Transport committee  We spoke about the JOEB process. That's where we have line pilots taking the training and evaluating it. Their results are telling us whether the training is adequate enough. What we haven't spoken about is that we also have a great number of pilots in our own program. We have p

Transport committee  I will say that we now have a much greater understanding of some of the key concerns with this aircraft. At the time we validated this aircraft, at the time that JOEB process was completed, we looked at our process, and we validated that aircraft. There was no particular pressure

Transport committee  Désolé, I can't say with any confidence that this would have prevented that Ethiopian accident. First, the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 investigative report has not been released yet, so we still have things to learn with regard to this accident. We still have more to garner fro

Transport committee  To prevent or reduce?

Transport committee  That measure reduced the reaction time of Canadian aircrews in recognizing a runaway trim stabilizer condition. It allowed the groundwork to reduce that reaction time. Thankfully, between the Lion Air accident and the Ethiopian Airlines accident, we didn't have any of those event

Transport committee  I would say no. I would not say that this could have absolutely prevented one. What we were doing was addressing a safety risk that we saw and identifying a way that we believed could reduce the reaction time of air crew and could help them address that situation. I don't think

Transport committee  Yes. The joint operational evaluation board will review the minimum training requirements for flight crews. As part of that, and to ensure that we truly do have a strong representation of Canadian aircrews who will be flying those aircraft, we are working with the three Canadian

Transport committee  Thank you for the question. Following the Lion Air crash that took place on October 29, 2018, we were examining that accident with the state of design, the FAA. The FAA issued their measure on November 7. They issued an AD, an airworthiness directive, which was adopted by Canada

Transport committee  When we implemented those measures, as part of common practice, we informed the FAA that our operators were making these additional changes. It wasn't a request; it was information that we were moving forward on that. We received word back from the FAA later on that they acknowle

Transport committee  We did sign that agreement, as you mentioned, on November 19. That doesn't preclude—and I have to stress this—the independence of our decision-making. Where we identify a risk, where we are uncertain of the certification process that the state of design, whether it be the FAA, EA

Transport committee  It is a bit difficult for me to answer that question in my second language. Allow me to respond in English. The validation process is fully independent of what the state of design does with regard to their certification, and it allows us for a continuum of involvement. We can c

Transport committee  Yes, we have that latitude.

Transport committee  Mr. Chair, on the first question about how usual is something like this catastrophic failure, it's not usual at all. This is an exceptional case. We've been looking at this aircraft and examining a possible safe return to service of this aircraft for almost a year now. We continu

Transport committee  Typically, the state of design will look at the event that happened with an aircraft and propose a mitigation measure based on their risk analysis and what they see needs to be done to mitigate that risk. The FAA proposed a mitigation measure through an AD, an airworthiness dir

Transport committee  Following the Ethiopian Airlines crash on the Sunday, as part of our continuing airworthiness process, we immediately began to collect information on what led to the crash. What were the conditions when the flight was happening? What happened to the flight? How far in their fligh