Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Harris, from a CSIS point of view, I cannot, unfortunately, provide you with the specific details of how and when we have provided this advice. I can tell you, however, that we are engaged with our partners at Immigration, PSPC and others across the government to provide advice on security threats to allow our partners to develop appropriate mitigation measures.

Canada-China Relations committee  Unfortunately, Mr. Harris, I cannot provide specific details of the type of advice and on what subject we are providing to our partners.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you, Mr. Fragiskatos. As I mentioned earlier in my answer to Mr. Paul-Hus, CSIS and also our partners in the national security community are quite involved with universities to provide them with advice. We are also working closely with them not just on the protection of research, but also on the potential interference on campuses in terms of academic freedom and potential threats that the students coming from abroad may feel from different countries.

Canada-China Relations committee  I can't speak for all universities, but I can say that this is an ongoing discussion. I can see that we've been having a different dialogue over the last year or two with universities. We are realizing, like everybody else, that there is a new intent in the regime in China.

Canada-China Relations committee  Several states have very sophisticated tools, both technical and human, for espionage and interference. We mentioned that China was one of these countries. There are several others, unfortunately, that have the ability, the interest and, sometimes, the opportunity to conduct espionage in Canada.

Canada-China Relations committee  Unfortunately, I cannot disclose the content of my discussions with the minister, but we are well aware of the situation.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you for the question, Mr. Paul-Hus. I will mention a few important points here. First of all, we work very closely with universities in different ways. We work with the presidents, but also with the people who are responsible for research and development. We also work with organizations such as U15, a consortium of Canada's leading research and development universities, to provide them with advice and guidance.

Canada-China Relations committee  At that point, Mr. Paul-Hus, secret information is not disclosed. However, we can suggest avenues of reflection and mention areas of risk to be mitigated, particularly with regard to hiring, cybersecurity measures, and measures to be taken with regard to contracts. We therefore maintain a close dialogue.

Canada-China Relations committee  As you can imagine, there are certain details I cannot give you here. But I can tell you that the government and various agencies, including CSIS, are working to protect the country from these threats. Some states, including China, which was mentioned in the past, are using every tool at their disposal to come after Canada's secrets and those that relate to our modern economy.

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Harris, from a CSIS point of view we do two things. In the specific case of academics, we provide advice. We engage with them and provide them with information about the threats they face and about the modus operandi and some of the techniques that can be used to get this information.

Canada-China Relations committee  Do you want to go first, Commissioner?

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you, Commissioner Lucki. It is a very complex issue. We have the rule of law in Canada. We have the right of the people who are accused to have the information known to them. But when we have intelligence and are using very sensitive sources, we also have a need to protect this information.

Canada-China Relations committee  Unfortunately, I cannot answer your question directly, Mr. Paul-Hus. I'm sorry.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you for your question, Mr. Paul-Hus. Yes, we work closely with our colleagues in the Canadian Armed Forces in general and with Special Forces in particular in various theatres of operations. Of course, these are very sensitive operations that we cannot talk about in public, but we have memoranda of understanding and we work very closely with them.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you, Mr. Paul-Hus. The argument that we are making is that technology, national security threats, and attacks on the privacy of Canadians are creating a very complex environment that is always evolving. For the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to be able to fulfil its mandate, it must always be evaluating the powers it has been given so as not to break the law.