Foreign Affairs Committee on March 1st, 2007

[Brian Storseth, Conservative, Westlock—St. Paul, AB]

What kind of direction are you asking for or do you need to resolve the issue? They're already there. I'm talking about what kind of money and what kind of equipment you're looking at to actually—

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Storseth.

Go ahead.

[Simon Conway]

The simple answer to that is funding, really. To be honest, the training is there. We know how to clear cluster munitions. It's problematic and it's dangerous, but with sufficient funding.... There is a lot of money going in there from a number of different countries, so I think they can be cleared.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Conway.

Madam McDonough.

[Alexa McDonough, NDP, Halifax, NS]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you all for being here today, and thank you for the very major role that I know each of your organizations played in making Canada and Canadians proud 10 years ago with the land mines treaty. And even though there are a lot of people out there wondering what happened to Canada's independent foreign policy, thank you for demonstrating that we can indeed work across party lines, as we've done at this committee, and with NGOs, in a solid partnership, to move forward on such a monumental challenge as that of banning cluster munitions in today's world.

I can't help but think that it may have been about a year ago today that we had an all-party breakfast on Parliament Hill with this issue before us, and pretty significantly, the Afghanistan ambassador appeared to speak in support of the campaign you were launching for the banning of cluster munitions at that time. So there has been some progress.

I want to ask a couple of questions that you may or may not know the answers to in detail or have time to elaborate on, but perhaps you could agree to share the information with the committee.

The first is in the context of Afghanistan today. I know that your research showed, 2001 to 2002, that there were 100 civilian deaths directly attributable and identifiable as a result of cluster munitions. But is it your understanding that cluster munitions are still being used in Afghanistan? If so, by which countries and in which parts of Afghanistan?

Secondly, there has been some concern expressed by some members of Parliament, although I'm happy to say nobody around this table at the moment, that we really need to hear from those who would advocate within Canada the continued use of cluster bombs. I'm wondering if you can help identify who such people might be, because I think probably we should know who they are and we should hear from them to know what is being said.

Thirdly, you spoke about the fact that the majority of European countries, I think, were among the signators, the 46 signators, in Oslo last week. Can you identify which countries who are NATO members were not among the signators?

Finally, my question is on the next step that you are advocating, which seems very reasonable--we should put our money where our mouth is; we should demonstrate that our words are followed by actions. Can you suggest what the cost to Canada is to take that next step of declaring a moratorium? Is there any downside that one can imagine, or is that the next logical step that you hope we can provide leadership for, helping to make happen by working together?

[Paul Hannon]

Yes, I will try to get back to you on the specific answers. I don't think we have time to get into depth on Afghanistan.

For those who advocate for, I suppose it would be odd for me to be identifying them for you, but we certainly have heard lots of military experts over the last six years in the CCW. None of them really made particularly strong cases for the use of the weapon; they were just trying to prevent us from presenting our cases that there were humanitarian concerns with the weapon. I'm sure our government officials in Foreign Affairs or National Defence could identify people.

I would suggest that if you do have them here, you should ask them what proof they have that these weapons are effective and what proof they have that they do what they claim they will do and how they will use them in modern warfare. I think that will respond to some of your questions, because we've not seen it. There are claims, and usually from manufacturers, but we've not seen any proof that they actually achieve the military objective they're supposed to achieve and that they do what they're supposed to do. But we do have lots of proof that they don't do what they're supposed to do and that they harm an awful lot, tens of thousands, of civilians and affect communities around the world.

We'll get you the list of the NATO countries that weren't there or didn't sign on.

Yes, I think the next logical step is for Canada to declare a moratorium. I don't see a cost in that. The immediate cost for Canada to play a role, as Steve has suggested, is basically some travel and resources in Foreign Affairs to go to conferences, do bilaterals, do the clever and creative diplomatic work that they've done on the landmine stream. They know how to do it.

[Simon Conway]

That may be a long-term saving, because if we don't act now we may well see these weapons proliferate further than they have. I saw Hezbollah using cluster munitions in southern Lebanon just last year. They had been sold by the Chinese to Iran, and Iran had supplied them to Hezbollah. We're now seeing non-state actors using cluster munitions. We may well see them being sold to other nations.

We could have a huge problem that would cost us a huge amount of money to clear up. Countries like Canada will inevitably be the ones that pay for clearing them up because they have done such a good job of paying to clear up land mines. Do you want to face that cost? It may be better to act now. It will save you money in the longer term.

[Steve Goose]

I have some relevant information on Afghanistan. We made Freedom of Information Act requests about U.S. use of cluster munitions in recent years, and the response came back that they had used them on a couple of occasions in Iraq after 2003. They used them very heavily in 2003 in the so-called major fighting. They've used them a couple of times since, but they told us the U.S. had not used them in Afghanistan since 2002.

We know there has been some speculation about the Netherlands having used them. Dutch officials tell us they have not.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much for that information, and thank you for being here today. It certainly has been a bit of an education, as well as a follow-up to the motion we had.

We will suspend for a few moments to allow you the opportunity to leave the table, and for our next guests to appear.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

I call this meeting back to order.

We're coming to a conclusion on our study on democratic development. We have a very limited number of witnesses left to hear.

We are very pleased today to have with us the President of the Canadian International Development Agency, Robert Greenhill. Welcome. It's good to see you again. We also have Adair Heuchan, acting director general from the Office for Democratic Governance. We're pleased to have you with us. You have given us a short document here on CIDA and their Office for Democratic Governance.

You have been here many times and know how this committee operates. You can make some opening comments. Then if we have time for questions, we would appreciate that.

Welcome. We look forward to what you have to say.

[Robert Greenhill, President, Canadian International Development Agency]

Thank you very much.

Thank you for affording me the opportunity to discuss this important issue, which is that of democratic governance and the role that we can play to help the government in this regard.

I would also like to start off by thanking the members for taking the time as a group to come to the meeting held by the Democracy Council. I think it was an excellent day, and by your presence you underlined the importance this committee is collectively playing in this important issue. It was recognized and appreciated by the people present.

As CIDA's minister, the Honourable Josée Verner, expressed to you when she testified to your committee back in October, democratic development is a core area of focus for our agency. And for us, democratic development means democratic governance. It means freedom and democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and accountable public institutions.

By freedom and democracy, we mean democracy based upon strong electoral, legislative, and party institutions rooted in a supportive democratic culture, including an active civil society and a vibrant free media. By rule of law, we mean fair and effective laws, accessible and timely legal institutions, and an impartial judiciary. Human rights for all can be achieved through strong human rights institutions and mechanisms that support civil society to fulfill its role in human rights education and accountability. Accountable public institutions are critical to manage the economy and public funds and to deliver key social services, such as health and education, effectively and without corruption.

Our commitment to supporting democratic governance has grown since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Today, CIDA makes the largest investment of any Canadian organization in democratic governance in developing countries, working closely with many other Canadian organizations and government ministries, because we recognize that open, democratic, and accountable systems of governance that promote human rights and the rule of law are essential to achieving long-term economic and social development and poverty reduction.

When Canada's new government came into power a year ago, democratic government was accentuated as an integral aspect of our work at CIDA. Now there is an increasing focus on promoting freedom and democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and accountable institutions in all of our country programming. In fact, for our major country programs, it is the only compulsory sector of focus. Different country programs can focus on other issues, whether they be health or education or private sector development, etc., but every one of our major country programs must have the element of democratic governance as a compulsory sector of intervention.

The handout you have in front of you illustrates a list of projects that CIDA has undertaken in the field in cooperation with other Canadian and international partners.

CIDA's decision to establish the Office for Democratic Governance last year represents a critical component of our determination to enhance CIDA and the Government of Canada's efforts to promote democratic governance around the world.

I've been asked to speak a little bit today on the origin and nature and role of the Office for Democratic Governance.

The office is designed to build on CIDA's capacity for effective practice of democratic governance and to serve as a focal point through which the agency can actively engage the community of Canadian and international experts, institutions, and other government departments whose work focuses on democratic governance. It's important to note that our role is to facilitate, coordinate, and accelerate, but certainly not to monopolize, Canada's democratic governance assistance. Many other government departments are very involved; many other key Canadian institutions, including NGO institutions, are actively involved, in collaboration with local partners in the developing countries.

Why was this office created? For many years, many Canadians have been active in this area of work and have made historic contributions, for example, Canada's role in ending apartheid and building democratic governance in South Africa. Yet until recently, there was no home to coordinate and synthesize Canada's role in advancing democratic governance. There was a lack of a strong and consolidated knowledge base, so although there was an impressive list of projects, it wasn't clear there was an impressive institutional understanding and comprehension coming out of all of these different projects. And there was no central organization charged with building and supporting Canadian capacity inside and outside government and no way to access the best expertise quickly.

Canada Corps, launched in 2004, represented an initial attempt to fill this vacuum, but as structured, the organization was saddled with a multiple mandate that went beyond good governance to include youth mobilization as well as public engagement. Canada Corps had some success in mobilizing Canadian volunteers and youth, yet it became clear over time that in order to maximize Canada's value-added, a more concentrated effort to promote democratic governance was needed.

With the mobilization of youth and volunteers already well-established in the Canadian partnership branch, which sends literally thousands of Canadians abroad through volunteer programs already every year, and public engagement deemed best placed within the communications function of the agency, it was evident that the real need was for an enhanced and comprehensive focus on democratic governance.

That is why on October 30, 2006, Minister Verner created the Office for Democratic Governance. This new organization's goal is to promote state-of-the-art thinking on democratic governance, to actively engage in the sharing of best practices and lessons learned across Canada and internationally, and to conduct innovative programming that complements existing work done by other branches within CIDA and other organizations within and outside of the government. Our goal is that this office will ultimately enhance the capacity of CIDA and the Government of Canada to deliver effective, timely, and equitable democratic governance programming in a way that promotes greater coherence and coordination among Canadian actors.

In terms of what's happened over the less than one year that it's been in place, the office has actively promoted freedom and democracy by providing critical support to electoral processes in many challenging venues. In the last 12 months, the office has deployed 290 Canadian election observers to observe 10 elections around the world, including those in Haiti, the West Bank and Gaza, and, most recently, the Democratic Republic of Congo. To accomplish this, the office has worked closely with other CIDA programming branches, as well as with other government departments, including Elections Canada, DFAIT, and DND.

The office has established a new practice of convening election task forces to respond in a coordinated manner to requests for election observation support, and it delivers new security training to election observers. The office has also fostered enhanced relationships with regional organizations such as the Organization of American States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In so doing, we've actually taken an issue of electoral engagement and not only increased the quantity of Canada's engagement significantly over the last year, in cooperation with Elections Canada and other institutions, but considerably enhanced the quality of our engagement.

We're also working in cooperation with other Canadian and international organizations, through the Office for Democratic Governance, to contribute to developing political systems that are more open, transparent, and accountable. As you saw through the Democracy Council, which the Office of Democratic Governance co-chairs, we've collaborated closely with DFAIT, with IDRC, and with other arm's-length Canadian organizations to create fora to engage the community of practice in democracy promotion.

Another element in which the Office of Democratic Governance, together with the rest of CIDA, is involved is in the explicit creation of a space and a role for southern civil society in development and democratic discourse in the south. One of the points Minister Verner made recently is our intention to work with other international partners to explicitly recognize the role of civil society and southern civil society in donor harmonization, to ensure that as we become more coordinated, working with other donors and with the governments of developing countries, we explicitly recognize and support the role of a civil society, and particularly southern civil society, in these debates.

The promotion of the rule of law in developing countries is also one of the areas where Canada can provide decisive assistance. Canada can be proud of its civil and common law experts. To optimize Canada's contribution, the Office for Democratic Governance recently completed a study that provides a picture of the Canadian institutions working in the area of the rule of law. That study, which was conducted in close cooperation with CIDA's geographic branches and with the institutions of the Canadian justice sector, will serve as a basis for an inclusive approach to rule of law programming. This approach will make it possible to advance Canada's foreign policy objectives, improve harmonization with other donors and meet the needs of the partner countries.

For example, the Office for Democratic Governance is making it possible to advance matters in Ghana, where we are working in close cooperation with local stakeholders to improve the skills and knowledge of legal services personnel. Again in Ghana, the offices are working with more than 200 journalists, editors and other representatives of the media world to develop their skills in talking about specific human rights issues.

We are also working specifically on the issue of human rights, and particularly on the way to measure human rights progress and impact. With the assistance provided by the Office for Democratic Governance in Metagora, an OECD pilot project designed to create a system that will be used to measure the state of democracy, human rights and governance, the Office is also helping to establish specific, relevant and effective indicators for developing programming based on evidence in the human rights sector.

We are working in close cooperation with Equitas and the universities of Montreal and McGill. The Office is also working to increase the ability of Indonesia's Department of Justice and Human Rights to protect human rights in the regions affected by the tsunami.

As regards the responsibility of public institutions, the Office has previously cooperated in improving the coherence and coordination of those institutions. It has established framework agreements with two globally renowned Canadian entities that are experts in governance, that is to say Statistics Canada and the Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Those framework agreements are assisting in bringing Canadian expertise in statistics management and audit to bear, which promotes a comprehensive approach and a more ambitious vision of Canada's contribution in favour of accountability in developing countries.

One of the Office's roles is to work with CIDA's program branches to promote democratic governance in a coherent manner. The Office has contributed to the development of programming frameworks for countries such as Tanzania, Honduras, Bolivia and the Ukraine. It has also cooperated with the geographic branches of Haiti, Nicaragua, Honduras and Pakistan in testing a governance indicator project. These indicators provide specific and appropriate data on which we can rely to develop effective programming.

In a collaborative learning perspective, the Office has combined its strengths with those of the Centre for International Governance Innovation, or CIGI, in Waterloo, to create a knowledge exchange gateway for all stakeholders involved in democratic governance. This virtual governance village will attract the international community's attention to Canada's pool of knowledge, expertise and leadership in the field of democratic governance promotion. It will improve the ability of decision-makers and practitioners to create policies and programs in developing countries based on evidence, and will facilitate the integration of that knowledge and innovative and effective practices.

Going forward in the future, over the next year the office will work hard to enhance the capacity of CIDA and partner institutions through innovative funding and capacity development initiatives. One example of this is the deployments for democratic development mechanism, a multi-million-dollar initiative that will help CIDA recruit and deploy the best and brightest Canadian expertise in democratic governance and respond quickly to needs on the ground.

Right now, what happens is if within CIDA or another government department we identify a need from a country on a certain expertise...if a country comes to us and says they'd really like help in reforming their office of the auditor general, or they'd really like to establish an improvement in this or that area, actually calling upon and deploying that Canadian expertise can be cumbersome and lengthy. By having a democratic deployment mechanism, we'll be working with a Canadian partner--and this has actually gone out now through a request for proposal and through a competitive bid--to be able to quickly draw upon and provide the best thinking and the best Canadian expertise in these different areas of democratic governance.

In promotion of freedom and democracy, the office will proactively support governments committed to democracy beyond the election event by shifting electoral assistance from a focus on the election as a one-day event to a more comprehensive and longer-term electoral cycle, including aspects such as transition of power and transparent media and reinforcing electoral commissions.

One of the office's key initiatives will be to coordinate the implementation of an enhanced anti-corruption strategy for the agency. Supporting accountability, transparency, and fairness is a core principle of Canada's new government and is critical to CIDA's aid effectiveness. As part of this implementation strategy, the Office for Democratic Governance will provide broad-based approaches to anti-corruption programming.

To be clear, we've had for years a very strong and effective focus on dealing with corruption within specific projects or programs that CIDA is involved in. What we want to do is go beyond that to actually help governments engage in broader, government-wide approaches to dealing with corruption, accountability, and transparency in a much more systematic way.

Finally, in the rule of law, the office will build upon the recommendations coming out of the study I just mentioned to help develop a strategic framework for rule of law programming, working with key Canadian institutions in this field. We also intend to develop a framework arrangement with the Department of Justice and facilitate the establishment of a rule of law community of practice with enhanced coordination and collaboration among the actors.

In conclusion, we expect and hope the Office for Democratic Governance will play a leading role in facilitating successful, innovative, coherent, and results-oriented democratic governance programming for CIDA, the Government of Canada, and the greater Canadian community of practice.

The Office of Democratic Governance will be at the forefront of our efforts to fight corruption. It will develop mechanisms that will allow the Government of Canada to access and deploy the best Canadian expertise quickly and effectively, and it will serve as a hub through which we support the community of Canadian and international experts.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to highlight the contributions of CIDA through the Office of Democratic Governance to this global challenge of democratic development. I'm personally very encouraged and thankful that you've undertaken this study, and I welcome the careful consideration and fresh perspective that your study will bring to the work we do in this area.

I wish you the best in this area, and I look forward to answering your questions now and to reading your recommendations in the near future.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Greenhill.

Just before we get into the questions, I have a document here that we can't seem to find on your website. It's called “Canada's Aid Program, January 29, 2007”. Would it be possible for this committee to get a copy of this document in both official languages?

[Robert Greenhill]

Absolutely.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

All right.

Can you just very quickly tell me how much CIDA will spend in total on democratic governance? We all recognize the great work CIDA does, but the most frustrating thing is when I cannot put a figure on expenditures. Can you give me an idea, in the current 2006-07 fiscal year?

[Robert Greenhill]

For 2005-06, the number will be $375 million.

For 2006-07, that number will increase. In terms of the specific number--

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

For 2007-2008.

[Robert Greenhill]

We don't yet have those statistics because that will depend on the minister's decision, but we can clearly say that it is constantly increasing. So it will be more than the $375 million I mentioned for 2005-2006.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

All right.

Let's go to Mr. Patry, please.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Merci beaucoup. I will share my time with my colleague, Borys.

Thank you very much, Mr. Greenhill and Ms. Heuchan.

In January, the committee received a documentary note on the Bureau for Democratic Governance from CIDA. Those documentary notes from CIDA state that this new office will have the special mandate of improving aid effectiveness.

On December 4, Ms. Diane Éthier of the University of Montreal appeared before this committee and stated that CIDA was not really evaluating effectiveness.

My first question is very simple. Will responsibility for evaluating the effectiveness of CIDA's democratic governance programs be assigned to the Office for Democratic Governance?

As for my second question, this morning I note in the documents that you have provided to us, the very impressive list of your democratic governance partners.

Where does the process for awarding contracts for the democratic development deployment mechanism stand?

I will ask my colleague to ask his question. This way, we're going to get all the answers in one shot. He's going to ask the question first.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Yes, he'll ask a second question, and then you can respond.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

What I'd like to jump into is the reshuffling. It appears that this has been a reshuffling of existing and ongoing programs. Is there an intention to get directly involved--as opposed to indirectly, through outside agencies--in this sort of work? What percentage of the projects in the past year, for instance, were engaged in directly?

You also talked of Canada Corps and the mobilization of youth and volunteers. There was a very successful project, their inaugural project, which was the electoral observer mission in Ukraine, which involved diaspora communities. Notwithstanding all the reservations and worries of the department, it was a tremendous success, precisely because of that factor.

Nowhere in the documents do I see mention of direct engagement of this tremendous reservoir of human knowledge that we have in Canada. It's a unique advantage we have over other countries in the democratic governance work that we could be doing abroad.

[Robert Greenhill]

Thank you for your questions. There are quite a few; I'll try to answer them all.

We ensure aid effectiveness at two or three levels. First, the team provides close follow-up to each of our projects. Second, in the context of the program, we conduct evaluations, often country-wide, and they are public. Third, the agency has criteria. For example, there's the percentage of aid granted and the percentage of our projects that have succeeded. That gives us an aid effectiveness measure in the context of these specific projects.

If we consider the effectiveness of aid for democratic development, we can also see very specific things in the field. For example, actions have succeeded very well in Haiti. For the first time in 200 years, Haitians have had municipal, legislative and presidential elections that have succeeded. We've also given three million Haitians identification cards providing them with some access to services for the first time in their lives.

In Afghanistan, where Canada spent $30 million to support the 2005 elections, we've seen that those elections in fact were held. If my memory serves me, 63 % of the population voted, including a number of women never previously equalled in an election in Afghanistan.

Future evaluations of specific projects are the responsibility of the departments that do them. Furthermore, we have a department responsible for evaluation and audit. After putting a new emphasis on accounting, we'll also have a chief audit executive, who will conduct audits for me on specific programs in order to ensure that the money is being well spent and producing results. As I said, we can directly see results, especially in the case of elections.

As regards the processes, they vary. Sometimes we work with multilateral organizations such as the organization of American states, the OAS, on some projects. On others, we call for competitive bids, for example for the Democratic Development Deployment Mechanism. This results in competitive bids from a number of persons who have expressed interest.

On the question of the role of the Office for Democratic Governance versus reshuffling, the intent of the office is explicitly to provide additional funds to the already large amounts of money we're investing in CIDA and across the government for democratic governance.

More than just the additional funds, the intent is to improve the quality of what we're doing in two ways. One is by supporting innovative programming such as some of the elections programming being done and this democratic deployment mechanism. The second way we can add value is by being the place to bring this all together. Far too often in the past our projects have been across different geographies and departments without being brought together. This is to provide a home for thinking, reflection, and coordination.

So in addition to the specific dollar amount, the quality and coordination of our engagement in democratic governance will go up significantly.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Can you give us the specific dollar amount?

[Robert Greenhill]

The amount we have budgeted for this year is $40 million, in addition to what we are doing through the--

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Due to the time, maybe you could answer in writing some of the other questions he posed.

Madam Lalonde.