Bill C-2 (Historical)

Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act

An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Colombia, the Agreement on the Environment between Canada and the Republic of Colombia and the Agreement on Labour Cooperation between Canada and the Republic of Colombia

This enactment implements the Free Trade Agreement and the related agreements on the environment and labour cooperation entered into between Canada and the Republic of Colombia and signed at Lima, Peru on November 21, 2008.
The general provisions of the enactment specify that no recourse may be taken on the basis of the provisions of Part 1 of the enactment or any order made under that Part, or the provisions of the Free Trade Agreement or the related agreements themselves, without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada.
Part 1 of the enactment approves the Free Trade Agreement and the related agreements and provides for the payment by Canada of its share of the expenditures associated with the operation of the institutional aspects of the Free Trade Agreement and the power of the Governor in Council to make orders for carrying out the provisions of the enactment.
Part 2 of the enactment amends existing laws in order to bring them into conformity with Canada’s obligations under the Free Trade Agreement and the related agreement on labour cooperation.

[Claude Guimond, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, gentlemen, and welcome once again before the committee to deal with the same topic.

My first question is for Mr. Moist. On March 24 of last year, during the debate on Bill C-2, the Hon. Scott Brison moved an amendment relating to, among other things, “...a general summary of all actions taken under the authority of this Act, and an analysis of the impact of these actions on human rights in Canada and Colombia”.

What do you think of that amendment?

[Alex Neve, Secretary General, Amnesty International]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I too will do my best to stay within ten minutes and not make you cranky.

I particularly welcome the opportunity to be here, which I must note is my third appearance over the past two years with respect to this particular issue, the Canada-Colombia free trade agreement. It is clearly something we are very concerned about.

At the outset, as I have emphasized in all appearances before the committee, I very much want to stress that Amnesty International takes no position either for or against free trade deals with any country, including this particular deal. We simply and consistently insist that any trade deal, be it free trade or restricted trade, be structured to avoid contributing to human rights violations and to do everything possible to strengthen the protection of human rights. From that perspective, we offer our comments with respect to Bill C-2.

Colombia remains a country mired in four decades of devastating armed conflict with serious human rights abuses committed by all parties, state security forces, paramilitaries, and guerrilla forces. That violence and those abuses devastate the lives of millions of Colombians, especially members of vulnerable communities living in rural areas. This is shockingly exemplified by the fact that as many as 286,000 people were forced to flee their homes in 2009 alone. That brings the total number of people forcibly uprooted since 1985 to more than four million, and that number is one of the highest in the world. I'm sure you've heard that before.

Much of that forced displacement arises because of a desire to take over land of strategic interest, which is of interest for a variety of reasons but often including economic interest.

Today I would like to zero in on two pressing situations of particular relevance to the issue of trading with Colombia, and that is the plight of indigenous peoples and of Afro-Colombians. In February of this year Amnesty International released a new report about the deteriorating situation of indigenous people in Colombia. Copies of that report have previously been provided to all members of the committee. Among other things in the report, we noted that the UN special rapporteur on indigenous peoples describes the situation in the country as “grave, critical, and profoundly worrying”, and he has called for a visit to Colombia by the UN special adviser on the prevention of genocide.

There are many dimensions to this crisis. One is the intensification of threats and violence aimed at forcing indigenous peoples off land valued for its agricultural potential, oil, or minerals. That's very relevant, given that the Canadian government has promoted the introduction of Bill C-2 by naming Colombia as a “strategic destination” for Canadian direct investment in mining and oil exploration, among other sectors. Colombia's national indigenous organization warns that the survival of 32 indigenous groups is at grave risk as a result of large-scale economic projects as well as the armed conflict and lack of state support. In 2009 alone at least 114 indigenous women, men, and children were killed. Many others were attacked and threatened, and thousands were driven from their land.

Once indigenous inhabitants have fled in fear of their lives, their lands are sometimes opened up for large-scale economic development. When indigenous leaders and communities try to defend their land rights and their right to free, prior, and informed consent about economic developments that affect them, they commonly encounter significant opposition and violence, especially if their lands are found to be rich in natural resources. To make matters worse, high-ranking government officials continue to make statements linking indigenous leaders and the communities they represent with guerrilla groups, which exposes them to the very real risk of attack. This has encouraged a climate in which grave abuses against indigenous peoples are tolerated, encouraged, or even facilitated.

The Colombian Constitution recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to manage the political and administrative affairs of their traditional lands, yet in practice these rights are not respected. In January of 2009, for instance, Colombia's Constitutional Court issued ruling 004, which found the state's response to the many problems faced by indigenous peoples in Colombia to be inadequate. The court gave the government six months to devise and implement a plan to guarantee the rights of displaced and endangered indigenous peoples. More than one year after that ruling, there is little evidence of any progress towards that goal.

Instead, Amnesty International continues to receive numerous reports of attacks, threats, and violence. An indigenous leader representing Embera communities, who was opposed to the development of international mining interests that will impact on the Jiguamiando river basin, has received paramilitary death threats, for instance. The threats follow another recent Constitutional Court ruling that mining interests had failed to consult the local population adequately and that a proper consultation should take place.

All of this has led the UN special rapporteur on indigenous peoples, in his most recent report, to conclude that government policies and programs have failed to effectively protect indigenous peoples and to safeguard their human rights.

The second relevant yet largely invisible situation I wanted to highlight is the threats and violence against Afro-Colombian communities, many of whom also live in areas of economic interest in terms of resource extraction or agro-business.

In February of this year, following a ten-day visit to Colombia, the UN independent expert on minority issues expressed concern about mega-projects or large-scale operations involving major corporations that are promoted as providing economic gain to the whole community but have had the effect of encroaching on Afro-Colombian land rights. The independent expert recognized that, as with indigenous peoples, Colombia has impressive legislation aimed at recognizing the rights of Afro-Colombians, but she reported that many of these laws are rarely implemented or enforced. She said, “In the face of such economic interests and mega-projects, it appears that the rights of communities are 'inconvenient rights' and that the laws put in place to protect them are equally inconvenient.”

To give you just one example, on January 13 of this year, a leader of the Afro-descendant communities of the Curvaradó river basin was ordered out of the vehicle in which he was travelling by a paramilitary, a short distance from a police base. He was shot and killed. He had played an active part in denouncing the illegal appropriation of lands in the area by African palm companies. Before and after the killing paramilitaries have maintained an open presence, despite the area being heavily militarized.

It is the violence against communities living in areas of economic interest who are defending their right to be consulted about economic development projects that makes an independent human rights impact assessment prior to implementation of Bill C-2 so imperative.

In 2008 this committee called for just such an assessment prior to implementation of the trade agreement, yet so far none has been commissioned. We realize that the Colombian and Canadian governments have given their support to a proposed amendment calling for yearly reviews of the human rights impacts of the agreement in both Canada and Colombia, to be carried out by the governments of both Canada and Colombia. This is not the same thing, however, as an independent human rights impact assessment carried out before the deal comes into force.

And I must stress that there are ample reasons to doubt the credibility of the Colombian government to accurately report on human rights conditions in the country. For example, the Colombian government denies that there continues to be an armed conflict in Colombia, yet both the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights continue to define the situation in Colombia as one of internal armed conflict.

The government also insists that the worst excesses of the conflict have now been overcome. There has been an improvement in some conflict-related human rights indicators, like a decrease in the numbers of civilians killed or taken hostage. People in some cities will tell you that they feel safer. But this is only part of the picture, a picture in which close to 300,000 people were displaced last year alone.

It is vital that Canada not give a legislated platform to the Colombian government's selective approach to assessing human rights, which highlights a handful of positive indicators while leaving aside grave ongoing concerns.

I read with interest, for instance, what Minister Plata had to say to this committee last week in reassuring you about the human rights situation. I note that he did not once mention indigenous peoples. From Amnesty International's perspective, that is a stunning omission when addressing human rights concerns relevant to the Colombian trade context.

The Colombian government claims that paramilitary groups have all demobilized, yet the paramilitary continues to operate in many parts of the country, sometimes in collusion with sectors of the security forces.

Human rights defenders too are experiencing a worrying increase in death threats. These are attributed mostly to paramilitary groups, but also to state agencies. Successive Colombian governments insist that significant progress has been made in bringing human rights abusers to justice. I will note that the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers said at the end of a ten-day visit just this last December that

...a climate of fear and insecurity appears to reign over the judicial system because of attacks and threats against judges, prosecutors and lawyers...This also affects victims and witnesses who often prefer not to denounce abuses or to testify before the courts...This situation leads to impunity...

What do we need? We need a human rights impact assessment that takes place before implementation. We've been calling for this for three years now. It could be complete by now. This would either provide reassuring evidence that there is no cause for concern or it would identify expected impacts on human rights, much as an environmental impact assessment can identify expected impacts. This in turn would afford an opportunity to take action to prevent human rights violations. This is a win-win situation, and it obviously requires a credible, independent process at arm's length from both governments.

There also need to be legislated assurances that recommendations of the assessment will be addressed and not simply noted and filed.

In closing, I would also urge you to hear directly from Colombian organizations that represent and accompany indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant communities. We've provided a list of such organizations. We think it's vital that you hear from the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia, ONIC, but there are three others that we've suggested as well. It is crucial that your hearings permit all affected parties to have a voice.

Thank you.

[Mark Rowlinson]

I'll limit my comments.

I just want to pick up by highlighting the weaknesses of the enforcement provision in the Canada-Colombia labour side agreement. The particular weakness that I want to focus upon is the fact that, once again, enforcement is left up to the signatory states and the signatory bureaucracies that are assigned the task of enforcing the labour rights.

That is to say, unlike in the investment provisions, the offended parties, whether that be workers, trade unions, or human rights organizations, have no ability whatsoever to advance these cases to a dispute resolution panel on their own. All of the enforcement takes place through the states themselves. The result of that, in our experience under existing agreements, is that you never get to the dispute resolution mechanism so you never get a remedy. Nothing, frankly, ever happens when these complaints are filed.

The other substantial failing, of course, is that there is a profound limitation on the remedies that are provided. Even if you were to get to a dispute resolution panel--namely, a fine in the amount of $15 million--and the payment of that fine...into essentially a labour fund; that's essentially how the agreement works.

Again, this committee has to ask itself whether or not a $15 million fine is a substantial enough penalty and remedy to seriously deter labour rights violators in Colombia, given the history of violence and appalling labour rights violations. In our respectful submission, that sort of fine is not sufficient.

Again, I urge you to compare the labour rights provision with the investor rights provisions. The investor rights provisions, in article 8, provide an enforceable arbitration mechanism that is effective, independent, and rapid. The awards are final and binding, and they provide real remedies to investors whose rights may be violated in the agreement. Again, the contrast is stark.

In our view, because this agreement contains no real trade sanctions such as the imposition of countervailing duties or the abrogation of preferential trade status in the event that a party fails to adhere to the labour rights provisions, and given the magnitude of the labour rights violations in Colombia and the failure of the current government to prosecute the offenders, we submit that simply issuing fines against the offending government is not an acceptable sanction. Moreover, it will provide no incentive for the Colombian administration to address the current crisis and bring an end to the violent assassination of Colombian trade unionists.

In general, experience suggests that the labour provisions in trade agreements, whether in side agreements or not, are unlikely to lead to concrete improvements for workers and trade unions. In our view, the labour rights provisions in the Canada-Colombia FTA are not sufficiently robust to even begin to address the serious labour and human rights situation in Colombia.

Finally, I want to take you back a little bit to the report that this committee produced in June 2008, entitled Human Rights, the Environment and Free Trade with Colombia, when it was considering the potential impact of the Canada-Colombia agreement. The report made several good recommendations unanimously, including the following recommendations.

4: The Committee recommends that an independent, impartial, and comprehensive human rights impact assessment should be carried out by a competent body, which is subject to levels of independent scrutiny and validation; the recommendations of this assessment should be addressed before Canada considers signing, ratifying and implementing an agreement with Colombia.

That was the recommendation of this committee in June 2008.

The Liberal trade critic has proposed an additional text, an amendment. I'm not exactly sure of the exact content of this proposal, but it was read into the record, and what was read into the record reads as follows.

The Minister shall cause to be laid before each House of Parliament by March 31 of each year or, if that House is not then sitting, on any of the thirty days next thereafter that it is sitting, a report of operations for the previous calendar year, containing a general summary of all actions taken under the authority of this Act, and an analysis of the impact of these actions on human rights in Canada and Colombia.

It is, in our view, undeniable that the amendment or addition to Bill C-2 proposed by the Liberal trade critic utterly fails to comply with the recommendation that this very committee had adopted in June 2008.

It utterly fails in at least three ways.

First, the recommendation of the committee was that the human rights impact assessment be carried out before Canada considers signing, ratifying, or implementing an agreement with Colombia. The proposal currently before this committee, of course, is that the reports be produced after the agreement is already signed and ratified.

Second, the recommendation of this committee was that the assessment would be independent, impartial, and subject to levels of independent scrutiny. The proposal now before this committee and under Bill C-2 is that the human rights reports would be prepared and submitted by the signatory governments themselves. Although there is not total clarity on who exactly is going to prepare these reports, in our opinion, the proposed human rights reports are not independent in any sense of the term as contemplated in this committee's June 2008 report.

Third, and most importantly, it was clearly the case that unless the recommendations in this committee's report were satisfied, then Canada should not implement a free trade agreement with Colombia. That is to say, if the conditions of the report were not satisfied, there would be real consequences. However, the amendment currently proposed by the Liberal trade critic has no consequences whatsoever, or that I am aware of, if in fact it emerges that the human, environmental, and labour rights situation in Colombia fails to improve, or in fact gets worse, once the Canada-Colombia FTA is signed. As such, without any penalty or enforcement provision at all, it is unclear to us if the amendment to the legislation has any real benefit. Rather, it seems to us that the additional paragraph is, frankly, window dressing.

In our view, the situation on the ground in Colombia has not changed substantially since June 2008. Therefore, we fail to see the basis upon which this committee would simply abandon the recommendations made in June 2008 and advance and recommend the implementation of this trade agreement.

Thank you very much.

[Denis Lemelin, National President, Canadian Union of Postal Workers]

I will give my presentation in French. I also have a document that was translated in both languages.

On behalf of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee on Bill C-2.

[The Chair, Conservative, Lee Richardson]

Good afternoon. Welcome to the fourteenth meeting of this session of the 40th Parliament of our Standing Committee on International Trade.

Today we're going to continue our consideration of Bill C-2, An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Colombia, the Agreement on the Environment between Canada and the Republic of Colombia and the Agreement on Labour Cooperation between Canada and the Republic of Colombia.

To assist us today, we have as witnesses, first, from the Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers, Mark Rowlinson.

Welcome, and thank you for coming.

From Pulse Canada, we have Carl Potts, whom we've had before. He's the director of market development.

Welcome back, Mr. Potts.

We also have with us Murad Al-Katib, a board member at Pulse Canada.

We also have, from Spirits Canada and the Association of Canadian Distillers, Jan Westcott, president and chief executive officer.

Welcome back again, Jan, and thank you for coming.

We also have with us CJ Hélie, the executive vice-president of Spirits Canada.

From the Canadian Union of Postal Workers, we have with us Denis Lemelin, the national president.

We are going to hear brief opening statements from each group. I hope these can be kept within 10 minutes, because I'd really like to give all of the members an opportunity to ask questions today.

As we do have other business on the agenda, I'm going to get going right now. Following your statements, we'll start immediately with questions. We'll try to keep the first round to 10 minutes, and if we have time for a second round, we will go to five minutes for each round of questioning.

Without further ado, I think we'll get started on Bill C-2 and ask for opening statements. As I'm facing the witnesses, I may just start on my left with Mr. Potts.

We'll hear from Carl Potts from Pulse Canada for an opening statement. Thank you.

[Jean-Michel Laurin, Vice-President, Global Business Policy, Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, everyone.

Good afternoon. Thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee today on behalf of the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters to discuss Bill C-2, the Canada-Colombia free trade agreement bill.

I believe this is the third time, and I have to admit I also hope it's the last time, that I'm appearing before the committee on this issue. Our position on this important trade agreement hasn't changed, but I'll try to be as original as possible in my opening remarks.

Before I start, I'd like to say a few words about the association and the members I have the privilege to represent. Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters is Canada's leading trade and industry association and the voice of manufacturing and global business in Canada. We represent businesses in all sectors of manufacturing and exporting activity across the country. Our mandate is to promote the competitiveness of Canadian manufacturers and the success of Canada's goods and services exporters in markets around the world. Small- and medium-sized manufacturers constitute the bulk of our membership.

Our work is focused on the issues that are most critical to our members, such as manufacturing competitiveness, U.S. business opportunities, international markets, people and skills, energy, and the environment. We're particularly interested in Bill C-2 because manufacturing is an export-intensive business, as my colleague just explained. Overall, manufacturing accounts for two-thirds of Canada's exports. In fact, the majority of Canada's industrial production is exported, so access to export markets is a priority for our organization.

As you know, the recession has hit manufacturers and exporters more harshly than any other sector of the Canadian economy. For our members, the recession was mostly felt between August 2008 and August 2009. During that 12-month period, our export sales fell by 32%, our manufacturing sales fell by 20%, and manufacturing production overall declined by 17%. Overall, more than 180,000 jobs were lost in Canada's manufacturing sector last year alone. Since 2005, manufacturing employment has fallen by 420,000, or approximately 20% of the manufacturing workforce in Canada.

As we head into recovery, we are realizing that there are significant structural changes that are reshaping market conditions here in Canada, but also in global markets. As a result, new strategies are required on the part of business leaders and public policy-makers alike to ensure business success and to enhance productivity and economic growth. We all need to focus on what it takes for businesses to maximize the value of global supply chains, improve manufacturing competitiveness, encourage investment and innovation, and take advantage of new opportunities in domestic and international markets.

One of the most significant changes we are witnessing right now is a shift in market power and economic growth potential away from the developed markets of North America, Europe, and Japan and towards the emerging markets of China, India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. In fact, for all countries, but especially for those with an open economy, such as Canada, economic recovery depends on developing new business opportunities in emerging markets. In turn, that rides on the ability of businesses to effectively sell their goods and services in these growing markets. We therefore need to continue to negotiate meaningful market access, investment protection, and tax agreements with other countries, such as Colombia, and this is why our association supports Bill C-2.

Trade between Canada and Colombia is actually complementary. Two-thirds of our exports to Colombia are manufactured goods, such as trucks, auto parts, fabricated metal products, turbo propellers, newsprint, and other paper and cardboard products. On the other hand, most of our imports from Colombia are energy products, such as oil and coal, or food products, such as coffee, bananas, and flowers.

However, Canada's exports to Colombia continue to face somewhat high tariffs that hinder competitiveness in that market. For example, Canadian exporters face tariffs averaging 12% on industrial goods and 17% on agricultural products when selling to Colombia. While Colombia enjoys almost completely open and duty-free access to Canada, with approximately 85% of their products entering our market duty-free, our ability to export to their market remains limited.

In fact, in many cases tariff rates are a real barrier to entering that market. Passage of the Canada-Colombia free trade agreement would get rid of those tariff barriers and provide Canadian manufacturers and exporters with preferential treatment over competitors around the world.

Moreover, on top of immediately eliminating nearly all of Colombia's tariffs on manufactured goods, the free trade agreement would help reduce non-tariff barriers and strengthen investment rules. Despite those trade barriers currently in place, Canadian businesses exported $600 million worth of goods to Colombia last year. From 2005 to 2008—so, right up to the beginning of the recession—Canada's exports to Colombia jumped by more than 58% over the four-year period.

The Canada-Colombia free trade agreement has the potential to have a significant positive effect on Canada's exports to Colombia, for mainly two reasons. First, as I mentioned, exports of Canadian products would grow as a result of the reduction and elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers; second, the free trade agreement would help preserve existing Canadian exports that would otherwise be lost if Colombia maintained its expansion of free trade agreements with other nations or groups of countries that compete with Canada in manufactured goods, such as the United States and the European Union.

Colombia offers excellent opportunities for Canadian exporters. Colombia and other trading partners recognize this, and Colombia has embarked on a very aggressive bilateral trade agenda involving the United States, as I mentioned, the European Union, the European Free Trade Association, and some of their other trading partners. These countries, especially the United States and those in the European Union, are some of our main competitors.

Implementing this agreement quickly would help us secure a position in this market and give us a competitive advantage over other countries, because we would be an early mover.

On the other hand, or on the defensive side, implementing the Canada-Colombia agreement is unlikely to result in significant new increases in Canada's imports from Colombia beyond those that can be expected to occur anyway, so it doesn't really put our industries at risk. In the case of many trade negotiations, there are obviously concerns about increased competition for Canadian industry, but in this case, because our trade is very complementary, those defensive concerns are not necessarily present.

We expect that Canadian imports from Colombia will continue to increase, but the principal drivers of that increase will be the expansion of Colombia's oil production and the continuation of the duty-free treatment that most Colombian exports already enjoy in Canada.

In conclusion, we believe that this agreement is good for Canada and good for Colombia. It's time that Parliament passed the legislation for the agreement to come into force so that Canadian exporters can benefit from improved market access and improve their presence in Colombia.

Thank you very much. I'll be happy to answer any questions.

[Carlo Dade, Executive Director, Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL)]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. First of all, I would like to thank the committee and yourself for inviting me to share some ideas on the free trade agreement between Canada and Colombia.

I've been before the committee two or three times before, so I will actually keep my remarks at or under five minutes to allow more time for the questioning. I will keep my remarks, too, focused on the bill before the committee, Bill C-2, which focuses on a free trade agreement between Canada and Colombia. Should there, however, be questions or interest about proposed amendments or other ideas that the committee is considering, I'd be happy to discuss those, either in the actual or the hypothetical.

In terms of the free trade agreement with Colombia, as I've stated before, context is important--for Canada, Canadian competitiveness, jobs, and the situation of the domestic economy. We've seen since the breakdown of the Doha Round and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas negotiations an aggressive move by countries throughout this hemisphere to sign bilateral agreements. In that regard, Canada has lagged behind, unfortunately.

We currently have, in effect, five agreements that cover seven countries. Just within North America, the United States has 11 agreements--and is aggressively negotiating many more--that impact 16 countries. Mexico has 12 agreements and is negotiating more—we've heard recently that they're talking with Brazil—and their agreements cover 46 countries.

So even within North America, Canada is falling behind in terms of international trade competitiveness, yet the trade agenda continues. It's not as if the problems that the U.S. has had with the Colombia free trade agreement have prevented it from moving to other agreements, such as the trade preferences for the Pacific, or the TPP agreement, where the United States is looking at a new trade regime between countries that line the Pacific—Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, etc.—with countries of the Asian Pacific Rim.

So the trade agenda continues, and it continues aggressively. It's extremely important that Canada participate.

Our choice in participating is factored on two bisecting trends and two bisecting interests. One, in places where we have existing trade, we're facing competition...and also the intersection of countries that have an interest and a willingness to quickly negotiate. We've seen this in the case of Panama, where negotiations took three or four rounds, and in the case of Peru, which also moved to aggressively and quickly negotiate with us. We see that, too, in the case of Colombia.

So the reasons for us to be in Colombia are twofold: there are opportunities and it's important for Canadian competitiveness, and the Colombians have shown a willingness to negotiate.

In terms of the importance for Canada, you can look at it sector by sector, province by province. In agricultural products, Alberta has $60 million worth of exports to Colombia; Saskatchewan close to double this, at $117 million, and these are only wheat, barley, and pulses. Quebec is sending $40 million a year of machine parts, including flight simulators and autos; and Ontario, $67 million in similar products. Even in paper and cartons, Nova Scotia, with $23 million, has an important market for that province's paper and carton industry, the wood industry, which has been suffering lately.

Finally, let me note that there is obviously a strong business case for the agreement. Investment will benefit; trade will benefit. It's important for Colombians. You've had Colombian unions here. The flower exporters, I believe, were before the committee explaining the importance of the agreement.

It's important, therefore, that if one is looking to restrict trade with Colombia or to prevent this agreement, given the importance of jobs in Canada, given the importance of exports in provinces across this country, one would need a very good reason. Obviously the human rights situation in Colombia is of great concern, but for it to have an impact on trade with Canada, you would really have to make a strong and compelling case, or even any case, that the products we sell, the commerce in which we engage, has an impact on human rights in Colombia negatively or even positively. Despite the fine work that CIC has done, and others, we really haven't seen this link.

Let me just quote briefly Federico Guzmán. I suppose you know Federico Guzmán, a lawyer in Colombia. Federico was in Canada in February, speaking about an Amnesty International human rights report. He was on The Current. The broadcast is available online—another fine job by Anna Maria Tremonti.

On February 27, the first part of the broadcast, five minutes in—if anyone would like to go and check the tape—he was asked specifically by Anna Maria about the impact of trade between Canada and Colombia on human rights.

His response was interesting. He said there's no real impact between trade; the impact comes from large mega-projects in Colombia--and impacts on displacement and other issues that we've heard.

Anna Maria followed up and asked him if there were indications or any evidence of specific violations or involvement by specific Canadian companies. Mr. Guzmán replied that, no, as of yet there were not, but should there be any violations, well, then, the Government of Canada really needed mechanisms in place to deal with these, should they occur.

Again, if we're looking at an important potential trade market, if we're looking at jobs back home, we really have to look at preventing the hypothetical--with perhaps some regime to identify problems should they arise, but, as yet, we have not found evidence. And this is from someone speaking on the Amnesty International report in Canada.

Finally, the exchange at the beginning of the committee was really interesting--the idea of having witnesses come in, and the difficulty and the shortness of time, and hearing from Canadians who are concerned about this.

Based on that exchange at the beginning, I have an idea for the committee. While it's very convenient for us, even in short periods of time.... I had about 24 hours to respond, too. There's a report waiting on my desk that CIDA, or someone else, will kill me for not getting to them. Be that as it may, it's great to have the opportunity to walk down the street and come here.

Given the interest of Canadians across the country, perhaps it would be more interesting for the committee to go to places such as Kindersley, Saskatchewan, or Brooklyn, Nova Scotia, or Pointe-Claire, Quebec, to talk to people on factory floors, people who are trading with Colombia, people whose jobs and future employment are perhaps tied to this agreement, and ask them about the impact of their products--the beans they sell, the wheat they sell--on human rights in Colombia, and have an explanation at these plants, on these farms, and elsewhere about the work that the committee is doing.

Thank you.

[Gauri Sreenivasan, Policy Coordinator, International Trade, Canadian Council for International Co-operation]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity.

Gerry Barr, president and CEO of CCIC, sends his regrets. We were given barely 24 hours' notice, making it impossible, unfortunately, for him to change his schedule or agenda.

I think it's important to flag at the outset that there is tremendous interest on the part of many civil society and human rights organizations to appear to discuss Bill C-2 and to propose amendments, which we have yet to see on paper. Most are still awaiting news of possible hearings.

The process to inform people with such short notice does present great problems. I think we need to be fair so that groups can see that there is in fact an openness to participation and debate, as has been promised in the House.

CCIC believes very strongly in the potential for trade to lift people out of poverty, if it brings benefits to vulnerable populations and allows states that are willing to promote development outcomes and protect the environment. But trade can also lead to dislocation of marginal groups, and it can lead to heightened exploitation or violence. There are no automatic relationships. The details of the agreement matter, and the local context matters.

As you know, there has been a lot of public controversy about this agreement because of the human rights crisis in Colombia. In our view, a country with such deep levels of violence does provide special obligations of due diligence for Canada as it seeks to promote increased trade and investment.

I want to speak to three areas today. I want to provide a reminder of some of the key human rights concerns. I want to highlight from an analysis of the actual text of the agreement, which is now out and which CCIC commissioned with legal experts. This is not the theory of trade, but an analysis of the actual trade deal on the table. And I thirdly want to speak to the issue of a human rights impact assessment, which is such an important area.

I am going to spend a little less time on the human rights concerns, because I think Yessika has just given a very moving and important overview.

There is a lot of different conflicting information out there on the human rights situation. In the end, I think members of Parliament have to decide which sources of information you are going to listen to.

We focus ourselves on independent and highly respected human rights organizations and on those working with the most marginalized in Colombia. From these sources, the picture is pretty clear. There are improvements in the area of kidnappings, and there's an increased feeling of personal security in major urban centres in Colombia. But there are continued and unacceptably high levels of violence and violations, importantly violence in which the Colombian state is deeply implicated. Yessika has spoken very well on the issue of paramilitary violence.

I think it's important to flag. We have noticed a lot of discussion in the House and in the media about violence in Colombia just being about the drug economy and among drug lords. What is not being underscored enough--and this is why I think you need to hear from Colombian human rights activists--is how the government of Colombia itself is deeply linked to that violence, and it's not in a minor way.

Yessika has just highlighted the frightful revelations of the last year in which the president's intelligence unit, the DAS, is now clearly exposed as having masterminded massive illegal surveillance, which included Supreme Court magistrates and human rights organizations. The illegally obtained information was used to provide hit lists to the paramilitary to attack trade unionists, human rights defenders, who were attacked, murdered, and whose children were threatened. The direct linkage between the role that the state was playing to develop information to give to paramilitary, who in turn attacked civil society organizations in Colombia, provides an important reminder of the nature of the violence. It is not just fights among drug lords.

I think it is also important to underscore that the rise of paramilitary activity has coincided with significant increases in the rates of internal displacement. Since 1985, it is estimated that there are now 4.9 million people displaced in Colombia, second only to Sudan.

Why is that issue important for the trade agreement? It is key because violence and displacement are directly linked to the struggle for control over land, both for narco-trafficking and for the development of natural resources, including minerals, oil, and gas. Canadian companies are heavily involved in these sectors. There is a direct and reasonable concern about the likelihood of even unknowing Canadian corporate complicity in the occupation of land that was obtained through violence.

I want to quote from the UN special rapporteur for internally displaced peoples, who noted that there is a widespread perception among displaced people in Colombia that “while displacement may originally have been caused by armed conflict, the taking over of their lands by large corporations is at least a side effect, if not part of a policy of forced displacement”.

So I think we have a lot of reasons to be concerned about the linkages between violence and the state, between violence and displacement over land and resources, and then the question of who is going to access those lands and resources for profit, which is the direct question of commercial relationships for Canada.

Let me talk about the trade deal on the table now. In response to some of these concerns, the Canada-Colombia trade deal has been described and explained to Canadians as a different kind of trade deal, as a deal that has top-notch safeguards and that addresses human rights. So that is why we waited for the release of the text and we undertook collaboratively with legal experts the job of examining the text.

What happens when you layer this particular trade deal onto the context of violence? It is not to say that the trade deal causes all the problems, which existed before the trade deal even arrived. The question is what is the likely impact of the trade deal in this context?

In our view, from looking at the agreement as negotiated, the deal turns out to be actually a fairly typical and aggressive market access agreement. The safeguards in the side agreements are quite ineffective.

Let me go over a couple of examples. On the substantive trade measures, there's a very important investment chapter, which provides Canadian investors in mining, oil, and gas with unprecedented new powers of enforcement in the Colombian context. These kinds of protections didn't exist in the bilateral relationship between Canada and Colombia before: new powers of enforcement to secure access to resources that would discourage contestation of their projects despite the highly contested nature of land in Colombia.

In our view, the arrival of those new powers of enforcement can act, and would act, as an anti-democratic force in Colombia inasmuch as they it provide a disincentive to strengthen human rights laws--for example, if the Colombian government wanted to introduce regulations to deal with the illegal seizure of lands once investors were already on.

Professor Penelope Simons from the University of Ottawa, whom I really encourage you to bring as an expert on commerce and investment, has underscored that the text also has no obligations on corporations to screen their security forces, conduct human rights training, or disclose any payments to the host-state government or to guerrilla forces.

There are no provisions currently existing in Canada, as this committee recommended in 2008, requiring the home state--that would be Canada--to create a right of action or to ensure access to our courts for victims of human rights violations that were committed by our corporate nationals. So the investment treaty focuses on investor protections and provides heavy threats of enforcement to secure their operations and no corresponding binding responsibilities and no recourse for victims who feel aggrieved by corporate actions in Colombia.

We talked briefly about the agriculture market access session. Again, the CCIC brief, which is in front of you--I'm happy to take more questions on that later--shows that a very aggressive market liberalization of Colombian agricultural sectors would accelerate displacement in vulnerable communities. We looked specifically at the areas of grains, wheat in particular, and pork, because a lot of studies have been done on the impact of the U.S. deal in these areas, and our products trade very competitively with the U.S. in those areas.

Based on Colombian analysis, the Canadian FTA would likely have a very negative impact on production and jobs in Colombia, undermining, for example, the livelihoods of about 12,000 local wheat farmers and possibly eliminating up to 39,000 jobs in the informal pork sector. The deal, interestingly, virtually eliminates the Colombian government's access to safeguard measures to protect farmers' livelihoods and incomes. In our analysis there is no evidence of a human rights friendly or developmentally friendly agreement here.

The side accords have been widely touted, but are they effective? Again, I would encourage you to call Steven Shrybman, a well-known environmental lawyer who has done the legal analysis of this. In a word, the environmental side deal you have before you in the Colombian agreement doesn't even match NAFTA standards. It may provide a legal disincentive to raise environmental standards. The labour side accord offers no independent means of enforcement for labour unions who are raising complaints.

The whole mechanism of the labour side accord, which has been pitched as a safeguard for violation, relies exclusively on the goodwill of the governments, the two parties with the least incentive to air dirty laundry, to enforce the accord.

Even if either of the governments decides to enforce and to send a complaint up to an arbitration panel, at best it can provide fines, which in fact would be resources to be fed back into programs likely run by the Colombian government. Unions in Canada and Colombia have denounced this kind of side accord as a response to the context in Colombia. In other places or other countries there may be a less severe labour scenario and the opportunity to propose papers and have a government hear your complaints may be an issue, but in Colombia this kind of side accord, which provides no independent recourse for unionists, is not seen as a safeguard.

Let me come to the last area, because it is really important. That is the question of a human rights impact assessment. The initial scoping study that we did of the agreement has led to a very strong demand from civil society, which has been taken up by Parliament, for an independent human rights impact assessment to check the validity of the safeguards and to check the nature of the provisions in the agreement before proceeding with implementation.

It's really important for Canada to do this due diligence. Other countries, such as the U.S., Belgium, and Norway, are approaching their trade deals with Colombia slowly and looking much more in depth at human rights issues. I noticed Mike Michaud, a Democrat in the U.S. Congress, just sent a letter about his concerns about the Canadian deal.

With the Canada-Colombia free trade agreement and with recent initiatives, human rights impact assessments have really moved into the mainstream of the debate on trade, and this is a really positive thing. The challenge now is to do the process credibly. What is a credible human rights impact assessment? Civil society has spoken to the need, at a minimum, for an independent assessment to be undertaken on the deal, and for the results of the assessment to be addressed before implementation. This was also the demand of this committee in 2008.

We actually await more details and a copy of the proposal as presented by the Liberal Party. We've seen the transcript in Hansard that has been accepted by the government. That's all we have to date.

I want to offer some initial comments on that. We would be interested to understand if that is an amendment that is proposed to be added to the agreement itself, to Bill C-2. How would that work legally?

As it currently stands, although the idea of the human rights impact assessment is so dear and important, the current proposal lacks credibility. There are three key issues that I would like us to discuss.

The assessment has to be prior. A human rights approach demands that we seek to avoid measures that can lead to human rights violations before they happen. It's true that it's more challenging than an assessment after the fact, but there are a lot of precedents. Think of environmental impact assessments. Think of the European Union's commitment to sustainable impact assessments. These are all done as prior impact assessments, and it's what speaks to the need and importance for Canada of avoiding violations, not documenting them after they've happened. A prior assessment is the first key thing.

Second, the assessment has to be independent. It must be at arm's length from those making decisions on the trade agreement. It has to be undertaken by a team with human rights and trade expertise and employ a human rights methodology that is transparent, consultative, and participatory.

Again, this is not a weird, outrageous claim. Look at the European Union; for its social impact assessment, it commissions independent teams that report back to an oversight body. Their model may not necessarily be ideal, but the important principle is respected. It's not acceptable for government officials who are committed to the trade deal that they have negotiated to assess the impacts. This is doubly true in Colombia, where government has shown a marked aversion to those who report on human rights issues and has attacked them.

The third issue is that the assessment has to be oriented to results and action. It needs to have precise and directed conclusions and recommendations for actions. There has to be a commitment in the amendment that actions and recommendations would be acted upon, rather than a commitment to table a report that would just be read and put on the shelf.

Speaking to the important principle, in our view the current proposal is too unwieldy. It actually claims to address the entire trade deal and claims it will document all impacts. It's not practical. We think it would be more realistic to identify specific aspects and provisions that Canada is concerned about, look at the impacts of those specific measures, make recommendations on them, and then commit to taking action on those recommendations. It has to be done empirically; it can't be done by sitting at a desk and assuming what the impacts are.

To sum up, we need a commitment in principle to act on the human rights impacts recommendations. We need results and action, we need the assessment to be prior, and we need the assessment to be done independently, and those are three key issues that we don't see right now.

I'd urge you to invite legal expert Dr. James Harrison of the U.K. to appear before you as a witness. He set out a series of important benchmarks to assess human rights impact assessments.

I think with the discussion of assessment, we have an opportunity to—

Balanced Refugee Reform Act

[Ève-Mary Thaï Thi Lac, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to speak today to the bill that the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism recently introduced in the House.

This refugee bill was eagerly awaited and badly needed. No one will be surprised to hear that the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act was very helpful to my fellow Vietnamese who immigrated to Canada at the same time as I did.

When people ask me about my background, they ask me three questions. First, they ask me where I come from; second, whether I remember the war; and third, whether I was one of the boat people. It is clear that Quebeckers and Canadians understand and agree with the principle of refugees.

This debate coincides with the 35th anniversary of the fall of Saigon. Many people from my country came here as refugees and became prominent citizens, like the refugees from other countries who came and made Quebec and Canada better.

The current act is quite out of date and sometimes gives refugee claimants a bad name. It is high time we modernized it.

On March 30, the federal government introduced Bill C-11 as part of its reform of the refugee system. If it were passed as it stands now, this bill could have a serious negative impact on refugees. It is not enough to pass a law to improve what is not working. What we must do is find a balance and create something that will work.

The Bloc Québécois has asked the government to provide the committee with the regulations so that we can do an exhaustive study, because many measures announced as part of this reform are not included in this bill.

The Bloc Québécois is in favour of studying this bill in committee, and I am proud to say that I will study it carefully, because I am the assistant critic. The member for Jeanne-Le Ber is the Bloc Québécois critic, and he does a very good job, by the way. We make a great team, and the people of Quebec can be glad to have a team like ours, because we will see to it that the flaws in this bill are corrected.

We are happy that the government is finally looking at implementing the refugee appeal division. However, we are disappointed that it is not fair, because not all applicants will have access, which we believe is discriminatory.

When people from designated safe countries are denied at the first level, they will not have access to this appeal division. Even if the government assures us that all files will be examined individually, there is no guarantee that there will be no mistakes.

My colleague from Jeanne-Le Ber pointed this out. We know the statistics of some IRB members. Some of them flatly reject 90% to 95% of the applications they receive, while others show more flexibility. A decision made by one man or one woman is arbitrary. That is why it is not fair that refugees from designated safe countries will not have access to the refugee appeal division.

Another thing: which countries will be designated safe by the minister and the government?

The government is currently working on Bill C-2, An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Colombia. The government tells us that a free trade agreement with this country is no problem because Colombia respects human rights.

However, Canada accepts Colombian refugee seekers who claim their rights have been violated in Colombia. Will the minister put Colombia on the list of safe countries? I wonder.

On the one hand, the government says it wants to sign a free trade agreement with Colombia because it is a safe country. On the other hand, it accepts political refugees from that same country because their rights have been violated. What will the minister choose? Will the minister decide to list it as a safe country?

That is why we think that the idea of safe countries is questionable. We do not know where the minister will put Colombia and other countries that do not respect the human rights of women or homosexuals—these are recognized rights.

Even though the Conservative government sometimes has difficulty acknowledging them, these rights are still recognized in Quebec and Canada. What will the minister decide? Will he designate certain countries as safe even though they do not respect human rights, women's right or the rights of homosexuals? What category will these countries be in? It worries me.

A civil servant will make the decision. Applicants from designated safe countries will have no right to appeal. That is far too radical considering that the decision will have been made by a single person. It is possible that an applicant's individual rights will not be respected. He will not have all the rights that other people with the same background but who come from different countries will have.

Statistics for certain board members are alarming. We should not find this kind of unfairness when the decisions are made by civil servants.

It also says that an immigration officer will have 8 days, as opposed to 28, to refer a refugee claim to a first interview with a department official.

Some people are traumatized when they arrive here. They have been abused and pressured. Some come from very corrupt countries. They do not trust the government in the country they came from. When they arrive here, they are told that in eight days they will have to explain their situation to a government official. They have left a corrupt country where their rights were violated. They are told that they have eight days to prepare to explain their situation. That is not very long for people who have suffered such great trauma.

Then, the second hearing happens 60 days later. Do not forget that many refugee status claimants arrive here having left their houses, their families and their jobs with no preparation whatsoever. They did not bring any documents to prove what they are saying. They have to get those documents.

As MPs, we occasionally write to embassies in Africa. Although we have more resources than refugees or applicants, it takes a fairly long time for the mail to get there as well as for the reply to come back.

What will we do when the person does not obtain the documents required for their defence within 60 days? Will their application be refused automatically? Will this person be penalized because they could not provide the necessary documents?

At present, it takes 19 months and now we are talking about 28 days. Perhaps we could find a compromise. I believe there is enough flexibility to do so.

At present, more than 45% of refugee claims are accepted. When refused, the failed claimants can ask the Federal Court for a judicial review. This court presently accepts 13% of applications. Where an error was made in the decision, 2% of requests are allowed. In total, 60% of applicants are successful in the end. The tragedy lies in the fact that many failed applicants have found work, married, had children born in Canada and have learned the language. In other words, they have fully integrated in the host society.

The current backlogs are unacceptable for 40% of the claimants who will be forced leave Canada. This government is largely responsible for these backlogs. Indeed, since 2006, we have gone from 20,000 to 60,000 backlogged claims. We know that over a third of the board members could have rendered decisions, but there are many vacant positions, which has caused this backlog.

As my colleague from Jeanne-Le Ber put it so well earlier, we cannot help but wonder if these delays are arranged on purpose in order to stay within certain quotas set by the government. What will they do in the future to stay within those quotas? Will they deny more claims? This will not serve Quebec or Canada.

We must ensure that this new legislation does not discriminate against claimants and does not deny more claims because they are processed faster. That would be tragic, both for the claimants and for our current system.

It is definitely time to reform this legislation, but that does not mean it should be reformed in a slapdash manner. We can take the time to reform it correctly. There is a difference between saying that it should have been done a long time ago and saying that we will do it too fast, which could lead to other injustices. If we did that, we might improve what is not working, but we would risk undermining the parts that are working. We must ensure that this bill does not create new injustices.

In committee, my colleague from Jeanne-Le Ber and I will ensure that when the time comes to vote on this bill in the House, it will be much improved and will respect the needs of claimants as much as possible. We no longer want to hear that, according to statistics, 60% of claims are completed and are successful. It is sad to hear people say that refugee claimants are abusing the system.

It is an essential system that is desperately needed, but the current legislation is outdated.

[David Plunkett, Chief Trade Negotiator, Bilateral and Regional Relations, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for this opportunity to appear before this committee and speak to Bill C-2, an act to implement the Canada-Colombia free trade agreement and the parallel agreements on labour cooperation and the environment.

This Bill implements the legal framework and legislative amendments required to deepen the economic and social relationship between Colombia and Canada.

You've already identified my colleagues who are with me. As you may be aware, Carol Nelder-Corvari is also our chief negotiator for this deal.

Canada and Colombia currently have a significant commercial relationship, with trade in excess of $1.3 billion and hundreds of Canadian companies doing business with Colombia. Key Canadian products such as cereals, including wheat and barley, machinery, pulse crops, paper, and motor vehicles are key exports to Colombia, and ensuring their continued competitiveness was a key reason for pursuing an agreement with Colombia.

Under this free trade agreement, Colombia will eliminate tariffs on nearly all Canadian exports. Their removal is important for Canadian exporters, particularly given that Colombia has concluded other trade agreements with key Canadian competitors such as the United States and Europe. By implementing this agreement, our exporters will have a competitive advantage to continue to grow in this market, particularly if Canada’s agreement is implemented before the United States and Europe implement their own deals.

Before turning to other benefits for Canadian businesses, it is important to highlight a recent market access development. On April 9, 2010, ministers Van Loan and Ritz announced that Colombia had reopened its market to Canadian cattle. This announcement followed Colombia’s January 2010 decision to reopen its market to Canadian beef. Canadian beef and cattle exports had previously been banned from the Colombian market due to BSE. Canadian industry has responded very positively to Colombia's decision to resume trade, and this development will complement the tariff reductions negotiated by Carol and her team in this agreement.

Moving beyond trade in goods, this agreement will lead to new commercial opportunities for our investors and service providers. Over 50 Canadian companies have invested in Colombia, principally in the mining, oil and gas exploration, and manufacturing sectors. In 2009, the stock of Canadian investment in Colombia reached approximately $773 million. These investments are leading the way for exports of Canadian-made machinery such as mining equipment and heavy transportation equipment. Once the FTA is implemented, a stable legal framework will be in place for Canadian investors in Colombia.

Canadian services exports to Colombia are in the area of $40 million to $50 million a year and are concentrated in the financial, mining, engineering, and petroleum extraction sectors. Upon implementation, Canadian service providers will be treated the same as Colombian service providers and will enjoy a secure, predictable, transparent, and rules-based trading system. Moreover, Canada obtained the same level of market access from Colombia as they provided to the United States. As a result, Canadian service suppliers will be on a level playing field with their American counterparts in Colombia.

As a comprehensive free trade agreement, obligations are also contained in the agreement on a wide variety of other subjects including financial services, government procurement, electronic commerce, telecommunications, and temporary entry of business persons. While these subjects may not be in the forefront of discussions regarding the benefits of the trade agreement, they are important components to ensuring that Canadian businesses are able to operate efficiently and competitively in the Colombian market.

As you are aware, in keeping with Canada's approach to free trade agreements, environmental and labour aspects of the economic integration were addressed through agreements on labour and environment. These important agreements contain strong obligations and clearly demonstrate that for Canada and Colombia, trade liberalization does not come at the expense of labour rights and the environment.

To conclude my part, Canadian businesses are not alone in recognizing opportunities in Colombia. In a World Bank study, Doing Business 2010, Colombia ranks as one of the top 10 business environment reformers. It ranked 37th in the category of “ease of doing business”, and it also ranked fifth out of 183 countries with regard to its ability to protect investor rights through the application of the rule of law. Clearly this is a country where opportunities for businesses are only going to increase.

Overall, the free trade agreement will strengthen our bilateral commercial relationship. This agreement has the support of key exporters and investors across Canada, many of whom have appeared before this committee. This is a high-quality and comprehensive trade agreement, and it will allow Canadian businesses to compete and excel in the Colombian market.

Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak to Bill C-2, An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Colombia.

First of all, the Bloc Québécois is opposed to Bill C-2. The Canadian government's main motivation for entering into this free trade deal is not trade, but rather investments.

I wish my Conservative colleagues would at least have the courage to tell the truth. Always trying to invent illusions, as the Conservatives do, is most harmful to us as we do our jobs as MPs.

They are trying to pass this off as a trade agreement. The Conservative members spoke of opening up major markets with Colombia. Canada has been negotiating for two years and I have yet to receive a single email from farmers or businesspeople in my riding asking me to sign this free trade agreement with Colombia.

This agreement contains a chapter on investment protection, which would make life easier for Canadian investors, particularly those who invest in the mining sector in Colombia.

The ultimate goal is to provide businesses with access to markets and investments.

We have to be careful because, comparing this investment protection agreement to all the others Canada has signed over the years, the one that would bind Canada and Colombia seems ill conceived. All these agreements contain clauses that enable investors to sue the local government if it takes measures that reduce their return on investment.

These provisions are particularly dangerous in a country where labour and environmental protection laws are uncertain at best. Such an agreement, by protecting a Canadian investor against any improvement in the living conditions in Colombia, could slow down social and environmental progress in a country that is in great need of such progress.

What Conservative MPs from Quebec and the rest of Canada need to understand is that people will not stand for our Canadian companies investing in a country where they do not meticulously observe labour laws, respect human rights and protect the environment.

I know that this is extremely hard to swallow for Conservative members from the west whose hands are full with the oil sands development, but the vast majority of Quebeckers and Canadians will not stand for the Canadian government allowing Canadian companies to invest in countries like Colombia without respecting human rights and protecting the environment.

Colombia has one of the worst track records in the world, and certainly in Latin America, when it comes to human rights. That is where the problem lies. The government wants to allow companies to invest in a country that does not respect human rights.

In order to promote human rights in the world, governments usually use the carrot and stick approach. If we want to promote human rights in Colombia, and if they absolutely want to do business with us, then we have to be able to tell them that they must first improve their human rights record.

They support efforts to ensure greater respect for human rights and reserve the right to cut off those benefits if things go back to the way they were.

If Canada signs this free trade agreement, it will relinquish its power to exert pressure. Not only will it give up the option of using the carrot and the stick, it will be handing that power to the Colombian government. That is why we said this was a bad deal. It is a bad, ill-conceived free trade agreement that eliminates the Canadian government's power to force Colombia to improve its workers' quality of life, human rights and environmental rights.

The government keeps saying that it has included side agreements on labour and the environment in the free trade agreement. But such side agreements are manifestly ineffective. They are not part of the free trade agreement, so investors are free to destroy the rich Colombian environment, displace people to set up mining operations and keep murdering trade unionists with impunity. That is what is going on now.

Our Conservative colleagues are trying to lull us into submission by telling us that it is a good agreement, but there are no provisions concerning human rights and environmental protection in the agreement, even though they should have been. The Conservatives talk about the side agreements, but they are not part of the main agreement, so companies are not required to comply with them.

The Bloc Québécois does not agree that the government should exchange its ability to exert pressure to ensure respect for human rights against the privilege for Canadian companies to make foreign investments.

The Bloc Québécois is in touch with the people. If they knew about this, Quebeckers and Canadians would never agree to investments that compromise human rights. Once again, the Conservative caucus is trying to make us accept this. We are being gagged. On Friday, the Conservatives decided to limit the time for debate on this agreement. The government wants to force all parliamentarians, all Quebeckers and all Canadians to accept this terrible free trade agreement.

In December 2009, this bill was debated at second reading before being set aside when Parliament was prorogued. I asked the minister who gagged our debate why, if it was so important to the Conservatives, the government prorogued the House and ended the debate just before the holidays. By proroguing the House, they decided to end the debate.

We think that it was, once again, to please investors close to the Conservative Party. That is the harsh reality. It is a party that acts out of political interest. The Prime Minister acted out of political interest when he prorogued the House. He is again acting out of political interest and also to help his mining friends, in this case, and the oil companies. It is a question of investments and Colombia's natural resources.

An amendment to an amendment stating that a number of human rights organizations were strongly opposed to the ratification of this agreement was rejected by the Conservative and Liberal parties on October 7, 2009. Once again the opposition parties, both the Bloc Québécois and the NDP, agreed on this amendment to the amendment to respect human rights.

The Conservatives and Liberal voted against this amendment to the amendment. The Liberals voted against it for political reasons. For some months now, all the Liberals' actions have been politically motivated. Inevitably, there has been pressure from mining and oil companies to get this free trade agreement signed.

The free trade agreement between the United States and Colombia, signed in 2006, is also stalled because of the human rights issue. Quebeckers and Canadians are not the only ones who oppose the agreement. The people of the United States are also worried about the human rights issue. This agreement should not be ratified by Congress until Colombia strengthens its legislation to protect minimum labour standards and union activities in order to respect human rights and labour rights.

Once again, the Conservatives decided to rush through with this in order to serve the interests of a handful of Canadian investors. The Liberals and the Conservatives are going to ratify this agreement despite the fact that the Americans have decided not to ratify it until Colombian laws change to allow effective union action and ensure minimum standards for working conditions. This will ensure that Canadian companies that employ Colombian workers provide them with decent working conditions and respect labour laws so those employees can work in an environment consistent with our values.

As the members can probably guess, out of respect for human rights and the environment, the Bloc Québécois will be voting against this free trade agreement.

[Olivia Chow, NDP, Trinity—Spadina, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the former Conservative member of Parliament now sits on the Liberal bench, and there is not a lot of change there. Any time a member of Parliament tries to change the subject and change the channel, there is something to hide. We are talking about Bill C-2, the free trade agreement with Colombia.

I understand that the Conservative members are so worried about this bill that last Friday, when the bill was not even on the agenda, they moved a time allocation motion to try to change the channel and say that we are going to have closure, similar to what occurred with respect to the HST.

[John Rafferty, NDP, Thunder Bay—Rainy River, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I listened with interest, of course, to the hon. member's comments. It occurs to me that the Conservatives are not even really serious about Bill C-2. I was thinking back to the prorogation we just had. It seems to me that this bill was well on its way before prorogation. Then, after prorogation, we had to start the bill all over from the beginning again.

If the Conservatives were serious about this bill, why did they bother proroguing in the first place and stopping all these bills, including crime bills and other bills that they said they were so interested in? Now these bills have to start all over again from the beginning. It seems to me that they are starting to agree with the NDP that this is not a good bill.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I must say that I have been dying to speak. I am shocked by the comments I have just heard about free trade promoting human rights, and by the Liberal flip-flop on the free trade agreement.

I would like to take a quick look at the past. I remember the reaction in Canada when Brian Mulroney negotiated a free trade agreement between Canada and the United States. Canada did not want a free trade agreement at all, but Quebec wanted one because it was good for Quebeckers. In the end, with the help of Quebec, Mulroney won the election, and he negotiated a free trade agreement with the United States.

Then, Jean Chrétien took power. He promised to do all he could to put an end to the free trade agreement. What did he do? He not only failed to put an end to it, but he also went on to become the greatest proponent of free trade agreements that I have ever seen. This comment was in response to the Liberal flip-flop.

As for human rights, I would like to hear how a free trade agreement could promote human rights. I have heard in this House, from very well-meaning people, that Bill C-2—

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I rise somewhat nervously, standing very much in agreement with the hon. member for Saskatoon—Humboldt. It does make me a little bit nervous to be speaking in such agreement with him. I will offer some different reasons why at second reading stage I will be voting in support of the Canada-Colombia free trade agreement and sending it to committee for review, consultation, consideration, amendment and passing so that we can continue a relationship with a country that desperately needs a relationship with Canada.

I have come to this position rather circuitously, hoping that I would hear something in the debate, and I have been listening to the debate, that would convince me that it is indeed good for Canada and Colombia to enter into this agreement. I have heard enough now that I actually think it is a good idea that we engage in this process.

It gives us an opportunity to look at human rights in that country in a new light and actually engages us in this discussion. In fact, if the government had not presented Bill C-2, we would not be having this discussion about human rights in Colombia. It is a good thing for Canadians to open their eyes to the human rights abuses, the dismal record of human rights in that country, but also the potential for a country to examine itself and police itself eventually and enter into world trade agreements and bring about prosperity and hope to its people.

For the last 25 years I have worked as a United Church minister. The United Church of Canada has stood very strongly in favour of various agreements in the world that will allow human rights to be discussed and also to be improved. It is in that light that I begin to look at this agreement.

I am very pleased that the Liberal Party will be presenting an amendment that looks at the mechanism within this agreement to ensure that human rights abuses are monitored and that the effect of this agreement is actually measured as time goes by.

In this discussion I have been surprised at some of the opposition members who seem to not understand that a free trade agreement is essentially an economic agreement. It is an agreement about trade, not principally a human rights agreement. We can take this as an opportunity to open the door to discuss human rights and to try to foster better human rights in another country, but it is essentially a trade agreement that is about prosperity, economics and making sure that Canadians have products that we can receive and use, and that we can sell and make a profit on.

This particular agreement, though, has raised concern. My constituents in Don Valley West have expressed that concern to me quite regularly. I have received a number of letters from very thoughtful constituents who are concerned that we may be fostering human rights abuses through this trade agreement. I simply do not see that as a possibility. Nor do I see a free trade agreement as being some sort of prize for having an unblemished human rights record. I do not think there is a single country in the world that could stand up to the test of having an unblemished human rights record.

Certain countries, such as Colombia, have a much more tarnished record on human rights. The record of atrocities has been enumerated by members of this House. As people read through Hansard, they can read the number of concerns that we have. Every single one of those is valid, but do we think a free trade agreement will help this or hurt this?

I have come to the conclusion that as we move toward freer trade with Colombia, we will be building prosperity and that prosperity will bring about human rights improvements. We do not have proof of that. Those concerns should linger in this House. Those concerns should dominate the work of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, as well as the committees of this House that examine international human rights and the effects of this agreement. I think that we will be investigating that over many years to come.

I am very pleased the amendment which we on this side of the House have managed to negotiate will ensure that our Parliament, and not only the government, will be monitoring human rights.

There is a sense that we do not trust the Colombian government. I understand that lack of trust. It is a government which has dubious electoral practices. Colombia is a country that has had unusual difficulties with respect to narcopolitics, gangs and various other human rights abuses. However, that does not mean we wait until those issues are dealt with before we start a trade agreement that actually improves the life of ordinary Colombians.

Ultimately that is our goal. Our goal is not to be ideologically for free trade, or ideologically against free trade. Our goal is to examine this agreement as an agreement with one country and see whether or not it will foster human rights, whether or not it will engage people in the international community in ensuring that the very poorest in our world have greater prosperity, greater openness in government, greater engagement with the world and greater opportunity to come to know Canada and what Canada stands for.

My sense is that the government has entered into this agreement largely based on an economic strategy. I applaud the Conservatives for beginning the debate, but I also am encouraged that they understand this is not just an economic agreement, but also an opportunity to engage in these questions of human rights.

I have received a number of letters outlining disturbing cases, but no more so than the conversations I have had with Colombians who live in my riding. I have never been to Colombia. I am not an expert on it, nor am I an expert on free trade, but I have an interest and a passion for the Canadians who have come from Colombia and now live in my riding. They have expressed two concerns. They have expressed concern for relatives who still live under the threat of a tyrannical government, but also those who have not had the possibility of jobs and the opportunity for economic advancement. They are of a divided mind when I discuss this agreement with them. They are concerned about the possibility of this agreement being used as a stamp of approval for the Colombian government and its current practices. In no way is it that at all.

This agreement is an opportunity to engage in the conversation and to begin to monitor human rights and put on that monitoring the obligation that Colombia will have to fulfill its obligations under this agreement. Monitoring of human rights is very much a part of that.

The most devastating cause of human rights abuses is poverty and misplaced power. This trade agreement begins to address both of those issues. It begins to look at a government and demand from it democratic institutions, democratic responses so that that government may be a world player with us and we can engage with it as a sibling government.

More importantly, it opens up the opportunity for prosperity, for the accumulation of wealth and for an understanding that ordinary people deserve jobs that we take for granted. It is simply too rich for us in a northern western country with all that we have to stand back and say that we expect something more from Colombia than we have of ourselves.

Canada's human rights record is not unblemished. Canada's human rights record certainly is not as extreme as that of a country like Colombia, but our own country has not been perfect with respect to first nations, with respect to new Canadians, with respect to women and with respect to children. We have much work to do on that, but that does not stop us, nor should it stop us from economic participation in the world.

This agreement affords us an opportunity as a Parliament to open up our doors, open up our minds, open up our hearts to understand another part of the world we may not understand. If we were to wait for all human rights abuses in that country to end before we engage with it economically, we would be waiting forever. Instead, we should open the door to have a two-way conversation, for goods and services to flow, for cultural opportunities to expand. In that sense we as a country will be helping another part of the world meet our standard of living, develop an economic standard, a human rights standard and a standard about the cultural way of living that we expect in Canada.