Preston Manning

[Iraq, February 10th, 1998]

Last night, Mr. Speaker, the weakest presentation made in the debate on Iraq was made by the Minister of National Defence. He said nothing had been ruled out, nothing had been ruled in, and had nothing much more to say.

If the American secretary of defence appeared before the Congress the night before committing forces to an action and had nothing more to say than that, he would be fired by the next morning.

What will the Prime Minister do to fill this vacuum at the top of the Department of National Defence?

[Iraq, February 10th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, yesterday parliament discussed the Iraqi crisis long into the night and cabinet apparently discussed it this morning, but some critical questions remain to be answered by the Prime Minister.

If diplomacy fails and force is to be used against Saddam Hussein, Canadians want to know what the overall military objective is. Is it to take out weapons factories or is it something bigger?

What exactly is the overall mission and how will we know if it is successful?

[Supply, February 10th, 1998]

Madam Speaker, first of all I find it incredible that the leader of the Conservative Party would put his focus in this debate on articles taken from the Calgary Sun and the Toronto Star .

The first one was written by Mr. Levant long before he worked for us. These positions do not represent the position of the Reform Party, as the hon. member knows. But it gives us an opportunity to declare what our positions are.

I have made it abundantly clear that our principal position is to want this country united like it has never been united before and to put an end to the kind of division that has been brought about by old line party politicians practising on this national unity issue and making a career out of it for 30 years and leaving us in the position where we are at.

Second, we believe that the key to uniting this country is to find a new balance of powers between the federal and provincial governments.

We have practical evidence from the pollsters and from our own experience that it is the one concept for changing the federation for which there is growing support inside Quebec and outside Quebec.

This is the principle on which we believe the country can be united. We are going to do everything in our power to communicate the rebalancing of powers in which we believe inside Quebec and outside Quebec and to provide a third option for Quebeckers and not the status quo federalism that has been represented by this party and that party for 30 years and not the separation of the country advocated by that party, many of which members were recruited into politics by that party.

[Supply, February 10th, 1998]

Madam Speaker, I welcome the opportunity to speak on the motion because it raises the issue of the future of Quebec.

The official opposition is very concerned about the future of Quebeckers. We want to do everything we can to make sure that this future is as good as possible.

I suggest that the motion before us is only half a motion. The motion is really referring to the rights of Quebeckers but it does so without qualification. It appears to imply that the right of Quebeckers to decide their own future is some absolute right but in reality, there are no such things as absolute rights.

Every right is subject to qualifications and limits. Rights are limited by the rights of others. My right to extend my fist stops at the end of your nose. So what we have before us is half a motion. The missing words are subject to the rule of law and the principle of democratic consent.

The official opposition maintains that Quebeckers have the right to decide their own future but first of all in accordance with the rule of law. In the case of Canada that means in accordance with the Constitution of Canada which is the supreme law of our country.

Whether or not the Bloc or the PQ like the Constitution of Canada, it is the law of the land. That law contains no explicit provision for the secession of a province. The only way a province could lawfully secede would be to pass a constitutional amendment which would then have to be carried in this House and approved by the other provinces.

The point that the current law does not provide for a unilateral secession seems patently self-evident to us, but if that point will gain more authority by a ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada, so be it. That is why we favour the reference to the supreme court to get a determination on this matter.

Members of the Bloc will say that they do not intend to respect the rule of law with respect to this point, the right of a province to secede, but I would plead with the Bloc members to tread very carefully on that ground.

Once you say—particularly once lawmakers say—that you respect the rule of law except on this point or that, you are opening a door which you may never be able to shut. And if you teach your people that there are exceptions to the rule of law and that when they disagree with the law they should feel free to break it with impunity rather than to change it, you are starting down a very dangerous road.

That is why I asked the hon. leader of the Bloc after his speech whether he believed in the rule of law within a new Quebec. He said yes. Yet if the Bloc teaches the people of Quebec that there are exceptions to the rule of law, what will be the answers of such members when some citizens of Quebec say to them down the road “We do not like your law. We intend to break your law and we declare that we have a right to unilaterally break it because you taught us that this is permissible”.

Another qualification on the Quebeckers' right to decide their own future is the principle of democratic consent. Reform has been quite clear on this point. We want Quebeckers to remain in Canada. We fervently desire to unite Canada for the 21st century.

We believe that Canada can be united by reforming the federation on the principle of equality and through a rebalancing of the powers. But we have also stated that if a majority of Quebeckers responding to a fair question in a fair referendum process were to decide in favour of secession, the Government of Canada would then have an obligation to enter into negotiations of terms and conditions of secession, terms and conditions on which Canadians would then have to pass judgment.

Before the Bloc Quebecois members rejoice too much at our endorsation of this principle of democratic consent, let me make clear that it is a two-edged sword. If we affirm that Quebeckers have a right to decide their own future in a referendum, that right should apply to every Quebecker including those who see their future as part of Canada.

The ballot for a referendum on secession to be fair to all concerned should bear two questions. And I do not mind saying what the wording of those questions should be: Should Quebec separate from Canada and become an independent country with no special legal ties to Canada, yes or no? If Quebec separates from Canada, should your community separate from Quebec and remain part of Canada, yes or no?

If a majority vote on the first question on separation is sufficient to trigger the negotiation of a secession, a majority vote on the second question in a particular district or municipality would trigger the partition of Quebec, a change in the boundaries of Quebec in accordance with the right of Quebeckers, in this case a minority of Quebeckers, to determine their future. In other words if Canada is divisible, as long as the process employed respects the rule of law and the principle of democratic consent, then Quebec is divisible by the application of the same processes and the same principles.

I conclude by saying it is because the secession of Quebec would not only diminish Canada but would also diminish Quebec, it is because both Canada as a whole and Quebec as an entity would ultimately be injured by secession and partition, that we search for a third way beyond separation and status quo federalism. We earnestly plead with Quebeckers to consider that third way and to generate a new consensus around that third option as the best guarantee of a secure and a prosperous future.

[Supply, February 10th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the leader of the Bloc a simple question. He mentioned people being beyond the Constitution, the voice of people being above the Constitution. Could he tell the House where the principle of the rule of law enters into his thinking? To make it more clear, will one of the governing principles in the new Quebec that he envisions be adherence to the rule of law?

[Middle East, February 9th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by defining the issue before the House as the official opposition sees it. The issue is whether Canada should accept or reject the invitation by the United States to participate in possible military actions in the Middle East, actions to stop terrorism and the production of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein.

The issue is not whether we support a maximum diplomatic effort to constrain Saddam Hussein. Every member of the House supports a maximum diplomatic effort. The issue is what to do if diplomatic efforts fail, whether then to participate in a military action.

I am sure we will find by the end of this evening the issue can be looked at from the political perspective. It can be looked at from the economic and military perspectives. But in all these considerations the official opposition wants to ensure that it is the human and moral dimensions that we keep uppermost in our minds.

If Saddam Hussein persists in the production of chemical and biological weapons and eventually uses them, the cost in terms of human life and suffering is incalculable.

The hon. member from Red Deer and others will dwell on this point a little later but let me mention just one chilling statistic. At the point when Saddam Hussein resumed his refusal to co-operate with the UN special commission, its inspectors were searching for 25 warheads armed with 40 gallons of toxins such as anthrax and botulinum, each of which can kill up to a million people.

If we have any doubts of Saddam Hussein's preparedness to use such weapons, as the prime minister has already said, we should remember that he used chemical and biological weapons against the Iranian forces in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. He used poison gas against his own people, the Kurds in the north, immediately after losing the gulf war.

There is no doubt about it in our mind. Leaving Saddam Hussein unchecked would exact an enormous toll in human suffering. At the same time, of course, military action to constrain Saddam Hussein will also exact a human toll.

It was observed in the House by then Prime Minister Mulroney during the 1991 debate that Saddam Hussein had demonstrated limitless tolerance for the suffering of his own people. He can be counted upon to use women and children as human shields to protect possible targets.

If military action is undertaken, the lives of military personnel themselves will be jeopardized. Canadian lives could be lost if it is the decision of parliament that Canada should participate militarily.

The human and moral side of the issue must be kept uppermost in our minds. I am personally convinced that the only moral justification for taking human life is if it can be demonstrated that the taking or sacrificing of some lives may save more lives than otherwise. I think that is the only moral justification for capital punishment. I think it is the only moral justification for taking lives through military action. That is really the moral issue with which we are dealing tonight.

Does the risk of loss of lives of innocent Iraqi civilians and the men and women of the armed forces of Canada and our allies outweigh the loss of lives on the part of innocent civilians and military people down the road if we do nothing?

I would be remiss if I did not frankly address the unsatisfactory form of the debate on the motion before us. For the debate to be meaningful and to provide real guidance to the people of Canada and the government, this is what should have happened.

First, we should have had a full briefing of all members of the House by the prime minister, by the foreign affairs minister and by the defence minister with an open question period to follow to get all the facts out on the table before conducting any debate.

This is simply common sense. You get all the facts out through cross-examination before you debate them. Why the rules and procedures of the House continue to defy simple common sense concepts like that is frankly beyond me.

Then you commence the debate. Not debate on a vague motion like the one before us, but a debate on a real position opposed by the government but subject to amendment by members of House and subject to a vote at the end of the day.

The prime minister excuses this lack of leadership by saying that he wants to consult first before putting forward a position. The more statesmanlike thing would be to put forward a position which represents the very best judgment of the government and then be willing to amend it or to change it on the basis of consultation and points made by members of the House.

In the absence of strong leadership from the government it falls upon members on this side of the House to fill the vacuum. We are calling upon members of all opposition parties to make a contribution, and I mean that sincerely.

Given the historic concern of the social democrats in the House about the human and social consequences of military action, we expect members of that persuasion to make a major contribution from that perspective.

Given the fact that the Progressive Conservatives were in power at the time of the last gulf conflict, we expect Conservative members to make a significant contribution by drawing upon that experience, what went right and what went wrong, and applying it to this situation.

As far as the official opposition is concerned, our principal contribution will be this. We have insisted in committee and in debate in the House since 1993 that parliament should be developing clear criteria to assist it in deciding how Canada should respond to requests for our participation in multilateral military operations to establish and maintain peace in the world. We raised this demand in relation to our participation in Bosnia and we raise it again tonight.

In our judgment there are at least six criteria which should be satisfied before Canada commits itself to responding to requests for participation in multilateral military initiatives to prevent and remove threats to peace.

First, parliament should be satisfied that there is a serious international threat and that diplomatic efforts to resolve it have failed.

In the case before us there is no question in our mind that Saddam Hussein and his weapons production capability constitute a serious international threat and that to date diplomatic efforts are not solving the problem, so this criterion is satisfied.

Second, parliament should be satisfied that so far as possible there is multinational support for military action.

In this case there is multinational support from our key allies, in particular the United States and the United Kingdom, so this criterion is satisfied.

Third, the government should be satisfied that there is a workable plan and strategy for military action to resolve the issue. We expect the government to assure parliament that there is such a plan and strategy. The government has not yet provided evidence along that line. We trust that it will do so before this evening is over. This criterion remains to be satisfied.

Fourth, parliament must be satisfied that any plan for military action includes a well defined mission and a clear definition of Canada's role. We expect the government to provide something on this mission definition tonight. It has not yet done so. Perhaps it will do so before the end of the evening. This criterion remains to be satisfied.

Fifth, parliament must be satisfied that the role expected of Canada is within our fiscal and military capabilities. We expect the government to give evidence along that line tonight. So far this criterion remains to be satisfied.

Sixth, parliament must be assured that there is a command and control structure satisfactory to Canada. Again we expect the government to provide some information on this structure. It has not yet done so. This criterion also remains to be satisfied.

Given that the seriousness of the threat is established and the need for action is clear, this is the advice of the official opposition to the government on this matter. There are five points.

(1) Canada has an obligation to support its allies in stopping terrorism by Saddam Hussein.

(2) Our support should be military as well as moral and political.

(3) The focus of any military action should be on putting Saddam Hussein's weapons factories out of business and allowing UN inspectors to do their work.

(4) As parliamentarians we should make the political decision to support. We should then let the defence department make the recommendations concerning the form and scope of our military support.

(5) It is important at the outset of these types of things to be clear on why one is doing what one is doing. The reason for supporting military action is that it is our moral obligation and in our national interest in stopping terrorism and the production of weapons of mass destruction.

In closing, I return to the point that for this debate to be meaningful it should end with a vote on a motion proposing the course of action. In that the government has failed to present such a motion, I would like to ask for unanimous consent of the House to revert to Government Orders and to continue to sit beyond the daily time of adjournment to consider an amendable and votable motion to read as follows:

That this House support diplomatic and if necessary military action by our allies to stop terrorism and the production of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein.

[Iraq, February 9th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, in 1991 when Canada decided to support military action to halt aggression by Iraq against Kuwait, the House debated the issue for three days, not just a few hours. It debated a motion on a position put forward by the government reaffirming our support of action by the United Nations followed by a vote.

Is tonight's debate merely window dressing, or will the government put forward a real motion on a real position followed by a vote?

[Iraq, February 9th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, we are possibly on the eve of a war. The leaders of the nations of the world are taking positions. It seems to me that it is time Canada's Prime Minister stood up to be counted and got off the fence.

Will the Prime Minister go beyond vague comments and clearly tell Canadians whether he is convinced that military action to stop terrorism by Saddam Hussein is required?

[Iraq, February 9th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, throughout our history Canadians have shown that we are willing to do whatever is necessary to protect ourselves and the world from tyrants and terrorism. If Canadians were asked whether we trust Saddam Hussein or whether we trust the U.S. and the U.K., we will stand by our allies. But we still have some serious questions for our Prime Minister.

When President Clinton called, did he make it clear exactly what the objective of any military strike against Saddam Hussein would be? Is it to take out Saddam Hussein's weapons factories, or is it something bigger and broader?

[Aboriginal Affairs, February 5th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, Stephen Constant from the James Smith Reserve wrote to the Indian affairs minister in 1996. Ten days later he got a call from the band leadership that told him that they had a copy of his letter. They said that they always get such letters. As a result the band cut off Stephen's financial support. His child was taken away from him until a court intervened.

Is the government prepared to call in the RCMP to find out precisely who in the department of Indian affairs is violating the privacy rights of ordinary aboriginal people?