National Defence committee  I don't think there's a difference in protocol. It's just that when the first high-altitude surveillance balloon crossed into Montana, its proximity to some sensitive American systems probably escalated the decision to make that fact public at that point. You need to realize tha

National Defence committee  Good question. I'll let General Prévost— I'm focused on the North American airspace. General Prévost, do you want to elaborate on that?

National Defence committee  It's not that NORAD is surprised, because we monitor the evolution of systems that could potentially pose a threat or could be of concern to both governments and military operatives, but in this case, it is once these systems approach North America that we start the standard proc

National Defence committee  Thank you for the question. Obviously, NORAD is always in a state of vigilance. Our motto is “We have the watch”. We're watching 24 hours a day, seven days a week, all year long. Intercepting Russian strategic aircraft is a common occurrence at NORAD. We regularly see these inc

National Defence committee  I'll start, and General Prévost may want to add something with regard to our CFINTCOM capability. I can tell you that we're fortunate that Canada is part of the consortium of Five Eyes countries that contribute to the intelligence community. Here at NORAD I get briefed on a regu

National Defence committee  We assessed, based on the analysis of the image captured during the flight of the high-altitude surveillance balloon, that the balloon might have a capability or limited capability to be steered around the airspace, but we also assessed that the majority of the flight path was ba

National Defence committee  I couldn't agree more with the member's statement. I've been in the air force, and I've lived through NORAD since pretty much when I started flying the CF-18 during my career. During NORAD's 65 years of activity, it has always been seen as an ecosystem of capabilities, where the

National Defence committee  Thanks, Mr. Chair, for the question and the request. Unfortunately, that list is classified. We'll work with command to potentially provide a declassified version of the list for the committee.

National Defence committee  Obviously, we detect objects by using the sensors we have. As you pointed out, those lifted off from the PRC at different times using different wind models to carry them. What we've seen is that those balloons and objects tend to follow wind patterns at altitude, and those change

National Defence committee  Thanks for the question. Again, my view is that it is one of multiple sensors that could be used. It is one they may have felt was not going be detected and one that may be a bit more difficult to attribute, as well, in terms of launch locations, capabilities and intent. That ma

National Defence committee  Thanks, Mr. Chair. I missed the description of the list. I apologize.

National Defence committee  The object was detected in early morning, but early morning in Yukon and Alaska is late morning for folks in the lower 48 just because of a later sunrise. Given the size of the object, it needed to be intercepted during daytime in order to be able to identify and characterize the

National Defence committee  Darkness is maybe a challenge, depending on the speed, size and characteristics of the object. The sensors on board the different aircraft may have an ability to actually characterize, but that ability is dependent on a number of factors, including infrared signatures and electro

National Defence committee  Thanks for the question—

National Defence committee  Okay, good. An assessment was made using a number of systems that are within NORAD and within the commander's ability to use. Those systems, after a quick analysis of the potential payload that was underneath the structure, led the commander to his conclusion.