Canada-China Relations committee  I'm going to turn to my colleague. At the time, the circumstances were still under investigation. I would say that until the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was able to provide evidence that pointed to their willing collaboration, which was undeclared, which would have been in June 2020, there was not evidence of their affiliations with external actors.

Canada-China Relations committee  I'll maybe turn to our chief security officer to respond to that question.

Canada-China Relations committee  In this case, there was intellectual property at play. This was the patent that was initially identified at the time. As evidenced in the documents, there were different discussions about whether the intellectual property in question was indeed proprietary or would have been more broadly available.

Canada-China Relations committee  At the time of these events, my understanding is that quarterly briefings were taking place with different research institutions, of which the national microbiology lab was one. I would say that in the intervening years, our relationship has become even closer. The expanded activities of the agency in response to the global pandemic, the importance of the intellectual property and the science related to our vaccines, and indeed many areas of health research require very close collaboration, which has been reflected in the recently launched ISED research security partnership policy.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think the most important activities that have taken place are awareness, employee communications and engagement. Indeed, it was an awareness briefing that raised the risk of these particular cases. There's the mandatory training and the emphasis on security responsibilities for all of our staff, no matter where they work and at what level, in addition to the physical and, of course, cybersecurity posture that has been enhanced.

Canada-China Relations committee  I would say that we have quite strict security procedures and processes in place. In this particular situation, we were dealing with two employees—Canadian scientists, eminent in their field—who took measures to hide their affiliations and aspects of their work. It was through awareness and training that the Public Health Agency and the lab personnel at the time identified a potential source of concern and then launched a series of investigations.

Canada-China Relations committee  I would say we've significantly enhanced our policies, because we are always looking for ways to detect and respond to such cases as early as possible, as well as to keep pace with evolving threats. In this case, employees were taking active steps to hide their activities and, indeed, made false declarations to the officials throughout their investigation.

Canada-China Relations committee  Yes, Mr. Chair. In this case, these were indeed Canadian citizens and eminent scientists. However, the investigation shows—and our Canadian Security Intelligence Service colleagues brought forward evidence on this—that they were working on undeclared collaborations with the institute in China.

Canada-China Relations committee  The investigations brought forward, including the reports that were tabled in Parliament from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, showed they were engaged in discussions with the thousand talents program in China and other talent programs that were incompatible with their status at the lab, and that they lied to cover these activities.

Canada-China Relations committee  Again, I think the documents speak for themselves in terms of the activities they outlined that the scientists engaged in that were undeclared.

Canada-China Relations committee  In this case, Mr. Chair, we pursued a number of different avenues in parallel. Initially, it was the security branch of the health portfolio that conducted some initial fact-finding, for example, uncovering the patent in September 2018 that launched the subsequent investigations.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you, Mr. Chair. There are five main areas of program improvements to security that we made at the lab. First, around physical security, we have tightened physical security screening measures. We've installed a modernized access control system; we've enhanced radio surveillance and monitoring, and we have strict protocols for delivery and shipping.

Canada-China Relations committee  In response to any incidents, including the ones identified in this case, we work with national security, law enforcement and public safety personnel, as well as with our chief security officer in the branch, to identify improvements to protocols and procedures that will help prevent or provide early warning for any such instances in the future.

Canada-China Relations committee  We've implemented mandatory training to raise awareness and provide guidance on the security responsibilities and accountabilities of all staff and security personnel at all levels. We've enhanced our onboarding and departure procedures. We have clear and regular communication in writing and through town halls and other measures in terms of security and conflicts of interest, and regular updates to those processes.

Canada-China Relations committee  International collaboration in this field is key to success. There is a limited set of international counterparts that work in this field and that have labs at the level that Canada does. We are in constant contact with them, as are our national security and law enforcement personnel, to compare our security posture, to share enhancements and to ensure that we are keeping pace with the evolving nature of the global situation.