Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think that's a question that is probably best posed to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and to our national security colleagues. At the Public Health Agency, we are alert to ensuring that all our international collaborations are approved and vetted, and we have fully implemented the research policy on sensitive technology research, including the national security guidelines for research partnerships with named research organizations.

Canada-China Relations committee  As we saw during the COVID pandemic, there remain significant public health threats in a globalized world. We are currently undertaking work and research looking at H5N1, or avian influenza, measles outbreaks and mpox. We have daily threat assessment and response meetings, assessing all these threats.

Canada-China Relations committee  Yes, I'm happy to speak specifically about some of the policies. For obvious reasons, we won't speak to the details of operational physical security measures. I would point, for example, to the review of all collaboration agreements by a science security committee, in addition to the investigators and the lab management.

Canada-China Relations committee  The Human Pathogens and Toxins Act has very stringent requirements for work that happens with pathogens of different risk groups. There is a list of pathogens according to their safeguards, and the requirements for them. The recently announced budget also includes indications of new legislation being brought forward to enhance the regulations further, given the postpandemic requirements for Canada to have domestic laboratory capabilities, health and life sciences capabilities and biomanufacturing capabilities to provide health security for us against future health threats and future potential pandemics.

Canada-China Relations committee  The work we undertook at the Public Health Agency and through the national microbiology lab in response to COVID-19 is an excellent example of the linkages that are required to combat a novel pathogen. I would like to turn to Dr. Poliquin to give some of the concrete examples of how the work with our colleagues advanced those efforts.

Canada-China Relations committee  I can confirm that, since this collaboration that we've been speaking of today ended, there is no collaboration with the government of China or institutes in China on issues related to that lab or any others. Minister Holland was referring to the fact that we continue to participate in the UN and other multilateral bodies where it's possible that there could be representatives of the government of China present, but there are no bilateral co-operation or collaboration agreements now.

Canada-China Relations committee  I will turn to my colleague, Dr. Poliquin, to talk about the rationale for that transfer. It was related to Dr. Qiu's work, but I'll turn it over to Dr. Poliquin.

Canada-China Relations committee  I base that statement on the very rigorous, multi-key approach that we have to safeguard pathogens and toxins. I'll turn to Dr. Poliquin to talk about the audit process that ensures that we have an accurate accounting constantly of those materials.

Canada-China Relations committee  What I can say is, first of all, I am the deputy head of the Public Health Agency of Canada. I'm not in a position to comment on the participation of scientists across the country. I can comment on the work of the personnel that belong to the Public Health Agency. I can say that they're required to submit declarations of affiliations for research and also conflict of interest.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you, Mr. Chair. As I mentioned, there was extensive international collaboration in responding to the Ebola outbreak that took place in west Africa from ,2014 to 2016. The work of the national microbiology lab and indeed, Dr. Qiu's life's work, was in therapeutics to respond to Ebola.

Canada-China Relations committee  I think that international collaboration on therapeutics for pathogens and toxins continues to be very important to the development of the science. I would say that, obviously, in hindsight, given the activities of these scientists and evidence of those activities, which emerged much later in that timeline, we would obviously look at decisions that were taken around their work sooner.

Canada-China Relations committee  The national microbiology lab is a world-renowned research institution of high reputation. Our partners internationally also face similar threats of foreign interference and are adopting many similar measures. The science of the lab remains well respected. The lab continues to be accredited, for example, by U.S. counterparts to the highest standards of biosafety and biosecurity.

Canada-China Relations committee  The measures that we took were in several different domains. There have been physical security measures and enhancements related to our protocols around shipping, physical security of the lab and access controls. We have more stringent policies in terms of the use of students at the lab.

Canada-China Relations committee  The current security screening process for security clearances at the secret level requires review every 10 years unless incidents arise that require a “review for cause” of that clearance, as was the case in this situation.

Canada-China Relations committee  I'm sorry. I don't have that information at hand.