Madam Speaker, I am pleased to be able to speak once again to Bill C-26, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (citizen's arrest and the defences of property and persons).
I would like to begin by thanking the justice and human rights committee for its work in studying the bill. The committee held six sessions that heard more than 15 witnesses from outside government. The committee heard from a number of associations such as several pan-Canadian groups including, among others, the Canadian Bar Association, the Barreau du Québec, the Canadian Convenience Stores Association, the Canadian Police Association, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, the Criminal Lawyers' Association and the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies. The committee also heard from a number of individuals including David Chen, a local criminal defence lawyer and several law professors.
The diversity of witnesses who appeared at committee reflects the fact that the proposals in Bill C-26, though only a few pages long, touched a long range of issues that are important to Canadians. The committee no doubt benefited immensely from hearing the perspectives of specific populations such as police officers, small-business owners and their families, private security interests and victims of domestic violence. The committee undertook a thorough and profound analysis of the legislation, which has implications not just for special populations but for all Canadians.
I would especially like to thank the committee and the witnesses who testified for their commitment to balancing the needs of victims of crime to respond to emergency situations on the one hand and ensuring on the other hand that the law discourages vigilante responses to crime and the escalation of violence and the abusive exercise of arrest powers. This is always difficult to balance, but at the same time we believe that members on all sides of the House should wish to see this balance struck appropriately.
The committee made several modifications to the legislation, which I will address shortly. I believe these modifications improved the legislation, and I would like to once again express my appreciation for the serious and professional manner in which all committee members approached these important and sensitive issues.
Members will recall that Bill C-26 proposes a responsible expansion of the citizen's arrest power and also includes a long-overdue simplification and clarification of the law of self-defence and defence of property.
With respect to the power of citizen's arrest, the expansion proposed in Bill C-26 is modest and limited. No one disputes the fact that arrests are primarily the responsibility of the police. However, in recognition of the fact that police are not always present when a crime is committed, the Criminal Code has long authorized citizens to arrest other citizens in certain specifically defined situations including in relation to a property offence. The critical aspect of the existing law is that citizens may only arrest a person they find committing a property-related offence at that very moment. An arrest made at a point later is not a lawful arrest and the arresting persons are therefore potentially liable to be criminally prosecuted for any of their actions that otherwise constitute an offence, such as an assault against the suspect. We know that sometimes this is not possible and so to avoid the unfairness of the law in treating as criminal the citizen who arrests another shortly after the crime was observed, Bill C-26 would modify the current law to allow the arrest within a reasonable time of that offence.
I know the committee did consider several motions to amend the bill to add additional limitations intended to prevent this sort of conduct. The committee did not agree to these proposals. This does not mean our government does not share the concern. Rather, it means we are confident that the proposals and the bill would not be construed or applied in this manner. The extended time in which arrest can be made would not be unlimited. It must be reasonable. This would allow, and indeed require, the court to inquire into the many relevant considerations. Most important among these would be the reason for the delay. The court could also inquire as to whether the delay had any particular detrimental impact on the arrested person.
Another relevant consideration would be the purpose of the law itself. In this context, the courts would be mindful that this would be a novel extension of an arrest power that is currently very limited. In interpreting it contextually, the courts would be in a position to constrain the extension in a manner that accords with its purpose. Whenever the court would find that the reason for a delay in making an arrest was inappropriate or otherwise unreasonable or that the delay caused an injustice to the arrested person or that it did not accord with the purpose of the law, the arrest could be found to be unlawful.
Furthermore, our government's confidence is bolstered by a safeguard that accompanies the expanded arrest power, which will further serve to limit the potential for abuse. This safeguard is a requirement that before the citizen makes the arrest he or she must reasonably believe that it is not feasible in the circumstances for a peace officer to make the arrest instead.
In other words, if an arrest is intentionally delayed for some particular purpose, it will be much more likely that the police should be called to the scene and make the arrest. If the police are not called and the arrest is made later, that arrest may be found to be unlawful on the basis that the arresting person could not reasonably have believed that the police were not able to respond. Taken together, our government is confident that these are reasonable and responsible amendments and that they should not unduly jeopardize the safety of Canadians. We urge all members to support them.
I will now speak briefly on the issue of the defence of person and property.
While the citizen's arrest reforms are fairly straightforward, even if they are somewhat controversial, the changes to the defences of person and property are more fundamental in that they completely replace the existing legal provisions with new and simpler ones.
The necessity to reform these defences stems from the fact that they are currently worded in an extremely complex and convoluted manner. In particular, our self-defence laws have been subject to decades of criticism by the judiciary, including the Supreme Court of Canada, trial counsel, criminal law academics, bar associations and the law reform bodies. Criticism has focused on the fact that the existing law is confusing and difficult to apply in practice. It is fair to say that the reform in this area is long overdue.
When the laws that set out the rules for emergency defensive action are confusing, we fail in our responsibility to adequately inform Canadians of their rights. Unclear laws can obviously complicate and frustrate the charging decisions of the police, who themselves may have difficulty reading the Criminal Code and understanding what is permitted. It is also extremely important. Self-defence can be raised by a person charged with murder. Self-preservation is perhaps the most fundamental entitlement any citizen may have, even more fundamental than the protection of one's property. It is essential that Parliament gets law reform in this area right.
Bill C-26 proposes a single new self-defence and defence of property provision that would be much simpler than the existing law, which provides for multiple variations of each defence depending on slightly different circumstances. The proposed new defences would reduce the existing law into its most fundamental elements, which are consistent no matter what the particularities of the situation are. We no longer need different rules for different circumstances. We only need one rule that is capable of being understood and applied in all situations.
I will now speak briefly to the issue of the defence of the person.
According to the proposed new law for defence of the person, people would be protected from criminal responsibility if the following three conditions are met: they have reason to believe that they or another person are being threatened with force; they act for the purpose of defending themselves or other persons from that force; and their actions are reasonable in the circumstances.
These are clearly appropriate elements for a new self-defence law. First, to be exonerated from a crime, people should have a reasonable apprehension of some kind of force. Second, their actions should be motivated by a defensive purpose. Self-defence is not a disguise for what is really revenge, for instance. Third, whatever actions are taken, if they are taken for a defensive purpose and in response to a reasonable apprehension of force, those actions should be judged to fall within the range of what a reasonable person would have done.
Most cases likely succeed or fail on the question of whether the actions were reasonable in the circumstances. This determination would be guided by the unique facts and circumstances of each individual case.
However, without limiting the nature and scope of factors that could be taken into account, the legislation does try to set out some of the more familiar and important considerations in a non-exhaustive list of factors. This list accomplishes several purposes. It is intended to signal to the judges that existing jurisprudence should continue to apply even though the elements of self-defence have been simplified. It should also assist judges in their duty to instruct juries about how to apply the law in a given case.
One of the most important types of factors has to do with an abusive intimate relationship between the parties to a confrontation. The watershed Supreme Court of Canada decision in Lavallee in 1990 acknowledged the difficulties juries can have in finding the behaviour of a battered spouse to be reasonable.
In particular, juries may not understand how battered partners might stay in abusive relationships or how they might come to predict future violence based on past experiences. If the jury does not understand how people in abusive situations can come to view their options, the jury is more likely to find their actions unreasonable and deny them a defence.
However, in the Lavallee case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that expert evidence can be called to provide an explanation as to why an accused did not flee when he or she perceived his or her life to be in danger. In this way the evidence can also assist the jury in assessing the reasonableness of the accused's belief about both the danger that he or she faced and the need to act as he or she did.
This type of case does not arrive often, but sensitivity to these situations is crucial. For this reason the history of the relationship between the parties, including whether there were prior acts of violence, is specified in the law as a relevant factor in the determination of whether the accused's actions were reasonable.
Other critical relevant factors include the nature of the threat and the response to it. For instance, whether the attacker threatened to break a finger or to kill; whether any weapons were present; and the relative physical abilities of the parties, such as their age, size and gender. So naturally, a petite elderly women and a fit young man may have different options available to them to respond to the same threat.
As part of its comprehensive study of the bill, the justice and human rights committee found that the list of factors could be improved in certain ways. It agreed to several amendments to the subsection of the legislation, all of which our government is in agreement with.
The first change was to the opening words of the provision. The original words read, “In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances, the court may consider, among other factors...”. The committee agreed to changes to these opening words to say, “In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances, the court shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties and the act, including, but not limited to, the following factors”.
This change has several effects. First, it makes it clear that it is obligatory, rather than permissible, for the court to consider all relevant circumstances. This is an improvement in clarity. Second, it highlights critical factors, namely the circumstances of the accused who is claiming self-defence, the other party and the act itself. Our government appreciates the additional clarity.
The committee made a change to the wording of one of the factors. Factor (e) originally identified the size, age and gender of the parties to the incident. The committee agreed that the relative size, age and gender of the parties may often be relevant in determining whether a person's actions in self-defence were reasonable. However, based on representations from the Canadian Bar Association, the committee concluded that these factors will not always be determinative of physical ability. In an effort to be more clear, it amended this factor so that it now reads: (e) the size, age and gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident. Once again, the government agrees with this additional clarity.
The committee made one final change to the list of factors. It agreed to add a new factor, namely, any history of interaction or communication between the parties to that incident. I have already spoken to the factor that refers to the history of any relationship between the parties. The committee felt that this factor could well be interpreted narrowly to apply to longstanding, intimate relationships and so might not capture interactions that are more casual or infrequent, or involve any single incident, such as a single threatening email. The committee added the new factor to address this type of situation.
On the issue of defence of property, the proposed new defence of property would adopt the same basic structure as self-defence. All of the existing provisions would be replaced with a single, general test for defence of property that captures its essential components, while maintaining the same level of protection as the current law.
There would be three essential elements of the defence of property. First, the defender must really perceive that someone else is about to do, or has just done, one of the following: enter the property without being legally entitled to; or take, damage, or destroy property. Second, the defender must act for the purpose of preventing or stopping the interference with property. Third, the actions taken must be reasonable in the circumstances.
A precondition for the defence is that the property must be in the peaceful possession of the person when the interference takes place.
This term is part of the current law and will be maintained in the new law. It has been interpreted by our courts to mean that the defender of the property must be in actual physical possession of, or have control over, the property at the time of the threat or interference, and that the possession itself must be unlikely to lead to a breach of the peace and is not contested by others. This is the way in which possession must be peaceful. It must not be contested or risk violence or public disorder.
In closing, Bill C-26 clarifies and expands certain provisions which authorize Canadian citizens to undertake actions that would otherwise be prohibited where there is a real emergency involving either threat to property they possess or to the safety of persons.
It strikes the right balance between discouraging crime and confrontation on the one hand and permitting Canadians to defend their basic interest where no other options are available.
I urge all members to support the bill. The reforms are long overdue and represent a principled and measured response to complex situations.
