Public Safety committee  It's always specific to our mandate, which is the Privacy Act. The Privacy Act—

Public Safety committee  Unfortunately, the question is somewhat misleading. Do we need to access the private communications in order to protect the networks? Is that what you're insinuating?

Public Safety committee  If I can come at it this way, the national security and intelligence review agency is going to be reviewing us to make sure that we're compliant with the law. It's going to look at all of our activities. If we happen to collect this information, it's going to ask, “Why did you c

Public Safety committee  Yes, information on the GII, the global information infrastructure, would include all sorts of things. However, our mandate is very specific that we cannot collect information about Canadians under foreign intelligence.

Public Safety committee  In that particular example, CSIS would be interested in you as a Canadian. They have a legal mandate to do that. They could leverage us under our assistance mandate. We always talk about part (a) as foreign signals intelligence, part (b) as cybersecurity, and part (c) as our assi

Public Safety committee  Yes.

Public Safety committee  Without going into too much detail, I would say that the example you give would be within the mandate of CSIS. If that partner has information about a Canadian, we then work in partnership with CSIS. We would look to CSIS and say, “There's information possibly about a Canadian.

Public Safety committee  Thank you for the question. I'll stay in English and try to answer by looking at this from the angle of foreign signals intelligence. When we collect information, you're quite right that given the nature of how communications work, we may come across information related to a C

Public Safety committee  Perhaps I could just jump in there and answer very quickly, Mr. Dubé, on the essence of why we need this information. As you can appreciate, the global information infrastructure of the Internet is incredibly complex. We are prohibited from targeting Canadians when we're conduc

National Defence committee  In terms of the $2.9 million specifically related to these estimates, they're mainly focused more on intelligence capabilities, collection of intelligence to be able to support our troops in theatre. That intelligence contributes to security against cyber-threats, but more specif

Information & Ethics committee  Yes, I'd echo that. Timeliness can be important. Certainly having a framework that is understood and that provides a better understanding of how information can flow can only improve timeliness. That can only improve the process of information sharing over time.

Information & Ethics committee  I'll jump in and say that I can only use our example and our mandate. From a necessity versus a relevance perspective, in my case, if you're sharing information with me, it can't be directed at a Canadian. It has to be directed at a non-Canadian outside of Canada, number one. It

Information & Ethics committee  In our case, in terms of receiving information, it's very clear how it can be done mechanically. We have a 24/7 operations centre that at any given time would receive information coming in. Then there's a strict protocol in place under which it would reach out to disclosure offic

Information & Ethics committee  Independent review by someone who would receive information that—

Information & Ethics committee  In our case, we have an independent commissioner who could review it.