Sean Casey

[Criminal Code, April 22nd, 2016]

Madam Speaker, I would like to thank and congratulate the minister on her speech and on her incredible leadership on a question that is so important in our country at this time.

I have a couple of questions. In her speech, the minister talked about the fact that there were many influences on the decision that the government ultimately decided to take. I would invite her to perhaps talk about the influence of the special joint committee on Bill C-14, and also on the Quebec legislation on Bill C-14.

The other question I would ask the minister to address arises out of the question from the Conservative member opposite and his expressed concern over the lack of clarity in the words “reasonable foreseeability”.

Could the minister comment on how the terms have been recognized and interpreted by the courts, and the guidance that it should be able to provide us in understanding the purpose of the legislation?

[Criminal Code, April 21st, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to private member's Bill C-242, an act to amend the Criminal Code, inflicting torture.

I would like to begin by thanking the member for London North Centre for his advocacy on this very serious issue. We can all agree that torture and all forms of violence have no place in our society.

The bill before us seeks to amend the Criminal Code to create a new offence, specifically prohibiting any person from inflicting torture on any other person—that is, private torture—for the purpose of intimidating or coercing that person. This new offence would be punished by a maximum term of life imprisonment.

As I have said, we do condemn all acts of torture; however the government has issues with this particular bill. Briefly, this bill aims to prohibit torture committed by non-state actors. The new offence would be punished by a maximum term of life imprisonment.

In contrast, the existing crime of torture, found in section 269.1 of the Criminal Code, is restricted to state-actor torture, which is torture committed, instigated, consented to, or acquiesced in by a public official.

This bill aims to specifically denounce the worst kind of assaults, those that cause severe pain and suffering over a prolonged period of time. Victims of such attacks could include women victimized by the most abhorrent kinds of sexual assaults, and our hearts go out to anyone who has suffered these deplorable acts.

The amendments proposed by this bill, while put forward with good intention, are already addressed in our criminal justice system, and they create an inconsistency by proposing a punishment that is not consistent with how the Criminal Code already addresses torture; and it overlaps with the already existing crime of torture set out in section 269.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Criminal Code currently has numerous assault provisions. For example, there is the basic crime of assault in section 265 of the Criminal Code, which has a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. There is the crime of assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm, which has a maximum punishment of 10 years' imprisonment. Bodily harm is defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code to mean any hurt or injury to a person that interferes with the health or comfort of the person and that is more than merely transient or trifling in nature.

There is also the crime of aggravated assault, which has a maximum punishment of 14 years' imprisonment. Aggravated assault is defined as wounding, maiming, disfiguring, or endangering the life of the victim of the assault.

Also there are offences of sexual assault in the Criminal Code. For example, there is the crime of sexual assault in section 271 of the Criminal Code, which has a maximum punishment of 10 years' imprisonment. There is the crime of sexual assault with a weapon or threatening or causing bodily harm to the victim, which has a maximum punishment of 14 years' imprisonment. There is the crime of aggravated sexual assault found in section 273 of the Criminal Code, with a maximum punishment of life imprisonment. Aggravated sexual assault is defined as, when committing a sexual assault, wounding, maiming, disfiguring, or endangering the life of the victim.

As well, there is the crime of state-sanctioned torture set out in section 269.1 of the Criminal Code, which has a maximum punishment of 14 years' imprisonment.

Furthermore, the Criminal Code contains sentencing principles that can apply to non-fatal violence inflicted on victims. For example, section 718.2 of the Criminal Code sets out a number of aggravating factors that must be considered by a judge before imposing a sentence in relation to any crime.

Among these aggravating factors are the following: evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender's spouse or common-law partner; evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation.

In other words, the Criminal Code already contains crimes that capture the kind of conduct that Bill C-242 wishes to specifically catch, perhaps most notably the crimes of aggravated assault and aggravated sexual assault. Existing sentencing provisions do already provide a range of aggravating factors that could apply in a case of private torture.

In effect, I believe there is no gap in the criminal law that requires the creation of a new offence of private torture to provide for a remedy. The proposed torture offence in Bill C-242 is therefore not necessary. It is also useful to know that these existing laws can and do work effectively to address these types of cases.

Next let me address the issue that this would create an inconsistency in punishment. The proposed penalty for this new offence of private torture would be a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. I start with a basic proposition that similar crimes should be dealt with similarly.

As I have previously outlined, the crimes of aggravated assault and torture in sections 268 and 269.1 of the Criminal Code have a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment. Even if the crime of aggravated assault is omitted from this equation, leaving us to compare just the offence of torture in section 269.1 of the Criminal Code to the offence proposed in the bill, the stark contrast in punishment remains: maximum punishment of 14 years in relation to section 269.1 versus life imprisonment in relation to the proposed offence.

Creating an offence of private torture could have the unintended effect of seriously weakening Canada's contribution to the focused global effort to prevent torture under the convention against torture. This could cause confusion as to what Canada considers to be its international obligation when it comes to the effective prevention of torture. This is because, as was indicated earlier in debate, there would be two definitions of torture, one of which, in the private torture offence, would be narrower than the internationally accepted definition of torture set out in section 269.1.

States that are reluctant to abide by the obligations set out in the convention could argue that they need not accept the internationally accepted definition of torture because Canada has enacted a private torture offence that contains a narrower definition.

It could be argued that this inconsistency could best be resolved by increasing the maximum punishment for torture in section 269.1 to life imprisonment. However, such a change would result in yet another inconsistency being created. The maximum punishment for aggravated assault would no longer be the same as that for torture under section 269.1 of the Criminal Code. It would remain at 14 years' imprisonment.

The result would be that someone who maims another by, for example, cutting off his or her hand, would be seen as less blameworthy than the state official or private individual who whips someone repeatedly.

In my view, it is far better to have the norm for maximum punishment for the most violent forms of non-fatal violence to be 14 years' imprisonment rather than to erode this norm by seeking higher maximum punishments for such conduct.

Let me address the final effect that the proposed offence would have on the Criminal Code. It would not complement the offence of state-sanctioned torture found in section 269.1. Instead, it largely overlaps with section 269.1 and thereby undercuts the exclusive jurisdiction of section 269.1 to address state-sanctioned torture. This is because it is defined so broadly that it captures anyone who commits the conduct defined as torture by the offence, whether private citizen or public official. Put another way, it is not restricted to torture committed by a private citizen.

The effect is that, if a case should arise where a public official commits torture as defined by the bill, a prosecutor would have the choice of prosecuting either under the new offence or the current offence found in section 269.1. Such a result is possible, especially if the prosecutor wishes to obtain the most severe sentence possible. He or she could avoid the 14-year maximum punishment for torture under section 269.1 of the Criminal Code by prosecuting under the proposed offence, which has a maximum punishment of life imprisonment.

In my view, creating this crime would likely have immense symbolic value to some of the most vulnerable persons in our society. However, symbolism alone is not enough reason to add yet another offence to the vast array of offences and sentencing procedures that already catch the most harmful kinds of assault and that already speak to Canada's ongoing efforts to protect the most vulnerable among us.

For these reasons, I am opposed to the bill, and I call on other members of the House to also oppose it.

I do wish to say in closing that the goal of the bill and the intent of the member is to advocate against violence, and that is a goal which we can all support.

[Safe and Regulated Sports Betting Act, April 19th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I am rising today to contribute to the debate on Bill C-221, an act to amend the Criminal Code with regard to sports betting, sponsored by the member for Windsor West.

During my remarks, I will be highlighting the concerns I have with the proposed reforms. The government will be opposing the bill.

As Canadian law now stands, single-event sports betting is illegal. However, provinces and territories may offer another type of sports betting, known as parlay betting, to their residents. Parlay betting requires the bettor to correctly predict the outcome for a number of games in order to win. Parlay betting offers bettors an opportunity to participate in a legal and provincially or territorially controlled betting environment.

Single-event sports betting involves betting on the outcome of one single game, such as a game in the Stanley Cup finals. This private member's bill proposes to repeal paragraph 207(4)(b) of the Criminal Code, which prohibits betting on a single sporting event. If enacted, the amendment would allow a province or territory to offer this type of betting, if it chose to do so.

In Canada, provinces are responsible for operating, licensing, and regulating most legal forms of lottery schemes. Each province determines the types, amount, and location of this kind of gambling activity within the province. If single-event sports betting were permitted, each province would be left to determine how to implement this reform.

There are a whole host of issues that need to be considered when looking at legislative changes to the gambling provisions in the Criminal Code. The impact of Bill C-221 on issues such as match-fixing and problem gaming would be best examined in conjunction with provinces and territories, which would be responsible for single-event sports betting.

The amendment proposed in Bill C-221 may be familiar to many parliamentarians because the same reform was proposed in former private member's Bill C-290 and before that in former private member's Bill C-627, both of which were sponsored by Joe Comartin, the former member for Windsor—Tecumseh.

During debate and committee study of Bill C-290 in the Senate, senators and witnesses raised concerns with regard to the proposed reform. For example, the Senate Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights considered Bill C-290 in 2011, and it heard that the NCAA, the National Football League, the National Hockey League, and the Toronto Blue Jays, on behalf of Major League Baseball, were all against this proposed reform.

The major concern for these leagues was that the proposed reform could affect the integrity of their games. The government shares these same concerns.

It is possible, as suggested by many sports leagues, that legalizing single-event sports betting could encourage gamblers to fix games, especially in areas where players do not earn a lot of money and may be more susceptible to bribes. The current parlay system of betting makes it unattractive to fix a game, because the only way to achieve a guaranteed payout would be to rig multiple events, which would be much more difficult to accomplish. Single-event sports betting would make a fraudster's task easier, since only one event would need to be fixed.

I believe it is very important to ensure that the integrity of the game is sedulously fostered, and I believe that we should oppose legislation that may significantly affect this integrity.

One of the sponsor's stated objectives is to stimulate the economy and to bring American consumers to Canada. The provinces and territories would stand to gain economic benefits from the proposed reform, but the question arises: at what cost and, specifically, at what social cost?

Studies suggest that 3% to 5% of Canadians are at risk for problem gambling, and 30% to 40% of gambling revenues come from that small percentage. In 2011, the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Toronto filed a letter with the Senate committee studying the former Bill C-290 and indicated that the empirical evidence in the field demonstrated that an increase in legal gambling opportunities could lead to an increase in problem gambling. The letter indicated a concern for sports betting in particular.

The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health reported an Ontario study that found that people with incomes of less than $20,000 per year were the least likely to gamble. However when they did, they were more likely to experience problems than those in higher income brackets.

These statistics indicate that the cohort of Canadians in the lower income bracket who gamble are the most vulnerable for experiencing problem gambling issues.

As well, individuals who live at or below the poverty line have little or no disposable income to spend on gambling. The amount spent on gambling takes a bigger bite out of their monthly budget. For someone making $20,000, spending even $1,000 a year on gambling is a very significant percentage of their disposable income.

Opposing this bill means protecting our most vulnerable citizens.

The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health also demonstrated that people, now patrons of illegal bookmakers, would likely continue to do so because of easy access to credit, convenience, and better odds.

The suggestion that this reform would be funnelling money away from organized crime and redirecting it into provincial coffers is clearly not strong enough to rationalize supporting the bill. In short, this proposed reform would bring about more gambling and would contribute to the many ills in society brought about by problem gambling.

While I appreciate that many would see these changes as a welcome way to stimulate the economy and to fund provincial activities, I do not believe that it should be supported. As such, I would ask members to join me in opposing this private member's bill.

[Safe and Regulated Sports Betting Act, April 19th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague for the passion that he brings to this topic. I know it is extremely important to his riding. I was there for the debate in the last Parliament when Joe Comartin brought the bill in, which passed on a voice vote and then went to the Senate.

It encountered some considerable headwinds at the Senate. It actually went to committee for study, as my hon. colleague would know. The Senate heard from the NCAA, the National Hockey League, the National Football League, and the Toronto Blue Jays on behalf of major league baseball, all of whom expressed concerns that this would affect the integrity of the game.

In fairness, I would invite my colleague to speak to those concerns that were raised at the Senate committee. I fully expect that he is aware of them, and the House should be as well.

[Medical Assistance in Dying, April 15th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, the short answer is yes. Medical assistance in dying is a difficult and extremely personal issue for all Canadians that is informed by life experience and personal beliefs. Medical assistance in dying is troubling for some, but for others this bill does not go far enough.

We are of the opinion that this bill is the best approach to take in order to ensure that the rights of a dying patient are respected and that vulnerable people are protected.

[Jacob Knockwood, April 15th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I am honoured to rise in the House to recognize the life of a great individual from Charlottetown, Jacob Knockwood, who passed away earlier this week.

Jake was known for hanging out on his bench in downtown Charlottetown. There, he loved to listen to his Walkman, usually decked out in some Montreal Canadiens paraphernalia. He always appreciated any mention of his beloved Habs from passersby.

Jake was an avid sportsman, bringing home countless medals in the Special Olympics as the goalie for the floor hockey team. Jake was born with a cleft lip and palate. He became a champion for the rights of people with disabilities out of necessity when he was placed in a psychiatric institution against his will.

My heart was warmed to learn that Jake had his last eight months out of hospital, living with his advocate and friend, Pat Sobey.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker, for letting me stand to recognize Jake and his downtown family in Charlottetown.

[Indigenous Affairs, April 14th, 2016]

Madam Speaker, our government is committed to renewing the relationship between Canada and indigenous peoples on a nation-to-nation basis.

This relationship will be based on respect, co-operation, and partnership. We support a vision of Canada that reflects a confident, inclusive, and just country that respects diversity, with balance for individual and collective rights. This includes recognition of indigenous peoples and their rights, as contained in section 35 of our Constitution.

Balancing and recognizing all of our interests is a nation-building challenge. Reconciliation will be a multi-generational journey requiring hard work by all of us.

[Indigenous Affairs, April 14th, 2016]

Madam Speaker, our government is committed to renewing the relationship between Canada and indigenous peoples on a nation-to-nation basis.

This relationship will be based on respect, co-operation, and partnership. A renewed nation-to-nation relationship is a political goal, but it reflects a history of crown-indigenous relations. Nation-to-nation relations are not a revolutionary break with our legal and constitutional order, but an evolution closer to the promise of section 35 of our Constitution as outlined in jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Canada.

Canada modernized its constitution in 1982 to reflect a confident, inclusive, and just country that respects diversity, with balance for individual and collective rights. In particular, section 35 recognizes indigenous peoples and provides protection for their rights. The inclusion of section 35 is a turning point in Canadian history.

It is to this end that the Supreme Court of Canada has encouraged a purposive view of section 35 and its promise of a balanced relationship between the crown and indigenous peoples. We can see this balanced approach presented in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision that was referred to by my colleague, the Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, from June 2014.

The court held that the Tsilhqot’in Nation has title to approximately 1,750 square kilometres of land in the interior of British Columbia. In the decision, the indigenous perspective and legal traditions were given equal weight to common law property concepts, for example, what goes into proving title, how title content is defined by indigenous views, and how justification has to take into account indigenous perspectives as well as the interest of the general public.

The Supreme Court of Canada did not address the issue of what happens when third party property interests intersect with title. However, an essential part of section 35 is to find an appropriate balance to reconcile the sometimes competing rights, claims, and ambitions of indigenous and non-indigenous Canadians.

Reconciliation will be a multi-generational journey, requiring hard work and compromise by both indigenous nations and Canada's institutions. All Canadians will benefit from a balanced and respectful dialogue.

I would like to thank the member for Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo for bringing this question forward, and indeed for bringing the question forward in a manner that allows for a more complete response and opportunity to emphasize the balanced approach that will be necessary in this and in all land claim disputes involving indigenous peoples.

[Impaired Driving Act, April 13th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by congratulating my colleague from Bellechasse—Les Etchemins—Lévis and thanking him for his work on this issue. It is an extremely important issue and we obviously support the intent of this bill.

I am pleased to join the second reading debate on private member's Bill C-226.

Bill C-226 proposes significant reforms to the Criminal Code provisions related to impaired driving.

Sadly, impaired driving remains the leading criminal cause of death in Canada. It has been a plague on society for nearly a century. The recent case in Toronto, in which Mr. Muzzo was sentenced to 10 years after killing three children and their grandfather, once again focused attention on impaired driving and the devastation it causes.

I believe that we can all agree that Parliament must do what we can in order to combat this crime, which continues to kill more than 1,000 Canadians every year and to injure many thousands more, often inflicting catastrophic injuries.

To end impaired driving, we need a concerted effort on the part of individuals, families, provinces and territories, the hospitality industry, advocacy organizations, schools, health professionals, and addiction service providers. I submit that Parliament needs to be a part of this effort. Therefore, I thank the hon. member for bringing this issue to the attention of the House through Bill C-226.

This is a very complex bill. The proposals represent a significant change to the laws on impaired driving and driving offences in general.

Under Bill C-226, the Criminal Code driving provisions, including impaired driving and over-80 driving offences, would be repealed and reintroduced in a brand new part of the Criminal Code.

This would not be the first time that Parliament has considered the problem of impaired driving. In fact, Parliament has a long history of trying to deal with the problem of drinking and driving.

In 1921, Parliament first addressed the issue by enacting the crime of driving while intoxicated. In 1925, Parliament enacted the offence of driving while impaired by a drug. In 1951, Parliament replaced the offence of driving while intoxicated with driving while impaired. Later, in 1969, Parliament enacted a new offence that reflected developments in the area of forensic breath testing. This is the offence of driving with a blood alcohol concentration that exceeds 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

This offence is commonly called “driving over 80”. It is a criminal offence separate and distinct from the crime of driving while impaired. It applies whether or not the driver exhibits bad driving or signs of impairment.

The actual measurement of blood alcohol content is carried out on an approved instrument, often referred to as a breathalyzer, typically at the police station. The breath testing is done by a police officer who is specially trained as a qualified technician to operate the approved instrument.

The Attorney General of Canada lists new approved instruments in a ministerial order after considering the advice of the Alcohol Test Committee of the Canadian Society of Forensic Science. The Canadian Society of Forensic Science is a non-governmental scientific body, and its committee is composed of very dedicated forensic scientists who, voluntarily and without remuneration, evaluate breath-testing equipment against the committee's published standards. The Alcohol Test Committee then provides its advice to the Attorney General of Canada for her consideration.

In 1979, Parliament authorized the use of the approved screening device at the roadside. The roadside screening device permits police officers to screen drivers for alcohol consumption. If a driver registers a fail on the roadside screening device, the police officer would have reasonable grounds to believe an over-80 crime has been committed. This belief is required in order to make the demand for a test on the approved instrument back at the police station.

It is only the result on the approved instrument that can be used in court to prove the over-80 offence. Despite Parliament's efforts to bring clarity to this area of the law, the impaired driving regime remains the most heavily litigated area of criminal law.

One of the areas that receives significant court attention relates to the issue of proving blood alcohol content. Parliament enacted a rebuttable presumption that the blood alcohol concentration at the time of testing is presumed to be the same at the time of driving in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. The courts came to accept a defence strategy whereby the accused and one or two friends would testify to minimal consumption of alcohol. The defence would then ask an expert to calculate what the blood alcohol concentration would have been at the time of driving based on the testimony of the accused. This calculation, unsurprisingly, would be under 80, and therefore, it rebutted the presumption, leaving the prosecution no other way to prove the over-80 offence. This stratagem became known as the two-beer defence.

This defence was severely limited in 2008 by the Tackling Violent Crime Act. In 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of the R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux, upheld the key elements of that legislation. Now, in order to raise the defence, the accused must first show that the approved instrument was not working correctly or that it was not operated properly. Evidence of the amount a person drank is not by itself evidence that the approved instrument was malfunctioning.

This has had the effect of greatly reducing trial time by reducing the number of cases where the defence challenges the accuracy of the approved instrument's analysis of blood alcohol concentration. It is important to note that modern approved instruments are very sophisticated with internal checks that ensure they are working properly.

Despite these changes in 2008, I am given to understand that there remain significant challenges with proving blood alcohol concentration in the courts. I wish, therefore, to focus my remarks on the measures proposed by Bill C-226 with respect to proving blood alcohol concentration, which I believe respond to the St-Onge decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.

Bill C-226 proposes to replace the current rebuttable presumption with respect to blood alcohol concentration with a provision that states that blood alcohol concentration is conclusively proven if three conditions are met: the approved instrument was in proper working order; there were two tests 15 minutes apart; and the two tests had results within 20 milligrams of one another.

Of course, this raises the question: How is it proven that the approved instrument was in proper working order? Bill C-226 proposes that the instrument is considered to be in proper working order if the qualified technician complied with the operational procedures recommended from time to time by the Alcohol Test Committee.

I note as well that the bill seeks to eliminate the defence of bolus drinking, sometimes called the drinking and dashing defence, where the driver consumes a large amount of alcohol just before driving and claims that although his or her blood alcohol concentration was over 80 at the time of testing, the alcohol was still being absorbed at the time of driving and he or she was under 80 when driving.

The bill also proposes to limit the intervening drink defence, where the driver drinks after being stopped by the police but before the driver provides a breath sample. In that situation, the driver claims he or she was under 80 at the time of driving and it is the post-driving drinking that put the driver over the limit. Bill C-226 would limit this defence to situations where the driver has no objective reason to think that the police would make a demand for a breath sample.

There is much more in this bill than I am able to convey in my allotted time. It is a significant piece of legislation proposing substantial reforms to the area of impaired driving and transportation offences in general. I look forward to listening to the continued debate on the bill and for a discussion of many of the other elements which are proposed.

[Indigenous Affairs, March 11th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, the Government of Canada is named as a defendant in this lawsuit. What it is going to say about the lawsuit will be said in court, not on the floor of the House of Commons.

The positions taken by the government in court will be consistent with our commitment to Canadians, with our values, and with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.