Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to rise today for the motion brought forward in the House by my colleague, the member for Wellington—Halton Hills. This is an important motion on Canada's foreign relations and national security and I am glad to have the opportunity to speak to it.
In our increasingly digital and interconnected world, security concerns are growing, gaps are becoming more evident and governments are attempting to tackle them. As technology evolves, so do the new challenges of how to ensure it is secure and accessible for the individuals using it. This includes our mobile networks and Internet connections. An issue that goes hand in hand with this is national security.
Governments across the world are thinking more and more about the implications and interconnectedness of national security, infrastructure and trade. Taking national security seriously also means protecting Canada's national interests and our Canadian values from foreign interference. Unfortunately, the Liberal government has been slow to react, allowing foreign actors to go unchecked in our system.
The motion, if passed, would require the government to make a decision on Huawei's involvement in Canada's 5G network within 30 days, fitting within the government's commitment to announce a policy and framework on China this fall, and develop a robust plan to counter China's foreign influence in Canada.
After years of talk, uncertainty for Canadian businesses and citizens, and our allies moving on this without us, the Liberal government still has not put together any plan or made a decision. We are not talking about the Chinese people, but about the People's Republic of China. The risk of allowing Huawei into our 5G networks is well documented, and the case is clear for why the government must ban it from our system.
Huawei's involvement in our telecommunications network poses a threat to national security, as, under Chinese law, Huawei must support, assist and co-operate with Chinese intelligence activities. Experts have stated that if the Chinese communist regime were to ask for it, Huawei would have to hand over the data that it collects.
When we talk about Huawei, we are talking about infrastructure that will be the backbone for other technology, as it is also well documented that Chinese regime enterprises are investing in critical infrastructure and asset projects all over the world. Allowing Huawei into our 5G network could mean allowing China's communist regime the ability to access Canadians' private and personal data, including potentially sensitive data that the Chinese regime could use for its benefit, for intelligence-gathering or to intimidate Canadians of Chinese origin within our own borders, which, as per reports, is occurring now.
Make no mistake. This data could be given, through Huawei, to a regime with a history of human rights abuses. It has jailed democratic and activist dissidents in Hong Kong and has persecuted and mistreated religious minorities, such as the Uighur Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists, including putting them into forced labour camps.
We cannot have weak leadership and a naive approach when it comes to dealing with a regime committing these atrocities. We need consistency, a plan and action.
The former public safety minister, Ralph Goodale, was in charge of a 5G review in 2018-19, and decisions kept being pushed off. In May 2019, he said the government would make a decision before the federal election, and then in July 2019, said it would do so after the election. That was a year and a half ago, and now it has been over a year since the election.
The request in this motion is therefore very reasonable. The Liberals cannot say they have not taken action because no one else has or that they have not had the time to review and consult.
Canada is now the only member of the Five Eyes international intelligence organization not to either ban or restrict the use of Huawei 5G equipment. Australia, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom, all like-minded allies of Canada, are our counterparts in the Five Eyes alliance. They have moved on this and Canada has not made a decision. We have heard no plan and we are delayed behind our allies.
We see a trend here where the Liberal government is lagging behind our allies on security decisions and trade negotiations.
In the United States, moving to ban Huawei from its 5G networks was a bipartisan effort, with members from both sides of the aisle coming together.
Last summer, the United Kingdom implemented a full ban on mobile carriers purchasing Huawei's 5G technology. The country's National Cyber Security Centre, a government organization tasked with preventing computer security threats, did a review of the system and agreed with this ban as well as recommending that full-fibre Internet operators transition away from purchasing any new equipment from Huawei.
It is time for the current Liberal government to act. At a time of much uncertainty, this is something the government has full control over and would finally give our citizens and business owners certainty. The motion simply asks for the government to take into account the review that it did two years ago, as well as all of the information at committees and with our allies, and include this in the government's announced China policy framework, which it is working on. The motion also calls upon the government to develop a robust plan, as Australia has done, to combat China's growing foreign operations here in Canada and its increasing intimidation of Canadians living in Canada and to table it within 30 days of the adoption of the motion.
The Australian model on this has shown to be a flag bearer of how Canada could also look to respond. According to Reuters, Australia came up with its own plan after its analysis showed that China's Communist regime was posing a threat to Australia's democracy and national sovereignty. The protection of democracy and national sovereignty is fundamental and, day by day, it is showing more and more that Canada must have its own plan in this regard. Another measure Australia announced was introducing a national security test for foreign investments.
Last summer, the committee I was formerly on, the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, undertook a study of the Investment Canada Act, including hearing from stakeholders and policy experts on how state-owned enterprises, including those from China, have been able to get into Canada for the purpose of expanding international influence.
Speaking at the committee as a witness, Dr. Charles Burton, senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute's centre for advancing Canada’s interests abroad, as an individual, testified. Having extensive experience in the Canada-China relations sphere, he called Canada's relationship with China one of economic coercion. He went into detail at the committee, explaining the intertwined relationship between Huawei and its executives, the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party. In his assessment, Huawei and indeed all enterprises from China meet the Canadian definition of state-owned enterprises for the purpose of the Investment Canada Act. Many academics have called on Canada to work to limit and counter China's attempts in this realm, going so far as to say that those in China's Communist regime believe that our government lacks the conviction to push back.
Another academic, Dr. Duanjie Chen at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, wrote about concerns regarding the Chinese Communist state strategy to dominate through the acquisition of large companies in other countries. According to Dr. Chen, “[State-owned enterprises] form an integral part of China’s national strategy for global expansion”. Canada's plan to combat China's growing foreign operations, intimidation and influence must include looking at these state-owned enterprises and their involvement in investment in our country.
Another concern some have raised is that foreign state-owned enterprises acquiring Canadian companies can get access to sensitive Canadian intellectual property and reduce the competitiveness of Canadian companies. Mr. Tim Hahlweg, assistant director of requirements at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, also spoke at the industry committee. Mr. Hahlweg stated:
As discussed in our recent public report, state-sponsored economic espionage activities in Canada continue to increase in breadth, depth and potential economic impact. In order to fulfill their national economic, intelligence and military interests, some foreign states engage in espionage activities. Foreign espionage has significant economic ramifications for Canada, including lost jobs, intellectual property, and corporate and tax revenues, as well as competitive advantages.
Mr. Jim Balsillie, chair of the Council of Canadian Innovators, also spoke at the industry committee regarding the Investment Canada Act. Mr. Balsillie described how the act must change to ensure it remains fit for purpose. He stated, “What I see is our policy-makers inviting foreign companies to take our sovereignty and prosperity away.”
It is not just economic intimidation. The federal government must look at the abuses conducted by this regime abroad and also at the influence and scare tactics that we have seen and heard of right on our own soil.
I would like to wrap up today by reiterating my support for this important motion, which will signify to the rest of the world, including our like-minded allies, that Canada is serious about standing up for our national interests and values, as well as having a strong and principled foreign policy backed by action.
