National Defence committee  Obviously, we're still doing data reduction of the radar contacts. The three different regions of NORAD involved with the intercepts are also doing video analysis. Obviously, those videos are at a higher classification than this forum. Those assessments are being done, as well as a better characterization of whether it's a commercial, non-commercial or private usage of balloons that is taking place, not only in our airspace but across other airspaces as well, so as to better understand how many of these systems are probably in the airspace at any one time.

National Defence committee  I appreciate the interest in the F-35s. Having worked on the project for a number of years, I can speak a little bit to that. I will see if Major-General Prévost wants to add. Again, it's the usage of the right tool for the right unknown or object that may be in both our airspaces.

National Defence committee  I believe that the sensors of the F-35 would have been able to. I'm not going to talk about the maximum altitude of the F-35 here because at the end of the day, the F-35—or any fighter aircraft—doesn't need to be at co-altitude with the object, because it can employ weapons that will make up that altitude difference if we decide to take out the object.

National Defence committee  I'll let Major General Prévost talk about the acquisition project.

National Defence committee  Obviously, we always try to optimize sensors for the potential threats that may be coming, especially on the approaches to North America. In our case, sensors have been cued to detect long-range aviation. We've worked on sensors to detect potential cruise missiles, which are one of the predominant threats out there, as seen in other regions.

National Defence committee  Mr. Chair, I thank the member for the question. The possibilities are endless. In terms of sensors and effectors, fighter aircraft or tankers and so forth, we have needs everywhere. We do the work with the tools we've been given, and we send a list of our requirements to the Canadian and U.S. governments every year.

National Defence committee  Okay. I'll start, and then I'll pass it over to General Prévost. The first unknown for us during the actual intercept phase of the objects was, again, characterization. Where is the object coming from? For the objects, we could not discern or didn't have a visual on any form of registration on the objects.

National Defence committee  If I may, Mr. Chair, I just want to highlight the fact that given the binational nature of the NORAD command, we're going to go for the best toolset that is available at the time but that is also currently available. In these conditions, given the changing environmental conditions and the desire to actually take it down as soon as possible, the asset that was on hand was the F-22.

National Defence committee  Time is always an element, a factor, and the nice thing is that Canada and NORAD don't have only the fighters; they also have the strategic tankers provided by both Canada and the U.S. to actually carry out the missions. In this case, at the Canadian air defence sectors and the Canadian NORAD region, which look at the disposition of fighter assets in the Canadian airspace, made the decision to actually keep the fighters in Cold Lake and to scramble from Cold Lake, which is the main operating base.

National Defence committee  The engagement over Lake Huron on February 12, which took place at around 2:42 p.m., or 14:42, carried out by F-16s with the latest AIM-9X missiles, turned out to require two missiles. Both of the missiles were shot from U.S. airspace, and the first one has been assessed as landing on the U.S. side of the border within Lake Huron.

National Defence committee  Definitely. I mentioned that we do risk assessment as it relates to the objects. In the case of the first event, it was the high-altitude surveillance balloon from the PRC. Then, after that, once a decision is made to actually engage the object, a follow-on risk assessment takes place with regard to the probability of success of that engagement with the different weapons systems we are going to use and also with regard to the probability for potential collateral damage to civilian infrastructure as well as to people on the ground when that object crashes or lands or arrives on the ground.

National Defence committee  I will let Major General Prévost speak to the issue of recovery.

National Defence committee  Thank you, Mr. Chair. Of course, one thing we're interested in right now is categorizing the objects, as I said earlier. We intercepted the objects. We tried to capture some images of these objects, but given their very slow speed compared to the fast speed of the fighters at high altitude, we had very little time to observe them.

National Defence committee  I can definitely amplify here. As I mentioned, our task is to detect, track, identify and characterize, and from there to assess the threat related to any unknown tracks coming across the NORAD airspace and within the NORAD areas of operation. As part of that, our folks on the ground are using sensors—mostly radar sensors—to detect anything that may be on the approaches of North America, as well as leveraging sensors for what may be in the airspace.

National Defence committee  I will turn to General Prévost to answer with respect to the recovery aspect.