Foreign Affairs Committee on May 31st, 2007

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

You're not one of those advocating a ban?

[Paul Meyer]

Not a total ban, because in the Canadian view, these munitions have legitimate use if they are used in accordance with international humanitarian law and have the qualities that would make them consistent with such use.

So you get into these areas—and this is what has to be defined—of what reliability level you should insist on, because one of the difficulties was the use by some countries of cluster munitions that had a high failure rate. These are the remnants of war, if you will, which can cause unacceptable humanitarian consequences later.

You can see how a determination, for instance, that in the future.... And many military, including our own, are taking the stance that if there were to be any future use or acquisition of these munitions, the reliability level would have to be 99%, compared to current arsenals, whose reliability is much less than that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Madame Barbot, vous avez sept minutes.

[Vivian Barbot, Bloc, Papineau, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here today.

Regarding the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, you are saying that it is an important aspect of Canada's foreign policy and that Canada supports the implementation of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

However, is there not a contradiction when, on the one hand, Canada pretends to be taking active measures to address the humanitarian and development impact of the proliferation of these arms while, on the other hand, ensuring that the interests of firearms owners, producers, brokers and retailers are respected?

In other words, these arms are coming from somewhere. I suppose that the illicit trade is being done through traders, producers, etc. How can Canada reconcile taking action both to protect these people and to fight this illicit trade?

[Paul Meyer]

Indeed, the illicit trade must be fought, while allowing the legitimate trade to go on. How can we reconcile these two actions? It is one aspect of the activities in this file. The United Kingdom has proposed to develop a comprehensive treaty that would govern all aspects and all types of arms. The challenge in developing such a treaty would be to formulate guidelines regulating the trade in this type of arms. In my view, defining standards that would be applied at the international level and aimed at determining the legitimacy of the sale of such arms would be a great step forward.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

Madame Barbot.

[Vivian Barbot, Bloc, Papineau, QC]

I would like to make a comment. At the present time, we know who is producing the arms that are found elsewhere. Could we not take more concrete steps, particularly when Canadians are involved? These arms do not end up on the black market by themselves. Since Canada is saying that it is an extremely important part of its foreign policy, it seems to me that we should be taking more binding action and not simply rely on an eventual treaty.

Moreover, you mentioned the non-proliferation treaty and the considerable tensions that are being associated with this treaty. You are quoting countries that are attacking the treaty, namely Irak, Libya, North Korea and Pakistan. I am somewhat surprised not to find in this list India and Israel. Is it a voluntary omission or are these countries meeting other standards than those you have been referring to?

[Paul Meyer]

No, madam. In fact, the goal is to promote the universal implementation of this treaty, including by the three countries that are not parties to the treaty for the time being, namely Israel, India and Pakistan. The reference to Pakistan is due to the black market that has been developed by a Pakistani individual, which represents another challenge for the treaty. As I said in my remarks, some countries that are parties to the treaty, for example Libya, Irak, Iran and North Korea, have violated their obligations under the treaty.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Madame Lalonde.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Mr. Ambassador, I wanted to know what the $150 million would be used for.

A couple of years ago, I took part, together with a Canadian delegation, in a meeting in Strasburg dealing with old weaponry material that are dangerous for the environment. I learned on that occasion that Russia was continuing to develop modern nuclear weapons, but was leaving the international community to deal with these obsolete equipments.

I would like to have your comments on this issue.

[Paul Meyer]

Russia is not the Soviet Union. It is a country that is undergoing a deep transformation. In my view, what is important is that Russia is now contributing to this global partnership. In fact, it is ranked second among donor countries. The Moscow government has indicated its real contribution to this project that was inherited from the former soviet regime.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Madame Lalonde, very quickly.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

At the end of the paragraph on the NPT, which is quite interesting, you are saying this: “...much more work will be needed to bridge the gaps existing amongst the NPT members and to restore the sense of common purpose...“.

Could you conclude with this?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Merci, Madame Lalonde.

[Paul Meyer]

Ms. Lalonde, we must have common goals and we must bridge the gap that exist between various perceptions. We must convince all parties that it is more important to reach common security goals than to focus on narrow national interests. The challenge will be to establish a persuasive diplomacy in order to reach that goal.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

We'll go to Mr. Obhrai for seven minutes.

[Deepak Obhrai, Conservative, Calgary East, AB]

Thank you for coming, Ambassador. It's good to have you here.

I can't resist telling my Liberal colleagues that if they have a government policy question, they could ask it in question period. I'd be delighted to tell them.

Let me ask you this question. I'd like to hear a brief idea on this. Before you came here, we had two witnesses who very eloquently talked about what was happening on the world stage. You have the India-U.S. nuclear deal, the Iranian issue, the Korean issue, and a lot of other non-proliferation challenges coming up. I would be interested in knowing what's happening in Geneva among the opinion makers, not the official policy but the mood. Is there optimism out there? Do people think it's moving towards what we want to achieve with NPT?

What is the mood out there in Geneva? Could you give us your brief observations?

[Paul Meyer]

Indeed—and it was noted by the earlier witnesses—there has been some significant progress in the Conference on Disarmament, a 65-nation body in which all the states that are considered to have nuclear weapons are represented, but it has not been able to officially agree on a work plan with these four areas that were enumerated: the fissile material cut-off treaty, which is just a treaty to stop the production of the stuff with which one makes nuclear weapons; the nuclear disarmament theme; the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and so-called negative security assurances, which are simply the assurances given to non-nuclear-weapons states by nuclear weapons states that they will not be subject to the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Through skilful diplomacy, I think a package has been developed that enjoys widespread support, but—and this is the big “but”—this is a body of 65 nations that does everything on consensus, so you need every representative there to be in accord. On this package that's currently before the conference, China, Pakistan, and Iran have indicated that they have some problems. Though they aren't actually coming out and saying they're opposing it, we're in a situation right now where they've raised some concerns and are saying that they really would like these concerns addressed. It is unfortunately looking as if some of the very positive momentum that was building up may be lost.

I think it is crucial that we keep the public scrutiny and the political scrutiny on these three states in particular. There is a very fair compromise deal on the table. It should be accepted, and if we want to see multilateral work in the realm of non-proliferation and disarmament move ahead, we need that basic kind of cooperation.

I would hope that all of you, in your contacts, could also be promotive of this. This is the best hope in many years to get this machinery back into gear, and we shouldn't lose it because of reservations by two or three of these states.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Khan.

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Your Excellency, I have a very quick question.

I'm really encouraged that the state arsenals will be without WMD. If that is the case, I think it needs to be celebrated. But there is another challenge, and it is a significant one: how do we deal with the transnationals who now have the ability to access the same science, no matter how crude it is?

My second question is, sir, can you shed some light on the process of redirecting WMD scientists?

[Paul Meyer]

Absolutely, the transnational or non-state actors are one of the current challenges.

I think what we need to do there is complement the existing regime, which is based on a state-centric approach, and we have to keep in mind that it's not like there are no problematic states any longer in the world. We need to ensure that remains valid but, at the same time, work again through cooperation to ensure that we're not giving openings for terrorist groups or other non-state actors to get their hands on WMD, for example. That's why the A.Q. Khan network has to be resolutely countered and investigated, and we need a strengthening of export control measures.

There are a number of international conventions—I won't go into them now—that have been prompted by this concern. The convention against nuclear terrorism was recently concluded. We've strengthened the convention on the protection of radioactive material to deny possibilities.

A lot of the work under the auspices of global partnership speaks to exactly these kinds of concerns. For instance, in the former Soviet Union, they used to power remote lighthouses with highly radioactive power sources. There is now a project under way to replace those with solar panels and other things, not that the material could actually be used in a nuclear explosive device, but it could be used in a so-called dirty bomb that could cause great consternation and casualties.

That's a very practical way in which you're just trying to keep a step ahead of those who might want to use this material for very nasty purposes.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

We'll go to Mr. Dewar, for seven minutes, please.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador, for your presentation today. It was most helpful. I appreciate the challenge you had in trying to compact all the work you've been doing into a short period of time. You did a terrific job of that.

I want to touch on the previous witnesses' idea of co-sponsoring a motion at the UN. I know you are an ambassador; you're not a minister. In terms of the ability to co-sponsor a motion that could create ad hoc committees on the four areas of concern--the cut-off treaty, the prevention of an arms race in space, the negative security assurances, and the new approaches to nuclear disarmament--I just want to have your comment on that approach. There is this quagmire that seems to exist, and the fact that we are in a new phase, as was mentioned by our previous witnesses. We are not dealing with two monolithic blocs. And there is the success of the SALT treaties and some of the other follow-up to that, which some would say was a little easier to do because we were dealing with two blocs. Now things are much more fractured and decentralized.

[Paul Meyer]

The focus at the moment is on this CD decision. We've always felt that if it could agree, the Conference on Disarmament, sanctioned by the broader UN committee for these negotiations or discussions, represented the preferred forum. That remains our principal focus now. We are encouraging other states to do what they can to persuade that handful of states that haven't yet endorsed this proposal. That's going to be our priority.

We will have to make our own assessment later this year when the CD concludes its formal session in mid-September. On the basis of that analysis, there may be further reflections about alternative approaches to take.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

I would encourage reflection on that. The CD has had many challenges. Sometimes when things aren't working, it's important to look at another way of doing things. Again, I appreciate your position and where you're at. I'm simply providing that for the record and for you.

With respect to my other question, Canada proposed a certain course of action at the first committee and it didn't work out. What were the challenges? Maybe it goes back to the gap analysis you were referring to. Why do you think it failed? In your opinion and from your position, what could Canada do differently to seek success?