Evidence of meeting #59 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 39th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was npt.
A recording is available from Parliament.
9:40 a.m.
Bloc
Francine Lalonde Bloc La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC
I quote from the report:
It is in the interest of nuclear disarmament that these technologies be severely restricted and placed under international control through non-discriminatory multilateral arrangements. Canada, as a state with high levels of competence in relevant technologies, should take an active role in investigating and promoting international fuel cycle control mechanisms.
Could you give us more details on this issue?
9:40 a.m.
Senior Policy Advisor, Project Ploughshares
Well, as we were saying, in order to prevent the wide distribution of technology that has quite immediate weapons applications, the proposal is to place the sensitive technology, such as uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of fuel, into multilateral hands, into international controls, rather than make it the prerogative of individual nation states.
Canada, because it has skills in this area, needs to play an active role in promoting multilateralism, but when we do that, we have to genuinely promote multilateralism, not multilateralism as long as our own national prerogatives are protected. So we can't go internationally and say there should be multilateral control of the fuel cycle but we'd like to develop uranium enrichment in our own country because we have the technology and the means to do it. If it's multilateral, it has to be multilateral.
If we're going to say, as Doug has said, that we can do uranium enrichment in our country, we're not going to be able to shut down the Iran issue. It's a complicated issue that needs physical scientists involved and the expertise of the officials, and so forth. But again, the fundamental principle is that these technologies should not be under national control, they should be under international control, and Canada should not argue that position while also trying to retain a national prerogative to pursue them.
9:40 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Thank you, Mr. Regehr.
Thank you, Madam Lalonde.
Mr. Khan and Mr. Obhrai will do a split.
9:40 a.m.
Conservative
Wajid Khan Conservative Mississauga—Streetsville, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here.
Now, I want to get on to a more practical side of things, the evolution of nuclear weapons for a certain purpose—I don't need to go into that history—and the recent example of over a million troops being on the border of India and Pakistan, almost a million troops on either side, eyeball to eyeball. I think if they had not had nuclear capacity, there would have been a war that had terrible impacts.
This is a response to what you said, sir, that nuclear weapons for security is not valid anymore.
You also said that you need a stronger weight. I don't know who you're referring to, perhaps the U.S., Russia, China? Who was that heavyweight, that stronger weight that you require?
Given that the nuclear weapons exist and given that nuclear science exists and is advancing, don't you think it is naive to assume that we can turn the clock back and eliminate or even control the science?
What I'd like to hear, sir.... This is a very complex question, and by no means do I support nuclear proliferation, but can you give us a comprehensive and attainable solution? I don't think statements in the United Nations are going to bring about any good. Is that a realistic approach? Is it attainable? Can it happen?
Those are the kinds of answers I'm looking for, sir.
9:40 a.m.
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
Thank you very much, Mr. Khan.
First, on “weight”, what I meant was that the Canadian government should speak at the highest levels, go to the highest levels—the Prime Minister, the foreign minister. The full exposition of the policy of the Government of Canada on this subject is very much needed.
On the security, it's pretty clear that nuclear weapons cannot be used and have not been able to stop the wars that have taken place over the past 30 or 40 years.
On India and Pakistan, the presence of nuclear weapons in both countries, in my view, exacerbates the situation rather than having an ameliorative effect. We have moved beyond a period when any one nation can hope to guarantee its own security by an overpowering military might, including nuclear weapons. Modern history is replete with examples of this.
And with respect to being naïve in aspiring to a nuclear-weapons-free world, this is not just a sermon or a homily; it is a legal requirement under the non-proliferation treaty. All states are obliged to pursue negotiations toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, from a political point of view, it is totally impractical to think that in the 21st century we can go on with the status quo, the status quo being defined as a number of states holding to themselves the right to have nuclear weapons while proscribing their acquisition by any other state. It's simply not working.
In the words of Kofi Annan, the recently departed Secretary-General, we are “sleepwalking” toward a catastrophe.
I cited the four prominent American statesmen—Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, and Nunn—who, in a remarkable piece in the Wall Street Journal, said that the time has now come for a nuclear-weapons-free world and to pursue this by certain steps that need to be taken.
No one thinks that the abolition of nuclear weapons can occur overnight. That's not the idea. It is the refusal of the major states to start heading down that avenue in a concrete, practical manner that is destabilizing the international regime today and weakening the non-proliferation treaty, which is the single best guarantee we have against nuclear warfare.
9:45 a.m.
Senior Policy Advisor, Project Ploughshares
I would just add, very briefly, that I was encouraged by your point that you do not support the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and so that's the challenge we hold in common. How do we make good on that concern?
We can't turn the clock back, but we can control the science. We can control the technology. And in fact, the record has been of fairly effective control of the technology. The breakout of technology to new regimes is very limited. The International Atomic Energy Agency is there and controls the technology and the science on a daily basis. It needs to be strengthened. It needs to be further reported.
I think one thing we can say is that we will never reach a point where the nuclear problem has been solved and now we'll go on to other things. There will always be temptations for somebody to pick up the science. They will have to be vigilant at all times. The institutional arrangements through the International Atomic Energy Agency to prevent proliferation will always be necessary and present and will require the energetic diplomatic support of countries like Canada.
9:45 a.m.
Conservative
Wajid Khan Conservative Mississauga—Streetsville, ON
Senator, you just said “refusal of the major states”. Russia just announced that they have the ability to penetrate the missile shield. So it is that issue that is so crucial: how do we have these countries reconcile? As Russia and China are becoming wealthier, they are going to be competing in military hardware and nuclear technology, and so on, to remain in lockstep with the United States and others for their own security. How do you convince them to back off? How do you convince the Iranians, who lost a million people in the war with Iraq, supported by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, that it won't happen to them again? Some people will argue that they have legitimate concerns. How do we reconcile those issues before we...?
9:45 a.m.
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
Thank you, Mr. Khan.
In brief, the pursuit of international law is the only way in which we can hope to live in a stabilized world as the 21st century goes ahead. I think Russia is manifesting, in the announcement that you just referred to, that there is indeed a renewed nuclear arms race going on now.
We have entered what I call the second nuclear age, the first age being in the Cold War, and now in the 21st century nuclear weapons are being built into the military doctrines of the major states as permanent instruments. This is completely against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it's against what I would call the risk factor. The risk of going down the avenue that will lead to nuclear disarmament is much less a risk to the world than the present maintenance of the status quo is a risk to the use of nuclear weapons.
9:50 a.m.
Senior Policy Advisor, Project Ploughshares
You mentioned the Russian missile test, and that's reflective of the action-reaction cycle of nuclear arms.
In the early nineties and throughout the nineties we were in a situation of action-reaction in a downward spiral, and there was then a complementary action to reduce nuclear weapons. It's possible.
The ballistic missile defence proposal of the United States is part of an action-reaction cycle that's starting to escalate that again. The Russian interest isn't breaking through the defences. It's possible for states to take initiatives that produce constructive reactions to their action, and that action-reaction cycle on a downward spiral is what we have to pick up again.
9:50 a.m.
Conservative
9:50 a.m.
Conservative
Deepak Obhrai Conservative Calgary East, AB
Yes, thank you very much for coming. Of course, I was here when you were here last time with former Prime Minister Kim Campbell.
The questions that are coming out here are legitimate questions in reference to this legal instrument, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. From your own testimony, everybody is relying on that to be the police thing that will ultimately reach the goal you have been looking for and we all have been looking for: the elimination of nuclear weapons. However, let me ask you this question, and I can ask this question to the other witness too.
The report card. The NPT says that we'll work to reduce and eliminate the disarmament portion of it. What is the report card today of the five permanent members who have been exempt and who have been told that they need to eliminate theirs?
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the proliferation that is going on in the former states is creating a very dangerous situation. Has anybody worked this out to see the report card? Has the U.S., the Chinese, or anybody else reduced to meet this NPT requirement that is there? Or are these people ignoring the NPT? And if they are, then why would somebody else come along and say we want to stick to the NPT as well?
My second short question here is this. The India nuclear deal creates a new situation. Would there be a need for a new instrument coming in here to take these kinds of national interests into account?
9:50 a.m.
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
Thank you.
I'll deal with the first question, and Mr. Regehr will deal with India.
First, I was puzzled by your use, Mr. Obhrai, of the word “exempt”. I'm not sure if you meant to imply it, but let me state clearly that the major nuclear powers are not exempt from their obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. With respect to reporting and ignoring, I would not say that the major states are ignoring the non-proliferation treaty. They come to all the review conferences. There was just a two-week meeting in Vienna preparing for the 2010 review; the nuclear-weapon states all participated. But they are trying to have it both ways. They are trying to pretend that their modernization programs are off on the side, and they want to keep the focus on Iran and North Korea.
I want to assert, as a person who believes in the elimination of nuclear weapons, that of course Iran and North Korea and any other country should be stopped from getting a nuclear weapon, but it's not going to be a successful campaign as long as those who have them think that they can go on pursuing them and ignoring their obligations.
They are deficient in their reporting, but Hans Blix says in his report—and eminent people from around the world say—that there are 27,000 nuclear weapons, that 95% of them are held between the United States and Russia, and that of that number about 2,500 strategic nuclear weapons, the smallest of which is about eight or ten times more powerful than the bomb that went off in Hiroshima, are being held on what's called alert status, meaning they could be fired on fifteen minutes' notice. So the risk of an accident, of a computer malfunction, of something happening, or of a destabilized regime somewhere infiltrating the whole nuclear weapons system is very high for the world.
When Mr. Dosanjh asked me what the single most important thing is and I answered that it was the CTBT, if he had given me two things to say, I would have said the second single most important thing, the second single thing, is to get those weapons off alert status. Why cannot Canada go after the United States and Russia together to say, it is wrong, you're endangering humanity by keeping those weapons on alert status, and for heaven's sake, at least show your goodwill by getting them off alert status?
9:55 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Thank you, Mr. Roche.
Go ahead, Mr. Regehr, quickly. I'm sorry, but we're over time.
9:55 a.m.
Senior Policy Advisor, Project Ploughshares
We need a new institutional arrangement for India. The objective is to bring India, Pakistan, and Israel into the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. That's not going to happen immediately, but we should not go the other direction and simply recognize them as nuclear states without placing them under any disarmament obligation.
How do we place them under disarmament obligation? If we can't eliminate their nuclear weapons, we need to take measures that, at a minimum, freeze them where they are. That means insisting that they ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty and that they put a verifiable freeze on their production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.
India claims to have a minimal deterrence strategy. It has easily adequate weapons and fissile materials to carry out that minimum deterrence strategy. It should be open to a freeze on that, and that's what the condition should be when we enter into a civilian cooperation arrangement with them.
9:55 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Thank you, Mr. Regehr.
We went over time there. Mr. Dewar, you will get extra time. Committee business has been cut back, so we will go a little bit into the next hour.
Go ahead, Mr. Dewar.
May 31st, 2007 / 9:55 a.m.
NDP
Paul Dewar NDP Ottawa Centre, ON
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you to our guests. It is indeed an honour to have you here today, and we are well resourced with your briefs and also your backgrounds.
It is depressing sometimes to look at how far we had come, and in what direction we are going. That's certainly in your brief, and for anyone looking at this issue, part of our challenge is that people have decided that this isn't an important issue. Nothing could be further from the truth, as you mentioned in the quote about sleepwalking into this.
Not to mention that when you have people of the stature and background of Misters Schultz, Nunn, Perry, and Kissinger, this isn't an ideological issue. This is a humanitarian issue, and that was clear from their op-ed. I'm absolutely delighted that they provided the world community with their opinion, because it's worth hearing.
What we're trying to establish here is Canada's position. I know that from Hansard, on May 17 in the House, Mr. O'Connor said to the Speaker in response to a question, “Mr. Chair, we are a member of NATO and we stand by NATO's policies. NATO, at this stage, has no policy of disarming from nuclear weapons.” Then in response to the person asking the question, he went on to say, “As the member knows, Canada chose, back in 1945 when we participated in creating the nuclear weapons, not to have nuclear weapons. That is our national stand.”
This kind of underlines the confusion here. I don't say that to embarrass anyone, because it's what you've already laid out. On the one hand, we are saying that as a nation state, Canada, we are not in favour of the use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, we have this dilemma with NATO, and it's so critically important that Canada use its role in NATO to establish a position. We can do that without compromising. We can do it by way of stating—and I think your point is an excellent one—a declaration of principle that can be adopted within NATO.
My question to start with, maybe to you, Mr. Roche, is how can we do that? This is a goal—I think there'd be a consensus amongst everyone—that we should attain, but how do we do that within NATO?
10 a.m.
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
Thank you, Mr. Dewar.
The chairman would probably like me to be brief in my answer, so I will be.
First, on “depressing”, that's true in some ways, but you have to turn that coin around. I submit that there is an historical momentum occurring toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. It was done through the indefinite extension of NPT in 1995, making the obligations permanent.
The International Court of Justice said that they have a duty to conclude negotiations. In 2000, there was a unanimous agreement for an unequivocal undertaking in 13 steps. It's only in the past few years that there has been this downturn.
So we have to help turn this around. You're right that this is not an ideological subject; nuclear weapons are a human rights subject. It is the most gross violation of human rights around the world, let alone to those who are actually going to suffer the direct attack. So it should be approached from a human rights point of view.
Last, on Canada and what the minister said, of course we're grateful that Canada is not a nuclear weapons country. We don't have them as such, although I'll leave the history aside. But it isn't enough just not to have nuclear weapons; we must be active in the international community in ridding the world of the scourge of the possession of nuclear weapons. This is endangering humanity.
Finally, I'll make my concluding comment today on what we can do in NATO. This committee, Mr. Chairman, has an illustrious reputation and experience in dealing with nuclear weapons all through the years, as you pointed to earlier in the meeting. Of all the things you study in the 21st century—I realize you have a big agenda, and there are a lot of important things going on in the world—there are two overarching problems: climate change and nuclear weapons. If we turn our back on the obligation to reduce and eliminate the danger to the world of nuclear weapons, we are not fulfilling our responsibilities.
So the Canadian government should be pressing NATO to review its strategy, and this committee is well positioned to advise the Government of Canada to exercise its influence and leadership in joining with like-minded states in NATO—certainly Norway, Germany, and Belgium would be three such states—to work together to revise NATO's policy. This is an achievable goal.