Mr. Speaker, this is a bill that the legislators at the time, when they passed it, thought was dangerous. Our legislation respects individual freedoms and the fact that individuals must never be punished unless we are certain that they are guilty of a crime, and it ensures that the individual's fundamental rights are not intruded upon.
The legislators at the time thought that such an intrusion was possible. That is why they inserted a sunset clause so that the legislation would be reviewed in five years to see whether it was still warranted. To determine whether this was the case, the attorney general was asked to report on whether the legislation was justified, and why. In all of the reports that he submitted, the attorney general noted that the fact that these provisions were not used by the RCMP or federal prosecutors in the first five years and two months of their existence illustrates that officials were proceeding cautiously in using these powers. They did not use them. Not once did the RCMP or other federal prosecutors make use of this legislation.
Nevertheless, the attorney general added:
The Government of Canada continues to believe that the investigative hearing and recognizance provisions are necessary preventive measures that should be part of the Criminal Code.
Why is it necessary to maintain a tool that has never been used? I think that when this came back for review—in February 2007, if my memory serves me correctly—we made it clear that there was a risk that these laws could be used by a malevolent government to stigmatize political opponents. The leader of the Liberal Party at the time said that one of his reasons for not supporting the renewal, that is, for not allowing the provisions to stand, was that there was a risk of unfairly stigmatizing someone. And that stigma could seriously damage the person's life because he would be subject to a court ruling related to terrorism followed by a recognizance.
Do not forget that this recognizance and the proceedings require reasonable grounds, plausible suspicions, but suspicions of a serious offence. Consequently, if it is suspected that someone has potentially committed or may commit a serious offence, that person is then subject to a court ruling. How will this person's life be affected by having a court impose terrorism-related conditions? If these suspicions were unjustified, which could very easily happen since they are only suspicions, how can this person prove that the suspicions are unjustified and then overcome the stigma? I remember that that was the case with Maher Arar, who was flagged not in court, but in reports that were sent to another security service, that of the United States. How can this person be taken off the no-fly list? I am sure that someone who has been subject to a recognizance would be on this list. And since it is public, if his employer hears that he was subject to a recognizance, will he keep his job? Will another employer give him a job in the future?
In today's society, do people realize the serious harm that befalls someone who is labelled a terrorist, even based only on suspicions?
The proposed legislation before us today contains no provisions to ensure that someone falsely suspected can somehow get rid of that stigma. The absence of such a procedure would be enough in itself to justify not renewing the clause.
It is important to understand why this measure is more or less useless. When an individual suspected of being involved in a terrorist act is brought before a judge, the only thing the judge can do is impose conditions; the judge cannot incarcerate that individual. And if the individual agrees to sign the recognizance, the judge must release him.
For heaven's sake, in today's reality, how does a person become the object of such suspicions, which do not allow authorities to lay formal charges against that person? Suspicions probably arise when authorities learn about some of the person's relationships or as a result of electronic surveillance conducted in people's homes. But if those things clearly established the existence of a terrorist plot and that person's involvement, there would be evidence of a conspiracy. Conspiracy is a criminal offence, even if the objective of the conspiracy is never achieved. So that person could be charged with conspiracy and brought before a judge. The judge determines whether it is in the public's interest to incarcerate the individual, considering the evidence of conspiracy that is presented. That judge can incarcerate the individual, unlike a judge whose only recourse is to impose release conditions. The judge can even detain the individual.
Then what happens? The proceedings continue and either the charges are dropped and the person is acquitted, or the person is found guilty. If he is found guilty, then so much the better.
Nonetheless, we have to consider that not everyone who is acquitted owes that outcome to a savvy lawyer or insufficient evidence presented to the judge. In our society, I like to think that people are acquitted because they are not guilty. When a person is acquitted of a charge he can go on with his life. However, when a person is ordered by a judge to sign a recognizance on suspicion of terrorism, he is stigmatized for life.
Is this the kind of weapon we want to leave behind for a potentially dishonest government, particularly when it is the attorney general who authorizes the use of this procedure? I am not comforted by that thought.
Even if the government is not that dishonest, there are circumstances in which it is very difficult to respect the principles of the democratic state we have the privilege of living in. I experienced one such circumstance. As a young lawyer during the October crisis, I saw a government that I respected—despite the many accords it signed—invoke legislation that had been left on the books, namely the War Measures Act. And look what happened and how the War Measures Act was used.
Does anyone remember what kind of people were thrown in jail, kept there, and accused? A popular singer, Pauline Julien, and several poets—including Gaston Miron, I believe— were arrested, but most importantly, nearly all of the candidates in the Montreal municipal election were incarcerated under the War Measures Act.
Should another terrorist threat surface, I believe that future authorities could panic and use this law to, at the very least, stigmatize their rivals. A future government could even be dishonest. Our governments are reasonably honest, certainly more honest than most other governments in the world, and existing laws give them an incentive to remain so.
This is a violation of the legal principles that guide us. Let us not forget that these principles are what make our kind of government so much better than the kind of government or regime that terrorists typically seek to establish. We cannot stoop to their level and keep laws on our books that could be misused.
There are two main reasons why this legislation should not proceed. First, the measures it provides for are useless. It has never been used because it is useless. Second, it is dangerous. A government could easily be tempted to use it, not for its intended purpose but to stigmatize political rivals, which is often the case. For example, those who want stricter and stricter laws are happy to denounce those who stand for fundamental legal principles and a different attitude toward crime. They are portrayed as being pro-crime. I have heard that many times from those in government now. I can certainly imagine them using these provisions under certain circumstances to taint the reputations of their adversaries by accusing them of involvement in terrorist activities.
I should also point out that, in its annual reports, the government was supposed to justify the usefulness of this law to date, but has never been able to. Does that record suggest that this law is useful? All the Attorney General had to say was this:
The Government of Canada continues to believe that the investigative hearing and recognizance provisions are necessary preventive measures that should be part of the Criminal Code.
I would like to know why he still thinks that this bill is useful and should be renewed.
I will point out to MPs not belonging to the Conservative Party that they agreed in 2007 not to extend these provisions.
There are still a number of reasons why this legislation should not be renewed. Not enough changes have been made, according to those who believe they are necessary. In particular, no effort has been made to add provisions to the legislation enabling an innocent person who has been subjected to wrongful suspicion and stigmatized by a recognizance required by judicial decision to re-establish his reputation, live an ordinary life and travel as freely as he did before the conditions were imposed.
Canada's international reputation is at stake. I repeat, in today's world, if we need to prevent a terrorist attack, we will be able to do so because of electronic eavesdropping, meetings or because we are informed that there is a conspiracy.
In that case, we can charge the person. Those who drafted this bill believe that signing a recognizance is less serious than having charges laid. It may be less serious in the short term, but I hope they understand that, in the long term, it is much more serious. A person who is wrongly accused will be acquitted and the stigma removed; however, a person who comes under suspicion unjustly has no way to remove the stigma that remains in the security agencies' reports.
Why has the legislator, the attorney general, who was presented with these arguments in 2007, not found a solution? Because he has made no effort to do so. That is laziness in addition to recklessness. He is accepting a law that, when initially passed, could be dangerous for individual rights. It is the type of law that terrorist organizations would like to see adopted across the globe. We are playing their game by drafting laws that grant such discretionary power. Therefore, this bill is useless and dangerous.
I will acknowledge that there are two amendments that would improve the legislation. First, there is the fact that police must show that other investigative methods have failed, and second, there is the right to have a lawyer of the person's choice present, as the member who spoke before me mentioned. But we still have the same fundamental problem: this law can destroy the reputation of someone who perhaps does not deserve it. There are only suspicions against a person, and no way of repairing the damage that has been done.
As was the case with the War Measures Act, there could be situations that we have not foreseen. When the War Measures Act was passed, a government could have been tempted, or even gone as far as to use this legislation simply to destroy the reputation of political adversaries and to place them in a difficult position.
I am referring to the election that was held the year after the War Measures Act was used and almost all those who ran against Mayor Drapeau were incarcerated. Obviously, Mayor Drapeau won this election by a landslide, by getting all of the councillors from his party elected. He made a historic statement to the effect that this was his kind of victory. There were many other reasons to vote for Jean Drapeau rather than his opponents at the time.
Thus, a law that goes against our general principles, and goes so far as to incarcerate political opponents, has already been used once in our history. What is to say that one day, this legislation will not be used to stigmatize and destroy the reputation of political opponents? Not to mention the fact that errors can be made in good faith. Someone can be wrongly—but in good faith—suspected of being a terrorist and be subject to these provisions, but if the suspicions turn out to be untrue, no one is able to correct that injustice.