Peter MacKay

[Public Safety, February 19th, 2015]

Mr. Speaker, once again the Leader of the Opposition is trying to scare Canadians into thinking that they will be targeted, and that is absolutely not the intent of the bill. In fact, one only has to read the bill to see that they will not be targeted. It states specifically that any activity undermining Canada's security does not include lawful advocacy, protest, dissent or artistic expression.

The type of activity the hon. member is describing is not going to be targeted by CSIS or the RCMP.

[Public Safety, February 19th, 2015]

Mr. Speaker, that is one of the most important elements of the bill, enabling CSIS to do just that, to disrupt and in some cases to take down material that could be used for radicalization. The hon. member again is incorrect in his assessment of the bill.

This is a comprehensive bill. This is a bill that involves oversight for those new powers. This is a bill that Canadians are responding to very positively, unlike the position staked out by the NDP.

[Public Safety, February 19th, 2015]

Mr. Speaker, that is patently false. Many departments of government, including the justice department, have cross-cultural round tables. Our security forces themselves are often involved in outreach, and they will continue to do so.

However, with respect to the substance of Bill C-51 before the House, the bill would give tools to our security forces to allow them to do more to prevent terrorism, to prevent violence. That is something that all communities in Canada are interested in and engaged in the discussion.

[Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, February 18th, 2015]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise and take part in what is obviously a very important debate on Bill C-51, the government's comprehensive counterterrorism package. This bill, which is titled the anti-terrorism act, 2015, deals, first and foremost, with public safety and efforts by our government to embrace methods that would improve and enhance safety for all Canadians.

The bill builds upon concrete legislative steps this government has already taken to combat terrorism, including through the Combating Terrorism Act, the Nuclear Terrorism Act of 2013, as well as more recent proposals found in Bill C-44, the protection of Canada from terrorists act. Therefore, members can see there is a litany of legislative action already demonstrated by this government.

We can make no mistake about it, these are real dangers, not theoretical or hypothetical scenarios. As we have seen in places like Paris, Australia, Brussels, and in Canada, these acts have deadly effects. This is why there is simply no denying the existence of the threat and the necessity to take practical steps to improve the way in which our security forces operate, coordinate and respond to acts of terrorism. This is also to increase our capacity to learn from international examples. The ability for CSIS to operate outside of our borders is the security capacity that is found in most of our allies, certainly most of our Five Eyes partners.

The government is involved in broad-based efforts to counter domestic and international terrorism in order to protect our country, our citizens and our interest in our allies. This is consistent with our counterterrorism strategy, which is to build resilience against terrorism. Therefore, clearly working through partnerships, including with all levels of government and community leaders, is key to effectively implementing this strategy.

As the Speaker may know and members may be aware, we have an outreach effort at the Department of Justice that involves a cultural round table where we regularly consult and receive input from various communities around the country. This is an effective way to gain insight and understanding of how Canadians perceive this issue of terrorism.

As well as implementing this strategy, we are including our efforts to counter violent extremism. Engaging with the cross-cultural round tables on security-related issues is of great benefit in getting the balance right. There is also significant collaboration with international partners in addressing the terrorist threat.

As the Minister of Justice, I am responsible for ensuring that Canada's laws remain robust, fair and just. This is particularly important in the area of criminal law. Canada, like its friends and allies, must ensure that our laws remain responsive and effective in combatting the scourge of terrorism, while at the same time ensuring our laws respect our fundamental rights and freedoms.

Bill C-51 contains a suite of criminal law reforms that will do just that by amending the Criminal Code to strengthen terrorism recognisance with conditions and peace bond provisions; create a new criminal offence for abdicating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general; provide courts with the powers to seize, forfeit and remove terrorist propaganda, including from web sites located inside our borders; and to better protect individuals participating in national security proceedings and prosecutions.

These steps, in addition to those discussed earlier by my colleague the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, will go a long way to closing any real or perceived gaps in our ability to respond to terrorist acts.

I would like to take a closer look at each of the four pillars of criminal law reform in this bill. However, I would like to begin by pointing out that these four pillars of reform have common denominators.

The Criminal Code reforms individually and collectively seek to provide law enforcement agencies with appropriate tools to thwart the activities of terrorists who actively engage in terrorism. Within these reforms, and with these in place, police officers will now be able to intervene sooner, more effectively, and achieve better results before the matters get more serious. This aims to provide our protection for all Canadians through enabling the police to pre-empt and prevent acts of terrorism.

I want to emphasize here that judicial oversight is the backbone of these criminal reforms consistent with Canada's values and principles, including, as the Supreme Court of Canada has often repeated and I will emphasize again today, the values of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law. This is the type of oversight that should provide considerable comfort and relief to those who have criticized the bill at its early stage.

I would suggest that this type of insight that comes from the courts in enabling our security agents to make those types of interventions prior to acts of terrorism is at the very crux of what we are attempting to do. It is not just to be responsive; it is to be pre-emptive in protecting Canadians from acts of terrorism.

The first area of criminal law reform found in Bill C-51 would strengthen the existing provisions on the recognizance with conditions and terrorism peace bonds contained in sections 83.3 and 810.01, respectively, of the Criminal Code. Let me go further. This Criminal Code recognizance with conditions is already a tool that can be used. It is designed to disrupt and prevent terrorist activity from occurring in the first place. For example, this provision allows a peace officer, with the consent of the Attorney General, a prosecutor acting with delegated authority, to bring an individual before the court with evidence to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to require the individual to abide by specific conditions designed to prevent terrorist activity from occurring.

It bears noting that the individual in question would not necessarily be the person who might carry out that activity. In other words, the person could be a party to the offence or enabling the offence. It is important to note here that the provisions currently require that the court be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorism activity will occur and that there be reasonable grounds to suspect that the recognizance with conditions is necessary to prevent that activity from occurring.

To move to the reforms, those introduced in section 83.3 of the Criminal Code found in Bill C-51 would lower the threshold required to obtain the recognizance from reasonable grounds to believe that terrorist activity will be carried out to the test of may be carried out. This threshold is also lowered from reasonable grounds to suspect that conditions are necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity to are likely to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity.

These changes have the practical effect of making it easier to disrupt terrorist plans before they are executed. Therefore, going before a judge and making the case, based on evidence collected, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the terrorist activity may be carried out lowers the threshold, thus allowing police to act more efficiently and, in many cases, quicker.

In the bill, our government would also increase the possible maximum period of preventive detention from a total of three days to seven days, with safeguards, including periodic judicial review of the detention, to ensure that it is still required. Again, if we look at international examples, in the United Kingdom, it is twice that period of detention. As it currently stands in Canada, it is three days. We would extend that to allow the police agencies to ensure that they are doing everything in their power to prevent the terrorist act from occurring on Canadian soil.

The bill, through the Criminal Code, would also provide similar measures with respect to preventing the commission of terrorist offences. Terrorism peace bonds, as we know, are preventive tools used to disrupt and prevent individuals from committing terrorism offences. Peace bonds and recognizance are used in the domestic criminal justice system as well, but here there are specific provisions found in this bill that expand the use of recognizance and peace bonds. An application to impose a peace bond can be brought even where there has been no criminal charge or no prior conviction, but enables a judge to impose any reasonable conditions in order to prevent the commission of an offence.

What we are talking about here is enabling the judiciary, the police and the prosecution, to put in place preventive measures, such as requiring the person to forfeit their passports, requiring them to report to police or authorities, or staying away from certain individuals, staying away from certain public places, for example, like a military base.

All of these might be seen as extraordinary in normal circumstances, but I would suggest that in the context of this entire debate, we are talking about an elevated threat assessment based on what occurred here in October, 2014, based on what is happening around the world and based on the assessment of our security forces. These are practical steps that allow our security forces, with judicial oversight, to take preventative steps.

Currently, the Criminal Code provides that any person who fears on reasonable grounds that the individual will commit a terrorism offence, with the consent of the attorney general or a prosecutor in his or her stead, can apply to the court to have a terrorism peace bond imposed requiring the individual to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, or to comply with any other reasonable condition that the court believes necessary to ensure their good conduct, some of the provisions I mentioned. These conditions can be for a period of up to one year or, in the case of a person who has previously been convicted of a terrorism offence, up to two years.

These amendments would strengthen the terrorism peace bond by lowering the threshold to obtain that peace bond to where a person believed an individual “may” commit a terrorism offence, instead of the current “will” commit a terrorism offence. The bill would extend the duration of a terrorism peace bond from two to five years for those previously convicted of a terrorism offence.

More generally, in respect of both recognizance conditions and terrorism peace bond conditions, the bill would authorize the imposition of sureties, which is someone who agrees to take the responsibility of ensuring that the person subject to the court order complies with the conditions imposed. The bill would also require judges to specifically consider the desirability of imposing geographic limitations. I mentioned earlier surrendering passports or other conditions that the judge deems appropriate.

Moreover, these reforms would increase the penalty for breaches of these court ordered conditions from two to four years of imprisonment, consistent with similar conditions imposed found in Bill C-26, the tougher penalties for child predators act.

Finally, I suggest that these reforms would have the added benefit of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of recognizance with conditions and peace bonds across the country by allowing for the use of video conferencing when necessary and interprovincial transfers of any peace bonds on the consent of the appropriate attorney general.

The proposed reform with respect to recognizance with conditions and recognizance to keep the peace relating to a terrorist offence would also apply to adolescents in accordance with the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

In short, the proposed amendments, which I have just referred to and described, seek to facilitate the use of the provisions to make them easier to obtain and to make them more effective in preventing terrorism, all with the backdrop of judicial oversight.

It is important to emphasize that the improvements we want to make to our terrorism prevention tools are compatible with what like-minded countries have in place.

For example, the United Kingdom uses similar measures to protect the public by subjecting individuals believed to pose a threat to public safety to conditions.

Australia also uses these control orders to prevent terrorist acts from occurring, which is to help enable the imposition of conditions on individuals. It is important because it shows that countries with strong democratic conditions, such as ours, and strong institutions which respect the rule of law, like ours, have also recognized that they can take measures that are firm in their response to terrorism, but fair in their approach to citizens, respecting the rights of those who are subject to these preventative tools.

Let us remind ourselves again of what we are trying to prevent: mass casualties, attacks on our institutions and the planting of bombs. What we see in other countries on the nightly news is no longer something that we are protected from merely because of our geography.

There are individuals who have sworn to cause us harm and who continue to make very pointed and prescribed threats against Canadian citizens. That is the backdrop in which we must remind ourselves this bill is rooted.

I pause here to emphasize that we are mindful of the concerns expressed by many stakeholders about these changes. Some have suggested that these proposals pose an unjustified and unnecessary infringement on fundamental charter rights. In response, I would note that there are many safeguards associated with the tools I have just described. I mentioned judicial oversight, the discretion exercised by our judiciary, and the requirement of the Attorney General's consent in their use. We have prosecutors now specifically trained in the use and application of this type of legislation.

In addition, there are reports to Parliament from our security agencies that refer specifically to recognizance with conditions. In addition, there is the requirement of a mandatory parliamentary review in 2018 and a sunset clause with respect to the recognizance with conditions I mentioned. This would all result in an ability to have eyes on and insight into the way the legislation would be applied.

Let us remember the objective of these tools: namely, the imposition of reasonable conditions on persons by the courts with a view to preventing terrorism activity and the commission of terrorism offences.

Our government takes the position that these measures are necessary to protect public safety. They are not to be used arbitrarily, and they are based on genuine concerns that put the public at risk.

The second area of the Criminal Code reform contained in Bill C-51, which would indicate a new indictable offence for advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general, is again an area of the law we think is necessary.

[Parliamentary Precinct Security, February 16th, 2015]

Mr. Speaker, this is an important debate, undeniably for Parliament and also for Canadians, for understanding the issues around security on the Hill. Surely October 22 shocked parliamentarians and all the staff and guards and police who were here, and it really shook Canadians in many ways to see that type of violence visited on one of the most important democratic institutions that our country has.

In this debate and in the wording of the motion there is much to examine. We have heard some very thoughtful comments and some very pressing concerns that have to be met, not the least of which are the concerns of the guards here.

I hope in the time I have remaining to put to rest some of the fears, because I do fear that, for whatever reason, there has been an attempt to leave the impression that the guards here on the Hill had somehow failed in their duty or had not done proper security and that they will be cast aside and would somehow be left in the lurch as a result of the changes that are foreseen.

I think it goes without saying that the precinct of Parliament and the buildings that make up that precinct should not have four separate, or arguably five, separate security forces working within a few hundred metres of the seat of government.

It has been stated a number of times, but it bears repeating, that these silos that have evolved naturally and that occur when we have separate security forces cause a breakdown in efficiencies and communications when it comes to providing proper security, so there is a very practical side to what we are attempting to do.

Mr. Speaker, you have been here a while as well. This discussion has certainly been going on as long as I can remember. When I came here in 1997, the discussion was happening then, but it goes back further than that. It has been the subject of some quite involved and thoughtful studies that relate to maintaining parliamentary privilege while maintaining services and security for current parliamentarians. It comes down to a very important crux of the issue, and that is the ability to integrate security in the most efficient way to protect those within this precinct.

Without going back to October 22 and re-examining the particular issues of that day, it stands to reason that our national police force, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, would be seized of this issue and would be given the overall responsibility. When one considers their plugged-in nature with CSIS for intelligence gathering and with CSEC in terms of military intelligence, their national reach and experience in history and connectivity to this place all lend themselves to being the body that would provide the greatest security.

This is why we have introduced the measure that has been the subject of this debate. It is an idea that I would submit is long overdue. It is not something that was simply brought about in the aftermath of October 22. In fact, in 2012 the Auditor General recommended moving towards an integrated security force. The Auditor General, in the report on the parliamentary precinct, also recommended a unified security force, and the integrated security model announced today and discussed here is all about acting on that recommendation, which states, “It is necessary to balance the desired level of access with sufficient security to ensure that risks are mitigated.”

Therefore, there was much work done before October 22, but I would submit that a great deal has happened since.

I said at the outset I wanted to mention and dwell for some time on the issue around the impact on the staff. Some have suggested that the RCMP will somehow exclude the courageous and commendable work that was done by security forces here, that they would somehow be cast aside.

The fact of the matter is that the RCMP, with their resources and their experience, are well versed at working with other security forces. That has been the evolution of our national police force. They have had, by necessity, to work with municipal police, with provincial police, and, as I mentioned, with other security agencies, and that has been to our country's benefit.

We saw a recent example, if I might mention what happened in the city of Halifax just a few short days ago. The RCMP worked closely with Halifax metro and an international police force in the United States to thwart what would have been a disastrous Valentine's Day massacre in the city of Halifax. I salute the incredible work that was done, much of which came about because of intelligence gathering and a humane tip offered through Crime Stoppers.

To come back to the point, the confidence we feel in the House of Commons protective services, the men and women who have guarded these premises for over 150 years and have done so with extraordinary professionalism, courtesy, and personal commitment, is not the essence of this debate. There is no denying that what happened on October 22, 2014 was perhaps the greatest example of their professionalism and courage.

I could not stand here without mentioning the sergeant-at-arms. Mr. Vickers, now our ambassador to Ireland, is a true Canadian hero, but there were many heroes that day, in uniform and working here on the Hill.

To be clear, this is an endorsement of a continuation of inclusion for the betterment of security here in the precinct. It is Canada's national police force that should lead that effort.

We are also committed to providing Canadians with continued access to the House of Commons. This has been another legitimate concern. Canadians want to be able to access this place. This an important home of democracy, and reasonable security measures must be balanced against that concern. Appropriate security measures will be implemented by this new integrated security unit for the parliamentary precinct and will be done with a great deal of input, including, most importantly, from those who have been doing this job for many years and decades.

Ensuring the safety of our visitors, our staff, our elected officials, including those in the Senate, and all those who work here in the precinct is following an international example. It is following what has happened in other parliaments. I am sure that this has been mentioned. In the U.K. and Australia, there has been a natural evolution to recognize the modern security threats and to recognize the physical infrastructure that has improved, as was mentioned by members here tonight.

It is important to emphasize that the Westminster parliament, the mother parliament of all, took steps in this direction some time ago. Canada is lagging in this regard, and the time is here. It and other parliaments have clearly demonstrated that security forces are much stronger and much more efficient when integrated while at the same time balancing the privileges of Parliament.

To that extent, I must also mention that this would not be done under the sole authority of the RCMP. Some have mentioned that it would therefore be the government controlling security. However, this would be done through the Speakers' offices. The Speakers of the House and the Senate would very much have a hand in how this integrated security force would operate.

I want to stress that the rights and privileges of Parliament through the Chair, the important office of the Speaker, would remain unchanged. This would include the privilege of the House and the Senate to control their own precincts and the right of members to come and go unimpeded.

This motion, should it pass and be implemented, is a natural progression in the development of a memorandum of understanding to govern the next steps. This is not something that would be drafted on the back of a napkin. There is a great deal of work already in place that would continue in a transparent and inclusive way.

The security imperatives are such that it is the government's objective, and it should be all members' objective, to see that this transition and partnership with security partners occurs as soon as possible. Following the passage of a parliamentary motion in both Houses, the government would work with the Speakers on the transition planning.

This again does not suggest that we are beginning this process anew. This is something that has been happening now for some time. It would build on those existing efforts.

Maintaining one force inside the Parliament buildings and one force outside the Parliament buildings simply does not make sense in this current threat environment. That is why we are in full support of integration throughout the precinct under the operational leadership of the RCMP.

The operational command would see an RCMP officer commanding the integrated security unit, but the selection process would be carried out in accordance with the RCMP Act, which is an act that includes all the elements of the existing RCMP. This is something that would be done in consultation with both Houses and with both Speakers.

I know the time is coming to an end, but I want to make the point, again, abundantly clear. This government, and I believe I am safe in speaking for all members here, has not lost faith for a moment in the security that has been provided by the men and women of the parliamentary security force. They are our best friends. They are people who we have come to know and respect and to care for deeply because of the way they have treated all members. I, for one, after time here on the Hill, consider some of the members of this force to be good friends, to be people who I have come to know, and I know their families. It is very important that they understand that we deeply value their service to this precinct but also to this country.

Their bravery that was on display on October 22 was nothing short of extraordinary. I am so glad that we had the opportunity to express that to them personally here on the floor of the House of Commons that day. All members demonstrated an incredible outpouring of personal affection, respect, and appreciation for all that they did on October 22 and for all they have done throughout their entire time here on Parliament Hill.

For those reasons, I would encourage all members in this House to support this motion, as it ends some of the duplication, overlap, and inconsistencies that can be exploited and can cause gaps in our security. No one wants to see security breached, as it was on that day. There has been ample time now to examine in detail what occurred.

More importantly, it is time to move forward in a thoughtful way that includes everyone, that puts security first, and that balances the rights of our parliamentary precinct and Canadians.

[Justice, February 6th, 2015]

Mr. Speaker, with respect to the first part of the member's question, I think that over-the-top rhetoric is quite insulting to our security forces.

To the second part of her question regarding the protections against lawful protest, this is covered by the act. This would not pose a threat to individuals who engage in lawful assembly.

I spoke to the earlier part of her question with regard to the mandate of CSIS not extending beyond its lawful authority and, of course, being subject to judicial oversight.

[Public Safety, February 6th, 2015]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for her question.

Government agencies and departments have many opportunities to consult the community on efforts to combat radicalization.

However, let us be clear. This is not an issue of playing politics. This is an issue of imminent threats. This is an issue we are adapting to in an evolving threat environment. That is why the legislation is brought forward, that is why these efforts are ongoing, and that is why the members opposite should--

[Public Safety, February 6th, 2015]

Mr. Speaker, there are numerous ways in which we are countering radicalization, including the ability, now, to remove material that is seen to incite or provoke terrorism. Beyond that, we have cultural round tables. We have outreach. The security forces themselves are very actively engaged in that.

However, I want to point out that the hon. member quotes selectively from the SIRC report. The report goes on to state that:

The Committee is confident that it has the expertise and ability to effectively take on new challenges.

It goes on to state:

...the Committee has confidence in its ability to adapt [to measures and]...remains relevant and effective in providing proper accountability of Canada's security intelligence activities.

They should quote the entire--

[Public Safety, February 6th, 2015]

The short answer, Mr. Speaker, would be, of course, a judge. I will point out that the powers being granted to CSIS will be subject to strict limits. CSIS will be forbidden from taking any measures that cause, intentionally or by negligence, death or bodily harm; that violate the sexual integrity of an individual; or that willfully obstruct, pervert, or defeat the course of justice.

CSIS will not become a law enforcement agency. CSIS employees would not be given the powers of peace officers, such as the ability to arrest or imprison individuals. CSIS has always been and will continue to be required to seek a warrant.

[Public Safety, February 6th, 2015]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for his question. This is a very important question. In fact, there has been some erroneous and inaccurate reporting around this subject.

CSIS' mandate to disrupt threats will be based on the definition of “threats to the security of Canada”. It is found in section 2 of the CSIS Act. It has been based on CSIS' primary investigative mandate since 1984. The definition includes espionage, sabotage, foreign-influenced activities, terrorism, and subversion, and it explicitly excludes lawful advocacy, protest, or dissent.