National Defence committee  This is what happens when you don't have a strategy, especially not a forward-looking strategy. In 2017, people like me argued that “Strong, Secure, Engaged” was already outdated the day it was released. I think this was a premonition that has proven to be true. What we need is a bipartisan 15-year strategy to rebuild our national defence, security and, arguably, our intelligence capabilities.

National Defence committee  Procurement is a problem. The greater challenge is people. People are the most important asset the government has, especially in this domain. It takes a very long time to build these skill sets. They are in very high demand, and they regularly get raided by the private sector. I think the committee would do well to think long and hard about what government can do to ensure it maintains capabilities and the people my colleagues at RMC and I, for instance, spend many years building up with very exceptional skill sets.

National Defence committee  The capabilities we have are very good, but they are very limited, because of personnel challenges, structural network equipment and procurement challenges, as well as challenges in updating policy and regulation. As you can imagine, a national defence organization that is struggling with the shortfalls it has doesn't have the time to update policy and regulation.

National Defence committee  I would say that if you look at open-source reporting by Microsoft, Russia has actually been more effective at deploying cyber-capabilities than it has been given credit for, and at integrating those capabilities with kinetic offensive measures on the battlefield. What Russia has learned in Ukraine is that you cannot achieve political objectives on the battlefield through cyberspace.

National Defence committee  Facebook is a great example, Ms. Mathyssen. Look at the joint investigation by the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia and the federal Privacy Commissioner. The problem is that there are currently very limited tools for the federal government to enforce measures against companies that do not follow Canadian rules.

National Defence committee  I suppose there's always a concern about state intervention in this domain, particularly when it comes to content. There's probably an opportunity to lay out clearer swim lanes and provide more transparency for the private sector, and perhaps—as I've proposed in the past—for government to lay out voluntary certification measures by which companies behave.

National Defence committee  I have had the pleasure of having some interactions with the Quebec team, and I find the province's efforts in these areas very interesting. The federal government could learn a number of things from Quebec. The federal government certainly has more capacity than any province. I think there could be a lot more intergovernmental collaboration, as there is in Australia, where the Australian Signals Directorate, the equivalent of the Communications Security Establishment in Canada, or CSE, has offices in each of the Australian states.

National Defence committee  Ms. Mathyssen, I wrote a book on this called Intelligence as Democratic Statecraft. It's a great question. There are considerable differences here. I had for years warned Canadians, when they were very concerned about surveillance by the Canadian state, that they might want to be more concerned about surveillance by private sector companies than the Canadian state.

National Defence committee  That's an excellent question, madam, because it has to do with the political culture and the strategic culture of each of these countries. For example, Iran primarily has strategic purposes in the Middle East region. Iran is not primarily targeting Canada, the United States or European allies.

National Defence committee  There is always co‑operation for tactical reasons, i.e., to challenge the international political order, which Russia and China believe does not serve their interests. Authoritarian regimes do not trust each other that much. That's why I'm not too worried about this long-term collaboration, especially on the Chinese side, because they have the capacity to act on their own and further their own nefarious interests.

National Defence committee  Ms. Normandin, it's not a risk, it's a reality. That's what's happening. Today, Canada lacks the capacity in several areas to be taken seriously by the other G5 partners, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. As a result, Canada is excluded from certain collaborative measures in the kinetic field and in the area of cybersecurity.

National Defence committee  It's not about strengthening the bill. It's about making sure that we use effectively the capabilities we have. The U.S. has vast capabilities that it uses on a regular basis, in part to prevent a change in the international balance of power. That is not primarily Canada's objective, although Canada's objective is inherently to uphold the status quo.

National Defence committee  It is a fantastic question, and it hits the nail on the head. The problem with current political decision-making processes—not with respect to any particular government in this country—for years has been that we dither too long in making key decisions where we need to provide political authority, authorization and direction.

National Defence committee  That is a very good question, Mrs. Gallant, because you can imagine that a hostile [Technical difficulty—Editor] social credit system for its 1.4 billion people would have the capabilities of building out that system for the rest of the global population. If I were a betting man, I would be saying that this particular country has already built out a fairly sophisticated profile on you, as well as your digital communications and your own data.

National Defence committee  It's a great question. We've tried for 20 years to build norms and consensus around this, and we've made very little progress within the UN and within other bodies. What you need to understand is that there are people who believe in the liberal rules-based international order—that's about 57 countries—there are countries that are agnostic, and then there's a subset of countries that simply do not believe in that order, so we will never get an international cyber-governance regime, at least not in the foreseeable future, but we can force hostile actors [Technical difficulty—Editor].