Foreign Affairs committee  Thank you very much, Madam McDonough, for the compliment at the beginning. I have written a bit on international--

Foreign Affairs committee  --humanitarian law and human rights law. I have not written about the arrangement, so I may have just misunderstood the way you phrased the question. This is a very complex environment, and there is much that you've put forward that I want to clarify in terms of the issue of p

Foreign Affairs committee  Sir, there were two parts to your question that struck me. One is the question of the human rights reports. I'd like to note that ISAF consists of 37 nations, 30,000 personnel, and the ISAF policy is to hand over to the Afghan society. So clearly there are challenges in the human

National Defence committee  Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Good afternoon. Bonjour. I would like to start by thanking you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. As judge advocate general, I have the statutory responsibility for the superintendence of the administra

National Defence committee  I'd be happy to do that, and thank you for the opportunity to clarify that issue. I'm taking reference in the decision to four and a half years to refer to the 2003 Chief Justice Lamer independent review that was statutorily required from Bill C-25 in 1999. First, I think it is

National Defence committee  The military justice system does exist under a system of review. In Bill C-25, obviously there was a requirement for a review every five years, and that resulted in the recommendations by Chief Justice Lamer. I also review annually the military justice system and report to the mi

National Defence committee  —that's not unique or problematic overall, depending upon how—

National Defence committee  Well, of course I can't comment on the appeal and what the courts might ultimately say.

National Defence committee  The amendments are not intended to be a temporary measure, I guess is the way to put it. And of course, what we're confronted with is that the Court Martial Appeal Court in Trépanier clearly said that the constitutional provisions were of no force and effect. From a policy pe

National Defence committee  The issues were raised primarily to the question of full answer and defence by an accused person. The military justice system is constitutionally recognized in paragraph 11(f) of the charter. That provision sets out the right to a jury trial in the civilian justice system, set to

National Defence committee  I'm answering a hypothetical; that's one of the problems. On a matter that's put before the Supreme Court, they can look at the existing legislation as well as the previous legislation. But that's for the court, and people argue it before the court in terms of how that—

National Defence committee  On my concern, as superintendent of the military justice system, over the sunset clause, the exact intention of this bill is to allow the system to function with clarity, certainty, and stability. The problem proposed by a sunset clause is that it could put us back in the same si

National Defence committee  Certainly the bill is set out to provide the required stability to make the system work. Any legislation that's passed would be subject to challenge at court martial. It happens every day in our courts martial. Our defence counsel will raise objections if they see them, put them

National Defence committee  What I deal with is obviously effects of decisions. In particular, it's clear that the judgment said that the provision that allows the convening of courts was of no force and effect, so it struck down that section. The problem it has created is that there's no other section or l

National Defence committee  I'm looking for certainty. My concern with all this is that there's no clear legal authority for DMP, the director of military prosecutions, to offer the choice. My concern is that what we're setting up has a lack of consistency, a lack of clarity. Our courts are struggling with