Public Safety committee  I see what you're getting at. I guess there are two things to talk about here. One is that we test things within the labs as well. It's not like we're going on to Canada's networks and stress testing networks in a way that's going to interfere with something. The other thing tha

Public Safety committee  If I may also add, this is not a back door through which information flows to other folks outside our mandate. Everything we do here still has to be bound within our foreign intelligence and cybersecurity mandate, and the furtherance of that mandate.

Public Safety committee  Yes. I could expand on that, but essentially that would be a challenge.

Public Safety committee  In that hypothetical situation, yes, that would be my reading of it.

Public Safety committee  I guess an example of where this would be used would be testing things that are going to be deployed in government systems to make sure, from a supply chain perspective, that there aren't back doors or the like built into them. Should somebody build in those back doors and we ask

Public Safety committee  This reflects what we do now, and these kinds of activities we've reviewed for the last 21 years. The infrastructure information definition, or the way it's bounded, is to make it clear this does not include information that's linked to an identifiable Canadian. The concern about

Public Safety committee  We operate this way already, that the ministerial authorization in terms of.... Again, I think I made the comment when I was here a few weeks back that this would make explicit implicitly how we would operate under ministerial authorization. When there is that specific state acti

Public Safety committee  I would say that this came up during committee consideration in terms of looking at what Mr. Forcese and others had recommended around making explicit what that implicit trigger is. We would already operate this way, so it's not inconsistent, in terms of it being put forward, wit

Public Safety committee  If he or she is located in Canada, we would not be directing our activities at that person.

Public Safety committee  These are serious authorities who require serious accountabilities, oversight, and review. The intent behind including the Minister of Foreign Affairs is the fact that there are international policy and international law implications to these kinds of activities that need to be c

Public Safety committee  Right now in terms of our intelligence collection activities, we can only collect in accordance with government cabinet-approved intelligence priorities. That involves cabinet and obviously the Minister of Foreign Affairs as part of those discussions and considers those implicati

Public Safety committee  The CSE act does not allow for a warrant to infringe on the charter.

Public Safety committee  In terms of the CSE act, we don't operate under warrant, and we don't have a warrant authority to infringe upon the charter. Again, I think the CSIS Act element speaks to that part of their regime and, I would say, that unique charter quantum as it relates to them as a domestic

Public Safety committee  I would say that, within the CSE ministerial authorization construct, we cannot direct our activities at Canadians, which is a big difference here, so that element of not infringing.... We don't have something proposed in the CSE act that would allow us to infringe upon a right.

Public Safety committee  Yes, absolutely. The section with CSIS is subsumed within the court warrants that they do get there. We have a different mandate than they have. We all have to adhere to the charter, and we have things in this legislation, in the CSE act, that reflect our mandate. The charter st