Rob Moore

[Federal Accountability Act, June 20th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, there have been some conversations with all parties. I believe if you seek it, you would find unanimous consent for the following motion. I move:

That Bill C-2, in Clause 181(2) be amended by replacing line 26 on page 132 with the following:

“(b) any parent Crown corporation, and any wholly-owned”

This is to bring in line changes that were made under Motion No. 13 to the Access to Information Act, bringing the Privacy Act in line.

[Federal Accountability Act, June 20th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his consideration of the arguments that have been put forward. I think they are serious arguments. I heard the quote by the member, which reads that “the judge shall consider the opinion in determining whether an offence was committed”.

The member also stated that we cannot tell a judge what to do, but that is exactly what the bill is doing. It is saying that a judge “shall consider” the opinion of the committee. This is not any committee. We are not talking about general laws relating to evidence. We are talking about a House of Commons committee, a committee of Parliament. We are talking about a committee that falls under the legislative branch. We are blurring that line between the legislative branch and the judiciary.

Committees are made up of elected members of Parliament. As anyone who sits on a committee knows, there can be influences on one's judgment. We have to be very careful that we never do anything to undermine the right of a member of Parliament or anyone else in Canada to a fair trial. That is one of the underpinnings of our justice system. It is one of the rights that we cherish under the charter and that we are all entitled to as Canadians. As I said before, even as a member of Parliament one is entitled to a fair trial.

By forcing a judge to consider evidence of a committee, we are blurring that line. Not only would we be blurring the line among the legislative, the executive and the judiciary if we were to adopt this, not only are we doing that, but we are at serious risk of undermining the charter rights of a member of Parliament who is potentially involved in one of these trials.

Just so we know the context, we are dealing here with offences that may be committed under clause 41.1, which would prohibit MPs from accepting “any benefit or income from a trust established by reason of his or her position as a member of the House of Commons”. Any person with reasonable grounds to believe that has happened can make a complaint to the committee. The committee will study it. The real problem is mandating that the committee's evidence be put forward to a judge and that the judge “shall” consider it. It undermines the charter rights of the accused.

[Federal Accountability Act, June 20th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, it was a privilege to serve with other members of Parliament on the committee studying Bill C-2, the accountability act. I think we did tremendous work on behalf of Canadians.

From the testimony we heard and from the work that was done, we had a thorough vetting of the issues related to accountability. We heard from a great number of witnesses and we worked in a way to move the bill forward. Members on all sides of the House sacrificed a great deal to see the bill through committee.

It is the number one priority of our government and it is something that was long overdue. Canadians were demanding more accountability from public office holders and from Parliament, more accountability in the way their tax dollars are spent and more transparency in the way we run our democratic process. This bill, at the end of the day, accomplishes all those things.

I want to speak to Motion No. 9, which is a serious motion and one I urge all members of the House to consider as it impacts on some very fundamental rights and issues relating even to members of Parliament.

Specifically, the changes brought in by adding two provisions, subclauses 41.4 and 41.5, to the new MP trust fund rules proposed for insertion into the Parliament of Canada Act raise serious legal policy issues regarding the independence of prosecutions from political interference, as well as serious Charter of Rights issues related to the ability to get a fair hearing. They also raise some concern with regard to the Constitution and the division of power. It is for those reasons that the government proposed reversing those amendments.

To be clear, I would urge all members of Parliament to consider this amendment very carefully. It is not a minor amendment like dotting an i or crossing a t.

The amendment in subclause 41.4 would require:

Any person...who has reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed under section 41.1 shall...notify the Committee of the House of Commons designated to consider such matters.

This is the clause that prohibits members of Parliament from accepting benefits or income from a trust established by reason of their positions as members of Parliament, and from circumventing this rule.

The committee may then issue an opinion on the matter. The committee would study the facts of the situation and then issue an opinion on the matter. The new paragraph 41.4(4) provides that, in any prosecution of that offence, if there is a criminal prosecution of the offence, the prosecution shall “provide the judge with a copy of the opinion of the Committee”, which would be a committee of this House. It is important to note the exact wording, “and the judge shall consider the opinion in determining whether an offence was committed”.

Further, a similar process is proposed in the second amendment, subclause 41.5, for contraventions of subclause 41.3, and that authorizes the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to make orders regarding the treatment of MPs' trusts, with the same requirement as I outlined before in paragraph 41.4(4), that “the judge shall consider”--the committee's--“opinion in determining whether an offence was committed”.

Obviously it is pretty clear, even on the face of the wording, that these amendments raise serious legal policy and constitutional concerns.

First and foremost, the amendments are inconsistent and completely at odds with the fundamental principle underlying the new director of public prosecutions provisions contained in Bill C-2, the federal accountability act, namely, the need to ensure the independence of prosecutions from political interference. It is that perception of political interference, the whole idea that somehow politicians could influence a judicial outcome, that is the whole reason for the underpinnings of the move to the director of public prosecutions. It underlines a lot of what we have done in the federal accountability act.

Obviously I hope that all members of the House would agree with me that we should not have political interference in the judicial process. I think that is fairly basic. This amendment, as the bill currently stands, would provide for just such an interference.

Second, the amendments present a serious risk of violating the Canadian charter right to a fair trial of a member of Parliament charged with an offence. All of us as Canadians, and even those of us who are members of Parliament, are entitled to a fair trial under our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

By requiring a judge to consider a parliamentary committee's opinion on whether an MP has committed an offence, the amendments would preclude a judge from respecting the procedural safeguards mandated by the charter, for example, by requiring a criminal court to consider evidence that is otherwise inadmissible either as hearsay or as opinion evidence with respect to an MP's guilt or innocence and/or to consider prior incriminating testimony, including testimony that the committee may have compelled from the accused member of Parliament. To be clear, this has an impact on the charter rights of members of Parliament and would undermine the right under the charter to a fair trial if we allowed this to proceed as proposed.

Third and finally, the amendment appears to undermine the separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently held and has often stated that this is a fundamental constitutional principle. In the House, we all know that there is a separation among the executive, the judicial and the legislative branches. It is essential to having a thriving democracy and fairness in our system that those divisions be kept sound. It is a basic constitutional principle.

In passing this as it is, it would impinge on at least the perception of judicial impartiality and judicial independence, another fundamental principle that flows from our Constitution. It is for these reasons that I ask all members to consider deleting proposed sections 41.4 and 41.5 from clause 99.

To sum up, the independence of the judiciary, the right for a member of Parliament to get a fair trial under our charter of rights, and the division and the separation of powers among the judicial, executive and legislative branches of our government are all pretty basic fundamental values that we all hold dear. I ask all members to consider that when we consider Motion No. 9.

I urge that the motion be adopted because otherwise we risk putting members of Parliament in a very serious situation with regard to their rights and we also undermine the independence of the judiciary in this country.

[Petitions, June 20th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to table a petition today, spearheaded by a mother from the town of Hampton in my riding, containing 17,471 signatures, in addition to 3,175 signatures from Canadians across Canada on the website.

The petitioners believe that a funeral is a necessity and should be a non-taxable service. They ask that Parliament have some respect for the dead and compassion for the grieving family by removing the GST, PST and HST taxes from all funeral services.

[Justice, June 16th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I will quote from the Liberal platform of last year: “A Liberal government will reintroduce legislation to crack down on violent crimes and gang violence, and to double the mandatory minimum sentences for serious gun-related crimes”. All talk.

This government took action to protect Canadians.

[Justice, June 16th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I cannot explain to the hon. member why Liberals say one thing during an election and then do another after an election.

I will tell him what Canadians told us. They said they were fed up with violent gun crime and they were fed up with a Liberal revolving door answer to crime.

With Bill C-10 we introduced tougher gun crime laws to ensure that serious and repeat firearms offences will be met by appropriately stiff minimum penalties. I am very pleased that Bill C-10 passed second reading and is being referred to committee despite the Liberals' flip-flop on this important issue.

[Graduating Classes of 2006, June 15th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, in my riding of Fundy Royal there are over 1,000 students graduating from high school this spring. I rise today to recognize the product of their commitment to stay in school, study hard and to graduate.

Because we live in a prosperous land, we can expect that great things await these young people. Canada's new government is doing its part to make this a reality. In the recent budget, the government brought in measures to help graduating students face the cost of post-secondary education, including a tax credit on books, the exemption of scholarships and bursaries from income tax, and the expansion of the eligibility of middle income students to receive student loans.

The graduates of today are the leaders that will shape the Canada of tomorrow. I invite members to join me in congratulating the graduating classes of 2006. As parliamentarians, we wish every one of them the very best for the future.

[Criminal Code, June 14th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill C-291, a bill that proposes to amend the Criminal Code to create a new offence of injuring or killing a child before or during its birth while committing an offence against the pregnant mother.

I believe, at its core, the bill is about ensuring that our criminal law strongly condemns and holds fully accountable those who commit violent acts against others, particularly against persons who are more vulnerable to violence. The evidence is clear that pregnant women are more likely to be victims of assault by their partners than other similarly situated women. These objectives are strongly supported by Canadians and, indeed, are reflected in the government's priority of getting tough on crime.

At the outset, I understand and support the message that Bill C-291 seeks to send to would-be offenders. If we are to achieve this important objective, we must seek to do so in a way that is consistent with fundamental principles of criminal law and that conforms with our constitutional law. If we do anything less, if we support legislative reform that does not follow the contours of our Constitution and its conventions, then we in fact fail to provide Canadians with the very protection against violence we seek to provide.

That is why the government cannot support Bill C-291. Although it appreciates the its intent, we believe its proposed reforms are in fact unconstitutional and, as a result, cannot do what it purports to do. It cannot succeed in providing the additional protection against personal violence, which we all agree Canadians want and deserve.

Bill C-291 proposes to create a new criminal offence. Under the bill, a person who injures or kills a child before or during its birth, while committing or attempting to commit an offence against the mother who is pregnant with that child, could be charged with the same offence against the child. Under Bill C-291, an accused could be charged with such an offence without knowledge that the mother was pregnant and without the accused intending to injure or kill the child. Therein lies the problem.

Bill C-291 proposes to create a new offence that would apply even though an accused did not intend to commit a crime. One of the fundamental principles of criminal law is that persons are not punished simply because harm was done, but rather because they are morally culpable for causing that harm. Therefore, a criminal offence may only be committed where there is both a guilty act and a guilty mind. There must be an intention to commit the act, as well as the commission of the act itself.

An offence that does not require a guilty mind and that requires only a guilty act is called an “absolute liability offence”. The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly found criminal offences of such a nature to be unconstitutional. The effect of the proposed offence in Bill C-291 is also to clearly prevent an accused from invoking available legal defences. This too raises additional charter concerns under sections 7 and 11(d), namely, the right to a full answer and defence.

Again, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently held that such grounds of unconstitutionality cannot be saved under the charter. In other words, punishing people who cause harm but who are not morally culpable cannot be said to be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.

As I said at the outset, while I understand and appreciate the objective of Bill C-291, I believe the bill's proposed reforms are unconstitutional. As a result, the bill cannot achieve its objective of safeguarding Canadians against violence. This does not mean that Canadians are not protected by existing criminal law.

Section 238 of the Criminal Code makes it an indictable offence, with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, to cause the death of a child while it is being born. As well, section 223 provides that where a person causes injury to a child before or during its birth, as a result of which the child dies after its birth, that person commits the offence of homicide.

Moreover, where an accused kills another person, whether the victim is pregnant or not, the accused may be charged with first degree murder or second degree murder, both of which carry a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment.

The criminal law ensures that the impact of violence perpetrated on victims is reflected by the sentence or penalty imposed in each case. In all cases, a sentencing court must consider aggravating as well as mitigating circumstances.

The specific situation of the victim is always considered. For example, was the victim a victim of spousal abuse? If so, section 718.2 of the Criminal Code requires the sentencing court to consider this as an aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes. Whether the victim was pregnant or the mother of one or more children will also be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Indeed, under section 722 of the Criminal Code, a sentencing court must consider a victim impact statement that has been prepared in a case that describes the harm done to, or the loss suffered by, the victim arising from the commission of the offence.

The government's commitment to Canadians does not end with merely supporting the existing criminal law. The Speech from the Throne underscores the government's commitment to get tough on crime, to tackle offenders, to bring in tougher sentences for violent and repeat offenders, particularly those involved in weapon-related crimes.

This commitment is directly relevant to Bill C-291, as I understand the bill was motivated by a case that is currently before the courts and which involved the use of a firearm. The government has already delivered on our Speech from the Throne commitment. On May 4, the Minister of Justice tabled Bill C-10, an act to amend the Criminal Code, minimum penalties for offences involving firearms, and to make a consequential amendment to another act. The reforms in Bill C-10 seek to ensure that the use of a firearm in the commission of a serious offence will be subject to a significant sentence.

Further, as the House knows, we brought in Bill C-9, which addresses the serious issue of conditional sentencing. The government is serious about getting tough on crime, about protecting victims and about ensuring that we have a criminal justice system that Canadians can have faith in.

Bill C-291 speaks to the importance of protecting Canadians against violence. It speaks to the need to ensure that our criminal law adequately reflects the serious impact of violence on all of its victims. I believe all members of the House can support these objectives. That said, our duty as parliamentarians is to ensure that we enact legislation that respects fundamental principles of Canadian law.

The government is committed to protecting Canadians and we have already taken strong measures to do so.

[Criminal Code, June 13th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to speak to Bill C-299. I would like to say at the outset that the government applauds the member for this very timely bill as well as his hard work in putting the bill together.

This bill would do several things. It would amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Competition Act, all with a view to dealing with the obtaining of personal information by deception. More generally, this bill seeks to address the scourge of identity theft.

Identify theft is a term that is frequently used and freely bandied about. For the most part, identity theft refers to the acquisition and improper use of another person's identification information.

This is an activity that is by all accounts rising rapidly in Canadian society. The types of information and information based items which may be obtained and exploited include names, addresses, financial account numbers, credit cards and debit cards and numbers, driver's licences, health insurance cards, passports, and social insurance numbers, to name but a few of the more significant and highly targeted items.

Armed with this information, a criminally minded person may do any number of things, such as obtain direct access to a person's bank accounts or make purchases with a person's credit card. Title fraud, a particularly troublesome form of identity crime, involves fraudulently assuming the identity of a property owner and using that identity to sell or mortgage the property out from under the owner.

In each of these manifestations of identity crime, the criminal is out to obtain money, obtain some form of financial value, or gain access to a service for which he or she would otherwise have to pay. Indeed, most incidents of identity theft are motivated purely by financial gain. Many of us as members of Parliament sometimes have had to deal with the very troubling stories from constituents who have been the victims of identity theft. It is something that leaves people feeling very vulnerable and violated.

There is another side to identity theft which is no less dangerous to society. Assuming the identity of another can get a person things, but it can also be used as a shield to blanket the identity thief in a form of anonymity. There is a freedom in having people believe that someone is other than who that individual actually is, a freedom that allows the individual to operate undetected by others from whom the individual wishes to hide.

In this form, identity theft may amount to a person renting an apartment or obtaining services in someone else's name. In many cases the criminal is very diligent about paying bills on time as this avoids raising suspicions. Criminals may also use the identity of another person to obtain employment. Worse still, a person may offer up the identity of another if detained or arrested in the investigation of a crime.

Both objectives of identity crime, financial gain and anonymity, may be closely linked to several very serious issues which this government is dealing with currently, such as drug trafficking, organized crime, and most alarmingly, terrorism. The reasons for this are obvious.

Identity theft is a means of generating revenue. Those involved in these types of activities directly seek this type of revenue. It is essential for them to fund their operations. They are seeking this revenue either as an end in itself or because money furthers their primary criminal intentions.

Drug traffickers, organized criminals and terrorists are certainly interested in staying beneath the radar of law enforcement, out of the eye of border authorities and away from the view of intelligence officials. Unfortunately, one of the best ways to accomplish all of these aims is to exploit and assume the identity of some innocent and law-abiding Canadian.

In many ways identity theft is not new. Human beings have been deceiving each other to obtain advantages for millennia. Identity deception is just one of many ways one person may deceive another in order to obtain something of value. It may be, for example, that one factor contributing to the rise in identity crime is the pace of new technologies. We have seen an explosion in technologies in recent years. While we are all reaping many of the benefits of new technologies, there is also the threat of new harms.

The Internet in particular has allowed computer hackers to get inside private sector and government databases to steal sensitive personal information. Any of us who have read the news are familiar with some of those situations.

Mass e-mailings or spam sometimes contain what is known as a “phishing” attack. This is a link to a deceptive website designed to look like the legitimate website of a known commercial establishment with a request for the recipient to input personal data. Phishing is a prime method of stealing identity information for criminal use.

The impact of identity theft on the victims of this practice can be devastating. There are obviously the financial losses suffered by the victim, including dozens or hundreds of hours and significant costs associated with rectifying frauds, clearing credit card records and squaring things with banks or credit card companies.

There is also the emotional and psychological harm to the victims who frequently report a feeling of being violated or having had their personal lives invaded. The seriousness of identity theft can be seen in the fact that there is a range of activities and initiatives currently under way to better safeguard Canadians from identity theft. The private sector, provincial governments, police, consumer advocacy groups and document issuing authorities to name just a few are tackling identity theft in a variety of ways. Through public education campaigns, consumer advisories, improvements to the security features on credit cards and identity cards, enhanced protection of privacy interests within businesses and government, and improved security of computer networks, the corporate, public and the not for profit sectors are working together to help minimize this behaviour.

In terms of the current criminal law, hon. members should know that where the term identity theft is used to refer to the actual use of another person's identity to commit a crime, our Criminal Code contains some offences that cover this range of behaviour. Where a person pretends to be another person and thereby obtains property or something of value or service, that person may be guilty of fraud or false pretense. Our Criminal Code also has a very broad and flexible offence of impersonation which prohibits pretending to be another person with intent to gain an advantage or cause a disadvantage. This is broader than an economic advantage.

There is also a range of offences related to forgeries, specific credit offences, specific passport offences and mail theft.

It is clear that identity theft at its worst is addressed in some offences in our Criminal Code. However, Bill C-299 accurately highlights the fact that there are limitations to the current reach of the Criminal Code, and as always, there is room for improvement. As I mentioned, the explosion in new technologies and the fact that criminals never rest means that we also as a government can never rest in our defence of Canadians' rights and protection of their property and their freedoms.

In 2004, justice officials consulted with some key stakeholders on basic questions about improving our Criminal Code. Based on this input, officials are refining some key points for improving the criminal law's ability to deal with identity theft. New and more focused consultation is certainly needed with the banking community and other sectors covered by identity theft.

We look forward to the fruits of those consultations. We are committed to ensuring that our criminal laws contain comprehensive and effective tools to combat identity theft.

I also look forward to working with my colleague, the member for Edmonton—Leduc, on protecting Canadians' personal information. I also wish to thank the member for introducing his bill and for giving me the opportunity today to discuss this pressing issue.

[Criminal Code, June 6th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, in response to the hon. member's question, the concern as to the application of this piece of legislation, to suggest that some people are concerned that one type of firearm or another is not included, someone could certainly bring forward any amendments to this piece of legislation.

The fact of the matter is, as I mentioned in my speech, we are targeting the gang violence in our big cities. Oftentimes, 65% of those crimes are being committed with handguns which would be restricted or prohibited weapons. That is very specifically what Canadians were seeing over the last few years. That is what the bill seeks to target. To be clear, after this bill is passed, mandatory minimums will be in place for all serious firearms offences, whether they be done with a long gun or a handgun.

With respect to the issue of studies, there are all types of jurisdictions, including our own, that have mandatory minimums for some offences. We are going to have to study the results coming out of those. To be clear, the Liberal Party and the NDP in the last election were proposing to toughen up mandatory minimum sentences. Presumably that also was based on their feeling that there was a need to get tougher and to send a deterrent message that there would be mandatory minimum sentences for the commission of gun crimes. The vast majority of MPs in this House ran under that very platform.