Public Safety committee  I think there are many factors. As I alluded to earlier, Interac has a very strong governance and operating regulations structure that is layered. It's not just about the security of a closed-loop network. It's about the participant's level of security, the issuers and acquirers,

Public Safety committee  We do vulnerability scan controls and have intensive security scans. We use only Canadian networks, Canadian telecom providers, and have Canadian data centres in multiple provinces. We run our transactions only through our Canadian data centres, so I don't anticipate that.

Public Safety committee  While I am not privy to the comment, the “innocent” comment seems to be directed more at general public knowledge.

Public Safety committee  Our resiliency in Canada, particularly with the financial institutions, is quite strong on a global scale. To your question about Canadian consumers, I would agree. I think public education is immensely important. Certainly this time of year, with the level of CRA scams that co

Public Safety committee  It's a great question. SWIFT is a global organization that has started early days in that. I would absolutely suggest that Interac would be an appropriate place as well. We currently run our operating regulations and minimum standards, whether they're security standards or partic

Public Safety committee  I can answer only for Interac, but I can firmly say that we are not. We are not prepared to allow data outside of our Canadian constitution and Canadian roots. Our incorporation—we became a corporation about a year ago—is quite strongly grounded in Canada. All of our data is to r

Public Safety committee  All our infrastructure and data are resident in Canada and owned and operated by Interac. To your question about a foreign entity as a hacker, our experience is that most hackers are foreign entities. We haven't seen a lot of domestic Canadian hackers.

Public Safety committee  That's a very good question. We have almost eradicated fraud in Canada on the debit card with chip and PIN. It's a very effective technology and secondary control, and only the person knows the PIN. The EMV technology on the card has been very effective to date. We do have risk

Public Safety committee  It's much less of an issue with the chip and PIN. Skimming devices still exist, though they have to have cameras to try to capture the PIN, but it's not a very elegant fraudulent solution because your hand could be in the way. So the risk is really negligible in Canada. The skimm

Public Safety committee  To add from my many years in banking, the technology has come a long way and the cheque imaging is quite good now. Of course, consumers are encouraged to destroy the cheque afterwards. However, duplicate cheque detection has come a long way as well. If you ever try to deposit it

Public Safety committee  I know one.

Public Safety committee  I do, yes.

Public Safety committee  I've been looking at the model. It's actually quite good. SWIFT has adopted a model wherein they publish the security standings of all their counterparties, as they call them, not from a creditor's standpoint but just as a counterparty to the system. It's a good model that we qui

Public Safety committee  Sure. I'm happy to crystal-ball some great ideas in that space. We would absolutely love.... The cybercrime unit, particularly in government and the RCMP, as well as law enforcement, will regularly monitor some of the online or dark web or deep web marketplaces. Those marketplace

Public Safety committee  Not always. I won't outline all of the behavioural models, but I will say—noting that 99.9% of transactions flow through, and that's just indicative of our volume—that when a transaction actually gets blocked, it is a known fraudulent transaction. There are certain vectors and in