Canada-China Relations committee  I think we have some pretty effective models from both Australia and the United Kingdom on how we can effectively operationalize a foreign registry act. I'm not sure why it takes us years of consultations. Yes, we need to make it commensurable with the charter, unlike the U.K. and Australia, but I don't think this is all that difficult to do.

Canada-China Relations committee  I'll be very quick. I think what we have is a culmination of 35 years of efforts by China. We also now have a critical mass of elite capture in this country as a result, which China is capitalizing on. I would say in response that to date, I cannot share my colleague's optimism with regard to the RCMP.

Canada-China Relations committee  Yes, I am a bit worried about the fact that in the discussion we are having, we are still looking in a very isolated way at the various efforts to interfere and to violate Canadian sovereignty. We are focusing on certain points, such as police stations, or certain episodes of interference targeting a few candidates, instead of seeing the full scope of the actions carried out.

Canada-China Relations committee  China invests a considerable amount in interfering in democratic institutions. It is done on a scale that aims at acquiring influence at all levels of politics. It also invests in politicians who will then be better known and be able to run in other elections. This strategy is well documented in connection with China's efforts.

Canada-China Relations committee  I don't doubt it, because one of the main objectives of foreign diplomats is to gather open sources, and our discussions this evening are open. China has the second largest diplomatic corps in Canada, after the United States, so there is certainly a Chinese diplomat taking good notes right now.

Canada-China Relations committee  The simple answer is yes. There are some terrific people who have written about the extent to which the CCP systematically instrumentalizes racism, in particular to thwart policy action against it, such as foreign agent registries.

Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you for inviting me to participate in this study, Mr. Chair. I will be speaking in English, but please do not hesitate to ask your questions in the official language of your choice. Beijing's espionage and interference is now the single greatest threat to Canada's democratic way of life.

National Defence committee  We are at risk of the fallacy of composition, because currently the whole is not greater than the sum of the parts. The problem for Canada is that being able to harness and leverage that ability to co-operate with allies and to work together to establish those norms means that Canada also has to bring considerable capabilities to the table, because why would people say, “Sure, Canada, you should have a part in drawing the red lines and helping us to determine what those lines are”, when in return we're not willing to deploy the capabilities that we have or we don't actually have the capabilities or commitment to enforce those red lines?

National Defence committee  Mr. Bezan, that's a very good question. I think the fundamental challenge we face is that we have focused on playing defence, and as long as you play defence, by definition, you will never be able to score. That is to say, you cannot win the game. At the very best, you can play to a draw.

National Defence committee  Sure, resilience on the part of critical infrastructure and private sector actors is key. However, when—not if—they get overwhelmed.... The incidents will come where, for instance, the financial system of one of our banks might find itself overwhelmed by an attack. What mechanisms do we have in place so the bank can call the CSE to tell the CSE that it is overwhelmed and that the CSE needs to do something about either disabling that particular attack or perhaps entirely sabotaging the capabilities that are enabling this type of attack in order to safeguard the financial system?

National Defence committee  You impose that, on the one hand, by drawing very clear red lines, and on the other hand by demonstrating that we are prepared to use the capabilities we have to enforce against malicious behaviour. Traditionally, middle powers such as Canada have done so in concert with allies and with partners.

National Defence committee  If you think, for instance, about the NATO intelligence mechanism that is currently stood up among a host of allies and partners, that could also be used as a coordinating mechanism on active and offensive cyber-measures, but currently we don't have an effective mechanism to coordinate on active and offensive cyber-measures outside of the Five Eyes intelligence community.

National Defence committee  I would say Russia is not to be underestimated, because there isn't much of a private sector for the many highly technically skilled individuals in this domain that Russia produces. They are disproportionately drawn toward malicious state-tolerated actors, as well as intelligence, military agencies and the like.

National Defence committee  We need to build links with the private sector and different stakeholders around the world, who may not be in a country per se. The field of cybersecurity is very widely distributed geographically, and establishing direct contacts requires effort. The purpose of embassies and ambassadors is to provide the government with open information.

National Defence committee  That is warranted activity that is being discussed, so it still requires an authorization through the rule of law. There are also safeguards in place with regard to how that information is subsequently used. People will have different views on whether those authorizations and the laws in place are acceptable to them or not, and whether the oversight, review, accountability and governance mechanisms are sufficient.