Peter Milliken

[Privilege, November 26th, 2009]

I have heard enough on this point.

I would like to thank the hon. members who raised this issue, especially the hon. member for St. John's East, whom I thank for his interventions on this.

In my view this is not a matter of privilege for the House at this time, and I say, “at this time”. It may become one.

The witness in question is testifying before a committee of this House, not before the House. The question of privilege, in my view, is one that should be raised in the committee. The committee has full power to decide whether or not its privileges have been breached and it will want to do so when it sees what information is submitted by the witnesses to the committee.

They may not have had all the papers with them on the day they appeared, but they may be tabled later before the committee or brought to the committee later. The committee can decide whether or not it has received what it was entitled to receive and whether or not there has been a breach of its privileges, and it can then present a report to the House.

If a report comes to the House, it is up to the Speaker to decide whether that report then allows a member to raise a question of privilege arising from the report, which will then get priority treatment in this House as befits a question of privilege.

I refer hon. members to pages 151-2 of O'Brien and Bosc, and this is in committee, where it states:

If, in the opinion of the Chair, the issue raised relates to privilege...the committee can proceed to the consideration of a report on the matter to the House. The Chair will entertain a motion which will form the text of the report. It should clearly describe the situation, summarize the events, name any individuals involved, indicate that privilege may be involved or that a contempt may have occurred, and request the House to take some action. The motion is debatable and amendable, and will have priority of consideration in the committee. If the committee decides that the matter should be reported to the House, it will adopt the report which will be presented to the House at the appropriate time under the rubric “Presenting Reports from Committees” during Routine Proceedings.

Once the report has been presented, the House is formally seized of the matter. After having given the appropriate notice, any Member may then raise the matter as a question of privilege. The Speaker will hear the question of privilege and may hear other Members on the matter, before ruling on the prima facie nature of the question of privilege. As Speaker Fraser noted in a ruling, “...The Chair is not judging the issue. Only the House itself can do that. The Chair simply decides on the basis of the evidence presented whether the matter is one which should take priority over other business”. Should the Speaker rule the matter a prima facie breach of privilege, the next step would be for the Member who raised the question of privilege to propose a motion asking the House to take some action. Should the Speaker rule that there is no prima facie question of privilege, no priority would be given to the matter.

In my view this is clearly a matter that the committee can consider. If it decides that its privileges and its members' privileges have been breached, it can report the matter to the House and we can deal with the matter when that report arrives here in the chamber.

But in my view the privileges of the House itself at this moment have not been breached. Possibly there has been a breach in the committee, I am making no judgment on that matter, but when the committee presents a report, I will hear argument on it if necessary and give a ruling in accordance with practice at that time.

However, I believe it would be premature for the Speaker of the House to decide a matter that is currently before a committee, and has not come back to the House from the committee except in submissions by the hon. member. The committee will have to decide on its own initiative whether or not the privileges of the committee or of its members have been breached by what has transpired.

We will leave the matter there for the time being and move on at this point to orders of the day.

[Points of Order, November 23rd, 2009]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised by the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on November 3, 2009, regarding the language used by the hon. member for Laurier—Sainte-Marie during oral questions that day. I want to thank the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration for having brought this matter to my attention, as well as the hon. member for Lévis—Bellechasse and the hon. member for Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, for sharing their views.

In his submission the parliamentary secretary alleged that the member for Laurier—Sainte-Marie repeatedly accused the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism of being a liar and asked the member for Laurier--Sainte-Marie to withdraw the remarks.

For his part, the member for Laurier—Sainte-Marie denied calling the minister a liar but admitted that he used the word “lies”, arguing that this was in fact acceptable as per past practice.

As I committed to do, I have reviewed Hansard and the video tapes of the exchange in question. Unable to discern what term was actually used in reference to the minister, I must take the member for Laurier—Sainte-Marie at his word as is the long-standing practice.

That being said, I would be remiss in my duties as your Speaker if I left hon. members with the impression that words can be uttered in strict isolation without taking into account their effect on decorum in the chamber. As stated in the House of Commons Procedure and Practice, second edition, at page 619:

In dealing with unparliamentary language, the Speaker takes into account the tone, manner and intention of the member speaking; the person to whom the words at issue were directed; the degree of provocation; and, most importantly, whether or not the remarks created disorder in the Chamber. Thus, language deemed unparliamentary one day may not necessarily be deemed unparliamentary the following day.

In another ruling concerning unparliamentary language delivered on May 26, 2009, at pages 3702 and 3703 of the Debates, I stated:

… that certain words, while not always aimed specifically at individuals and therefore arguably technically not out of order, can still cause disruption, can still be felt by those on the receiving end as offensive and therefore can and do lead to disorder in the House.

It is that kind of language that I as Speaker am bound by our rules not only to discourage but to disallow.

These words ring as true today as they did then and are equally instructive in determining the acceptability of language used by hon. members.

As I have done in the past, I appeal to all hon. members on all sides of the House to choose their words with greater care. A reasonable degree of self-discipline is not a luxury. It is indispensable to civilized discourse and to the dignity of this institution. That point has been made in several of the points of order raised earlier this day.

Accordingly, in the matter before us today, I must find that the remarks made by the member for Laurier—Sainte-Marie did create such disorder that the dignity of this House was compromised, and as such were unparliamentary. I would therefore ask him to withdraw his words.

I thank hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, November 19th, 2009]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on November 3, 2009 by the hon. member for Sackville—Eastern Shore concerning the mailing of a ten percenter to some of his constituents by the hon. member for Saskatoon—Wanuskewin. The mailing was critical of the voting record of the member for Sackville—Eastern Shore on the issue of the long-gun registry.

I would like to thank the hon. member for raising this matter and providing the Chair with a copy of the material in question, as well as the member for Saskatoon—Wanuskewin for his contribution on the issue.

In presenting his case, the member for Sackville—Eastern Shore claimed that the member for Saskatoon—Wanuskewin had sent a mailing to some of the constituents of Sackville—Eastern Shore that contained information that was factually wrong regarding his position on the long-gun registry as well as on his voting record on this matter. He accused the member for Saskatoon—Wanuskewin of deliberately misleading his constituents and impugning his reputation on the work that he had done on legislation regarding the long-gun registry.

In his comments, the hon. member for Saskatoon—Wanuskewin obliquely acknowledged, without apologizing, that he had made an error and that the ten percenter in question was incorrect in reference to the member for Sackville—Eastern Shore. The member for Saskatoon—Wanuskewin then thanked the hon. member for his long-standing opposition to the long-gun registry.

The situation before us today is analogous to one in 2005 in which a similar mailing was sent to the constituency of the hon. member for Windsor West. That mailing had the effect of distorting the member’s voting record, again on the gun registry and thereby misinforming his constituents. In finding a prima facie case of privilege, on April 18, 2005, Debates, page 5215, I stated:

This may well have affected his ability to function as a member and may have had the effect of unjustly damaging his reputation with voters in his riding.

The 38th report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs tabled on May 11, 2005, on the same matter concurred in that view.

Again, I quote:

[The member for Windsor West] noted that he had received complaints from constituents as a result of the mailing. By unjustly damaging his reputation with voters in his riding, it thereby impairs his ability to function as a member.

Having reviewed the material submitted, as well as the arguments made, the Chair can only conclude that the mailing sent to the constituents of Sackville—Eastern Shore did distort their member's true position on the long-gun registry and, at the very least, had the potential to create confusion in their minds.

It may also have had the effect of unjustly damaging his reputation and his credibility with the voters of his riding and, as such, infringing on his privileges by affecting his ability to function as a member.

Accordingly, I find that a prima facie case of privilege does exist and I invite the hon. member for Sackville—Eastern Shore to move his motion now.

[Points of Order, November 19th, 2009]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised on November 5, 2009, by the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Government House Leader. The point of order dealt with the admissibility of an amendment adopted by the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities in its consideration of Bill C-280, An Act to amend the Employment Insurance Act (qualification for and entitlement to benefits) and reported to the House on November 5.

I wish to thank the hon. Parliamentary Secretary for having raised this issue as well as the hon. members for Chambly—Borduas, Acadie—Bathurst and Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord for presenting their arguments on the matter.

The parliamentary secretary reminded the House that Bill C-280 was identified by the Chair as requiring a royal recommendation in a ruling delivered on June 3, 2009. He argued that the amendment in question, which seeks to increase the weekly benefits payable to a claimant from 55% to 60% of the average weekly insurable earnings likewise infringes on the financial initiative of the Crown. He completed his presentation by referring to page 655 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice, first edition, which says:

An amendment must not offend the financial initiative of the Crown. An amendment is therefore inadmissible if it imposes a charge on the Public Treasury, or if it extends the objects or purposes or relaxes the conditions and qualifications as expressed in the Royal Recommendation.

In his intervention, the member for Chambly—Borduas insisted that the committee was well aware that certain provisions in the bill already contained proposals which would result in increased spending and that the amendment was consistent with those proposals. The member for Acadie—Bathurst added that in situations of private members’ bills requiring a Royal Recommendation, the Speaker is responsible for deciding the question only once the bill is returned to the House. Finally, the member for Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord claimed that there had been no discussion of admissibility regarding this amendment at committee.

As the House knows, the Speaker does not intervene on matters upon which committees are competent to take decisions. However, in cases where a committee has exceeded its authority, particularly in relation to bills, the Speaker has been called upon to deal with such matters after the bill in question has been reported to the House. In doing so, the Chair is guided by Speaker Fraser's succinct explanation of April 28, 1992, at page 9,801 of the Debates.

It reads:

When a bill is referred to a standing or legislative committee of the House, that committee is only empowered to adopt, amend or negative the clauses found in that piece of legislation and to report the bill to the House with or without amendments. The committee is restricted in its examination in a number of ways. It cannot infringe on the financial initiative of the Crown, it cannot go beyond the scope of the bill as passed at second reading, and it cannot reach back to the parent act to make further amendments not contemplated in the bill no matter how tempting that may be.

Having examined the specific amendment at issue and reviewed the submissions of all hon. members, the Chair finds that the amendment in question does propose a charge on the public treasury and therefore infringes on the financial initiative of the Crown.

While the Chair can appreciate the difficulties that may arise when a committee must examine a bill which, upon its reference to committee, is flawed with respect to the royal recommendation, a committee must carry out its mandate without exceeding its powers. In my view, by adopting an amendment that infringes on the financial initiative of the Crown, even when it is directed at a clause itself needing a royal recommendation, a committee ventures beyond its mandate.

Consequently, I must order that the amendment to clause 5, adopted by the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities be declared null and void, and no longer form part of the bill as reported to the House.

In addition, I am ordering that a reprint of Bill C-280 be published with all possible haste for use by the House at report stage to replace the reprint ordered by the committee.

I thank the House for its attention.

[Points of Order, November 16th, 2009]

Order, please, if the House will grant some indulgence.

On Tuesday, October 27, the hon. government House leader rose on a point of order concerning the admissibility of an opposition motion placed on notice on October 26, in the name of the hon. member for Thunder Bay—Superior North. The hon. member for Vancouver East intervened on the matter, as did the hon. member for Wascana. So that the work of the House could proceed without delay, I immediately stated that the motion was out of order and I promised to return to the House at a later date with a fully considered ruling.

I would now like to put before the House the reasons for my decision that day.

For the benefit of the House, the motion printed in the notice paper read as follows:

That Bill C-311, An Act to ensure Canada assumes its responsibilities in preventing dangerous climate change, be deemed reported from committee without amendment, deemed concurred in at report stage and deemed read a third time and passed.

In explaining why he felt the motion was out of order, the government House leader's main argument was that what this motion was proposing to do could be done only by unanimous consent.

He added that in his view the best the House can do to expedite legislation, without the unanimous consent of the House, is to offer a motion that considers each stage separately with a separate vote. Otherwise, he argued, a situation would arise in which any opposition party could put forward a similarly draconian motion on any private member's bill and have it expedited through the legislative process.

For her part, the House leader for the NDP stressed the wide latitude given to opposition parties on supply days to propose motions of their choosing.

In support of this argument, she quoted from House of Commons Procedure and Practice at page 724:

The Standing Orders give Members a very wide scope in proposing opposition motions on Supply days and, unless the motion is clearly and undoubtedly irregular (e.g., where the procedural aspect is not open to reasonable argument), the Chair does not intervene.

The House will remember that on March 21, 2007, in a situation analogous to the one before us, I ruled out of order an opposition motion submitted by the member for Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine. In that case, the motion in question sought to expedite the consideration and adoption of several government bills in a manner similar to the motion of the hon. member for Thunder Bay—Superior North.

As I pointed out in a subsequent ruling on March 29, 2007, past interventions from the Chair regarding opposition motions have been rare, restricted to cases in which a motion is “clearly and undoubtedly irregular”. I also explained that there is nothing whatsoever in the relevant procedural authorities to suggest that opposition motions on supply days were ever conceived of as a means of fast-tracking bills already present elsewhere on the order paper. House of Commons Procedure and Practice stresses, at page 701, that a key principle underlying the business of supply is that the House, and by extension the opposition via motions proposed on allotted days, has:

--the right to have its grievances addressed before it considers and approves the financial requirements of the Crown.

As I stated in 2007, (Debates, March 29, 2007, p. 8138) it is evident from their historical background that opposition motions on supply days were never envisaged as an alternative to the legislative process:

The very high threshold of unanimous consent creates a pivotal safeguard in ensuring that every measure before the House receives full and prudent consideration. What is being proposed not only does away with that safeguard, it takes advantage of the stringent regime governing supply days. In that regard, for example, it is important to note the precedence accorded to opposition motions over all Government supply motions on allotted days.

Furthermore, recent amendments to the rules dealing with such motions offer an especially stringent regime: first, the rules provide what amounts to an automatic closure mechanism since the motion comes to a vote at the end of the day, thus guaranteeing a decision on the motion; and second, no amendment to the motion is possible without the consent of the mover.

In stark contrast, any motion which could be brought forward by the government to expedite consideration of a bill would be debatable and amendable, and the imposition of time allocation or closure would necessitate a separate question from the motion proposing adoption of the bill at a particular stage or stages in the legislative process.

In addition, as mentioned in my initial comments when ruling the motion out of order, as worded, the motion fails to provide members any opportunity to debate the bill itself, in effect short-circuiting the legislative process. The Chair is mindful of the wide latitude available to the opposition with regard to supply motions, but as your Speaker, it is my duty to ensure that matters placed before the House are in keeping with our rules. The reasons outlined above make it clear why the motion of the hon. member for Thunder Bay—Superior North was ruled out of order.

In conclusion, I would ask hon. members to bear in mind today's ruling and the ruling of March 29, 2007, when they are preparing future opposition motions. The Chair will continue to give the traditional latitude to the sponsors of motions to be debated during supply proceedings, but the Chair counts on the co-operation of the sponsors to respect, and not go beyond, traditional limits for such motions.

I thank the House for its attention in this matter.

[Privilege, November 5th, 2009]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on October 27, 2009, by the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons regarding the disturbance in the public gallery that occurred during Oral Questions on October 26, 2009.

I wish to thank the government House leader, the hon. member for Mississauga South, the hon. member for Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, the hon. member for Vancouver East, and the hon. member for Langley for their interventions.

As members will recall, during Question Period on October 26, a disturbance occurred while the leader of the New Democratic Party was asking a question. Several persons were shouting in the public gallery and the House had to interrupt its proceedings for several minutes while the gallery was being cleared by our security officers.

In raising his question of privilege, the government House leader charged the member for Toronto—Danforth with contempt, alleging his involvement in this incident. The substance of the government House leader's allegation, a version of events supported by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of the Environment, is summarized in the following paragraph of his intervention, found on page 6240 of the Debates of October 27, 2009:

The leader of the protesters is the political events organizer of the NDP. His group gained access to the parliamentary precinct because of the leader of the NDP. The leader of the NDP provided a practice room for this group. The group was allowed to go from its practice to the galleries where it obstructed the proceedings of the House and intimidated some members.

The government House leader explained that it had been reported to him that members had felt uncomfortable and had feared for their safety.

In reply to this very serious allegation, the House leader of the New Democratic Party emphatically denied that the member for Toronto—Danforth was involved in the protest that occurred in the public gallery. She indicated that he was simply doing his job by meeting with the group as did other members of Parliament, but that he had no knowledge of the planned protest.

This morning the hon. member for Toronto—Danforth assured the House that he was not aware that a disturbance had been planned by the visitors with whom he met on October 26. He denied being involved in any way and expressed dismay that such allegations were made.

At the outset, the Chair wishes to state that it views the disruption of the proceedings of the House as a very serious matter, and as has been noted by the government House leader, House of Commons Procedure and Practice on page 84 states:

Speakers have consistently upheld the right of the House to the services of its members free from intimidation, obstruction and interference.

Some members may recall that the House experienced two gallery disturbances in 1990; both instances are most instructive in dealing with the case at hand. The first occurred on April 10, 1990, when two visitors disrupted the proceedings of the House by throwing papers from the galleries onto members in the chamber. The next day, a member raised a question of privilege charging another member with contempt of the House, alleging that he had provided passes for the protesters and had prior knowledge of the protest. On April 27, as reported on page 10760 of the Debates of the House of Commons, the member thus charged denied such prior knowledge, thereby settling the matter.

The second case happened on October 17, 1990, when again, objects--in this case macaroni and protest cards--were thrown onto the floor of the House by protesters in the galleries. A question of privilege was raised the next day, as reported on pages 14359 to 14368 of the Debates of the House of Commons, in which a member charged another member with knowing in advance about the demonstration and doing nothing to prevent it. He contended that the member was thereby an accessory to a contempt of the House. The member who was the subject of the charge denied his involvement in the matter. In his ruling delivered on November 6, 1990, Mr. Speaker Fraser stated that as the member had denied his involvement, that matter was at an end.

In the case presently before the House, the allegations made about the involvement of the member for Toronto—Danforth in the gallery disturbance of October 26 have been categorically denied. In keeping with the precedents outlined above and with the long-standing tradition in this place that we accept an hon. member's word, the Chair accepts the statement of the hon. member for Toronto—Danforth that he was in no way involved. Accordingly, I will therefore consider the matter closed.

Having set aside the question of privilege raised by the government House leader, the Chair wishes to stress that it continues to have serious concerns about the gallery disturbance itself. The actions of the sizable group of individuals in using subterfuge to gain admittance to the galleries and then to disrupt our proceedings are totally unacceptable, and do them and their cause little credit.

They were less than frank about their intentions, and the aggressive behaviour of a few individuals as they were escorted out was particularly provocative. If anything, this incident graphically illustrates the extent to which members can be vulnerable and must be vigilant to avoid being dragged into situations when their guests abuse their trust.

Before I conclude, I would like to take the opportunity to thank the House's security personnel for their work during the incident on October 26. Their swift action in clearing the public gallery under difficult circumstances allowed the House to resume its work with a minimum of delay.

I would like to thank all of my colleagues for their attention.

I wish to inform the House that because of the ministerial statement, government orders will be extended by 32 minutes.

[Privilege, November 5th, 2009]

I am now prepared to make a couple of rulings that I know members are dying to hear.

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on October 27, 2009, by the hon. member for Joliette alleging the premature disclosure of the content of a government bill to the media prior to the bill’s introduction in the House.

I would like to thank the hon. member for Joliette for having raised this matter, as well as the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, the hon. Minister of Public Safety, the hon. member for Wascana, the hon. member for Vancouver East, the hon. member for Beauséjour, and the hon. member for Scarborough—Rouge River for their comments.

In raising his question of privilege, the hon. member for Joliette claimed that a breach of the privileges of the House had occurred as a result of the public disclosure of the content of Bill C-53, An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (accelerated parole review) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts.

The member argued that the Minister of Public Safety in a press conference and through a press release and backgrounder on the bill had disclosed its essence and content to the public and media before it was introduced in the House on October 26, 2009, and that this amounted to a contempt of the House. It was his contention that, “The issue is not the quantity of details but the quality of details—”. He pointed to the importance of the confidentiality of bills prior to their introduction, saying that he always advises colleagues to hold press conferences on their bills only after their introduction.

Likening this situation to the question of privilege he raised on October 22, 2009, concerning the disclosure of details of Bill C-52, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing for fraud), prior to its introduction, the hon. member for Joliette wondered if there was no longer any reason for him to apply the rule of confidentiality of bills on notice so strictly.

During the interventions of the hon. member for Wascana, the hon. member for Vancouver East and the hon. member for Beauséjour, the seriousness of this issue was raised. The chair was urged to consider whether this was becoming a pattern and to give clear direction to the House on the rules that apply in this respect.

Following question period on October 27, the Minister of Public Safety rose to address the issue of whether the contents of Bill C-53 had been improperly disclosed prior to its introduction in the House. The minister noted that the rule prohibiting disclosure of the content of bills prior to their introduction arises out of a 2001 Speaker's ruling. The minister noted that the ruling limited the time period in question to the time between the bill being put on notice and its actual introduction in the House. He argued that the underlying principle is that the text of the bill should be made available first to members of Parliament.

Citing the 2001 case, in which the justice minister had actually circulated to the media a copy of the text of the bill and provided comment on it, the Minister of Public Safety acknowledged that the text of a bill cannot be disclosed to a select group ahead of parliamentarians seeing it. He then went on to accuse the opposition of looking to expand this rule significantly, effectively prohibiting the government from ever discussing any policy that might, in the future, be the subject matter of a bill before the House.

In his comments, the minister argued that the purpose of the rule is not to stifle discussion or debate or an exploration of policy issues but to restrict the actual disclosure of the text of a bill. That is only partly correct. The purpose of the convention is also to ensure that members are not impeded in their work by being denied information that others have been given.

The minister also noted that the time period in question is limited only to the time between a bill being put on notice and its actual introduction, and in this he is correct. Prior to giving notice of a bill, a minister or a private member developing a legislative initiative is of course free to discuss the proposal with anyone, but the House has the right to have first access to the text of the bill once it has been placed on notice. The specifics of a bill, once it has been placed on notice, should remain confidential until the bill is introduced.

In the case before us, the Minister of Public Safety differentiated between his own conduct and prohibited actions, stating that he did not disclose the contents of Bill C-53 but rather discussed an existing policy problem and the intention of the government to solve it. He provided neither a specific explanation of the government's solution nor an indication of what the text of government legislation in this regard would be.

As members have indicated, it has been a long-standing practice that the content of all bills on notice is confidential until they are introduced in the House. As I mentioned in my ruling of March 19, 2001, referred to by the Minister of Public Safety, at page 1,840 of the Debates:

The convention of the confidentiality of bills on notice is necessary, not only so that members themselves may be well informed, but also because of the pre-eminent role which the House plays and must play in the legislative affairs of the nation.

I went on to say that:

To deny to members information concerning business that is about to come before the House, while at the same time providing such information to media that will likely be questioning members about that business, is a situation that the Chair cannot condone.

In the 2001 case, the Chair ruled the matter to be, prima facie, a case of privilege, and it was ultimately referred to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

In the committee's report on the matter, presented to the House on May 9, 2001, this important principle was reiterated. Following a commitment by the then Minister of Justice to establish protocol governing the processes for bills prior to their introduction, the report stated, in part:

The Committee believes that the protocol of the Department of Justice whereby no briefings or briefing materials should be provided with respect to a bill on notice until its introduction in the House of Commons should be adopted as a standard policy by all government departments. We believe that such a policy is respectful of the House of Commons and its members. It recognizes the legislative role of Parliament, and is consistent with parliamentary privilege and the conventions of Parliament.

While an attempt has been made to liken the situation surrounding Bill C-53, the case before us today, to the disclosure of the details of Bill C-52, clearly the circumstances of these two situations are not identical.

In the case of Bill C-52, specific details of the bill were released to the media and the public. On October 26 and 27, respectively, the Minister of Justice and then the Minister of Public Works and Government Services apologized to the House and made commitments to ensure that their actions concerning Bill C-52 would not be repeated. Their apologies put an end to the matter, as I indicated at the time. However, the House—and in particular ministers—should note that had it not been for the apologies of the ministers, the case might well have had a different outcome.

However, in the case of Bill C-53, the Minister of Public Safety categorically assured the House that, “none of the provisions, none of the potential mechanisms, none of the solutions, let alone the specific text” were divulged prior to the bill's introduction in the House.

While, by his own admission, he discussed in broad terms the policy initiative contained in the bill, the Chair is satisfied that the Minister of Public Safety did not disclose the details of the measures being proposed in the bill. The Chair is also satisfied that there has been no contempt of the House as a collectivity nor of any member individually as members were not denied information they need to perform their duties as parliamentarians.

Accordingly, the Chair finds no grounds for declaring a prima facie question of privilege in this case.

I wish to thank the House for its attention to this ruling on a matter of considerable importance to us all.

[Points of Order, October 29th, 2009]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised by the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Government House Leader on October 8, 2009, regarding the admissibility of the motion of instruction moved on the same day by the hon. member for Vancouver East.

I thank the hon. parliamentary secretary, the hon. member for Vancouver East, and the hon. member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley for their interventions on this matter.

The parliamentary secretary argued that the motion of instruction listed on the order paper as Government Business No. 6 is out of order because, in his view, it attempts to time allocate a bill and, as such, is no longer permissive.

He added that the inclusion of a deadline in the motion of instruction had the effect of overriding existing reporting requirements for private members' bills already contained in the Standing Orders.

He also asserted that the motion contains two separate proposals and should, therefore, require two separate motions.

In speaking to the parliamentary secretary's point of order, the hon. member for Vancouver East pointed out that the committee may decide whether or not to exercise the powers given to it by the House, thus, rendering the motion permissive.

For his part, the hon. member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley pointed out that there was a precedent for such a motion of instruction, referring to a motion that was debated on May 30, 2005.

As stated on page 641 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice, and I quote:

Motions of instruction respecting bills are permissive rather than mandatory. It is left to the committee to decide whether or not to exercise the powers given to it by the House...

Once a bill has been referred to a committee, the House may give the committee an instruction by way of a motion which authorizes it to do what it otherwise could not do, such as, for example, examining a portion of a bill and reporting it separately, examining certain items in particular, dividing a bill into more than one bill, consolidating two or more bills into one bill, or expanding or narrowing the scope or application of a bill.

In the matter raised by the parliamentary secretary, the Chair must determine whether the wording of the motion of instruction is permissive or mandatory.

The first and main part of the motion is to give the committee the power to divide the bill. This is recognized as permissive by past practice and procedural authorities. I can see nothing in the motion of instruction that orders the committee to do anything specific with Bill C-311. The deadline and other procedural actions contained in the motion apply only if the committee takes the step to create Bill C-311A, in the full knowledge of the consequences that would ensue.

As I read the motion, the committee can still choose to report Bill C-311 in the same way as it would any other private member's bill.

Members are aware that the Standing Orders stipulate that a private member’s bill must be reported back to the House before the end of 60 sitting days, or, with the approval of the House, following an extension of 30 sitting days. Otherwise, the bill is deemed reported back without amendment.

It has been argued, in this case, that the inclusion of a deadline in the motion of instruction comes into conflict with the provisions of Standing Order 97.1(1), thus rendering the motion out of order.

However, in the view of the Chair, it is not unreasonable to envisage a scenario where the House, for whatever reason, would want a committee to report a bill back prior to the reporting deadline set out in Standing Order 97.1(1).

So, there is nothing, in my understanding of that Standing Order, or in the procedural authorities, that would preclude the House from adopting a motion of instruction that included a reporting deadline.

The example referred to by the hon. member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley is particularly instructive on this point. That motion of instruction, debated in the House on May 30, 2005 (Journals, p. 800) stated in part: “that Bill C-43A be reported back to the House no later than two sitting days after the adoption of this motion”. It provided a deadline remarkably similar to that contained in the motion of instruction moved by the member for Vancouver East.

In the view of the Chair, just as in the 2005 example, the inclusion of a deadline in the motion of instruction for Bill C-311 does not infringe on the committee's discretion to exercise the power to divide the bill, nor with its discretion to amend the bill.

Finally, the Chair is not persuaded by the parliamentary secretary's argument that the motion contains more than one proposal and that it should be divided into two separate motions. A close reading of the motion shows that the portion regarding the reporting deadline is contingent on the main proposition; namely, the permissive instruction to divide the bill.

Accordingly, for all the reasons outlined, the Chair must conclude that the motion is in order.

I thank hon. members for their interventions on this matter.

[Points of Order, October 27th, 2009]

I thank the hon. member for Wascana for that very helpful advice. It is something that had occurred to me. Members can see why I am so interested in the point that is being raised.

In any event, I thank the hon. government House leader and the hon. member for Vancouver East for their submissions on this issue.

I certainly agree that it is one that has to be resolved immediately, as suggested by the hon. member for Wascana.

I will give a preliminary ruling now which is that, in my view, this motion is out of order, and I will not permit it to be moved tomorrow. Someone will have to choose something else for tomorrow's supply day and members can sort that out.

In any event, I will give reasons for my decision on this matter in due course. I will come back with something more reasoned. However, I point out that I think, as the government House leader has said, even if this kind of motion could be moved, as a preliminary observation on the matter, there is no provision whatsoever for debate on the bill; it would be deemed adopted at all stages now, which, as the hon. House leader has pointed out, could be done by unanimous consent. However, even on time allocation or on closure, there is provision for debate for a certain specified time; it may be short, but there is a debate. With this motion, there is none and so, the debate would be on the motion only, not on the bill. Accordingly, in my view, the bill goes beyond what is permitted for supply debates.

I will give a more elaborate reason outlining my views on this matter to the House in due course but, at least for tomorrow, we will not proceed with that.

The hon. parliamentary secretary to the government House leader has a point of order.

[Points of Order, October 22nd, 2009]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised on October 9, 2009, by the hon. member for Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel regarding the use of Standing Order 56.1 to disallow further amendments and subamendments at the second reading stage of Bill C-23, Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act.

I want to thank the hon. member for Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, as well as the hon. member for Vancouver East and the hon. Minister of State and Chief Government Whip for their comments.

The member for Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel argued that the motion of the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, having been moved pursuant to Standing Order 56.1, should be ruled out of order since it does not fall within the definition of a routine motion as prescribed in that Standing Order. Instead, he argued that the Standing Order was used to limit debate, in the same fashion as moving the previous question.

In addition to agreeing with the arguments raised by the member for Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, the member for Vancouver East expressed concern about the expanded use of Standing Order 56.1 and the “creeping, sort of incremental change” accompanying this, which then led her to question the appropriateness of its use in this case. She added that there are other mechanisms available to the government to manage the amount of time allocated to debate on Bill C-23.

The chief government whip contended that the government was applying Standing Order 56.1 correctly and that there had been previous instances where the Standing Order was used in this fashion.

For the benefit of members, the motion adopted on October 9, 2009, reads as follows:

That, notwithstanding any standing order or usual practices of the House, the second reading stage of Bill C-23, An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Colombia, the Agreement on the Environment between Canada and the Republic of Colombia and the Agreement on Labour Cooperation between Canada and the Republic of Colombia, shall not be subject to any further amendments or sub-amendments.

As mentioned by the member for Vancouver East, similar concerns over the expanded use of Standing Order 56.1 were raised in 2001 when it was used for the disposition of a bill at various stages. When I ruled on that point of order on September 18, 2001 in the Debates at pages 5256 to 5258, I expressed reservations about the trend toward using that Standing Order for purposes other than for motions of a routine nature. My predecessor had already urged the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs to examine the use of Standing Order 56.1, and I reiterated this need for the committee to do so at the earliest opportunity.

In the absence of such feedback, on May 13, 2005 in the Debates at pages 5973 to 5974, I allowed a motion that provided for the completion of the second reading stage of two bills to be moved pursuant to Standing Order 56.1. Again, I highlighted the fact that the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs still had not undertaken a study of Standing Order 56.1, and as such, I was not in a position to rule definitively on the appropriateness of that Standing Order's use and I stated the following on that occasion.

I believe having had nothing back [from the committee] I can only allow this one to proceed at this time, particularly so when the time allocated here is much more generous than would be the case under closure or under time allocation…Accordingly the motion appears to be in order.

Similarly, on October 3, 2006, I allowed a motion moved pursuant to Standing Order 56.1 which in part disallowed further amendments or subamendments to the second reading stage of Bill C-24, the Softwood Lumber Products Export Charge Act, 2006. Another motion with such provisions was allowed to proceed on December 12, 2007, in reference to Bill C-28, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 19, 2007 and to implement certain provisions of the economic statement tabled in Parliament on October 30, 2007.

As was the case in those two most recent examples, even though the current motion disallows further amendments and subamendments, it still allows members who have not yet done so to speak to the amendment and the main motion. Furthermore, as I then stated in my ruling in the Debates on October 3, 2006 at page 3571:

The motion does not set a deadline for completion of the proceedings, as would be the case under time allocation or closure...There is a significant difference.

This does not, however, negate the concerns expressed by members over time about the need for a clearer and agreed upon understanding of this Standing Order. The following quote from my 2006 ruling still applies in this case:

My predecessor and I have both encouraged the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs to examine the appropriate use of the Standing Order. To date I am not aware of any report by that committee on this question.

Should the House feel the need to change the parameters pertaining to the use of Standing Order 56.1, I would suggest once more that members bring their concerns to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. Since the committee has not yet offered clear direction on the definition of Standing Order 56.1, and since motions disallowing amendments and subamendments have been ruled admissible in the past, I rule that the motion moved by the Government House Leader on October 9, 2009 is in order.

I thank hon. members for their attention.