Scott Reid

[Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, October 18th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, my hon. colleague has cabinet level experience in the province of Manitoba with a variety of matters. Having dealt with his own cabinet colleagues in the administration of government, he perhaps has more expertise than I do on some of these things.

With his permission, if I could broaden it and deal with the whole question of the politicization of nominally independent agencies, perhaps I could deal with the thematic base of his question.

There is a problem with the politicization of independent agencies in this country that is unlikely to occur when we look at our neighbours to the south. I think the reason is that the Americans have a system of government in which the executive is clearly separated from the legislative branch. The legislative branch in turn has some independent control over selection for the judiciary, which means that the judiciary is also completely and fully independent. Appointments tend to be made with some legislative control as well. This is something that is absent here.

The governor in council always appoints people who are satisfactory to the Prime Minister. Moreover these appointments are made without any kind of outside input except that which the government of the day finds permissible and acceptable. We can see this most dramatically perhaps with the whole question of the ethics counsellor.

If the member for Malpeque is really interested in what I feel about these things, I would encourage him to stay here tonight. I have a late show question and we will go on at great length on that subject under the new rules.

As an example, the ethics counsellor is not in any way independent. Of course the promise that was made during the 1993 election was that there would be an independent ethics commissioner. There are similar problems with the chief of defence staff, who is given a bureaucratic rank as a deputy minister. We see the separation and independence that is given to agencies being eroded. This was our protection and our version of the kinds of protections that are built into the divided powers of the American system. That is where the problem is coming from.

How could that be overcome? Giving parliament genuine control over the choice of people placed in these kinds of positions may solve this problem. For example, the election of the Speaker has produced a genuinely independent Speaker. The questions that used to arise as to the independence of speakers in past parliaments, going back to the 1970s and 1980s, no longer exist. That is because the Speaker is clearly an independent agent elected and responsible to the House.

If elections were taken in a similar manner, and I am just throwing this out as a possible solution, we may see that this would provide some kind of protection or ratification perhaps of someone who has been nominated by the government through an independent vote in the House. That kind of thing might genuinely produce the kind of freedom from political interference in a variety of these areas which is currently lacking.

I look forward to any questions particularly from the member for Malpeque.

[Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, October 18th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, there is nothing quite like a two week break in the middle of an impromptu speech to allow one to gather one's thoughts. I had the opportunity over the two week break to spend a bit of time curled up with the material and actually read the bill, something I had not done at the time of my first comments on it. It was fascinating reading. I am glad it is a short bill, unlike Bill C-36.

I will confine my remarks to clause 5 which deals with police powers and freedom of assembly. I will deal with some of the issues raised by these provisions.

When dealing with the question public assemblies we can start with the notion of an assembly of a small number of people for an innocuous purpose and work our way up to something which is a threat to public order and safety. There is a spectrum or range of actions but I will go through the bill and lay out some of the stages to make a point that relates to section 5.

The least aggressive or least intrusive form of public assembly is a gathering of people to discuss political action. The general public may not even be aware of it. This is the most clearly understood form of freedom of association and the one most clearly in need of fundamental protection.

Moving up the scale a bit, one may imagine a gathering which aims to draw attention to a concern or grievance but which is known about only by those who choose to pay attention. It may be a voluntary gathering to promote public awareness but only those involved in the issue would pay much attention.

Bumping it up a bit more, one might see a slightly more forceful gathering to draw attention to an issue. Perhaps people would gather in a public place where they know others would see them and where they would expect to be reported on the news and draw the attention of the public to their cause. Under normal circumstances this is both defensible and admirable.

Moving on from that, a gathering could draw attention through some form of preapproved and consensual interference with the regular routine of business; for example, a demonstration for which a permit has been received. A street could be closed off and the demonstrators could move down the street and disrupt the normal flow of affairs, but in a manner understood and accepted by those in positions of authority.

Provisions are written into municipal laws to permit this sort of thing. Indeed, sometimes it is ritualized in the form of political events we hold on a regular basis. What comes to mind is Remembrance Day when traffic is closed off in part of the downtown core so we can honour our fallen soldiers through a political action.

Moving it up a bit more, we might see an action or demonstration that directly interferes with the conduct of regular life in a way that is not fully consensual and does not have everyone on board. An example might be a picket outside factory gates which is not merely for the purpose of handing out leaflets but for obstructing the flow of traffic in and out. As used to happen in the United States, a demonstration may block the entrance to a prison and thereby make the carrying out of an execution more difficult. This slides over the edge into a bit of illegality but is not as serious as some of the examples that will follow.

Some demonstrations damage property. These are sometimes connected with strikes, strike breaking activity and some political demonstrations. A bit higher on the scale are demonstrations or gatherings that threaten personal security and safety. These move into what could be described as riots.

Finally, at the extreme end of the spectrum we may find forms of demonstration or collective action that threaten life. This is clearly the kind of public demonstration for which there can be no toleration in society.

The traditional legal description and manner of dealing with such assemblies can be found in sections 63, 64, 65 and 66 of the criminal code. I will read part of that if I might. Section 63(1) reads:

An unlawful assembly is an assembly of three or more persons who, with intent to carry out any common purpose, assemble in such a manner or so conduct themselves when they are assembled as to cause persons in the neighbourhood of the assembly to fear, on reasonable grounds, that they

(a) will disturb the peace tumultuously; or

(b) will by that assembly needlessly and without reasonable cause provoke other persons to disturb the peace tumultuously.

Subsection (2) states:

Persons who are lawfully assembled may become an unlawful assembly if they conduct themselves with a common purpose in a manner that would have made the assembly unlawful if they had assembled in that manner for that purpose.

Section 64 goes from unlawful assembly to imagine the stage of the spectrum I described as a riot:

A riot is an unlawful assembly that has begun to disturb the peace tumultuously.

The law then anticipates different punishments for those who participate in a riot or unlawful assembly. Section 65 states:

Every one who takes part in a riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

Section 66 refers to those who participate in unlawful assembly. It states:

Every one who is a member of an unlawful assembly is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

The law has traditionally made a distinction between lawful and unlawful assembly. As members will notice, individuals who participate in lawful assembly are not merely not punished by law; their rights to assemble freely are protected by law. The charter of rights and, before it, the bill of rights clearly laid out such protections. The American bill of rights also lays out protections for lawful and peaceable assemblies.

We see a range, then, from completely legitimate and protected actions which the government may not interfere with to those which the government must necessarily interfere with for the benefit of society. This is a spectrum.

The law takes into account that at the same place and time there may be people who are legally demonstrating in a manner that is protected by the law and the constitution; people who are engaged in unlawful assembly and are subject to summary conviction; and people who are engaged in riotous behaviour and could be punished by up to two years in prison. This could all be going on at the same place at the same time.

The law is designed to provide incentives so that those who are assembled lawfully do not choose to move into an unlawful assembly and those who are engaged in unlawful assembly may resist the temptation to slide into riotous behaviour.

In general these are pretty good practices. They are longstanding conventions in the law and have served our society, American society and other societies in our legal tradition very well indeed.

I will turn from these general comments to clause 5 of the bill under consideration today. I will read it if I might. Clause 5 would amend section 10 of another act and make the following additions. It starts at subsection 10.1(1):

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police has the primary responsibility to ensure the security for the proper functioning of any intergovernmental conference in which two or more states participate, that is attended by persons granted privileges and immunities under this Act and to which an order made or continued under this Act applies.

Subsection 10.1 (2) states:

For the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities under subsection (1), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police may take appropriate measures, including controlling, limiting or prohibiting access to any area to the extent and in a manner that is reasonable in the circumstances.

Subsection 10.1 (3) states:

The powers referred to in subsection (2) are set out for greater certainty and shall not be read as affecting the powers that peace officers possess at common law or by virtue of any other federal or provincial Act or regulation.

This would include the earlier acts I have read.

This part of the law as I understand it is intended as a response to the kind of anti-globalization demonstrations and actions that took place in Quebec City, and before that, outside our jurisdiction, at the so-called battle of Seattle. Demonstrators at the Seattle conference a couple of years ago engaged in a range of actions from peaceful protests, to what is the American version of unlawful assembly, up to what everyone would agree was riotous behaviour with full battle gear in some cases, gas masks, bricks and all kinds of paraphernalia that allowed them to be quite disruptive and violent.

Looking at the example of Quebec City which is directly relevant to this part, I have some friends, including the man who ran against me for the nomination in Lanark--Carleton and with whom I have remained on very good terms, who were in Quebec City and protested against globalization in a peaceful manner. However there were others who were engaged in the worst sort of violent behaviour. Policemen were struck by bricks. Private property owners had their property destroyed as part of these unlawful protests.

There was a range between brick throwing hoodlums and those who were there acting under the protection of our constitution. We should be quite specific that the goal of those who were on the violent margin of all that was to have the effect of causing so much chaos at one of these assemblies that it would become impossible to carry on their function. What is going on is the assumption that they cannot win the debate against globalization, or whatever the issue happens to be, through the normal democratic means, that they cannot do it by convincing people through democratic, open and legal assemblies and therefore they will use those as a cover for illegal actions. That is reprehensible. To the extent that the legislation deals with that, it probably is a positive thing.

I note that clause 5 makes an attempt to deal with this by stating that the RCMP clearly will be in charge of security at all such conferences. The logic here is that in Seattle for example the local police were in charge of security. They had no idea what was coming. They had no specialized training for it and in addition they had no practice for that sort of thing. At first they underreacted which allowed the city to be put into chaos. Then they overreacted and beat up people who were completely innocent, dragged away people who had done nothing wrong along with those who had, and as a result were able to create sympathy for the illegal protesters in a manner that surely was completely unintentional. To this extent this part of the legislation probably is positive.

The one great caveat that has to be put on all of this is that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police unfortunately is becoming increasingly a politicized agency. This is done because the commissioner of the RCMP has the status of a deputy minister and effectively is now part of the regular civil service. This is a problem that generally is true in our semi-independent agencies in government. It is a very unfortunate thing. We saw the interference of Jean Carle for example in what was going on in Vancouver at the APEC conference five years ago.

It seems to me what would give greater security here would be if this particular legislation or other legislation were to try and re-establish the kinds of separation between the executive government and the political masters in the Liberal Party who do have a certain stake in ensuring that justice is not administered fairly. It is unfortunate that this is occurring. It could be corrected. With goodwill on that side of the House and in the government it would be entirely possible.

[Privilege, October 16th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, in relation to the member's proposals regarding sunset clauses, it seems to me that there has been a bit of consensus emerging in the House. We now have members from the Alliance, the Tories, the New Democrats and several Liberals who have spoken in favour of sunset clauses, and I think this outline is particularly interesting.

There are some systemic differences between the Canadian and American legislative systems. In the American system the president functions separately from the congress, whereas in the Canada the Prime Minister functions within the House.

First, would a review that takes place or an extension that requires a vote of the House not seem to the member to be superior?

Second, could he be a little more specific about which sections of the law he thinks should be included in the sunset clause?

[Anti-terrorism Act, October 16th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, toward the end of his remarks my hon. colleague made reference to a sunset clause. Would the hon. member echo the remarks that were made by the hon. member for Winnipeg--Transcona with regard to the value of having a sunset clause which would require a re-enactment or a review of the law at the end of a set period so that any problems that occurred and any excessive measures that may have been included could be rectified at that time?

[Anti-terrorism Act, October 16th, 2001]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his very thoughtful commentary. I was particularly happy to hear his suggestion that the legislation should include some form of sunset clause. Of course if necessary it could always be re-enacted by parliament with any necessary amendments to take care of any flaws that would have become evident after a couple of years in operation. I am glad he made that point.

In looking at this, does the hon. member have any specific examples that he has seen in the past in his lengthy parliamentary experience where by this sort of clause has been used effectively? Could he suggest a more concrete way in which this would be appropriate for this legislation?

[International Actions Against Terrorism, October 15th, 2001]

Mr. Chairman, on September 11, following the infamous attacks in New York and Washington, President George W. Bush described those events as attacks on freedom itself. Tonight I propose to speak about the implications for freedom of the anti-terrorism legislation that the government is proposing and has put forward today.

This is legislation designed to deal with some extraordinary threats to our freedom. It does so, necessarily perhaps, by limiting some fundamental freedoms. In particular, from my own quick reading of the bill, I take note of six specific limitations on freedoms which I think ought to be taken very seriously by all of us.

The first of these is a restriction on freedom of association. It would be an offence under the law to participate in a terrorist group. There is also a restriction on the right to privacy. As well, there would be easier use of electronic surveillance against terrorist groups, which necessarily means not only surveillance of terrorist groups but also of those who are suspected, not necessarily accurately, of being members of such groups or of being participants in such groups.

To make this last point, I will read from some of the background material provided by the government.

We see that the new law would eliminate the need to demonstrate that electronic surveillance is a last resort in the investigation of terrorists. We see as well that the proposed legislation would extend the period of validity of wiretap authorization as issued by a superior court judge, and finally, the requirement to notify a target after surveillance has taken place could be delayed for up to three years rather than the one year currently specified in law.

We see as well that the right to a public trial would be limited to some degree through amendments to the Canada Evidence Act which would forbid public disclosure of information that is considered to be of national interest and that might come up in court.

As well, the right not to be detained without charges being laid would be infringed to some degree. The criminal code would be amended to create a new category of what is called preventive arrest. This would be done where it is deemed appropriate for people who are suspected terrorists.

Freedom of speech would be restricted to some degree, with restrictions on the use of Internet and telephones for the promotion of hate.

Finally, property rights would be restricted to some degree through civil forfeiture laws.

It may well be that these are justified restrictions on freedoms given the emergency circumstances with which we are presented. Rights are never absolute. I think we all understand this when we think of the homely phrase “my right to swing my fist ends where your nose begins”.

Even in the United States where the bill of rights lays out the rights within it, subject to no restriction whatsoever, the practice has in fact been for the courts to find ways of defining restrictions into the definitions of these rights. For example, the right to freedom of speech was defined more narrowly by the creation by the courts of something known as speech acts, whereby a kind of speech is considered not to be speech but rather to be a kind of act and therefore not subject to protection under the bill of rights.

In Canada, section 1 of the charter of rights applies in this respect and provides limitations. If I may, I will read section 1 to the House to make this point. It states:

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice have stressed at great length that the new anti-terrorism act would conform to section 1 of the charter. I think what they are driving at is that insofar as the new anti-terrorism law restricts or would restrict individual freedoms it would do so only by placing reasonable limits prescribed within this law and doing so only to the extent that can be justified in a free and democratic society like Canada's.

However, this means that if they are to succeed in meeting the tests they are setting for themselves they must meet with what is known as the Oakes test. This is a test that was defined by the supreme court in a 1986 case, Regina v Oakes.

The standard of proof that the rights are being restricted in a manner that is not excessive is only the civil standard, that is to say, the balance of the probabilities must be in favour of the government should the government find itself in any kind of court proceeding where it is trying to demonstrate the constitutionality of one of these restrictions on rights. The balance of the probabilities essentially means that there has to be a better than 50% chance that the government is in fact justified. This is not a perfect test and it is certainly not a perfect protection for liberties.

Peter Hogg, the great constitutional scholar, says this is probably the only realistic test that is available to us, that is, the test applied by the civil law rather than the more restrictive test applied by the criminal law, but he does stress that it too has its dangers. To make this point, I would like to quote Peter Hogg, who states as follows:

--where the validity of a law turns on a finding of fact (for example, the existence of an emergency), that finding of fact need not be proved strictly by the government; it is sufficient that there be a “rational basis” for the finding.

Therefore we do see the potential for some restrictions that could in fact represent a genuine erosion of our overall freedoms and liberties, and after all, it is in protection of freedoms and liberties that we are trying to enact this legislation.

With all this being said, and remembering the extraordinary circumstances that we face today which justify this kind of legislation, it seems to me that there is an absolute need for a sunset clause in the legislation. We do believe that this emergency will pass in time, certainly that it has the potential to pass in time and that if it has not passed by the time that the sunset clause would take place or would kick in, it could be reenacted or some new version could be enacted that is perhaps a bit refined due to the experience we would have had in dealing with the law in practice and with the rights restrictions that it states in practice.

If, for example, the law were to say that this law would cease to be in force and effect after the passage of three years' time unless reenacted by parliament, I think that would be a very good idea. Instead we have in this legislation a review clause. Subclause 145(1) of the bill states:

“Within three years after this act receives royal assent, a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this act shall be undertaken by such committee of the Senate, of the House of Commons or of both houses of Parliament as may be designated or established by parliament for that purpose”.

Subclause 145(2) states:

“The committee referred to in subsection (1) shall, within a year after the review is undertaken pursuant to that subsection or within such further time as parliament may authorize, submit a report on the review to parliament, including a statement of any changes the committee recommends”.

All of which is well and good except for the fact that it imposes no sanctions should the government not arrange to have such a committee convened.

The problem we have is that in the past the government has failed, and failed regularly, to actually establish such committees and ensure such reviews when they have been called for. A perfectly good example is the Referendum Act. A review should have taken place by mid-June of 1995. In fact no review has taken place and we are now six years overdue. I worry that the same thing will happen here.

For this reason I strongly encourage the government to change the legislation and write in an actual sunset clause that will actually cause the legislation to cease to be in force and effect if no reenactment takes place. I think that would be a strong improvement to this law. I do urge the government to make that change.

[Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, October 5th, 2001]

Madam Speaker, if I might just bring to your attention the fact that a frequently made error in the House is assuming that the name of my riding is in alphabetical order. In fact it is in reverse alphabetical order. It happens all the time. People frequently misspell Carleton as well. It is an ongoing struggle but we make do as best we can.

I want to dwell on the civil rights aspect of the legislation before the House. It has been referred to by members on the government side as a piece of housekeeping legislation, which is one of those phrases that makes my ears perk up. My hackles rise a bit when I hear that phrase being used, in much the same way that one's nerves get unsettled when there is a knock on the door and someone announces “I am from the government and I am here to help”.

It is too easy to deal with civil rights issues and the reduction in civil rights by means of slicing off a little at a time and saying that it is just housekeeping, that it is just a little right here, a little right there. When we look at the whole question of civil rights and legal rights, the whole system of protection we have built up is a series of very small, very careful protections against those little salami slices that can be cut away. That is why when we read a bill of rights or our own charter of rights, we find that the protections for civil liberties tend to be very much in the nature of protections against a whole range and series of individual potential abuses as opposed to a broad umbrella statement of the rights that ought to exist.

For example, it is not enough to talk about freedom of speech, freedom of assembly or the right to a fair trial. One has to go on and say, for example with regard to the right to a fair trial, that one has a right to habeas corpus, that one has a right not to be tried twice for the same offence, and a whole series of other similar protections, the right to counsel, and the right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Also, within that right against unreasonable search and seizure are certain sub-rights to prevent against warrantless searches. When warrants are issued, any evidence collected can only be evidence that relates to the terms of the warrant. For example, if the police come into a person's house because they think that person is guilty of crime A and they find evidence that suggests that in fact the person is guilty of offence B , that evidence cannot be used in that prosecution.

This kind of ad hoc protection against ad hoc abuses is absolutely vital when we see ad hoc reductions in these rights, particularly those which are not clearly and specifically spelled out in our charter. We have reason to want to take very special care to make sure that we are not seeing the beginning of this process of slicing off those little salami slices of freedom. Just taking away those little bits of freedom might result in that great mass of freedoms, which makes us such a beacon to the world, being lost. That is the kind of thing we worry about.

Today we are dealing with a very specific right. This is the right to freedom of assembly to register one's protest. This is a right that has existed in our society and in our ancestors' societies for centuries. I am thinking particularly of England.

There was a time when Britain's parliament was far from being the model that it is today. For example, at one time women could not vote, working men could not vote, men who did not hold property could not vote, and the franchise was exercised only by a tiny fraction, less than 10% of the population. Also, the system of representation in the boroughs was extraordinarily corrupt. There were some boroughs known as the rotten boroughs in which there could be as few as a dozen people casting ballots to elect a member of parliament. Other boroughs were of enormous size and as a result experienced a great deal of underrepresentation

All kinds of theories were developed on how to deal with this. In the end, the right of protest on the street, of going out and demonstrating was practised. Sometimes there was a little bit of alcohol consumed and these things could evolve into riots, but that was understood and accepted.

That actually was the framework within which we in this country were able to develop a greater degree of freedom. This applies to the British and the Americans as well. That was absolutely critical. It would be a great shame to see that lost or reduced at all.

[Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, October 5th, 2001]

Madam Speaker, I would like to turn to one of the themes that my hon. colleague dwelt upon which falls within his own area of considerable expertise and experience. He talked about the human rights situation in other countries, particularly Africa. My hon. colleague has visited Africa and worked there as a medical doctor on something like 17, 18 or 19 different occasions over the past several decades. He has developed an extraordinary knowledge of the situation in Africa in regard to the economic situation and the human rights situation and has a very subtle understanding in some cases.

I have a question for him that breaks down into several parts. First, in dealing with how we could respond to the situation in Africa and other parts of the world where we see terrorism of domestic populations taking place, I wonder what kinds of sanctions or penalties could actually effectively be imposed and would actually work.

In asking that I would like to extend it out a bit. As an historian I tend to look at what has been done in the past and what has worked and what has not. What has my hon. colleague seen that has worked effectively in other parts of the world? Drawing upon that, which of these possible sanctions could actually be advocated effectively by Canada for these kinds of situations? Of course there are some actions that perhaps we cannot advocate for one reason or another. Looking at countries in situations similar to our own, such as the situations of the Americans, the Australians, the Swedes, the British and so on, what has been advocated by those countries for encouraging a reduction in this kind of abuse of human rights in countries such as Africa and elsewhere?

[The Acadians, October 3rd, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, it is with regret that I will be voting against Motion No. 241. My reasons for doing so are twofold.

First, I feel that this motion is based on a faulty premise, that being that guilt can be collective and can be passed on from one generation to the next.

Second, despite the good intentions of those who drafted it, the motion seems to attribute ultimate responsibility for the expulsion of the Acadians to the crown, which is not an accurate reading of the events of 1755. A more historically accurate reading would lay blame with the colonial governors of New England and the pioneers they represented.

I will begin with the historical argument and come back later to the philosophical one.

Many of the facts surrounding the deportation of the Acadians are unchallenged. In 1755, the colonial authorities began a process of uprooting and deporting that part of the Acadian population which had settled on British lands, beginning with the centre of the Acadian colony along the east shore of the Bay of Fundy.

Nova Scotia's Governor Lawrence, and Governor Shirley, commander in chief of the British forces in New England, began by seizing colonists' firearms to prevent them from using force to resist. Then they took a large number of adult males hostage in order to guarantee the docility of their families at the time of deportation.

In the years that followed, approximately three-quarters of the total Acadian population, or 13,000 people, were deported. Some of these people were sent to New England, others to Louisian, and still others were returned to France.

Although we know with certainty the degree of suffering caused by the deportations between 1755 and 1763, it is much more difficult to pin down historical responsibility for them. One thing is certain and that is that governors Lawrence and Shirley were at the heart of the decision making and must bear ultimate responsibility, but nothing proves that they acted with the approval of the parliament of Westminster.

According to the most commonly accepted version of events, Lawrence acted with the authorization of the local council in Nova Scotia, and parliament and King George did not take part in the planning of the deportations.

More recently, Roger Paradis, a professor of history at the University of Maine, has uncovered documentary evidence suggesting that the authorities in London were involved. He cites a bill, sent to London in 1758 by Governor Lawrence, listing the expenditures incurred for the deportation. He has also revealed the existence of a circular sent by Lawrence to governors of the New England colonies, which presumes that these governors were, at the very least, aware of the events taking place in Acadia.

However, what strikes me is that even in this revisionist interpretation of history, the colonial authorities in Acadia and New England take on the primary responsibility for the acts committed while the crown only has a secondary responsibility. Moreover, it is obvious that the first ones to benefit from the military security that was increased as a result of ethnic cleansing in Acadia were the New England pioneers and specifically those living in the portion of the colony of Massachusetts then known as the “District of Maine”.

I emphasize that I will not support the notion of a collective or hereditary guilt, but even if I did support it, I think that the first collective excuses that should be conveyed to the Acadian people should come from the government of Maine.

It is therefore interesting to know that on April 13, 1994, the Maine legislative assembly passed a resolution regarding the deportation of the Acadians. It was carefully drafted in such a way that the blame is laid exclusively on the British, and it never hints at the fact that Maine, a sovereign state, or its predecessor, the English colony of Massachusetts Bay, could have been involved in any way. I think that the best we can say about this statement is that it comes from a serious misinterpretation of history.

Unfortunately, the motion before us today is based on the same mistake. The motion calls on the crown to “present an official apology to the Acadian people for the wrongs done to them in its name”. However, the fact that the deportation was ordered in the name of the British crown does not mean that the crown itself was the primary culprit, even in 1755.

Similarly, history is full of outrageous acts committed in the name of various religions or in the name of the people of one territory or another, while the authority named had very little to do, if anything, with the harm that was done in its name. A more historically accurate motion could demand official apologies from the legislative assemblies of each of the New England states for the harm done in their interests and with their complicity.

I should be clear about the fact that I would oppose this too. I would do so because I do not accept the notion that an institution can maintain a heritage of collective guilt which is imposed upon successive generations of those who become members of that institution or who fall under its protection.

It seems to me that some participants in the debate over this motion and in similar debates that have occurred in the past have contemplated two quite different concepts. The first concept is the expectation, which I regard as legitimate, that all participants in the public life of a civilized society should adopt a moral attitude toward the past. A moral attitude involves recognizing and embracing those past actions that are regarded as good and just and rejecting those that are regarded as unjust or monstrous.

The second concept is the idea that guilt for a past injustice can be passed on, institutionally and collectively, in precisely the same way that the residual effects of that wrong continue to have some impact on the descendants of those who suffered the initial wrong. This is simply untrue.

The adoption of a moral attitude by an actor in political life allows us, as potential voters or as potential political allies, to assess how that individual might act in the future should he or she be a decision maker in some similar future circumstance. Such a calculation is necessary in a system of representative democracy because it is always conceivable that one can win an election in a time of peace and then find that his or her mandate extends into a period of unexpected turmoil or war. After the events of September 11, I think we can see the utility of such expectations.

By contrast, an attitude of collective guilt or responsibility, or worse yet, of expecting others to assume a mantle of guilt or responsibility for acts in which they themselves did not take part, strikes me as being of no utility at all.

A debate similar to the one taking place today took place in this House 17 years ago on Pierre Trudeau's last day as prime minister. He was asked by Brian Mulroney in question period to issue an apology for the wartime internment of Canadians of Japanese descent. Trudeau's response reveals a subtle grasp to the distinction that I am attempting of draw here today.

He said:

I do not see how I can apologize for some historic event to which we...were not a party. We can regret that it happened. But why...say that an apology is much better than an expression of regret?

I do not think that it is the purpose of a government to right the past. It cannot re-write history. It is our purpose to be just in our time--

This does not excuse us from a responsibility to adopt a moral attitude of condemnation toward this great wrong any more than we can adopt an attitude of moral neutrality toward the monstrous evils of more recent times. As moral actors, we need to recognize the existence of these past wrongs, to identify them to our fellow citizens and to do all that we can to ensure that no modern version of this wrong can occur.

Therefore, let us vote against this motion in its present form, but let us vote for it if it is reintroduced in the House in a form that allows us to express, without apology, our sorrow over this past wrong and if it allows us, without condemning others, to indicate our determination that no such wrong will ever in the future be tolerated on Canadian soil.

[Canada—Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, October 2nd, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I am voting in favour of the bill.