Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to speak to Bill C-43, yet another immigration bill. With 1.4 million Canadians out of work, 300,000 more Canadians today than in 2008 when there was an economic recession, one would think the House and the Conservative government would actually focus more on job creation instead of putting all their energy into dealing with perceived problems through legislative means.
Since 2000, the auditors general have been saying that the problem with who comes into the country and who gets deported is not really with the law, but with the administration of the law. A succession of auditor general reports, in 2000, 2003, 2007, 2008 and 2011, all five reports said the same thing. Between Canada's immigration service and the Canadian Border Service Agency, there are serious problems in how the law is administered as to who gets into the country and who gets deported.
The 2007 auditor general report talked about it not being clear which department did what. It said that it was not consistent as to who was deported and who came in and the level of compliance was not monitored. There was no regard as to how much it cost to remove people from the country. More damning was it could not track those who needed to be deported. For a good percentage of them, it was unknown where they had gone. In dealing with detentions and removals, the report stated that the policies and procedures were not applied consistently and that the database that dealt with detentions and removals was a complete mess, unfortunately.
That was in 2008, four years ago. Surely, things would have improved. Surely, we would know who we were letting in, whether they were criminals or not, and who was being deported. Actually, no, things have not improved.
The Auditor General did another report in 2011. Many hours and months were spent tracking what was happening with Canada Border Services Agency, which has the task of dealing with people, and Canadian immigration services overseas, as to who was admissible to Canada and who needed to be deported. It noted in chapter 2 of the report that the operation manuals had not been updated and there were actually three different screening manuals. However, with the hundreds of bulletins and manuals, if the officers wanted to check, they did not have the search capacity to do so. Therefore, they were trying to find out which manuals to apply and which bulletins they should use. They would go on a search and their computer system would not allow them to search. It was not clear. There are many and they are not necessarily updated either.
It is interesting that there is a lack of country specific risk profiles. The profiles are not systematically produced and, even if they are produced, they are not distributed. According to chapter 2.29 of the Auditor General's report, the overseas officers often have no idea what kind of person should not be coming into our country. In fact, half of the officers said that they did not have specific and sufficient information to assess if people were inadmissible. They do not know whether they have security concerns because the manual is not updated, the risk profile is not clear, it is not systematically produced and it is not distributed.
As I said earlier, there were audits in 2000, 2003 and 2008. The Auditor General went back to see whether there was a framework to ensure the quality of the jobs done, both here in Canada and overseas, and whether there was a performance review. Apparently, there is no performance review, no guidance, no training and not enough information to properly determine who should or should not come into this country. That is from the Auditor General's 2011 report, chapter 2.37.
In chapter 2.39 of the report it states that the department's 2011 program integrity framework calls for the monitoring of the quality of decision making through random, systematic and targeted quality assurance activities. That means that they check to see whether the law is being applied properly. This so-called program integrity framework has not been implemented and, therefore, is not done, which means that we do not know whether the existing law, the previous law or the future law is being applied.
We are seeing that the Conservatives keep trying to change the channel. It is the department that is broken and the system is not working, according to the Auditor General. Instead of cleaning the system and doing it better administratively, the Conservatives are wasting time. They keep trying to change the law every three months and taking the time to change the channel. For Canadians who know that something is not right, the Conservatives would say that it is not the system that is the problem but that it is the law, which is not true. According to the Auditor General, it is the system that is broken.
I have more. The Conservatives said that there are all types of problems because there is no timely review of the effectiveness of the security screening process. Whether it is CSIS, CBSA or Canada Immigration Service, we need to have all of them connected. The Auditor General said that the IT systems are not inter-operable, meaning that they are not necessarily connected. The field agents, the people out there working to decide who gets to come in and who needs to be deported, cannot get all the information they need. That is another problem.
The Auditor General went on and identified other serious problems. It is not just the system. The report also mentions that there is an absence of a formal training program or curriculum. The workers are not formally trained. It says that close to 40% of the analysts had not received training. They do not know how to apply the law because they have not received training. It is not their fault. As well, 74% were missing training in research techniques. That is the majority. Three out of four front-line officers were missing training in research techniques, so they do not know how to do it.
To make it worse, even though there is no formal training program or curriculum, if they have been there for a long time, maybe they would gain that information and knowledge from experience, but no. Forty per cent of the staff have employment records for two years or less, which means there is a high turnover in the front-line staff. There is little stability. With high turnover and very little training, it makes the situation much worse.
It is the system and the administration of the law that are the problems. Instead, rather than fixing the problem, we have yet another immigration bill, Bill C-43, to deal with the admissibility of temporary residents. We can change the law all we want but if there is the absence of a formal training program or curriculum, a high turnover, the manuals are not up to date, there is very little risk assessment and the system is not being reviewed in a way that is comprehensive, there is a serious problem.
The Auditor General went on to say that when officers make decisions, they normally document the reasons for them. Actually, 28%, which is 3 out of 10, have documentation, which means that when 7 out of 10 officers make decisions, they do not document them. Did the person who made the decision follow procedure as to who gets deported and who gets admitted? We do not know. Did the person who made the decision conduct a full assessment? The public does not know because the person did not document what he or she did when the decision was made. Normally there would be mandatory checks but that was not done in 80% of the cases and the checklist was not used, which is a serious problem.
What did the Auditor General say needs to be done? He said that there needs to be a quality assurance process, good training and service standards. Are there service standards yet? No. CBSA and CIC have no service standards. How do we know whether the people coming into this country or being deported are the right people? We do not know.
The Auditor General asked how the problem got started. Apparently, in 2003, when CIC used to deal with enforcement, it separated that out and gave it to the Canada Border Services Agency, which established it and changed the act. Since then, it has not been clear as to who does what. It has done two memorandums of understanding and yet the information, management and share services were still under negotiation as of a few months ago. It is still trying to figure out who is supposed to do what. It was supposed to do a joint risk management strategy so that it would be clear as to how risk would be dealt with, those who are allowed to come into the country through temporary resident permits, except that its joint risk management strategy has not been implemented. It sounds good but it has not done it yet. Instead of ensuring that the director and the front-line staff do what they need to do, we have yet another legislative change.
According to the Auditor General, there is a huge problem. Chapter 2.96 states that CIC and CBSA do not have systematic mechanisms for quality assurance or measuring performance that would provide a reasonable level of assurance that their processes are working and that practices are appropriate for today's challenges.
Furthermore, the organizations have only recently begun to develop a joint risk management approach, as they have not done it yet, and similar issues have been identified in our audits since 2000. This is not a new problem. There needs to be a sustained effort by CIC and CBSA to address the gaps in the admissibility determination process so that the related risks are properly managed.
That was in 2011. What about this year, 2012? The assistant Auditor General, Wendy Loschiuk, and the principal responsible for the audit I was quoting from, Gordon Stock, came to the immigration committee. At that time, committee members asked whether all the recommendations in the Auditor General report had been implemented. Ms. Loschiuk said that even though some better techniques to track people had been adopted, the whereabouts of some of these people were still unknown.
In fact, it is not clear where 41,000 of these folks have gone and, of the people who were detained but released on bonds, it is not clear whether they have complied with the conditions of their release. There was little information available on the costs of detaining and removing persons or on whether policies and standards for detention were applied fairly. Now we would be giving the minister even more arbitrary power to apply these so-called policies and standards even though we do not know whether they are being applied fairly because there are no performance standards. This whole thing is absurd. They need to better coordinate their efforts.
The report is very damning. It says that there are lots of gaps in the system and very little helpful information available from security partners. It also says that security screening for a permanent residence visa can sometimes take more than three years, which is too long. It also says that the system to check whether it is working needs to be strengthened for the admissibility determination process.
In a system that is supposed to help protect Canadians, it is just as important to review the decisions to grant visas as it is to review the decisions to deny them. As the Auditor General said, rather than focusing on decisions on why visas are denied, we should focus on how visas are granted. However, that has not been done.
Is this a serious problem? Yes, the system is in serious need of change. However, I want to put it in perspective. Only 1% of applicants for temporary residence and 0.1% of applicants for permanent residence were found to be inadmissible. Of the 257,000 people who come to this country and become permanent residents, what are we talking about? We are talking about 46 people, which is not a huge concern in terms of changing the law. The real concern is how the law is being administered.
The Conservatives have fallen down on the job of ensuring the law is being applied properly and fairly.
