Subcommittee on International Human Rights committee  First is raising the cost on those who are supplying weapons to the belligerents. As I mentioned, in many respects, this is a conventional conflict. It's causing huge devastation to the civilian population and to infrastructure. It's well known who is supplying the weapons, but there has been little cost imposed on these actors.

Subcommittee on International Human Rights committee  The legal determination I will leave to others. What I will say is that it is well documented that there has been ethnic cleansing of various ethnic groups on a significant level in Darfur. Some of the same groups were targeted in prior genocides. The killings are happening and the risk of genocide is significant.

Subcommittee on International Human Rights committee  Some of the most significant work being done on the ground in Sudan is being done by Sudanese organizations, emergency rooms and resistance committees, and there is a need for direct support. This has been articulated by USAID administrator Samantha Power and others, who realize and acknowledge that the international community needs to figure out creative ways to get direct funding and support to organizations on the ground that are providing medical and other services at the grassroots, neighbourhood and community levels.

Subcommittee on International Human Rights committee  Number one, the costs on the belligerents are not high enough to incentivize a ceasefire, nor are the costs on the RSF and the SAF, as well as on their backers. We know the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Russia, Iran and others are supporting the belligerents, not just through funding and politically, but also through arms and the exploitation of minerals, including gold.

Subcommittee on International Human Rights committee  There are many risks. First is the spillover into neighbouring countries—South Sudan, Egypt, Chad, Libya—of not just refugees but also conflict, potentially. These are, in many cases, countries already grappling with issues of internal instability. Then there are the risks of violent extremism.

Subcommittee on International Human Rights committee  One thing that's underappreciated is how much worse the conflict could become. As I mentioned, there are already historic levels of internal displacement and really significant levels of external displacement. There are many foreseeable ways that this conflict could become significantly worse.

Subcommittee on International Human Rights committee  Yes, absolutely. In closing, there will be no ceasefire unless the costs on belligerents and their sponsors are significantly raised by the international community. There will be no peace agreement unless the SAF, the RSF and the civilian front are included in negotiations. Negotiations will not succeed unless the fundamental incompatibilities that led to the 2019 revolution, the 2021 coup and the 2023 war are addressed.

Subcommittee on International Human Rights committee  Thank you, honourable members of Parliament. I appreciate the opportunity to share perspectives on the issue of Sudan and to elevate the voices of our Sudanese partners, who have suffered greatly and are desperate to be heard. There is no greater expression of democratic self-determination than the popular overthrow of a dictator.