Robert Goguen

[An Act to amend the Access to Information Act (transparency and duty to document), March 5th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak to Bill C-567, introduced on January 28 by the hon. member of the NDP for Winnipeg Centre, entitled, An Act to amend the Access to Information Act (transparency and duty to document).

My colleague spoke about the requirement to document decisions and actions. I agree that this can be problematic and requires careful consideration.

Let me turn the attention of the House to another important and problematic feature of Bill C-567. It appears in clause 3, which would modify the current exemption that government institutions can use to protect records relating to the operations of government. I believe it is important to draw the attention of the House to the fact that the current exemption in the Access to Information Act that can be used to protect advice prepared for government is referred to as a “discretionary exemption”. This means that the head of a government institution must first decide whether a particular record contains advice prepared for government. Next, the head must decide whether to exercise that discretion by way of protecting the record or by way of releasing it. To me this seems to be a fair approach.

This exemption is an important one. It is used to protect the advice and recommendations that public servants give to a minister or advice or recommendations that may be coming from a minister. The exemption is also used to protect the confidential deliberations taking place within the public service on policy options.

The rationale behind this exemption is that disclosure can, at times, have a chilling effect on the candidness of advice, recommendations, consultations, and deliberations given or received by the federal public service and can lead to a reluctance to deal frankly with a difficult situation.

The modification proposed by Bill C-567 would require that government institutions conclude that the disclosure of a record is harmful to their operations and their processes before they decide to refuse to disclose the record. I wonder how workable it would be for government institutions that have a genuine reason to protect, at least temporarily, advice prepared for government to be able to demonstrate that the release of the advice would be harmful to their operations.

I will also add that the bill would not only add this prejudice test, but it would also shorten the time period of application of this exemption to five years instead of twenty years. If I understand correctly, this exemption would, after five years, no longer be applicable by a government institution to protect the policy advice it gave to a minister.

Let me turn to another provision of Bill C-567. Clause 4 constitutes a crucial aspect of this bill. As a result of clause 4, the bill would considerably modify the way that confidences of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada have been treated under the Access to Information Act for the past 30 years. We can all agree with the Supreme Court of Canada when it said that cabinet confidentiality was essential to good government in Babcock v. Canada, 2002, SCC 57, at paragraph 15.

There exists in Canada a constitutional convention wherein private deliberations between ministers of the crown for the purpose of rendering advice to Her Majesty should remain confidential. This constitutional convention has been recognized in three statutes, the Access to Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the Canada Evidence Act. It is in recognition of this convention that cabinet confidences have been excluded from the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. It is in recognition of this convention that in the context of litigation, under the Canada Evidence Act, cabinet confidences cannot be reviewed by a court. Because of this exclusion in the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, the information and privacy commissioners do not have access to cabinet confidences to review them or make findings on them. The courts, reviewing a decision from a government institution, cannot see cabinet confidences either. That is the current state of the law.

What Bill C-567 proposes to do is to replace the exclusion for cabinet confidences that has been in existence for less than 20 years by an exemption that would apply to cabinet confidences in existence for less than 15 years. Because records subject to an exemption, as opposed to an exclusion, are subject to the act, this amendment would give the Information Commissioner the power to review cabinet confidence documents during his or her investigations and would give the Federal Court a right to review these documents. With this bill, the non-exhaustive list of records that could be included as cabinet confidences would be replaced by a more narrow definition of the concept. It is unclear whether the definition would capture all of the types of documents currently included in the list of examples of cabinet confidences.

I would also remind the House that as the bill touches only on the Access to Information Act, there would be inconsistencies with respect to other legislation that also govern the treatment of cabinet confidences, such as the Privacy Act and the Canada Evidence Act.

Another important feature of Bill C-567 is that it would give the Information Commissioner of Canada the power to order government institutions to disclose documents, including cabinet confidences. This is a fundamental change in the role of the information commissioner. It constitutes a shift from her role as an ombudsperson to one of a quasi-judicial order-making body. This is a substantial amendment that is not at all likely to improve our access to information regime.

In his proposed reforms to the Access to Information Act, former information commissioner Reid did not recommend that the role of the information commissioner be changed in any such way. Mr. Reid's view was that the ombudsman model works effectively; that fewer than 1% of complaints end up in courts; and that based on experience in other jurisdictions, the order-making model would not reduce litigation or improve outcomes. His predecessor, the late John Grace, also voiced similar views during his mandate.

The bill also contains a requirement that the head of a government institution disclose a record if the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs the need to maintain the secrecy of the information, even if an exemption would otherwise apply. What this means exactly is not clear to me, and what guidance could be given to government institutions on this matter is also equally unclear.

What members of the House would need to think very carefully about is the impact that such a public interest override test would have on the application of certain very important exemptions in the Access to Information Act. Most notable is the one that relates to information obtained in confidence from our international allies or provincial counterparts. This exemption, which is mandatory for very good reasons, under Bill C-567, would be subject to a public interest override test.

What would this mean? What greater public interest could justify the disclosure of records provided to us in confidence by another government? How would we explain that the documents that we received in confidence from our international or provincial counterparts may not necessarily remain protected? These are serious concerns.

The same public interest test would apply to the exemption protecting personal information. We all know that personal information about an individual is protected under the Privacy Act. The Courts have recognized that the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act are two-sided coins. Together, they set out the rules governing disclosure and protection of information held by the federal government. They are equally important statutes, and when applying them, judges must read them together. The Supreme Court of Canada said that the Access to information Act and the Privacy Act are a seamless code, with complementary provisions that can and should be interpreted harmoniously.

There are provisions in the Access to Information Act that allow for personal information to be disclosed in very specific circumstances and as instructed by the court. These provisions are carefully drafted to work harmoniously with the Privacy Act. This means that more personal information cannot be disclosed under the Access to Information Act then would be authorized under the Privacy Act. Both statutes regulate the disclosure of personal information to third parties in the same way.

It is important to note that what is being proposed could be very damaging to privacy interests. As most of us no doubt realize, the federal government relies on Canadians' willingness to provide the government with their sensitive personal information so that the government, in turn, can run a myriad of important programs and activities. I would emphasize that in many situations, individuals are actually obliged to provide the government with their personal information.

There is a fundamental bargain involved here, which is that because the government requires so much personal information in order to do its business, it bears a heavy burden to take great care with the personal information with which Canadians entrust their government. I believe that the introduction of a public interest override in the Access to Information Act requires great consideration.

To conclude, I would reiterate the message that the former minister of justice, the member for Niagara Falls, gave, in 2009, in the government's response to the report of the House Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, which studied the 12 recommendations for reform by Commissioner Marleau. He indicated the following:

The Access to Information Act is a strong piece of legislation. It is crucial that careful consideration be given to the impact changes to the legislation may have on the operations of the [access to information] program. Legislative amendments must be examined in the context of administrative alternatives, such as enhanced guidance and training that can be equally effective to realize continued improvements.

I believe that this message is still sound today.

[Supreme Court Act, February 28th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss the second reading of Bill C-208, An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act (understanding the official languages), put forward by the member for Acadie—Bathurst.

The bill would amend the Supreme Court Act. It would introduce a new requirement for judges appointed to the Supreme Court to understand English and French without the assistance of an interpreter.

The English and French languages have shaped Canadian society. Both linguistic communities are at the heart of our national identity.

The Government of Canada recognizes the importance of supporting the development of its official languages minority communities. To that end, in June 2008 the government announced the Roadmap for Canada's Linguistic Duality 2008-2013, a government-wide commitment with a budget of $1.1 billion, based on two pillars: the participation of all in linguistic duality and the support of official languages minority communities in the priority sectors of justice, health, immigration, economic development, and arts and culture.

This initiative has been followed by the Roadmap for Canada's Official Languages 2013-2018: Education, Immigration, Communities, which provides a renewed investment of $1.1 billion over five years, with clear priorities to protect, celebrate, and strengthen our official languages across Canada. One of the road map initiatives under the education component is an investment in training, networks, and access to justice.

I first want to say that our government is strongly committed to enhancing the vitality of English and French linguistic minorities in Canada and fostering the full recognition and use of both English and French in Canadian society

I also want to assure the House that our government is committed to maintaining the tradition of excellence that is the hallmark of the judicial appointment process, so that Canadians continue to trust and respect our judicial system.

Canadians take pride in the judicial system and in the steps taken to ensure citizens have access to justice in either official language. The Supreme Court of Canada is a model of institutional bilingualism, which reflects the intent of Parliament that our national institutions be bilingual.

The government remains committed to preserving a fair, unbiased legal system. To that end, we intend to continue to be guided by the principles of merit and legal excellence in the selection and appointment of judges to the superior courts of the provinces, the federal courts and the Supreme Court.

To date, our government has appointed 400 judges to various Canadian courts. We are proud of having appointed these highly competent judges and lawyers. Our appointments embody the principles of merit and legal excellence that will continue to guide our decisions in the appointment of judges.

Merit and legal excellence are the foundation of the judge appointment process. The other criteria are knowledge of the law, judgment, work habits, ability to write and communicate, honesty, integrity, a concern for fairness and a social conscience.

Bilingualism is another factor we consider. Our government can take candidates' linguistic abilities into account to ensure that Canadians have access to justice in both official languages. We are determined to create a federal legal system that provides equal access to justice in both official languages.

I would also like to point out that, before each appointment, we consult the chief justice of the court in question to find out the court's needs, including its need for specific language skills. The chief justice is in an ideal position to understand the needs of the communities the court serves and to identify specific needs when positions become available. Our government also listens to the advice of various expert groups and individuals about factors to consider when filling vacancies.

To ensure that we have an ample and balanced pool of bilingual candidates for the bench, our government asks associations of lawyers and francophone communities to identify and encourage people with the necessary skills to apply. We also ask them to inform the minister about these people.

We are not denying the importance of language skills, particularly when a specific need is identified. However, merit remains the primary and most important factor that must be taken into account in appointing judges.

First and foremost, our government is determined to appoint the best-qualified individuals. We will continue to appoint competent and dedicated people, and adhere to the principle of gender equality, cultural diversity and bilingualism.

The Supreme Court of Canada plays a fundamental role in our democratic society, in particular as the ultimate guardian of the values entrenched in the Constitution.

It is therefore essential for its members to be selected from among the most distinguished and most competent of jurists. That is why when filling vacancies in the court, we take great care to select the best candidates, both in terms of knowledge and experience and of social conscience.

The judges appointed to the Supreme Court for the past 130 years have been among the best justices the court could have had. The qualities we look for in a candidate include outstanding intellectual capacity, superior ability in judgment writing, the capacity for innovative thinking on emerging legal issues, and a demonstrated sensitivity to the diverse values enshrined in the Constitution. All these qualities go hand in hand with regional representation. It is important that the Supreme Court represent all Canadians. That is why we must take this important factor into consideration.

This is how Peter Hogg, a renowned constitutional scholar, described the professional and personal qualities that a Supreme Court of Canada justice must have:

A judge has to be able to resolve difficult legal issues, not just by virtue of technical legal skills, but also with wisdom, fairness, and compassion.

A judge must have the energy and discipline to diligently study the materials that are filed in every appeal.

A judge must be able to maintain an open mind on every appeal until he or she has read all of the pertinent material and heard from counsel on both sides.

A judge must always treat the counsel and the litigants who appear before him or her with patience and courtesy.

A judge must be able to write opinions that are well written and well reasoned.

...a judge must be able to work cooperatively with eight colleagues to help produce agreement on unanimous or majority decisions and to do his or her share of the writing.

Whereas the Supreme Court is the final court of appeal in Canada, it is essential for our government to be able to select qualified jurists from all regions of the country when appointing justices to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Passing Bill C-208 would mean giving greater importance to linguistic considerations than to merit, by reducing the pool of otherwise highly qualified candidates, particularly from parts of the country where there may be fewer judges who are capable of handling cases in both official languages.

Indeed, the Supreme Court already respects the right of all Canadians to be heard and understood in the language of their choice. All Supreme Court services are provided in English and French, and all communication already takes place in both official languages.

In addition, anyone who has to make written submissions to the Supreme Court may do so in either English or French. A large majority of the judges currently sitting on the Supreme Court are proficient in both official languages and are perfectly capable of handling cases in either language without the use of simultaneous interpretation.

Supreme Court judges also have the option of taking language training; indeed, they are encouraged to do so. High-level and very high-quality translation and interpretation services are provided for Supreme Court hearings. Furthermore, all judges are supported by at least one bilingual law clerk.

The current composition requirements of the Supreme Court Act, together with the historical practice of regional representation, allow us to preserve our firm commitment to bilingualism.

The extraordinary expertise and commitment of the current Supreme Court judges clearly demonstrate just how seriously our government takes these appointments, as did previous governments.

Bilingualism is an important factor to consider in the selection of Supreme Court judges. However, this factor must not overshadow the merit and excellence of judges from a legal standpoint, or the importance of regional representation.

For all of those reasons I just mentioned, we cannot support Bill C-208 in its current form.

[Supreme Court Act, February 28th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I really enjoyed the hon. member's speech.

He said he heard in committee that there are plenty of bilingual judges in every Canadian province. We know that Supreme Court justices are selected on the basis of merit and legal excellence. The criteria used to assess them are knowledge of the law, judgment, work habits, ability to write and communicate, honesty, fairness, concern for fairness and social conscience.

I would like to know whether my hon. colleague has counted the number of bilingual judges in each province and whether he has assessed them against these criteria.

Simply being a bilingual judge does not necessarily mean that one meets all of the criteria and can sit on the bench of the Supreme Court of Canada.

[Justice, February 27th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, every day in Canada, children are the victims of sexual abuse.

Sexual abuse of children causes unimaginable harm and may have serious consequences that affect victims into adulthood and throughout their lives.

Yesterday, the Minister of Justice introduced comprehensive legislation to crack down on predators who exploit and abuse children.

The tougher penalties for child predators act will ensure that offenders receive prison sentences that better reflect the serious nature of these crimes.

A key aspect of this legislation is not only mandatory sentencing but consecutive sentencing for those who victimize more than one child. This means no more discounts for those who are convicted of multiple offences.

This is in stark contrast to the Liberal leader, who said that he would not rule out repealing mandatory sentences for anyone.

On this side of the House, we believe that people who sexually abuse a child should go to jail. I call upon all members, and especially the Liberal leader to support this vital piece of legislation, and further protect our children and communities.

[Status of Women, January 27th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, clearly, we are very concerned about the Supreme Court's recent decision, which struck down certain provisions of the Criminal Code.

We are in the process of exploring all possibilities in order to protect women and girls who are vulnerable because of this practice. Unlike the Liberal Party, whose proposal to completely legalize prostitution would put women in more danger, we will be examining the most prudent solutions in order to protect vulnerable women.

[Economic Action Plan 2013 Act No. 2, December 3rd, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, the member sees that the mandate of the government is to create jobs and prosperity, and to stimulate the economy.

It is through the will of the people via the election of this government that this takes place. Obviously small businesses are the heart and engine of the economy through the labour of their many owners. They create many more jobs and feed many more families. Prosperity is always accomplished when the government stays out of the way of hard-working Canadians and they have the liberty to spend their money as they see fit, because they can judge better than us.

[Economic Action Plan 2013 Act No. 2, December 3rd, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, obviously, the bill may be large in its scope but the Government of Canada deals with many different issues, and all changes will be in the best interests of the people of Canada.

The government gets its mandate, its democracy from the people of Canada. This is why we are moving forward with the bill, to make sure that we create prosperity and jobs, and that Canadians all benefit from a greater quality of life.

[Economic Action Plan 2013 Act No. 2, December 3rd, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, I have a hard time seeing the connection between that question and my speech, but as soon as Justice Nadon is confirmed as a Supreme Court justice, he will be able to quickly focus on all of these kinds of issues.

[Economic Action Plan 2013 Act No. 2, December 3rd, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, I wish to speak in support of clauses 471 and 472 of the economic action plan 2013, no. 2, which would add declaratory provisions to the Supreme Court Act. These declaratory provisions have been introduced to clarify the criteria for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada. In particular, the intent of these provisions is to clarify that an individual who was at any time a barrister or advocate of at least 10 years standing at the bar of a province would be eligible for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada. This would remove any doubt regarding the eligibility of accomplished judges of Canada's Federal Court for appointment to the Supreme Court.

Normally, the purpose of legislative amendments is to enact new provisions or to amend existing provisions to change the outcome of the provisions they replace or amend.

By their very nature, the proposed declaratory provisions will specify the correct interpretation of the law since its enactment. Basically, the wording reinforces the meaning of this law and makes it easier to understand.

The Supreme Court of Canada recently explained the impact of these declaratory provisions. In its 2013 ruling in Régie des rentes du Québec v. Canada Bread Company Ltd., the court stated the following:

The interpretation imposed by a declaratory provision stretches back in time to the date when the legislation it purports to interpret first came into force, with the effect that the legislation in question is deemed to have always included this provision. Thus, the interpretation so declared is taken to have always been the law...

In accordance with the purpose of a declaratory provision, clauses 471 and 472 of the bill confirm the fundamental requirement that judges must fulfill to be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada. According to the current wording, these provisions specify that, the clauses authorize Federal Court justices to be appointed to vacant positions representing Quebec in the Supreme Court of Canada, provided that they have at least 10 years standing as members of the Barreau du Québec.

Consequently, former and current members of the Barreau du Québec will be treated in the same manner as former and current members of the bar of any province. The purpose is to have uniformity and equality for all provincial bars.

The Government of Canada is of the view that there is no doubt that Federal Court judges are eligible to fill any vacancy on the Supreme Court. This view is shared by former Supreme Court justices, the Hon. Ian Binnie and the Hon. Louise Charron, as well as the noted constitutional expert, Professor Peter Hogg.

During its study of clauses 471 and 472, the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights also heard evidence from Professor Benoît Pelletier, who was supportive of the government's position. The committee of the other place heard from the former Supreme Court justice, the Hon. Michel Bastarache, who also agreed with the government's interpretation.

Former Quebec minister of intergovernmental affairs and constitutional expert Benoît Pelletier, was very clear about the interpretation:

The interpretation that I believe prevails, or should prevail, when examining the spirit of the provision, is that, essentially, it is sufficient to have been a member of the bar for 10 years. But, one might not be a member today. It would not make sense to interpret the Supreme Court Act as disqualifying from the outset all justices of the Federal Court. It is an interpretation which, in my opinion, does not hold up.

It should be no surprise that so many leading experts agree with the government's view. As the Minister of Justice noted in his remarks to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights regarding these very provisions, Federal Court experience is a strong asset for any candidate to the Supreme Court precisely because the Supreme Court regularly hears appeals from decisions of the Federal Court.

As the members of the House are well aware, judges of the Federal Court have served and continue to serve with distinction on the Supreme Court.

Furthermore, the Honourable Robert Décary, former Federal Court of Appeal justice, recently said, in the October 25, 2013 edition of La Presse, that by suggesting that Federal Court justices with civil law training do not have the civil experience required by section 6, does not take into account the increasing interdependence of Quebec, Canadian and international law.

I know that none of the Federal Court judges who have been appointed to the Supreme Court to date were appointed as members from the courts of Quebec. However, Federal Court judges ought not to be treated differently and excluded from consideration for appointment to the Supreme Court simply because after their many years of practising law in Quebec, they joined the Federal Court bench.

In keeping with the principle of bijuralism, the Federal Court justices must regularly interpret the Civil Code of Quebec when they apply federal laws in areas such as tax, copyright and bankruptcy in deciding matters that arise from Quebec.

However, despite the weight of expert opinion, some have continued to question the eligibility of Federal Court judges for appointment to the Supreme Court, particularly as members of the court from Quebec. In order to resolve this critical issue as soon as possible, the government has referred the matter to the Supreme Court of Canada.

In the meantime, Bill C-4 was determined to be the quickest method of clarifying the Supreme Court Act to guarantee that Federal Court judges can be considered in the process of filling upcoming Supreme Court vacancies, the first of which will arise next year. These declaratory provisions clarify, without making substantive changes to the law, that individuals with at least 10 years at any bar in Canada, including the Quebec bar, at any time during their career would be eligible to sit on the Supreme Court of Canada. Enacting these provisions would ensure that the Supreme Court would have the benefit of Parliament's declared intent of sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act when it renders its advisory opinion on these reference questions that have been put to it.

For these reasons, I am opposed to the amendment to delete clauses 471 and 472 of Bill C-4.

[Criminal Code, December 2nd, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in the debate on private member's Bill C-489, an act to amend the Criminal Code and the Corrections and Conditional Release Act with regard to restrictions on offenders.

On the comments of the previous speaker, the member for Malpeque, I am pleased to say that in the House, perfection is never the enemy of the good.

This bill has received the unanimous support of all members of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. I would like to thank the committee for its thorough review and for reporting back so quickly to the House.

Before I get into the amendments adopted by the committee, I would like to congratulate the member for Langley, British Columbia. I note his important work in promoting the interests of victims, of which this bill is a direct result. I would also note how the member for Langley worked with all parties to gain support for this bill and was open to a number of suggestions to improve the bill, all of which, I believe, makes this bill worthy of the unanimous support of the House.

The government indicated its support for the objectives of this bill, given its consistency with the government's commitment to the rights of victims of crime. In previous Parliaments, this government has taken bold and decisive action in this area, including the Safe Streets and Communities Act, which, among other things, established a new and higher mandatory minimum sentence for sexual offences against children, eliminated conditional sentences for serious and violent crimes, and eliminated record suspensions, formerly known as pardons, for serious offences.

As indicated in the Speech from the Throne on October 16, 2013, this government has committed to introduce and support new legislation that follows through on our belief that victims come before criminals. The Minister of Justice has already fulfilled one important government commitment to crack down on cyberbullying with the introduction of Bill C-13, the protecting Canadians from online crime act, on November 20, 2013.

Bill C-489 is completely consistent with the government's commitment to strengthen the rights of victims at every stage of the criminal justice process. This bill would require judges to either impose or fully consider specific conditions prohibiting contact between offenders and their victims, witnesses, or other individuals to protect them against contact from offenders.

The bill proposes to amend provisions of the Criminal Code and the Corrections and Conditional Release Act that would allow courts and the Parole Board of Canada to impose conditions on offenders released into the community. These include prohibitions for child sexual offenders orders, probation orders, conditional sentences, peace bonds for child sexual offences, and federal penitentiary conditional release orders.

It is estimated that about 110,000 offenders each year would be subject to this new requirement proposed by Bill C-489. The source for this figure is the 2012 Juristat, Statistics Canada, and the Parole Board of Canada's annual report on conditional releases.

Turning to the report of the justice committee, I note that a number of amendments to the bill were adopted by the committee. I would like to briefly summarize these amendments.

The bill proposes to amend section 161 of the Criminal Code. This is a prohibition order that currently requires a judge sentencing a child sexual offender to consider imposing specific prohibitions on the offender that come into effect once the offender is released into the community. These can include prohibitions to stay away from specific places where children might be present and/or not to work or volunteer with children.

The bill proposes to also require the court to consider prohibiting the offender from being within two kilometres of any dwelling house in which the victim can reasonably be expected to be present without a parent or guardian. In considering this proposal, the justice committee expressed concern that it was too rigid, as the court would only have two choices: either impose a two-kilometre restriction or impose no restrictions at all.

While a two-kilometre restriction might well be appropriate in many cases, the committee expressed concern that in many instances it might be too big or possibly not even a big enough distance to achieve the objectives of preventing contact between the victim and the offender. As a result, the committee adopted a motion to require judges to consider conditions of two kilometres or any other distance. I believe this change in the bill makes sense and I will fully support it.

The justice committee also adopted a motion to require the court to consider imposing a condition prohibiting an offender from being in a private vehicle with a child. In adopting this change, the committee recognized that the recent Safe Streets and Communities Act had already enacted a new condition against any unsupervised contact with a child under the age of 16.

Bill C-489 would also require a court to impose mandatory non-contact conditions for all prohibition and conditional sentences under the Criminal Cod”, although there is some discretion retained by the court not to impose such a condition if it finds there are “exceptional circumstances”. In addition, the condition can be waived by the victim if they consent to the contact. The provision would also require a court to provide its reasons in writing if it does find that “exceptional circumstances” exist.

The justice committee also adopted a small number of amendments to these proposals. First, the bill was amended to change the requirement that the judge give written reasons to require the judge to provide reasons in the record.

The committee felt this change was important, as the requirement to provide reasons in writing would have a potentially significant impact on court resources. The new formulation of requiring reasons to be stated in the record would still achieve the desired results of the original clause.

Second, the committee amended these proposals in cases where the identified victim consents to the contact by the offender to require that the victim's consent be in writing or in some other form specified by the court. This would ensure certainty in subsequent proceedings regarding whether or not there was in fact consent. Again, I believe these amendments make sense, and I support them as well.

Bill C-489 proposes to include similar non-contact conditions for section 810.1, peace bonds that are imposed on suspected child sexual offenders. This provision in the Criminal Code allows a recognizance with conditions to be imposed on any individual by a court if there is a reasonable fear that the defendant will commit a sexual offence against a child under the age of 16, unless there are exceptional circumstances.

To maintain consistency and to avoid any confusion in the courts, Bill C-489 has been amended to remove the reference to “exceptional circumstances” in this provision, given the fact that the judge has full discretion to impose any of the listed conditions under section 810.1.

The bill has also been amended to remove the requirement of the court to provide written reasons for the peace bond condition, given that all peace bonds are already required to be provided in writing and filed with the court.

As introduced, the bill also proposed to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to ensure that the releasing authority has the ability to impose non-contact conditions on offenders as well as geographic restrictions.

While the Corrections and Conditional Release Act currently authorizes conditions to be imposed upon an offender when granted conditional release, there is no specific obligation to consider the input of victims in determining appropriate conditions.

The committee adopted an amendment to require the releasing authority, either the Parole Board of Canada or the head of the institution, to impose reasonable and necessary conditions on offenders, including non-communication or geographic restrictions if a victim or other person has provided a statement regarding the harm done to them, the continuing impact of the offence, or their safety.

Finally, the committee amended the bill to come into force three months after receiving royal assent to provide adequate opportunity for courts and correctional institutions to prepare for these reforms.

I fully support the efforts of the sponsor of the bill to enhance the level of protection afforded to victims when offenders are released into the community.

Bill C-489, as amended by the justice committee, goes a long way to address concerns that all too often offenders are able to come into close proximity to their victims. I agree that Bill C-489 will help to ensure that victims, their families, witnesses, and other individuals will feel safe in their homes and in their communities when offenders are released.

I hope all hon. members will join me in passing the bill.