Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to stand in the House today to speak to the motion brought forward by my opposition colleagues.
I note that my colleagues from the Liberal Party were not inclined to take up any of the suggestions made by the government House leader last Thursday. I would also welcome the opportunity to debate how his party would propose to eliminate the budget deficit, a commitment our government made to the Canadian people, which we will deliver on next year.
Today we are debating the motion from the Liberal Party, dealing with the long-standing provisions in the standing orders related to the curtailment of debate. In particular, the motion seeks to amend the standing orders so that one could not use the procedural mechanisms of either closure or time allocation in relation to any bill that seeks to amend the Canada Elections Act or the Parliament of Canada Act.
This limiting of the motion to these two acts obviously comes as no surprise, given that the opposition parties are opposed to our government's fair elections act, which would amend the Canada Elections Act. While the focus of my remarks today will be on Standing Orders 57 and 78 and their histories, evolution, and appropriateness, I would also like to take a minute to make a few observations on this particular aspect of the motion.
I would contend that if it were not for their opposition to the fair elections act, we would not be debating this motion at all today. Previous governments of different partisan stripes have long used these procedural mechanisms to curtail debate when they were in government. Of particular note, there is good reason why my Liberal colleagues did not include in their motion, amendments to the standing orders to change how closure or time allocation is used.
Their real opposition is with a particular bill before Parliament, and I expect most of their comments today will be directed toward that bill, as opposed to the Standing Orders. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to state my support for the fair elections act, and I will quote the Minister of State for Democratic Reform as to why I believe the bill should be passed:
...the fair elections bill would ensure that everyday Canadians are the players in the game, that special interests are pushed to the sidelines of the game, and that rule-breakers are pushed out of the game altogether.
He went on to say:
It would close big-money loopholes, impose new penalties on political impostors who make rogue calls, and empower law enforcement with sharper teeth, a longer reach, and a freer hand.
As I said, what I would like to focus my remarks on today is the history and evolution of Standing Orders 57 and 78. By highlighting their evolution, I think it will become clear to those following this debate, possibly even to the members opposite, why these procedural mechanisms that curtail debate are necessary and appropriate.
Often in this place, the terms “closure” and “time allocation” are incorrectly switched and misused, especially by the opposition. To be clear, Standing Order 57 provides the government with a procedural mechanism to force a decision by the House on any matter currently under debate. This is referred to as “closure”. Whereas, Standing Order 78 sets out the procedural mechanism for restricting the length of debate on bills through “guillotine motions”; referred to as “time allocation”. The standing order actually has three subsections that set out different kinds of restrictions which apply to the allocation of time, depending on the degree of acceptance among the representatives of all parties.
Before I provide an overview of the evolution of these two standing orders, I would like to quote three sources: the current government House leader; a past government House leader; and Beauchesne’s, which is one of our procedural bibles. Each of these statements address the necessity and appropriateness of using such procedural mechanisms. To begin, on page 162 of Beauchesne’s it reads:
Time allocation is a device for planning the use of time during the various stages of consideration of a bill rather than bringing the debate to an immediate conclusion.
A compelling argument as to the necessity of time allocation motions was made by the former Liberal government House leader when speaking to the report of the Special Committee on the Modernization and Improvement of Procedures of the House of Commons, the last time the rules regarding time allocation and closure were amended.
On October 4, 2001, as per page 5946 of the Debates, he stated:
Time allocation is necessary, of course, when debating legislation, so that the government can put through its legislative program. The opposition parties are, I am sure, aware of that necessity but they object when the government makes use of it.
I will leave it to the House to decide who has stated this principle more eloquently and effectively, but in keeping with the words of a former Liberal government House leader, our very own government House leader has also tried to convey this principle to our colleagues in opposition. As recently as April 3, 2014, he stated the following with respect to time allocation and Bill C-31:
Of course, time allocation is not used by this government to shut down debate, because here we are debating, which we will be doing tomorrow, Monday, and Tuesday. It is used as a scheduling device so that all members of this House can have certainty and confidence about when the debate will occur, and more importantly, about when the vote will occur and when the decision will ultimately be made. That is very important.
I find it very interesting that this same practice that was used many times by the Liberals when they were in office is now being criticized by that same party. Canadians are not fooled, however. They expect this from the “do as I say, not as I do” Liberal Party.
I would now like to provide an overview of the history and evolution of these two procedural mechanisms, as it is important to note how they came to be established as rules in our Standing Orders and how they have evolved over time.
While neither closure nor time allocation existed as procedural mechanisms at the time of Confederation, it did not take long before it was recognized that complete freedom of debate was impossible and that some restraint would have to be exercised, or some accommodation reached, for the House to conduct its business within a reasonable timeframe.
In the years following the turn of the century, the inability of the House to come to a vote on a question was not infrequent, leading often to long, protracted debates.
This led to the House in 1913 adopting amendments to its rules to add a mechanism to end debate called “closure”—effectively our current Standing Order 57. Other rules then followed that also addressed the issue of lengthy debates, including limiting the length of the speeches of members in 1927 and, in 1955, further limits were imposed on certain debates.
Closure was applied 11 times from 1913 to 1932, but then was not used again until 1956, when the pipeline debate took place. That spring, during the acrimonious debate on the bill, entitled, “An act to establish the Northern Ontario Pipeline Crown Corporation”, closure was invoked at each stage of the legislative process. It was the only mechanism, at the time, that the government could use to advance this legislation.
With respect to legislation, the use of closure was deemed to be somewhat inflexible and inadequate as a tool for conducting the business of the House. Discussions began with a view to looking at ways in which the time of the House could be better managed with respect to the consideration of bills. It was felt, as highlighted by the pipeline debate, that the closure mechanism was not effective in advancing legislation, since the process of giving notice, moving the motion, and voting on it had to be repeated at every stage of a given bill.
In the 1960s, as the business of the House became more complex, the House agreed to establish a number of special committees charged with considering the procedures of the House and, in particular, to make suggestions to expedite public business. It was recognized that the complexity of legislation was increasing and that procedural mechanisms were needed to ensure that business would be dispatched within a reasonable amount of time.
Agreeing upon a mechanism was not easy. In the 10th report of the Special Committee on Procedure and Organization, presented to the House in 1964, it was acknowledged that it was difficult to reach an all-party agreement on the proposal to deal with the fundamental question of the allocation of time, and so no recommendation was made at that time.
Following the report, early in the next session, the government moved a resolution that included a time allocation mechanism. It called for the creation of a business committee that would propose an allocation of time for the specific item of business referred to it. If unanimous agreement could not be reached by the committee, consisting of a member from each party, a minister could then give notice during routine proceedings that at the next sitting of the House, he or she would move a motion allocating the time for the item of business or the stage.
The government's resolution was debated for 12 days and amended to provide, in the instance where unanimous agreement could not be reached, for a minimum of two sitting days at the second reading stage, two sitting days at the committee stage, and one sitting day at the third reading stage.
Eventually this proposal was hived off from the resolution and studied by a special committee. The committee proposed a further amendment that would allow the Speaker to extend the sitting on the final day of a time allocation order applying to third reading of a bill. On June 11, 1965, the proposal was adopted as provisional Standing Order 15(a).
In the following Parliament, the House decided not to extend the provisional Standing Order 15(a). Instead, the House referred the matter of time allocation to the Standing Committee on Procedure and Organization.
On June 20, 1969, the House adopted the third report of the committee, which provided for three options under which a time allocation order could be made—effectively the basis for our current Standing Order 78.
The procedure mechanisms for closure and for time allocation have remained, by and large, unchanged since they were established in 1913 and 1969 respectively. There have been a few minor changes, which I will briefly outline
With respect to closure, the mechanism has been modified on only three occasions. In each case, the change related to the time for putting the question. In 1913, the time for putting all questions necessary to dispose of the closure motion was fixed for 2 a.m.
Subsequently, the time was moved back one hour to 1 a.m. in 1955, in order to conform with the change made to the ordinary time of adjournment. The time was then moved back to 11 p.m. in April 1991, and finally to 8 p.m. in October 2001.
Similarly, there have been only a few amendments to the time allocation Standing Order. In June 1987, amendments were adopted to provide that time allocation motions after only oral notice would be moved under government orders rather than under motions during routine proceedings, and that debate on items of business under consideration at the time the motion was moved would be deemed adjourned.
Then in 1991, the House agreed to remove the two-hour debate on the time allocation motion moved pursuant to then Standing Order 78(2) and 78(3). The motion was to be decided forthwith. In addition, the text of the Standing Order was amended to provide that if the time allocation motion were moved and adopted at the beginning of government orders and the bill under question was then called and debated for the remainder of that sitting, that would count as one sitting day for the purpose of the Standing Order.
As is the case with many Standing Orders, practice and Speaker's rulings have also played a role in defining how the procedural mechanism of time allocation is to be used. The following are a sampling of some of the key rulings since the implementation of such a Standing Order in 1969.
In December 1978, Speaker Jerome ruled that a time allocation motion could be moved covering both report and third reading stages, even though third reading had not yet begun. Speaker Sauvé confirmed in 1983 that notice of intention to move a time allocation motion could be given at any time.
Speaker Fraser ruled that an oral notice of a time allocation motion need only be a notice of intention and not notice of the actual text of the motion.
Finally, in 2001 a new Standing Order was adopted, flowing from a recommendation in the report of the Special Committee on the Modernization and Improvement of Procedures of the House of Commons that I referenced earlier. Standing Order 67(1) was adopted, providing for a 30-minute question and answer period when a closure motion or a time allocation motion, without the agreement of any of the opposition parties, were moved on a bill. During this 30-minute period, questions would be directed to the minister sponsoring the item of business under debate, or to the minister acting on his or her behalf.
From the historical overview I have just provided, I think that it is telling that these procedural mechanisms have not only been longstanding, but that they have also remained largely unchanged since they were implemented.
I would venture to say, therefore, that the reason for this is that they fulfill an important purpose, that is to provide the government of the day with a tool to ensure that legislation can be debated and advanced through the House in a timely fashion. This is a tool that all governments have used to date.
Without such a tool being available to the government of the day, the opposition would be able to indefinitely delay each and every government bill. That would be undemocratic and would not recognize the mandate given to the government by the Canadian people.
In closing, I need only go back to the second session of the 37th Parliament to highlight an example of the use of time allocation on a bill that would violate the conditions set out in the motion that we are debating today. It was the previous government, and the very same government House leader I quoted earlier, that moved a time allocation motion for Bill C-24, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act (political financing). Therefore, I question not only the purpose of today's motion, as it is clear that the procedural mechanisms of closure and time allocation serve an important role in this place, but also the sincerity of the party opposite, as those members know full well that without this mechanism, governments would be unable to pass virtually any bill.
