Industry committee  I can respond quickly, with your permission.

Industry committee  Without commenting specifically on the STIR/SHAKEN standards, I can tell you that this issue was observed when EMV smart card technology was introduced in Canada. In the months following the implementation of the technology and once the critical mass had been reached, we saw frau

Industry committee  Yes. In all cases of fraud, the fraudsters go where the laws are the easiest to circumvent and where there are fewer regulations. If the standard isn't implemented here and is implemented south of the border, the fraudsters will come to Canada.

Industry committee  As I said earlier, it's essential to take action with regard to the STIR/SHAKEN standards. In terms of information security and consumer protection, Canada lags behind Europe and some of the American states. It's becoming urgent to act. If we don't act, we'll become the target of

Industry committee  That's a very broad question. It would require probably its own two-hour session. We could use direct by mail—why not?—but fraudsters have been observed intercepting mail sent to customers. If they really want to target someone, they will intercept the mail. I think it brings u

Industry committee  Thank you for the question. Ultimately, I think that education is a good thing. People need to learn about the risks that they face when they're online and when they answer calls. In my opinion, the legislation is inadequate. However, the legislation does partly touch on the pro

Industry committee  Yes, absolutely. That's the biggest limitation. This technology will apply only to calls from Canada and possibly the United States. All participating countries will benefit. However, not everything that comes from outside will be covered. However, when we know that a call doesn

Industry committee  Thank you for the question. Perhaps we could look at two tools in the short term. The goal is to provide tools to companies that face these risks. Now that the fraudsters have access to the information, how can we equip banks and telecommunications companies with tools to preven

Industry committee  I don't know if it's the only one, but it's a useful one, for sure. I don't think we can afford not to have this additional layer of security and validation. We do not want to let fraudsters have that tool in their tool box when we can—not without difficulty—technically deploy

Industry committee  Unfortunately, the issue with the STIR/SHAKEN standards is that the carriers don't believe that this deadline will be met. If I'm not mistaken, representatives of Rogers, Bell and Telus appeared before a House committee to request an extension of the deadline. I think that it's n

Industry committee  Thank you for the question. I think that the issue isn't so much the misalignment but the lack of any perceived real risk of a fee or a penalty. Fees are charged for the failure to disclose a leak of important information. However, there must also be a perceived real risk of a p

Industry committee  The primary benefit of accountability is that it gives the government a clear picture of the situation. This makes it possible to determine the exact number of victims and to guide the steps needed to strengthen security measures in banks and telecommunications companies. This c

Industry committee  Thank you, Mr. Lemire. To start, I'll provide some clarity around the 600%. It refers to the increase in the number of attacks involving COVID-19 during this very specific period of time, not necessarily to the increase tied to economic factors. Naturally, during times of econom

Industry committee  Members of the committee, good afternoon and thank you for having me today. My name is Simon Marchand, and I am the chief fraud prevention officer at Nuance Communications Canada. Nuance is an American company with a strong presence in Montreal. It develops technologies that rel