National Defence committee  Thanks. I hope so as well. I see a singular opportunity: the importance of small and medium powers, like Canada and the Nordic countries, sending signals in this climate of global competition, which great powers cannot. I see this as a moment for Canada to work bilaterally or multilaterally in smaller groups of like-minded countries, play a role in signalling our solidarity and bring a dose of sobriety to some of the debates flourishing right now.

National Defence committee  It's really important for us not to distort the fact that Russia does have sovereignty and sovereign rights as an Arctic state and China does not. It should be affirmed that there are deep-seated differences between China's interpretation of its role in the Arctic and that of all of the Arctic states, including Russia.

National Defence committee  If I may respond, I do think we need a military presence in the Arctic. The question is, how much, and how proportionate is it to the threat environment that we place in the Arctic specifically? I would argue that Canada can best defend the Arctic by investing smartly in homeland defence overall and in a forward presence in Europe.

National Defence committee  I'd say, first of all, when we're talking about extending continental shelves, this is not territory. We're talking about sovereign rights to resources on the seabed or below the seabed. I think it's problematic to talk about this as territory, because it sets out the wrong concept of what we're dealing with.

National Defence committee  I was actually reassured that Russia has continued to adhere to the established process under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to submit their scientific research in support of their particular position to the Convention on the Law of the Sea—

National Defence committee  There is no presence built into articles 76 and 77 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. Presence has nothing to do with establishing your extended continental shelf. That already belongs to you as a coastal state. We're dealing with overlap. In terms of China as a near-Arctic state—thank you for that question—very simply, we need to continually remind China that “near-Arctic state” is an idea with no legal status whatsoever.

National Defence committee  Thank you, Ms. Lambropoulos. First of all, I think we have to prepare for many future contingencies and possibilities. Ultimately, at the end of the day, I turn to our military and security experts to determine the balance of probabilities and risks, because we're always managing risks.

National Defence committee  I will focus directly on what you asked about offensive capability. The way I would phrase it is like this: How do we avoid the security dilemma that occurs when we make investments in defence that are interpreted by an adversary or competitor as something that in turn threatens them and encourages them to make an increased investment and triggers what might be an arms race or a security spiral?

National Defence committee  It would be my pleasure.

National Defence committee  Yes, Madam Chair, I definitely concur with most of the points. I think we want to parse Chinese interest in the Russian shipping and resource sectors as yielding somewhat different outcomes. We have seen Chinese investment in the liquefied natural gas sector, particularly in the Yamal Peninsula with the Yamal-2 project, which is the one example of Chinese investment in the Arctic on a grand scale.

National Defence committee  As much as there's pressure to act on this right now, we're still dealing with such a state of uncertainty that I think we're wise to have adopted the posture that we have of re-engaging and reinvigorating certain projects under the auspices of the Arctic Council that do not involve Russia and in essence preserving the integrity of this high-level forum until such a time as there may be opportunity to re-engage and build it forward into what the Arctic Council should be.

National Defence committee  I'll just make my quick summary point, which was about ensuring that we're synchronizing our Arctic-related homeland defence efforts with those of our allies and with Canadian partners, including northern partners. We need to remember that the Kremlin's foremost goal is to fragment our alliances and our partnerships with like-minded Arctic states or within our states.

National Defence committee  Thank you. I think there are actually a lot of misconceptions about what has been going on with the Arctic Council since late February. First of all, it has not been suspended. The like-minded Arctic states—and you notice I did not say “Arctic 7”, because I wish that term would be completely excised from the conversation these days—have chosen to put a pause on their involvement for the time being.

National Defence committee  Thank you. There are a series of existing mechanisms. For example, the differentiated Inuit Nunangat space and the opportunities associated with the Inuit-Crown partnership committee over the last number of years are a really opportune space for working on collaboration and alignment of priorities and co-development of implementation efforts between Inuit leadership and the federal government.

National Defence committee  One of the reasons I articulated the “through, to and in” concept is that everything relating to threats in the Arctic, in my mind, should be led, wherever possible, by northern rights holders and northern stakeholders. When we're talking about threats to the Arctic at those tables, there must be northern representation in the spirit of “nothing about us without us”.