Science and Research committee  Mr. Chair, thank you for the question. I will focus my comments on a national security point of view. I would say that what we have seen is a fairly significant change in the last four or five years. It's not just from an intelligence point of view and with us sharing more, but that everybody else is realizing that the environment has changed.

Science and Research committee  I think we are in a world where some of what matters—the information and the data—resides in government hands, but most of it does not. With the way the technologies are evolving and the way the research is evolving, what we need is.... Even if you were able to build a Fort Knox in one area, if you leave the back door open, it's not going to work.

Science and Research committee  Mr. Chair, can we add one point, please?

Science and Research committee  I can add quickly that yes, Russia is, of course, of concern, It is less so in terms of sucking up all of the information the way the PRC does, but it is much more specifically a concern for technology that is right now under sanctions. They're trying to go around sanctions to get access to those technologies.

Science and Research committee  I think that Minister Champagne was here earlier in the week to explain, so I would not want to put words in his mouth. I figure the minister's testimony is on the record. On the second part of your question, sir, I think that it is very important that we identify risks, both in terms of protecting and in terms of transparency.

Science and Research committee  This is, I think, the crux of the issue here. The PRC has been very transparent in its approach. It has put in place new legislation that forces any company, any organization and any person of Chinese origin to collaborate with the intelligence service. In the case of a company like Huawei, irrespective of their intent—I will not speak about their intent at the moment—they are under an obligation, if required, to share their information.

Science and Research committee  When we look at the way the theft of intellectual property through state-sponsored activity occurs, we realize we need to address all aspects of the ecosystem, to use your word. One thing CSIS has been doing is talking about this issue more publicly. I welcome the work of this committee to enlighten Canadians about this phenomenon.

Science and Research committee  Mr. Chair, I thank the member for his question. I believe that was said by one of my colleagues from the Five Eyes at the meeting described in the article. Having said that, I fully support the argument that's being made. There are indeed threats to Canadian universities. In Canada, we are very fortunate to have cutting-edge universities.

Science and Research committee  Mr. Chair, I thank the member for that very important question. First of all, CSIS works with a lot of federal government agencies. Specifically, CSIS works directly with universities and some researchers. We provide information directly to universities and research centres, to the extent possible, within the limits imposed on CSIS by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

Science and Research committee  Mr. Chair, this is part of the complex environment, and this is why it's so important to work with the institutions. We've seen attacks through traditional espionage activities. We see it through cyber-espionage. We've seen it through collaboration on research projects. Sometimes we'll have people with different affiliations come in overtly and have access to information that should probably be kept a bit more discreet.

Science and Research committee  Since the government's introduction of new guidelines and regulations, we have done a few things. One, we have done a number of engagements with the research councils to share with them our perspective of the environment and of the threat. Also, Mr. Chair, we have done part of the review process, so the granting councils are referring a number of the applications to the government.

Science and Research committee  Mr. Chair, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, there are limits to what I can reveal publicly. That said, we are more concerned with research than with general university funding. In fact, we can see examples in the public domain of the various tactics of the Chinese government.

Science and Research committee  Mr. Chair, I'll be careful about the nature of the briefings I'm giving, but I do believe that it has been said publicly that I have personally briefed Minister Champagne. I have briefed a number of other ministers. I'm saying that with the caveat that I cannot confirm or deny all of the briefings I've given.

Science and Research committee  Mr. Chair, the minister is receiving a lot of information, of course, mostly from his department. He's also receiving information through his participation in different committees, and that includes receiving intelligence from CSIS. I do understand the member's question. Again, I just want to reiterate that I think the words I've used in this committee in my opening remarks and the words we've used in our public report and in previous public appearances here in Canada have spoken very clearly about the magnitude.

Science and Research committee  Mr. Chair, I think what is important is to look at the threat specifically. I would say that there is a gradation in terms of the different activities and the institutions that are engaged in these activities.