Public Safety committee  Further changes.

Public Safety committee  Yes, subject to my concern about personal information that might be swept into the ministerial authorization or not swept into the ministerial authorization.

Public Safety committee  Absent a specific suggestion in this bill, I don't know that I would single anything out as better embedded in regulation. Professor Wark and Professor Carvin this morning both mentioned that the concept of dataset is broadly clothed. If we were to define it rigidly in the act, t

Public Safety committee  In response to your question, yes, I would prefer to see it in legislation.

Public Safety committee  It's for the reasons you've described. For one thing, it is embedded and more difficult to change. For another, in the past, ministerial directives were not always transparent. We know about only the 2009 and 2011 ministerial directives through the use of access to information. A

Public Safety committee  Essentially proposed subsection 24(4) constitutes that, for greater certainty, it is possible legally for the CSE to acquire information incidentally in the course of its properly authorized foreign intelligence and cybersecurity conduct. That incidentally acquired information wo

Public Safety committee  The classes of Canadian datasets have to be approved by both the minister and the intelligence commissioner. Then, if the service chooses to retain individual datasets, that retention is subject to court approval, and the court could impose conditions on queries and exploitation.

Public Safety committee  The amendments I'm proposing would affect the foreign intelligence authorizations and the cybersecurity authorizations that are alluded to in proposed section 23, to ensure that in those two contexts information that triggers a constitutional interest is steered through the autho

Public Safety committee  My preference is to steer every new change through the intelligence commissioner process. The issue here is that these authorizations are broadly textured. At present, for example, for foreign intelligence I understand there are three ministerial authorizations and one cybersecur

Public Safety committee  There are two sorts of false positives. There's the false positive that stems from when the person has the same name as someone who's on the list, and that's the discussion we've been having as of late. That's where a redress system—“I'm not really that person”—is effective. Ther

Public Safety committee  My single concern really relates to the circumstances in which the director of CSIS can authorize a query of a dataset that hasn't gone through the regular retention process involving the Federal Court, for instance. There's no indication in the statute as to what the service can

Public Safety committee  Off the top of my head I would just make it clear that the results of queries done in exigent circumstances under proposed section 11.22 should be tied into the rules on retention that you find in proposed section 11.21. Obviously, that's going to require some tinkering.

Public Safety committee  I wasn't party to the drafting of Bill C-51 so I can't comment on the circumstances that drove its manner of drafting. Certainly, Bill C-51 opened the door to the service doing threat reduction of any sort, which before was a disputed issue. We know from what the director has sai

Public Safety committee  Sure, absolutely, although I fear the translator may be driven mad by the effort to turn my microprint into French.

Public Safety committee  My response would be that, certainly from my perspective, Kent Roach and I did not dispute the policy objectives that Bill C-51 was trying to accomplish, with one exception, and that is the new speech crime. We thought it was unnecessary. If one were to repeal those provisions th