Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, as I think members know, CSIS is an intelligence organization. It's not a law enforcement organization. We have no powers to detain, intercept or arrest anyone.

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, the documents that have been provided to the committee, and my testimony in previous appearances in front of your committee, indicate that we first engaged PHAC in the guise of a threat briefing in August 2018. It was at the tail end of that meeting when PHAC officials

Canada-China Relations committee  That is accurate.

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, we have provided numerous briefings to the officials the member is speaking about. I do not have the specific timelines in front of me.

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, thank you for the question. We indeed have a fairly long list of concerns regarding the PRC's attempts to steal Canada's secrets—both government secrets and, more and more, what is being developed in our cutting-edge universities and research laboratories. As I've

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, you'll understand that I cannot reveal the specific nature of our intelligence. I will perhaps take a step back from the specific question and answer Mr. Angus by saying that we, as an intelligence service, would not be aware of all patents filed in another country.

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, I think it's fair to say that there were indeed a number of flags raised. I was personally involved in response to the 2014 cyber-hack by the PRC against the NRC, and I can tell you that all the right authorities of concern in Canada and abroad were very aware of wha

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chong, if I remember, I think I testified that the initial concerns that were raised were more in the nature of administrative issues, as opposed to national security issues. I think that explains, in part, some of these delays. One thing that's clear, however, is that since

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, I can speak to this question from a CSIS point of view in terms of our engagement. As I mentioned in my previous testimony—a colleague of Mr. Chong was talking about the pace at which CSIS was able to produce this intelligence to the PHAC—I think this was done in a v

Canada-China Relations committee  The specific set of circumstances you're talking about—the infiltration and the potential recruitment or espionage activities of the PRC or others vis-à-vis the science-led research of the federal government—is not just because of the Winnipeg lab issue, but because of other case

Canada-China Relations committee  One of the elements I've talked about is the work of this committee and the work that we've been doing with Public Safety, ISED and specifically CSIS to make sure that we talk about these issues. It's very important, because it's only through the knowledge of ourselves and other

Canada-China Relations committee  Unfortunately, I will not be able to speak about our ongoing investigations.

Canada-China Relations committee  The government policy is quite clear that it's the deputy head of any organization who has the authority to grant and revoke a clearance based on the security advice the deputy head receives. I mentioned last week that the Treasury Board Secretariat, which was in charge of that p

Canada-China Relations committee  If I understand the question, if someone allowed a person to do work that required clearance without that person having clearance, that would be a serious violation of policy. I would say this would be, of course, of real concern.

Canada-China Relations committee  I think the question is absolutely legitimate. However, as I said, CSIS is not in the business of running the lab. That is why we went to them with our concerns about national security in 2018 and to share with them our expertise. This is our job. We share with them our expertise