Mr. Speaker, Bill C-299 suffers from many of the same flaws that, unfortunately, have been characteristic of the government's general approach to criminal justice. It legislates in response to a single incident rather than taking a more comprehensive outlook. It focuses on punishment after the fact rather than on the importance of the prevention of the crime to begin with. The bill relies on a mandatory minimum sentence rather than heeding the overwhelming evidence from jurisdictions around the world, including our own Department of Justice, that mandatory minimums are not only ineffective but also prejudicial.
At second reading my colleague from Mount Royal referred to numerous studies demonstrating the ineffectiveness of mandatory minimums in countries around the world, including the United States, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada. The research concludes that mandatory minimums do not prevent or reduce crime but result in more crime in and outside of prisons, that they prejudice already vulnerable offenders and in no way serve the objective of deterrence for which they are often advanced.
Accordingly, having regard to the evidence, we remain opposed to mandatory minimums on grounds of principle and policy, and we have sought to remove the mandatory minimum provisions from the bill at committee.
The committee heard from a former Supreme Court justice, the Hon. John Major, who said that even without a mandatory minimum in place, kidnappers in Canada have been dealt with severely by the courts on a consistent basis.
The committee also heard from Michael Spratt, a criminal lawyer from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, who warned us—and my colleague knows this from personal experience as a lawyer and as minister of justice, with whom I had the pleasure of serving in Canada—that mandatory minimums do not remove discretion from the legal process. They simply transfer it from judges, who work in open court and publish decisions that are reviewable, to police officers and crown prosecutors whose decisions are neither reviewable, transparent nor public.
With respect to Bill C-299 then, if the prosecution were to deem a five-year penalty excessive in a particular case, it could decline to prosecute or could charge for a lesser offence or another offence such as abduction, and no recourse would be available to those who disagree. It would again undermine the very intention of the sponsor of the bill.
Clearly, the arguments against mandatory minimums are overriding. Regrettably, we are not surprised that our Conservative colleagues on the justice committee remain unconvinced, but we are surprised by the disturbing if not alarming justifications of mandatory minimums that some of them put forth.
The member for Brampton West, for example, argued that there was no distinction between incarceration and deterrence, saying that an individual in prison was necessarily specifically deterred from committing crimes. That suggests that a viable crime prevention strategy is to put as many people in jail for as long as possible. As the logic goes, if everyone were in prison then no one would be out committing crimes. Regrettably, this myopic approach is not only absurd but also ignores entirely the root causes of crime and the importance of rehabilitating offenders and the need for both prevention and deterrence.
Another alarming attempt to justify mandatory minimums came from the Conservative member for Scarborough Centre, who asked: “[H]ow do we protect society from judges who decide that the same offence should be applied to someone who lifts a chocolate bar and to someone who commits murder?“ Apart from the fact that guidelines and precedents exist to direct judges when determining appropriate punishment, and apart from the fact that no convicted murderer in Canada has ever received a chocolate bar calibre sentence, and apart from the fact that should such a sentence ever be handed down, the appeals process would undoubtedly correct the problem, the member's comments demonstrate a lack of understanding of the judicial process.
The committee heard a good deal of evidence that limiting judicial discretion is an ineffective way of fighting crime. It heard no evidence whatsoever that Canadian judges have been guilty of the kind of dereliction of duty the member describes. Indeed, Justice Major urged committee members to have confidence in our judges and to value judicial independence. At the very least, we would urge all members to respect our judiciary and to value the importance of having evidence before impugning the judiciary's common sense.
In that regard, the evidence is squarely against mandatory minimums. Yet those of us who affirm the facts know what we can anticipate from those who support this discredited approach. Indeed, we will be subject to accusations that we care more about criminals than about victims, comments that regrettably resurfaced in last week's debate on Bill C-37.
I trust that there will be no demagogic accusations in this debate. We all want the kidnapping of children to stop. The question is how to achieve that goal. Do we address, to the extent possible, the underlying causes of crime, programs for the prevention of crime, providing police with the tools they need to keep people safe and making every effort to rehabilitate the criminals in order to reduce the likelihood that they will re-offend? The answer is a resounding yes.
Imposing mandatory minimum sentences that we know do not work, that limit judicial discretion in unusual or unanticipated cases and that represent an approach that compounds rather than addresses the initial injustice are neither effective deterrents nor do they serve the purposes of justice.
Let us look at the irony here for a second. Simply put, by including an exemption in the bill, the government is implicitly acknowledging in a small way the need for the judicial discretion at sentencing. The motion before us seeks to improve the clarity of that exemption by giving judges more flexibility to deal with unusual cases.
The first amendment proposed would exempt from the mandatory five-year minimum anyone substantially similar to a parent, guardian or person having lawful care or charge of the child.
The second amendment would exclude from the exemption anyone deprived by a court of all parental rights.
Ideally, of course, the mandatory minimum provision would be stricken as well, but failing that, we offer these amendments as the next best thing. We hope the House will signal its desire for these changes and that the Senate will report back an improved version of the bill.
We trust that members on the government side will carefully study the critiques that have been made of mandatory minimums and will heed overwhelming evidence that they simply do not work at best and are prejudicial at worst.
While it is our sincere hope that this is the last bill with a mandatory minimum provision that will come before this House and that the serious shortcoming is not likely to be fixed at report stage, I do hope that the other shortcomings of the bill may, nonetheless, be ameliorated somewhat to our amendment which otherwise would support the intention of the mover himself.
