Health committee  Mr. Chair, thank you for the question. As I stated earlier, and I'm happy to restate the answer, there are a number of different products that come out of the GPHIN program, one of them being the GPHIN daily report. What I had stated is that the GHPIN daily report did identify the cases of mysterious pneumonia later identified as COVID-19, and that early signal to senior management galvanized the system immediately and this—

Health committee  By December 31, the significance of the event was clear in the public health surveillance community and partners internationally were already aware of the signal. There were other event-based surveillance systems that had issued similar to the GPHIN daily report on that same day, and the external independent panel had identified that there would have been no opportunity for the GPHIN to identify this signal earlier than it had.

Health committee  Mr. Chair, what I think has been important in the COVID-19 response, where we've seen a fierce, globally competitive market, is the benefits of having domestic supplies available to the jurisdictions. In a number of areas, we are now well situated, for example, with N95 respirators, with domestic manufacturing in Canada.

Health committee  Mr. Chair, I'm unable to answer that question, with respect. We would follow the appropriate procurement policies. If there is a more detailed response required, then I would have to defer to my colleagues at PSPC. Thank you.

Health committee  Thank you. Mr. Chair, I'm unable to answer that question as it's posed, but what I can say is that domestic manufacturing capacity is—

Health committee  Mr. Chair, the member has raised an important issue with respect to the life-cycle management of products through the national emergency strategic stockpile. Certainly, our first line of deployment is to the provinces and territories for use within their health care systems, but where we see that stocks may expire before we're able to deploy them, we would follow the policies that are laid out by the Treasury Board in terms of appropriate divestment and deployment.

Health committee  We have been actively engaged with the provinces and territories, as well as indigenous and municipal governments. During the COVID-19 federal response, we put in place a single window at the Public Health Agency [Technical difficulty—Editor] to reach out to us for the surge supports that would be available to them.

Health committee  The epidemiology of the COVID-19 virus is what will determine when we move to an endemic state.

Health committee  If you'd like to hear about it with respect to our border measures, I could ask my colleague Ms. Diogo to speak to that. In terms of—

Health committee  As I said, the virus and the epidemiology in Canada will dictate when we have reached an endemic state. When we have some—

Health committee  I'll turn to my colleague, Ms. Diogo, if there is additional detail with respect to the public health measures associated with the border that she is in a position to share.

Health committee  We thank the Office of the Auditor General for flagging this important recommendation so early on in the pandemic. We did rapid point in time assessments from January to March 2020, which identified the impact of the virus as low. Our risk assessments were based on the WHO's rapid risk assessment guidance.

Health committee  With respect, I believe my colleague has already responded to the question to the best of our ability to answer it. Thank you.

Health committee  With respect to the vaccination program, as I've stated, the officials who led the vaccine rollout are not here at the Standing Committee of Health today. We'd be pleased to speak to the data with regard to the success of the vaccination effort, including, most recently, through the omicron aspect of the outbreak and the impacts on hospitalization and ICU utilization.

Health committee  I'll start the answer and if my colleague has additional points to add, I'll turn to him. We've not yet reached an endemic state in Canada—