Serge Cardin

[Université de Sherbrooke Vert et Or, November 7th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, on Monday, awards of excellence were presented to 54 young Quebecers at the annual gala of the Fondation de l'athlète d'excellence du Québec.

I was pleased to learn that the Université de Sherbrooke women's volleyball team was proclaimed university team of the year.

The Sherbrooke team distinguished itself last year at the national level, winning a silver medal at the Canadian university championships. Three of its players later went on to play with the senior national team.

The team's trainer, Normand Bouchard, was named university trainer of the year.

On behalf of my fellow Quebecers, I offer warm congratulations to the Vert et Or team and its trainer on making the podium. They do the Eastern Townships and Quebec proud.

[Léo Drolet, October 3rd, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, last Monday we lost one of the Eastern Townships' great builders when Mr. Léo Drolet, founder of Sherwood-Drolet, one of the biggest hockey stick makers in the world, died at the age of 82.

The company started up in 1949 with a $5 loan from his mother, and now sells more than 2.2 million hockey sticks yearly, all over the world. It is one of the foremost sports equipment manufacturers. Moreover, several of the top hockey players use made-in-Quebec sticks.

Mr. Drolet was an entrepreneur known for his creativity and his modesty. His passion for what he did has helped contribute to modernizing hockey by reinventing the hockey stick.

On behalf of the Bloc Quebecois, and of all the people in the riding of Sherbrooke, I would like to extend my condolences to the Drolet family.

[International Boundary Waters Treaty Act, September 27th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I am indeed pleased to continue with debate on Bill C-6 for 17 minutes.

I would of course be tempted to provide a brief summary of my first 23 minutes. I had thought of asking you to provide one, but the person in the chair has changed, so I cannot do that.

What I said, in substance, as my introduction, was that water, like air, is a vital and essential element that we should in no way compromise.

Water is such an essential element that having too little is as bad as having too much. When there is none, things dry up, and when there is too much, things drown. A balance must therefore be maintained, both in quantity and in quality.

I referred to several past experiences which related to water or which had taught me more about it. I said that I was quite quickly introduced to the concept of a water basin involving a good many people.

I spoke of the rights and obligation, again in terms of quantity and quality, each person has toward his neighbours, both upstream and downstream. I also referred to the rights and obligations the municipalities and regions have toward each other, not to mention countries, such as Quebec and Canada.

I also said that we tend to think that the water level in lakes and rivers stays the same. This is, however, completely wrong.

We need only consult my illustrious and eminent colleague from Terrebonne--Blainville on this. A great fisherwoman, she has told me of catching fish whose bellies showed the effects of having to swim on the bottom to keep themselves submerged.

I also touched briefly on the entire problem concerning water and the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act.

On average, barely 1% of the waters of the Great Lakes is renewed annually by precipitation, surface water runoff, and inflow from groundwater sources. Under the circumstances, we must recognize that, while the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River system represents one fifth of the earth's fresh water, this resource is not unlimited.

Because of climatic risks, increased desertification worldwide, limited supplies of drinking water around the world and energy development based on this resource, the idea of exporting large quantities of water on tanker ships or of diverting rivers has emerged as a serious option in the past ten years or so in Quebec and Canada.

To the list of environmental threats to water supplies is added the new and significant threat of bulk water exports and large scale diversion of our lakes and rivers.

After a quick overview of Bill C-6, I of course came to the issues involved in this bill. I mentioned that, while most people agreed that water resources need protection, it is far from clear that Bill C-6 ensures their increased protection.

Is the Liberal government not using the current panic over the issue of water protection to grab powers that are beyond its jurisdiction? That is a legitimate question.

We identified three major problems that could be raised in connection with the bill we are looking at today. The first relates to the definition of a water basin. The second concerns the many powers given the federal minister in connection with exceptions and with licensed activities. The third relates to the usefulness of the bill we are looking at.

Because of these three elements, Bill C-6 goes beyond federal jurisdictions and infringes on provincial ones.

The fact that the notion of watershed is not defined in the bill is of course a source of concern, but the fact that it is up to the governor in council to define it by regulations, on the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is hardly acceptable. This is undoubtedly very dangerous from a jurisdictional point of view and regard to the ownership of natural resources, which essentially belong to the provinces.

In fact, in a document dated February 10, 1999, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade clearly indicated what a watershed is, and I quote:

A land area draining into a common watercourse. Often called a catchment area, drainage basin or river basin. Examples of watersheds in Canada include Atlantic (including the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River), Hudson Bay, Pacific and Arctic. A single watershed can cover a relatively large section of the Canadian landscape. For example, the waters of the Great Lakes include not only the lakes themselves but also the many rivers, and their tributaries, that ultimately flow into the lakes.

Why not make this clear in the act? Chances are the definition that will be proposed through regulations will be the one found in the February 1999 document and will therefore directly infringe, by law, on relevant provincial jurisdictions.

The second point concerns the powers given to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These powers are considerable. From issuing licences to selecting the types of projects that may be eligible, not to mention the practices that may be exempted from the application of the act, the minister's responsibilities under the constitution are being greatly expanded.

It is true that, under the 1909 treaty, projects directly affecting boundary waters already require a review and the approval by the parties concerned. In case of a dispute, it is up to the IJC to settle the issue. Under the treaty, Canada cannot take any unilateral action that would change the level and flow of waters on the American side of the border.

In that sense, the bill only formalizes the already common practice of requiring a licence to build a dam, for example, or to install works that obstruct waters.

However, article VIII of the 1909 treaty sets out the three possible uses of water in order of precedence and, as long as there is no conflict among these uses, the contracting parties have equal and similar rights in the use of the waters.

The various uses of water provided for are as follows: uses for domestic and sanitary purposes; uses for navigation; uses for power; and for irrigation purposes.

In Bill C-6, only the ordinary use of waters for domestic purposes, the concept can be stretched, for uses are not necessarily that clearly defined, and for sanitary purposes is expressly excluded. There is no reference to the use of water by the provinces for power purposes.

The provinces' energy choices could be ignored, especially since, with a broad definition of water basin, the extent of waterways affected by Bill C-6 could be greater.

Amendments to the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act could allow the Minister of Foreign Affairs to interfere in the management of Quebec's natural resources. Yet these provisions clearly violate established law and the division of powers between the provinces and the federal government.

Section 109 gives indisputable property rights to the provinces. It is this section, taken together with sections 92.5, 92.13 and 92A, which prompted Senator Gérald Beaudoin to say, in his book on the Constitution of Canada, that the provinces have:

--broad powers with respect to the use, acquisition and management of lands, and the development and marketing of natural resources.

What comes to mind here is the development of the extensive hydroelectric resources in Quebec. Jurisprudence has also established that the expression “lands” in section 92.5 also extends to waters and mines.

What we have here therefore are flagrant, I would even say reprehensible, encroachments on provincial jurisdictions.

Finally, we must also question the relevance of the bill.

To protect water resources from the perils of unlimited trade, Canada, Mexico and the United States declared in 1993 that “NAFTA creates no rights to the natural water resources of any Party to the Agreement”. The federal government is thus saying that, given the existence of this joint statement, as long as water is not considered a good or a product, and is in its natural state, it does not come under the provisions of trade agreements, including NAFTA and WTO. However nothing could be less certain.

Such a statement, common or not, would have no value whatsoever before an arbitrator because, as the Vienna convention on the law of treaties stipulates, the contexts, the elements external to a treaty or international convention, cannot be taken into consideration in its interpretation if the text itself remains obscure and if the parties agree on the pertinence of these external elements.

Since the United States has clearly stated, the very day of the joint statement, that nothing in it changes the NAFTA treaty in any way, it is therefore legitimate to state that water is subject to consideration as a good within the meaning of the various international trade agreements.

In fact, from the moment that Canada exports this resource, it becomes a good under NAFTA and GATT. Even if not legally considered a product, it could be the object of proceedings under NAFTA chapter 11 on investments and services, and under national treatment. In addition, it is clear that, if the federal government issues export permits, water will henceforth be considered a commercial good within the meaning of these trade agreements.

However, should a province decide to issue a licence, this appears to be applicable only within its own jurisdiction, within one territory, according to the department, and I quote:

--the fact that certain projects have been approved does not in any way indicate that future bulk water removal projects must also be approved. Canada's federal and provincial governments retain full sovereignty over Canada's water.

Officials have indicated that:

Any precedent due to the approval of a water export project would be limited to the province concerned and linked to the legislation that allowed the water to be exported, not to trade agreements.

Despite these statements by the government, a reading of the trade agreements, NAFTA in particular, does not leave one convinced of this. We cannot know what the outcome might be of court proceedings entered into by private investors against Canada or a province if an export permit were issued to a foreign company. In addition, the IJC states that certain observers make reference to Canada's tariff listing to conclude that all waters must be considered a good and that this stance is incorrect.

It goes on to say that this list “merely indicates that, when water is classified as a good, it enters into a specific tariff category”. According to a number of observers, we do not know with any certainty whether water could be considered a good, and the BAPE itself could not settle this.

It would be safer to be sure of the situation before passing such a bill. For now, it appears completely inadequate and clearly threatens the jurisdiction of the provinces over their natural resources, in this case, water.

The federal government is clearly using opposition to water exports to justify, in the eyes of the public, its interference in the form of Bill C-6. However, this legislation appears inadequate, and the effect it would have on international trade is uncertain.

Furthermore, the important issue of groundwater, despite the fact that it was clearly raised in the IJC's preliminary and final reports, is not even mentioned. Yet this issue is directly linked to flow maintenance and to both the level and quality of the Great Lakes waters. The federal government is silent on this issue.

The Speaker has indicated that my time is running out as swiftly as the spring runoff. I will therefore wrap up quickly.

The government, through Bill C-6, contrary to what it says, is overstepping its constitutional jurisdiction with respect to boundary waters, is interfering in Quebec's jurisdiction with regards to potable water, and is, in reality, offering no satisfactory guarantees as to the impact of this bill on international trade agreements.

There is a fairly quick solution to the problem, since we know quite well that a sovereign country has complete control in negotiating its own treaties. If procedure will allow me, I would like to make a proposal. In order to sign its own treaties, Quebec must become sovereign if it wants to continue to have water that is good in terms of both quality and quantity.

[International Boundary Waters Treaty Act, September 24th, 2001]

I will conclude for now, Madam Speaker. When the House sits next time, we will look again at the three elements I have just defined, namely, the catchment basin, the many powers granted the federal minister to determine exceptions and activities requiring permits and the usefulness of the bill under study.

In revealing these three well defined points, it will no doubt be clear that the Bloc Quebecois does not support Bill C-6. Water, as I said earlier, is vital.

A motion to adjourn the House under Standing Order 38 deemed to have been moved

[International Boundary Waters Treaty Act, September 24th, 2001]

No, it is not important, it is relative. If one weighs 300 pounds, it is 92%; if one weighs 100 pounds, this should be about the same, unless the person is drying up.

In terms of the water that we use directly, that we drink, this would represent, according to analyses, less than 1% of the water required for domestic and hygienic uses. We see then that the water we use, whether in the industrial or the institutional sector, and for all the other domestic uses, including washing clothes and dishes, cooking, using the toilet, showering, bathing, there is less than 1% left for drinking. There are also exterior uses, that is, for watering the grass and the garden, washing the car and cleaning the yard. It is often in domestic uses that people are being asked to be careful about the amount of water they use.

So, it is always people who are being asked to make some efforts, but it is rarely industries, institutions, and probably even less people who would think about selling water. We know this could be quite a lucrative business.

For example, concerning water treatment, we get water for free. Of course, infrastructures have been built; 27 kilometres of pipes represent major infrastructures. There is no value to add at this stage, but there is a treatment cost of about 30 cents per cubic meter. So I figure that some people would be tempted to sell bulk water.

Still in my introduction, I would also just like to inform members of the House about a small example of an environmental disaster, of a troubling situation in the Aral Sea, and I quote:

The problem of the vanishing Aral Sea has become a serious ecological problem, a national catastrophe even. The origin of the problem dates back a very long time, but it has taken on a new dimension in recent decades.

The construction of irrigation systems throughout central Asia, and particularly the development of water supplies for major residential and industrial sites, has causes a terrible ecological catastrophe: the death of the Aral Sea.

Not long ago, governments were still boasting about the new irrigated lands recovered from the desert and the steppes, forgetting that the water used had come from the Aral Sea and its two sources. Today, the entire area around the Aral Sea has been affected by this ecological disaster. Between 1911 and 1962, the depth of the Aral Sea was 53.4 metres. The water volume was 1,064 cubic kilometres and the sea's surface 66,000 square kilometres. At that time, the sea played a central role for transportation, industry and fishing, and also regulated the climate.

Around 1994, the water depth dropped to the 32.5 metre level, from 53.4 to 32.5. Its volume was less than 400 cubic kilometres—as opposed to 1,064 it had dropped to 400—while the surface had been reduced to 32,500 square kilometres—a drop from 66,000 to 32,500.

This is a true ecological disaster. Judging by the great thirst some in North America have for the water of Quebec, the water of Canada, the water of the Great Lakes, there is a potential risk of ecological disaster here as well.

As we know—despite the rain outside at the present time—we tend to think of the water levels in lakes and rivers staying the same. This is absolutely wrong. The levels of the seas are rising, constantly, while the levels of lakes and rivers is dropping, and rapidly at that. This is not even taking into account all the analyses that could be done on water tables and the impacts of industry and agriculture, and particularly of high population densities in a given area, requiring heavy demands for water to be met.

There is runoff water. When a drop takes I do not know how long to reach a river after falling on earth, it is purified, contributes to the water table and goes down the river. It could take a fairly long time. Now, a drop falls on the sidewalk, on the ashphalt and reaches the river in a few minutes or hours.

This is a sort of introduction, to describe my involvement in matters involving water.

Let us move on now to setting the context of this whole issue of water and the treaties on boundary waters.

As I said earlier, water is a limited resource, despite what we might think. For example, the report prepared by the International Joint Commission in 1999 provided that:

Although the total volume in the lakes is vast, on average less than 1 percent of the waters of the Great Lakes is renewed annually by precipitation, surface water runoff, and inflow from groundwater sources. Under the circumstances, we must recognize that, while the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River system represents one fifth of the earth's fresh water, this resource is not unlimited.

Furthermore, in recent years, discoveries and research on the greenhouse effect and the potential risks of increased temperatures have made underscored the great fragility of the resource and the pressure it is under.

Because of climactic risks, increased desertification worldwide, limited supplies of drinking water around the world and energy development based on this resource, the idea of exporting large quantities of water on tanker ships or of diverting rivers has emerged as a serious option in the past ten years or so in Quebec and Canada.

So, to environmental threats to water supplies is added a new and significant threat of bulk water exports and large scale diversion of our lakes and rivers.

There is no doubt that bulk water exports offer significant economic possibilities. It is because of this potential that some provinces have examined the possibility of issuing to companies permits allowing them to consider bulk water exports.

In the early eighties, following a drought in California, British Columbia delivered such permits to five Canadian and one American companies. However, over the years, the province changed its position and, concerned about the possible impact of such trade on B.C.'s natural resources, it decided to prohibit bulk water exports through provincial legislation.

We know that the possibility of issuing similar permits was examined by other provinces. The case of Newfoundland recently made headlines. The province quickly gave up the idea, but the possibility remains. This, combined with the recent lawsuit by the California-based company Sun Belt Water against the government of British Columbia, raises concerns and brings back the issue of trade risks associated with exporting this resource.

In this context, the federal government has been promising to legislate for the past year. But what about the federal strategy so far?

The federal government announced in early 2000 that it intended to act more directly in the matter of water export and introduced a three pronged strategy. That strategy follows from a motion on water protection passed by the House of Commons on February 9, 1999.

There are three parts to the strategy: first, changes to the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act in order to give the federal government regulatory power over the bulk removal of boundary waters; second, a joint reference, with the United States and the IJC, to investigate the effects of consumption, diversion and removal of water, including for export purposes, in boundary waters; and third, a proposal to develop, in co-operation with the provinces and territories, a Canada-wide accord on bulk water removal so as to protect Canadian water basins.

On February 10, 1999, Canada and the United States appointed the IJC. After noting a growing number of proposals to export water from the Great Lakes and other areas of the United States and Canada, the two countries agreed to ask the commission to study the issue and make recommendations within the next year. A preliminary report was tabled on August 18, 1999 and the final report of the IJC was tabled on February 22, 2000.

In its preliminary report, the International Joint Commission recommended that during the next six months it would need to complete its study, the federal, provincial and state governments prohibit bulk removal or sale of water. It emphasized a number of points worth mentioning here.

First, it indicates that there is no surplus in the Great Lakes system and that bulk removal of water could reduce the system's resiliency, or resistance to stress.

Second, information on removal of underground water is definitely inadequate. There is a problem here, because underground water can have a major impact on the integrity and quality of ecosystems.

The report also points out that it is impossible to forecast the demand for water. Moreover, the possibility of climate change and, more recently, all sorts of natural factors make it impossible to evaluate with any degree of certainty the level and rate of flow of the Great Lakes over the next few years.

In its final report entitled “Protection of Waters of the Great Lakes” of February 2000, the IJC concluded that the Great Lakes needed to be protected, especially in view of cumulative uncertainties, pressures and repercussions of removals, of consumption and of demographic and economic growth, as well as of climate change.

The report includes the following conclusions: first, the water of the Great Lakes is a critical resource. On an average annual basis, less than 1% of the water in the Great Lakes system is renewed.

Second, if all interests in the basin are considered, there is never a surplus of water in the Great Lakes system; every drop of water has several potential uses.

Third, International trade law obligations, including the provisions of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, WTO agreements, and the GATT, do not prevent Canada and the United States from taking measures to protect their water resources and preserve the integrity of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem, to the extent that decision makers do not discriminate against individuals from other countries in implementing these measures. Canada and the United States cannot be forced by trade laws to jeopardize the waters of the Great Lakes' ecosystem.

Let us have a look at Bill C-6 and examine the context briefly. This bill is the direct result of the strategy the federal government made public in February 1999. It concerns its will to regulate the removal of water in boundary waters.

The federal government says that the intent of this bill is to facilitate the implementation of the boundary waters treaty, a treaty that also deals with other issues arising along the border between Canada and the United States. Thus, the amendments prohibit water removal and the transfer of boundary waters out of their watershed.

Also, under the proposed amendments, activities affecting the flow and the natural level of water on the American side of the border would depend on the delivery of a license by the foreign affairs department.

So the federal government suggests adding sections 10 through 26 to the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act.

Sections 11 and 12 deal with the licences required when boundary waters are used, obstructed or diverted in a manner that affects the natural level or flow of the waters. These two sections specify that such licences do not apply in respect of the ordinary use of waters for domestic or sanitary purposes. The licensing allocation plan would not apply either to the traditional uses, like the removal for agricultural or industrial uses within the basin.

In the same way, no person could, except in accordance with a licence issued under section 16, construct or maintain any remedial or protective work or any dam or other obstruction in waters flowing from boundary waters, or in downstream waters of rivers flowing across the international boundary, the effect of which is or is likely to raise in any way the natural level of waters on the other side of the international boundary. This provision would not apply in respect of the exceptions specified in the regulations.

Section 13 prohibits any bulk removal of boundary waters from the water basins. The general provisions of this bill specify that sections 11 to 13 do not apply to projects undertaken before the coming into force of these sections, unless the effects are still perceived after their coming into force.

Clauses 16 through 20 set out the minister's powers and provide an overview of his ability to issue and revoke permits and to charge penalties.

Clause 20 states that the minister may, with the approval of the governor in council, enter into an agreement or arrangement with the government of one or more provinces respecting the activities referred to in sections 11 to 13, although not specifying what such an agreement would be.

Clause 21 addresses the regulations under the act which would guide the minister's decisions. Among other things, it states that the minister could, with the approval of the governor in council, make regulations defining water basins, specifying exceptions, and unlike the old Bill C-15, the government can identify exceptions from clause 13(1), which is the heart of the bill, prescribe classes of licences and determine persons eligible to hold such licences, and the form such applications and licences must take.

What are the issues involved in Bill C-6?

Although the entire population acknowledges that water resources need to be protected, it is far from obvious that Bill C-6 will actually protect them any better. In fact, one would be justified to wonder whether the Liberal government is not taking advantage of the panic situation about protecting our waters to grab powers that are outside its jurisdiction.

There are three major problems that must be raised in connection with the bill we are looking at today. The first relates to the definition of water basin. The second concerns the number of powers assigned to the federal minister in connection with exceptions and with licensing activities. The third relates to the pointlessness of the bill we are looking at.

Because of these three, Bill C-6 goes beyond federal areas of jurisdiction and encroaches on provincial jurisdictions, including those of Quebec, of course.

How much time do I have remaining, Madam Speaker?

[International Boundary Waters Treaty Act, September 24th, 2001]

Madam Speaker, I am particularly pleased to speak to Bill C-6, an act to amend the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act.

I will not be telling those listening anything new if I say that water, like air, is a vital and essential element which we should in no way compromise. Water is such an essential element that having too little is as bad as having too much. When there is none, things dry up, and when there is too much, things drown. A balance must therefore be maintained, both in quantity and in quality.

I would like to back up a bit and talk about when I was a municipal councillor in Sherbrooke for 12 years. During that time, I had the pleasure of chairing the CHARMES management corporation. This was a corporation that looked after the Saint-François and Magog rivers in Sherbrooke. I was therefore quite quickly introduced to the concept of a water basin involving a good many people. Everything that comes from upstream and everything we send downstream has repercussions everywhere. I quickly understood that we were responsible for the quality of the water that flowed past us downstream, just as we had rights with respect to the water that flowed to us from upstream.

I remember when I was about ten years old swimming in the Saint-François river under the supervision of the recreation committee and the water was of impeccable quality. When I began working with the CHARMES management corporation, we could not really swim in the Magog river. It was necessary to take specific action to improve the quality of that river's water.

For 12 years, therefore, the importance of water in terms of both quantity and quality was brought home to me. In Sherbrooke, I was also responsible for water and water treatment services. To all intents and purposes, the municipality of Sherbrooke supplied water to approximately 130,000 people—even though the city had only 78,000 inhabitants. The amount of water we drew from a reservoir, Lake Memphrémagog, 27 kilometres from Sherbrooke, was considerable: approximately 60,000 cubic metres daily, or 21.9 million cubic metres a year.

We know that this water is used by industry, by institutions and by municipalities, either for domestic or for sanitary services. When it comes to the importance of water, what is surprising is that life—we all know that the human body is almost 92% water—

[Revenue Canada, June 12th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, a taxpayer from my region filed his income tax return in French, as usual, but received a notice of assessment that was in English only. He was told that this was because he had omitted to check off the box to specify his preferred language.

Could the minister responsible for official languages tell us if his new policy is to consider all Quebecers as anglophones unless they clearly identify themselves as francophones?

[Nuclear Fuel Waste Act, May 18th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to the bill on the long term management of nuclear fuel waste.

First, I would like to draw a parallel with the discussions on open line shows this morning. Yesterday, the finance minister gave his economic update. On a local radio show in my riding people were expressing their views on various elements of the minister's statement, including the debt.

Why am I talking about the debt? People where saying that over the past 30 years previous governments had been accumulating the debt. The government is now taking steps to pay it down as quickly as possible so that future generations are not stuck with reimbursing the amounts borrowed by previous generations.

What I want to stress here is responsibility. We must take responsibility for what we are doing now and for what we did in the past. When it comes to the nuclear world, nuclear waste in particular, we are told, depending on the source, that nuclear waste can last 200 years, 300 years or 500 years. Other sources mention 1,000 years, or even several thousands of years.

How can we deal responsibly with waste that will affect people throughout the world for hundreds, even thousands of years?

Since we have been talking about the nuclear industry for a number of years, I would like to step into the past and point out a few things about the background to the bill.

In February 1998, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency published the “Report of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel”, known as the Seaborn report.

In a 1978 joint statement, the governments of Canada and Ontario asked Atomic Energy Canada Limited to develop a concept for the deep geological disposal of nuclear fuel waste.

In a later joint statement, in 1981, they agreed not to go ahead with the selection of a site for that purpose without first holding proper public hearings at the federal level and submitting the concept to the approval of Canadian and provincial authorities.

In September 1988, the federal Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources referred the concept, along with a broad range of nuclear fuel waste management issues, for public review.

On October 4 1989, the federal Minister of the Environment appointed an independent environmental assessment panel to conduct the review.

At that time, the panel's mandate was to review a concept rather than a specific project at a specific site. The panel was also mandated to review a proposal for which the implementing agency was not identified, and to establish a scientific review group of distinguished independent experts to examine the safety and scientific acceptability of the proposal. The mandate also involved reviewing a broad range of policy issues. Finally, all those elements had to be reviewed in the five provinces concerned.

AECL describes its concept as a method of geological disposal of nuclear fuel waste in which the waste form is either used CANDU, or Canada deuterium uranium, fuel or the solidified high level waste from reprocessing. The waste form is sealed in a container designed to last at least 500 years and possibly much longer.

Waste containers are placed within the confines of underground disposal rooms or in boreholes drilled from the rooms. The disposal rooms are between 500 and 1,000 metres below the surface. The geological medium is plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield.

Such a facility would cost an estimated $8.7 billion to $13.3 billion in 1991 dollars, depending on the amount of waste to be disposed of. The panel conducted its review in several provinces, including Quebec and Ontario. It did environmental impact assessments and consulted the public, namely the natives.

Among other activities, the terms of reference directed the panel to examine the criteria by which the safety and acceptability of the concept for long term waste management and disposal should be evaluated. It also required the panel to prepare a final report addressing whether AECL's concept is safe and acceptable or should be modified, and the future steps to be taken in managing nuclear fuel wastes in Canada.

Here are some key panel conclusions. Broad public support is necessary in Canada to ensure the acceptability of a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes. Safety is a key part but only one part of acceptability. Safety must be viewed from two complementary perspectives: technical and social.

To be considered acceptable, a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes must have broad public support, as I was saying earlier, and must be advanced by a stable and trustworthy proponent and overseen by a trustworthy regulator. Therefore, for the public, the level of confidence in the people and organizations managing nuclear wastes is very important.

After applying these criteria to the AECL disposal concept, the panel came to a number of key conclusions.

The key panel conclusions are the following: from a technical perspective, the panel believes that safety of the AECL concept has been on balance adequately demonstrated for a conceptual stage of development, but from a social perspective, it has not. It also says that, as it stands, the AECL concept for deep geological disposal has not been demonstrated to have broad public support. The concept in its current form does not have the required level of acceptability to be adopted as Canada's approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes.

Then the panel considered the steps that must be taken to ensure the safe and acceptable long term management of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada.

Here are its main recommendations.

A number of additional steps are required to develop an approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes in a way that could achieve broad public support.

Among other things, we should issue a policy statement governing the management of these wastes; initiate an aboriginal participation process; create a nuclear fuel waste management organization, or NFWMA—but its better to use the full name, so we know what we are talking about; a public review of the regulatory documents of the AECB through effective consultation processes.

We also need to develop a comprehensive public participation plan, to develop an ethical and social assessment framework and to compare the options for the management of nuclear wastes.

Taking into account the views of participants in our public hearings and our own analysis, the commission developed the following basic recommendations to governments with respect to a management agency.

It was recommended that a nuclear fuel waste management organization be established quickly, at arm's length from the utilities and AECL, with the sole purpose of managing and co-ordinating the full range of activities relating to the long term management of nuclear fuel wastes.

Another recommendation was that the agency be fully funded in all its operations from a segregated fund to which only the producers and owners of nuclear fuel wastes would contribute.

It was also recommended that its board of directors, appointed by the federal government, be representative of key stakeholders, and that it have a strong and active advisory council representative of a wide variety of interested parties.

It was also recommended that its purposes, responsibilities and accountability, particularly in relation to the ownership of the wastes, be clearly and explicitly spelled out, preferably in legislation or in its charter of incorporation.

It was also recommended that it be subject to multiple oversight mechanisms, including federal regulatory control with respect to its scientific-technical work and the adequacy of its financial guarantees, to policy direction from the federal government and to regular public review, preferably by parliament.

Finally, the commission pointed out that until the foregoing steps have been completed and broad public acceptance of a nuclear fuel waste management approach has been achieved, the search for a specific site should not proceed.

If the AECL concept is chosen as the most acceptable option after implementation of the steps recommended above, governments should direct the NFWMA, together with Natural Resources Canada and the AECB or its successor, to undertake a review all the social and technical shortcomings identified by the scientific review group and other review participants, to establish their priority and to generate a plan to address them. The nuclear fuel waste management organization should make its plan public, carry out public consultations and then implement its plan.

As members will recall in the Seaborn report, the panel recommended that the federal government establish a management committee with the objective of finding solutions for nuclear fuel waste management and implementing them.

However there has been a change of approach and through Bill C-27 the government has decided to pass the waste management responsibility off to the provinces. In Quebec, Hydro-Quebec should be the one in charge of establishing a waste management organization. I point out that the WMO must establish, by appointing its members, an advisory committee to study proposals and make recommendations.

The idea is to establish a waste management organization whose objective will be to set out nuclear fuel waste management proposals for the federal government and to implement the proposal it accepts. The WMO established by Hydro-Quebec must then make available to Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and to any owners of nuclear fuel waste produced in Canada, at a reasonable cost of course, nuclear fuel waste management services as provided in the proposal approved by the governor in council.

When I gave details about Hydro-Quebec,, I must say that I was venturing an opinion and was interpreting a little. Would Hydro-Québec make recommendations? If so, would it do so individually or in conjunction with the group mentioned in the bill? This group is comprised of the Ontario Power Generation, Hydro-Québec, a New Brunswick power corporation and Atomic Energy of Canada.

Some aspects of the bill are not clear. For example, we presume that all these stakeholders will work on a nuclear waste management policy but we can also presume that this would be done individually.

As for financing, the nuclear energy corporations, such as Hydro-Québec and Atomic Energy of Canada, would individually or jointly, as I said earlier, create a trust fund that would be used for implementing the approved waste management proposal.

Under the bill, Hydro-Quebec would have to pay, 10 days after the day on which the bill came into force, $20 million for its fund, and $4 million in each subsequent year. Afterward, the waste management organization, Hydro-Québec, would be able to propose shares to the federal government.

We also know that there is interest on any late payment. I suppose members know about this. We all get into situations where payments are due but not in arrears, of course. If the funds or the interest are not paid, the bill provides for fines not exceeding $300,000 for each day on which the offence is committed.

In this trust, the first withdrawal of funds must be for an authorized construction or storage activity. The funds must be used to implement the proposal approved by the minister.

Examination of the bill shows that the proposal to the minister should include three management approaches, particularly concerning the following: disposal in the Canadian Shield; storage on site at nuclear plants; centralized storage, either above or below ground; a comparison of the benefits, risks and costs taking into account the economic area to be determined; a description of management services; an implementation plan; a timeframe, and especially a program for public consultation and an annual financing formula for policy implementation.

However there is a hitch in the bill, which provides, as I read it and I think that I am right, that only the minister can hold public consultations. As we know, consultation is crucial because we also know that the capacity to rely on those who will manage nuclear waste is just as crucial.

Of course the waste management organization will have to submit an annual report of its activities. The form, the updated estimated total cost, the financing formula, the amount of the deposit to be paid, of course, and the amount of the final guarantees to be included in the annual report must be approved by the minister.

All these reports will be tabled and the minister will make a public announcement in this regard. Let me repeat that this report still provides for fines of $50,000 to $300,000 per day of violation. Should we consider that as an incentive for the tabling of these reports on time? I think so. Are the fines too high given the importance of the reports to be tabled? It is a question worth asking. The members will answer if they want to.

The Canadian government is the only one that regulates the nuclear industry. It has invested more than $5 billion in this area over the years and approximately $150 million a year since 1994, whereas all the other countries of the world, even those that use nuclear energy the most, are reviewing their use of this type of energy and are even thinking about progressively decommissioning their nuclear power plants and opting for alternative energy sources.

The Liberal government is determined to promote this type of energy as an interesting alternative to fossil fuels, which create more pollution in spite of the virulent public opposition and the major problem of radioactive waste. Last year, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited estimated that it would cost $377 million to decontaminate its plants and dispose of the waste.

However, the Seaborn panel clearly indicated in 1998 that the estimated cost of a long term nuclear waste management facility ranged from $8.7 billion to $13.3 billion in 1991 . Today, the amount is estimated at $15 billion for most countries, such as France and the United States.

Therefore, the amount of $20 billion, plus $4 million annually for Quebec, raises questions in our minds. Will it be enough? In November 1999, at a meeting of the parties to the convention on climate change held in Bonn, Germany, Canada proposed a plan that would give emission credits to countries that export nuclear reactors, which would enable Canada to meet its targets indirectly without reducing its own emissions.

Despite growing opposition from the people, Canada is continuing down the nuclear path instead of favouring renewable energy and adopting strong policies for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

During the last election campaign, the Bloc Quebecois promised to suggest that the federal government cancel any funding to the nuclear fission industry and that the $150 million that go to that industry every year be retargeted for research and development in the area of clean energy.

Since this opens the door to exporting nuclear waste, one has to wonder if the government really understands the public's opposition to this type of project.

On the subject of importation, in a previous committee sitting, I had the opportunity to discuss with officials from the Department of Natural Resources.

I asked one of them, with respect to importing nuclear wastes, if the waste management organization were to find relatively good solutions—being taken for granted, of course, that we support nuclear projects and therefore consider that the proposals are relatively good—should we fear that nuclear waste might be imported to get a better return on our investment in various waste management programs or projects that Canada might implement?

This is a major risk because in every one of our communities there are waste disposal sites for solid waste or domestic waste. We know what this is all about. When I was on the municipal council in Sherbrooke, we had a waste disposal site. There is one in my ward. One can imagine the problem it creates.

When it comes to the management of nuclear waste or any other kind of waste—of course technically they cannot be compared, although as far as a process is concerned it is the same thing—nobody wants it in their backyard. We all know that. We do not want to see waste imported because it has happened before. It has happened in Quebec and I am convinced it has happened in other provinces too. We should avoid it.

In view of the fact that often the only thing that matters for our Liberal government is money, I am afraid that at some time in the future waste will be imported to make our nuclear waste management system more profitable.

It is something we must keep in mind because the official from the Department of Natural Resources told me that for the time being they had more than enough to do in dealing with our own waste. What concerns me, not to say scares me, is the fact that he said that for the time being they are not considering this.

When I am told “For the time being, we are not planning on it”, am I to understand that their plans may change tomorrow, next week or next year?

That is why the bill must really be transparent. All its details must be clear, precise and, to the extent possible, be assessed. Moreover, even though consultation is provided for in the legislation, we must never neglect to consult. The population must be consulted.

Even if the urgency is evident, we believe that public consultation—and let it be clear that we do not want the kind of bogus consultation that was held in regards to MOX and that lasted only 28 days—is necessary and fundamental.

Another thing will have to be closely considered. The bill intends to force Quebec or, more precisely, Hydro-Quebec to operate according to the proposal that will be adopted by the natural resources minister in Ottawa and to the criteria set by him. Is Quebec really in agreement with these criteria? That is what we will determine later.

We also have a concern about the fines provided for in the bill. Do members not think that the fines imposed for each day of infraction are excessive, considering that this type of bill always contains variable factors? We know that the bill contains provisions allowing additional delay, but the issue of fines is still of concern us.

If we look briefly at the situation of Canada's nuclear power stations, we find that the obligation to treat nuclear fuel waste is unfortunately something that the Bloc Quebecois cannot oppose, but we do strongly oppose the use of fuel and the operation of power plants using nuclear fission.

As members know, in his most recent report, the auditor general clearly indicated that the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission needs to improve its regulatory regime for power reactors. Among other things, the audit pointed out that the commission does not use quantitative measures to rate nuclear power facilities.

According to the auditor general, the rating systems used are not always based on specific criteria but rather on the judgment and expertise of staff.

While we do not believe that the staff would be dishonest and is probably competent, we would like to point out that the auditor general said, and I quote:

The criteria for what is acceptable or unacceptable are subjective and could be misunderstood.

Moreover, as the auditor general pointed out in the report, CNSC faces significant difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified staff. Combined with its current regulatory regime, which relies heavily on the expertise and judgment of staff, the lack of human resource capacity could impact its ability to function adequately in the future.

Considering that only a responsible approach is necessary on this matter, the Bloc Quebecois will support Bill C-27, while maintaining major reservations. The Bloc Quebecois will continue to follow the matter very carefully because there are major issues involved in this bill.

These issues relate to the huge economic investment required for a management regime based on the protection of the environment and of the health of Quebecers. The Canadian people and even the American people would be affected by this bill. While Mr. Bush is not giving a lot of hope on this matter and the Canadian government has a strange approach toward this, we consider it our duty to ensure first and foremost that the bill does not have negative consequences and that the issues will be carefully considered at all stages. At this point, we agree on the bill but we have very major reservations.

In conclusion, people need to have a good relationship with the main stakeholders, as, of course, with the federal government in its responsibilities on waste management. There must also be a trust relationship with the fuel nuclear waste management organization.

If it is possible to create this trust, we will get the support of the public. The public will have to be consulted, but it has to be real consultation and not token consultation, as I said earlier.

The bill will have to be very specific on the potential for importing nuclear waste. It must be clear that the waste management organization's sole purpose is to manage nuclear waste from Quebec and Canada. We know very well that nobody would accept nuclear waste from other countries, with all the risks involved.

Our responsibility today is crucial. We are making decisions that will have an impact on events that could occur in hundreds or thousands of years. Some people are used to managing without any long term vision but here we need to consider future generations, and much more than the next few generations, as we are talking about hundreds and thousands of years.

We will get a chance in committee to deal with various aspects of the bill and we retain the right to move amendments to Bill C-27.

[The Environment, May 18th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, it is not a question of insisting but rather of demanding.

Canada, minus Quebec, has the world's worst record for carbon dioxide emissions per capita. What is more, Ontario and the northeastern United States produce sulphur emissions that end up falling as acid rain on Quebec, damaging our forests and lakes.

Is the minister aware that the Bush plan, with its coal fueled generating plants, will undermine all the years of effort Quebecers have been putting into acid rain reduction?

[The Environment, May 18th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, President Bush's energy plan even includes oil drilling in the Great Lakes, which is liable to cause significant damage to the St. Lawrence.

Could the minister say clearly today whether Canada intends to oppose such a project?