Transport committee  That's a very difficult question. I'm not sure I would characterize complacency with the officers of Transport Canada. Even though I'd like them to give me feedback, I understand the legality aspect behind it. What I am seeing, as a recurring pattern, is the airframer not providing sufficient answers.

Transport committee  Yes, you're correct in your assessment. Why is it? We might be the best to ask this question to Boeing. Why do they not even reply to an invitation to appear before this committee, for instance? I extended an offer of technical help to them. I gave them lots of ideas. I even proposed a couple of design changes that could have vastly improved this aircraft.

Transport committee  Affirmative.

Transport committee  At this point, there's been no feedback, and I'm not seeking feedback from Transport Canada because when I went to see them on June 18, 2019, I understood when they said that they could not give me feedback, given the ongoing investigations. However, I will be requesting to be at the debrief, for sure, when that investigation is completed.

Transport committee  It always could be useful to involve other...while the pilots are well involved in the certification process. All those systems, including the interiors and [Technical difficulty—Editor] are being certified as well. I find one of the big lacks is in the engineering systems. The systems engineering aspect has been what has caused those two crashes, because they did not do the safety analysis properly, which led them to assess a criticality level of failures that was not sufficiently high.

Transport committee  Certainly the 737 Max is safer now that the MCAS software has been changed. However, to say that this is now the safest airplane because of all this scrutiny is just not true, simply on the basis of the obsolete system for the pitch trim, which has only one electric motor. We're talking about relying on human muscles as a backup to a single electric motor, while all other aircraft have at least two.

Transport committee  Yes. Okay. There was a sudden jolt of 0.5 degrees on the H-stab in the first crash. Nobody talks about it in the final report, yet Transport Canada, when I worked on such systems, imposed not more than this amount of movement, half a degree, under some failure conditions. High control forces conditions have been observed as well on the second flight.

Transport committee  Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members. When I testified to this committee on March 10, I was asked if I'd table my findings at that point. I did so confidentially, with the desire and the idea to give Boeing a fair opportunity to answer the questions that were then 24 main questions over 44 pages in the document I had sent them.

Transport committee  Yes.

Transport committee  At the beginning of my career, I was flight controls engineer and I would simulate the 737 flight controls in the simulator. That included getting all the logic and all the performance, and testing it to verify. It was my work there that allowed me to predict what the forces are on the column.

Transport committee  It's informal, I would say, rather than formal. We should formalize it, perhaps.

Transport committee  Okay. Sylvain has gone through the type certificate. Go ahead, Sylvain.

Transport committee  Oh, on the nomenclature, I wouldn't know about the nomenclature.

Transport committee  Normally—and Sylvain will be able to correct me if I'm wrong—if something turns out to be a major change, it should appear on the type certificate. Is that correct?

Transport committee  No.