Public Safety committee  I absolutely can. Starting in 2014, we have the Moncton shooting perpetrated by Justin Bourque. In that shooting, three were killed and two were wounded. In 2015, we have the Halifax mall plot. That plot was disrupted and there were no casualties. In 2016, we have the Edmonton stomping attack.

Public Safety committee  I can say generally that because we take the threat activity very seriously and we have a lot of assets at play in the organization.... We have regions across the country, as you know, and we have stations abroad. All these employees of our organization are working in concert with their law enforcement partners and other members in the S and I community to identify and disrupt this activity.

Public Safety committee  Thank you very much for the question. Maybe I can start at the bottom. I think I can work my way through that a little more clearly if I start with the “other” category, because it helps to describe the narrative in the IMVE space. For the IMVE space, the “other” category is obviously part of the four that I articulated at the outset, which include xenophobic, linked to white supremacy or neo-Nazism and ethnonationalism; anti-authority and targeting of government and law enforcement; and gender-driven, which can lead to violent misogyny.

Public Safety committee  Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm grateful for the opportunity today to appear before this committee and appreciate your taking the time to study the issue of IMVE in Canada. The threat that IMVE poses remains a high priority for CSIS. As mentioned, my name is Tim Hahlweg, and I'm the assistant director of requirements at CSIS.

Industry committee  It's a great question. As part of the ICA process, obviously we're very engaged from a national security community perspective, along with DND, the RCMP and other people. We have a lot of different government departments out of which that threat information may emerge, and then we have those discussions as to whether or not they meet something we need to investigate further.

Industry committee  There are a number of threat actors out there, as I noted, so within the classified space with your NSICOP colleagues, we do have those discussions about the countries that are potentially problematic. Foreign interference cuts the swath, and we've been subject to foreign interference and economic espionage for a number of years.

Industry committee  I can't comment specifically on that, because it does impact operational considerations.

Industry committee  I couldn't speak to those specific operational areas, but generally any time we have a state-owned enterprise that has its own national interest advanced and in the fore as opposed to Canadian interests, that would be problematic.

Industry committee  Again, that's a policy consideration, and I would turn to my colleagues in ISED for that

Industry committee  Absolutely, thank you very much. The recommendation, as I indicated, is that we will continue to investigate. We are very engaged, very active, with our domestic and our foreign partners in this space, but as I mentioned, I think getting out there proactively and educating anybody in this space and anybody in a vulnerable sector is critical.

Industry committee  I think it's a great question. By educating people in vulnerable sectors, especially now in the COVID context, if we use the biopharma example, that education piece and that outreach is critical for these companies to know and be aware when they might be vulnerable to attack. Once they are armed with that information, they can start to spot signs and then they can get in touch with the government to say they think something is going on here and you might want to review this.

Industry committee  It's a great question. I'm going to have to defer part of that question to my colleagues from ISED and, potentially, Public Safety. I can say that it is obviously a concern from a national security lens if people are trying to obfuscate their original intent or their goals in this area.

Industry committee  I'm not sure I fully understand the scope of your question. Obviously, protecting Canadian data is hugely important for national security, and as I mentioned in my opening remarks, that is a concern for us that we highlight in all our public reports and in all our talk on economic espionage.

Industry committee  I'm not sure if it would be more specifically at risk. It would depend on the circumstances. But going back to my original comments, having a broad range of Canadian data going to an SOE, which is linked to another country's intelligence organization, is problematic from a national security perspective.

Industry committee  I don't know about strategic. I would turn that question to my colleague Dominic Rochon. From our perspective and our lens, organizations that hold significant amounts of personal information on Canadians, as I mentioned, critical infrastructure including the telecommunications, transportation and energy sectors, but also emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum information processing and semiconductors, that's our principal concern right now from a service perspective.