were we responsible for negotiating this deal. It should be noted that Korea's main opposition party also opposes the inclusion of such a mechanism.
However, this is not the China FIPA deal, nor is it what we have seen of CETA as of yet. There are significant distinctions to be made here. The Korea deal is fully cancellable or renegotiable on six months' notice, unlike the China FIPA deal, which locks us in for a minimum of 15 years. This agreement has guaranteed transparency rules for ISDS tribunals, and hearings must be held in public. The agreement does not apply to provincial, territorial, or municipal procurement or crown corporations. Shipbuilding is, notably, exempt from federal procurement rules. The agreement does not apply to or negatively affect supply-managed agricultural products. Finally, the agreement does not contain any negative intellectual property provision. I am happy to say that we are able to distinguish the agreement before us today from those that have come before it.
The outstanding question, of course, is this. What is there to recommend this deal? We believe the agreement will have a net benefit for Canada's economy and Canadian workers. That assessment is made by employing essentially three criteria. First, is the proposed partner one who respects democracy, human rights, adequate environmental and labour standards, and Canadian values? Second, is the proposed partner's economy of significant or strategic value to Canada? Third, are the terms of the proposed deal satisfactory?
With respect to the first of these, Korea has a robust multi-party system of democratic rule, an active trade union movement, and a diverse civil society. South Korea is a developed country ranking 15th on the human development index.
On the matter of the Korean economy and its strategic economic value to Canada, Korea is a member of the G20, it has the 15th-largest GDP globally, and it is our 7th-largest trading partner. However, it is worth noting that we are on the losing end of this trading relationship currently, with a trade balance deficit of about $4 billion and growing. It is unfortunate but important to note that, in the nine years that successive Liberal and Conservative governments took to negotiate this deal, Korea has moved forward with a free trade agreement with the European Union in 2011 and with the United States in 2012, and further free trade agreements are pending.
As a result, the market share of Canadian companies in Korea has dropped 30% since the full implementation of its free trade agreement with the United States. The losses have been particularly heavy in the agri-food, seafood, and aerospace industries. The Canadian agri-food business, which is a key economic sector here in Canada, responsible for 1 in 8 or 2.1 million jobs, was hit particularly hard.
Similarly, the Canadian aerospace industry was hit hard. Exports to Korea dropped by 80% from $180 million to roughly $35 million in the last couple of years alone.
It is well past time to ensure that Canadian companies and workers can take advantage of a fair, reciprocal, and freer trading relationship with South Korea. That is why we see, almost without exception, Canadian business representatives and Canadian labour across all sectors of the economy in support of the deal.
There is a notable exception: segments of the auto sector. They are important segments in the form of the Ford Motor Company and the union Unifor, in particular, which have withheld their support for this agreement. There are certainly positive provisions in the agreement for the auto sector, but this is not to suggest that the concerns of Unifor and the Ford Motor Company are unfounded.
It is worth noting that, last year, Canada failed to attract a penny of the $17.6 billion invested globally in the auto sector. It is also worth noting that the United States succeeded in its deal with Korea, where the Conservative government failed. It built stronger protections for domestic auto production into its agreement.
This raises the very important question of what the government is doing to support the auto sector in Canada to ensure that it is in a position to thrive in a globally competitive industry.
The 115,000 auto jobs are important jobs. They are far more important than the number would indicate, because they stand as representative of the kind of jobs that made certain parts of this country, and by extension the whole country, thrive.
In my riding of Beaches—East York, at the corner of Victoria Park and Danforth, there once stood a Ford Motor Company plant. It is where Ford made its Canadian Model Ts and Model As. It became the first Canadian plant of Nash Motors and finally American Motors until it closed down. Now, it sits next to what the City of Toronto calls, because of issues of structural poverty, a “priority neighbourhood”. A strip mall now stands where that auto plant once did.
Just outside the northwest corner of my riding is Toronto's Golden Mile. It was home to significant industrial concerns in the post-war period, including a General Motors van plant. A Globe and Mail article from some years ago probably captured best what became of the Golden Mile. It said:
...the Golden Mile was a golden flame that burned brightly for nearly half a century until it was snuffed out by big-box stores.
Today, it is the Eglinton Town Centre's towering pylon with a checkerboard of retail signage that stands tallest on the once-proud strip.
The Golden Mile mall, significantly, houses a City of Toronto social services office.
While we stand in support of this deal, this is an issue that points to a broader economic context of this agreement. We asked the government what it is doing for urban economies where we see tremendous growth and only growth of precarious employment; where there is a growing level of working poverty; where there are burgeoning, informal economies; where youth unemployment is nearing 20%; where nothing but big-box stores, dollar stores, and social service agencies stand where once stood industry.
It is not about going back. It is about moving forward. I do not see an economic vision coming out of the government, which addresses the economic needs of a vast portion of Canada and Canadians.
