Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would also like to thank the members of this committee.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you for your question. As you say, China's objective is to impose this language and ensure that the Chinese position is presented as the universally recognized position, which is not the case. Resolution 2758, which was passed in 1971, does not mention the status of Taiwan, as the United States, for example, does not in the Taiwan Relations Ac.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you very much for this. I think we need to speak out and make sure that Taiwan is mentioned in our official communications, not because we want to change our one China policy but because we want to make sure that the status quo is being maintained. We need to make sure, also, to address directly the Taiwanese civil society, not always making everything political, but making sure that all of the changes, people-to-people changes, concrete co-operation projects can be promoted among and between our civil societies.

Canada-China Relations committee  I would say that it's by being inclusive, as inclusive as possible, not only at the political level but in every single co-operation project we may have in the Indo-Pacific. We mentioned the ODA and a development project in the South Pacific—and it could be, of course, in southeast Asia, etc.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you for your question. I think you are perfectly correct. Today, Taiwan is often an underestimated actor when it comes to development aid, and yet Taiwan not only has financial capacities, but, most importantly, it has relatively unique experience in the Indo-Pacific countries.

Canada-China Relations committee  This is exactly what the Chinese have been saying. They are now explaining that the median line never existed, and they are quite right. There was never a legal agreement between Beijing and Taipei on the median line, but it was a tacit agreement, and de facto that line was respected on both sides.

Canada-China Relations committee  It's a very tricky answer because it depends on our political determination. To go until the end, in the sense of escalating the ladder if the Chinese choose to escalate, is very tricky and very complicated. The only answer might be a coordinated answer, not only from the U.S. and its key allies but more broadly from the international community.

Canada-China Relations committee  I do not think it would be a game-changer, to be honest. Within international organizations, it would be impossible for Taiwan to participate because the Chinese would block these attempts in the same way they've been doing since 2016. We can still of course wish and support stronger participation of Taiwan in international organizations, but China has the ability to block it.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you very much for the question. I would say that that Taiwanese ODA has been quite limited for the last few years. Compared to the U.K., Sweden, or even Canada, it remains a very tiny percentage of Taiwan's GDP. Taiwan could do even more. Taiwan is doing that not only with its “diplomatic allies”, the term that Taipei uses to mention the 14 countries that have diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.

Canada-China Relations committee  The incursions are not as frequent as they were in August. Let's say the trend is slowing down a little bit, yet China has successfully changed the status quo because these incursions keep going. You have fewer of these, but you still have some incursions when you had almost none in the first part of the year or in 2020 or 2021.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you very much for your question. As you mentioned, it's a very incremental push on the Chinese side, what some people might call the salami-slicing tactics. For sure, we need to support Taiwan and make sure that every time China tries to change the status quo by force, there is a collective and coordinated answer at least at the G7, because that's one of the key levels that have been chosen over the last few years to make sure we have a united answer, and more broadly a transatlantic answer to address what's going on in the Taiwan Strait.

Canada-China Relations committee  I would say the risks are limited. To be clear, the provocation would not be for these visits to continue in the same way they have for decades, but to stop them. What would be the message sent to the Taiwanese if suddenly the French, Canadian, European or even American parliamentary officials and MPs just stopped visiting Taiwan?

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you for your question. I think a distinction has to be made in relation to the actors that have the biggest role to play. In that regard, the United States is obviously the leading actor, in particular as a result of the security guarantees given in the Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress in 1979.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you for your question. As you know, the French government wants to emphasize the concept of strategic autonomy. The alliance with the United States in no way means a 100% alignment. France is obviously not equidistant and neutral, but it does not want to align itself completely on certain cooperative actions that may take place in the region, for example the quadrilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, India and Australia known as the Quad.

Canada-China Relations committee  The balance of power has actually changed enormously in the Taiwan Strait, in favour of Beijing and against Taiwan. Today, the figures are between $250 and $300 billion dollars in military spending on the Chinese side and more along the lines of $15 to $20 billions on the Taiwanese side.