Foreign Affairs Committee on April 10th, 2008

[Gen R.J. Hillier]

Yes, sir, I'd be delighted to speak to that. There are two aspects of the mission and setting success for the mission that helicopters enable, overall, under the umbrella of flexibility.

The first aspect is force protection. We have soldiers, sailors, airmen, and airwomen, not just our nationalities, in places throughout Kandahar province, at forward operating bases, or patrol bases, or out at police substations. As I mentioned earlier, the number of roads and the number of kilometres of road in that area are very limited. So when you're moving back and forth on the ground, you become predictable. Most of the roads and the ones we're trying to pave now that will reduce that somewhat are gravel roads. Therefore, it's very easy to dig them up; it's very easy to put in an improvised explosive device of any size and then camouflage that so you're not going to see it.

We take a lot of steps, obviously, to prevent that, but the first thing you can do, and specifically with the leased helicopters, is the hash and trash, getting all the beans and bullets and water and spare parts, and all those kinds of things, from Kandahar airfield out to that forward operating base, or that patrol base, or that police substation, and quite literally jump over that route, not be predictable and not be constrained to it, and therefore not be such a vulnerable target with a high probability of getting hit by an IED.

That's part one with the helicopters. It really does reduce the logistics support traffic, and that, I believe, would lead to a reduction in some of our casualties, along with other things we do.

The second part, given our manoeuvre forces, is a mobility throughout to be able to take the initiative away from the Taliban and to go to wherever we consider they're staging and strike them there before they can strike in Kandahar City or in Panjwai.

That's why something like the Chinook helicopter gives us an air mobility option. All of a sudden, you're into the area. You're not seen a long way off, coming down a road and raising clouds of dust and therefore somebody is either waiting for you with an ambush or else has long disappeared. That gives flexibility, a mobility that reduces vulnerability and allows us to take, in a huge way, the initiative away from the Taliban and therefore be more successful at improving the security in Kandahar City and the districts surrounding it, and just enabling a bit more space to build the other things we're trying to do: the army, the police, and the developmental projects.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

Thank you, General.

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

I will take you back to Pakistan, and I am very encouraged by your comments.

From my communications with the current political leadership of Mr. Zardari, and from his public statements that it is Pakistan's war, I think the public in Pakistan now, with the political system they have, realizes the seriousness. I also have a lot of confidence in General Kayani; he's a very capable general and a good soldier.

It has also been suggested that perhaps there should be some dialogue with the new government in the northwest frontier, to get their view and to move forward.

But my main question is, can you tell us how the new reality of the military-civilian circumstance that has evolved in Pakistan has made a difference and is benefiting our combined strategic interests in that area?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Khan.

Very quickly, General Hillier, please.

[Gen R.J. Hillier]

Sure.

What I would say is that it has helped take away some—some—of the freedom of the Taliban leadership to reside inside of that federally administered tribal area in Pakistan, where governance really is non-existent, security is very much limited, and development is just not visible, and where they have been able to hide, plan, recuperate, and to recruit and pay and get folks to go back into Afghanistan to mount attacks, or else to mount them inside with the existing Taliban.

The increased number of troops up there has helped in the past to do that. It's also helped directly through the operations that have been conducted to remove some of the Taliban leaders. In the last year, we had the number three man in the chain of command of the Taliban, Mullah Abdullah, taken out; and as result of joint operations, we had Mullah Dadullah, probably their pre-eminent commander, killed because of that kind of joined-up operation.

Lastly, you start to see an effect on the border itself, where you see constraints on the number of fighters who are coming in to join the Taliban; difficulty for their commanders moving back and forth, which is most important for us; and constraints on the routes they can use, which makes it easier for Afghan forces, or us, in supporting the Afghan forces, to interdict them and prevent them from getting into places where they can launch attacks.

I don't need to make excuses for Pakistan's forces. They are not used to fighting a counter-insurgency operation. They really are focused on a big armoured threat from the continuing Pakistani-Indian tensions, and they have great difficulties doing that. We need them to do all they're doing and we need them to do more, and if they can do more in a joined-up fashion with the Afghans, I think that would bring a great deal of effect.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, General.

We'll move back to the official opposition, and Mr. Chan.

[Raymond Chan, Liberal, Richmond, BC]

Thank you, General, for the great briefing you gave us.

I would echo the respect that Canadians have for you and the soldiers in the field. Every Christmas, every December, I am asked to go to schools to collect Christmas gifts and cards to bring back to your department and to pass on to the soldiers in the field. Occasionally, the students get a reply from the soldiers, and they're very happy to see that. So through you, to the soldiers in the field, the next time you're there, let them know that those reply cards are very welcome.

I have two questions for you, General.

The witnesses who have come to the committee, particularly from the NGO sector, have been saying there are increases in the hostility or indiscriminate nature of the Taliban's attacks in the south. So my question to you, General, is whether that is the case. Do you expect to be able to contain the increases in those attacks? They are saying those attacks are jeopardizing the achievements we have been able to attain so far.

The second question I have, General, is that you talk about welcoming NGOs, international NGOs, to the southern part and to Kandahar. In my riding, there are some NGOs willing to go to work with local NGOs there and to deliver some support to the locals in the south. Do you think it's safe enough for Canadian volunteer workers to go to work in the Kandahar region at this moment?

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chan.

General Hillier, again, please.

[Gen R.J. Hillier]

Sir, let me just say that indiscriminate attacks by the Taliban have increased—and I emphasize the indiscriminate part. They've switched some of their attacks away from us, because we are a hard target, to the more vulnerable, the more fragile.... School teachers have been killed. In this past week three schools were attacked with explosives designed to destroy them. If they can, the Taliban focus on international members of the IOs or NGOs, but also local Afghan folks who work for these; and they also focus on the Afghan National Police where they possibly can. At one point last year, the minister of the interior told me that the casualty rate for his police across Afghanistan was 12 police officers killed a day, and that's because the Taliban focuses its indiscriminate attacks on those who are simply trying to bring sustainable security to Afghanistan.

So from that point of view, yes, the number of attacks overall has gone up, in part because we have more troops and police in the south and have really gone there to take the initiative away from the Taliban itself. So now we're having violent actions in areas where we didn't before, and sometimes—not always, but sometimes—it's because we've gone there to confront the Taliban with the Afghans and the police itself.

I'll say that the security situation for international civilians, folks who are trying to build the Government of Afghanistan out in those districts, folks who are trying to build a school or a hospital, is still very fragile, and it is going to remain that way for a while yet. In the Zhari district, despite the Afghan National Army battalion and the Afghan National Police largely having taken over security responsibility for the district, we are going to have, for the foreseeable future, the occasional IED attack; we're going to have suicide bombers, whether on foot, bike, or vehicle; and we're going to have the occasional ambush itself. Those kinds of things will continue to frighten away people who work with IOs and NGOs with the honourable intention of trying to help people who are desperately in need of help.

The indiscriminate part of the attacks is what I would emphasize. I think the Taliban has shown its true colours, and it is despicable.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, General Hillier.

We'll go to Madame Deschamps.

You have five minutes.

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I am going to start by asking you two questions. If I have time, I would like to be able to ask a third. I will be brief.

General, in your presentation, you mentioned the detection of homemade bombs. Canadian soldiers have sustained proportionately more loss of life than any other country, and the losses can be attributed to homemade bombs. The equipment for detecting those bombs was defective and we are told that it still is today. If that is so, I would like to know how we can justify that sad state of affairs.

The Prime Minister made a statement in the House last January in which he said that the army never told the government that it had stopped handing over detainees to Afghan authorities. I would like to know who is telling the truth. Who is right and who is wrong here?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Madame Deschamps.

General Hillier.

[Gen R.J. Hillier]

Madame, let me just respond to that first question. First of all, you're incorrect; we have not taken more losses than other countries. The British have had now, I believe, almost 100 soldiers killed in action in the operation in southern Afghanistan. One loss, from our perspective, is one too many. We put our entire focus on trying to—

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I was talking about losses that can be attributed to homemade bombs.

[Gen R.J. Hillier]

It's very hard to talk precisely about losses in, say, Kandahar province versus losses in Helmand province. You heard what I had to say about where we are operating. The lack of roads means that we are sometimes predictable, but we are doing a variety of things with enormous intensity to continue to reduce the risks while there.

The equipment is not faulty, Madame. We have the most high-tech equipment available, the best technology available in the world right now. I will just give you an example of the enhanced route-opening capability held by us and the Americans, the only two countries in the world who have it, which goes out and clears the roads, etc. We have mine rollers and mine plows on our tanks going out before us on the roads. We have UAVs, which do surveillance on those roads, and a variety of tactics to do this.

However, we also have an enemy who is thinking and who is, of course, unconstrained by the laws of war, unconstrained by any sorts of policies from a government to actually do things with good values and good interests at heart, and they have found some ways to slip some IEDs in, which we sometimes cannot detect, or they have sometimes come in after we've gone across a route, targeting our young soldiers there. We work at this constantly. We learn lessons and we analyze every attack. You heard what I said about the work we do before the blast, at the blast, and after a blast.

Let me just tell you, having been at Trenton and met most of the families of those young soldiers, this one is my number one priority—and we work hard at it. The equipment is not deficient. There is the simple fact that an enemy, given enough time, enough opportunity, can actually find a way to strike you and find a vulnerability, and that is what they have done with those IEDs. That is their weapon of choice. We continue to work against that.

Madame, we have a responsibility to keep the Government of Canada informed as to what we do, and I am very confident that I meet those responsibilities to our government. It doesn't matter whether it's operations, detainees, or anything else.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, General.

That concludes—

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I would like to have had an answer about the Afghan detainees from...

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

I think we are pretty well out of time, Madame Deschamps. General Hillier has to catch a plane and he said specifically that he would have to leave at 4:30.

We thank you, General, for again coming here. You've spoken somewhat about the technology and the equipment that's available. I can tell you that we as a government are very committed to making certain that our men and women who lay their lives on the line daily for us have more of this high-tech, top-of-the-line equipment.

We thank you, and we would ask you to pass on to our troops our appreciation for the very good work they are doing in Afghanistan.

We will suspend for one minute and allow the general to take his leave. Then we will invite our witnesses for the second hour to come to their seats.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

We'll call this meeting back to order and welcome each committee member back.

In the second hour today, we are very pleased to have two guests with the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. The first is from the International Crisis Group, David Mozersky, the project director for the Horn of Africa. Also, we will hear from Martin Amyot, the vice-president of corporate development for La Mancha Resources Inc.

This is in regard to the study by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development on Sudan, and to listen to different individuals and organizations that come forward to brief this committee on the crisis in Sudan and Darfur.

We welcome our guests today. I'm not certain if you have appeared before our committee prior to this. We look forward to an opening statement, and then we would move into a time of questions and hopefully answers.

Welcome, and I'll invite Mr. Mozersky to begin.

[David Mozersky, Project Director, Horn of Africa, International Crisis Group]

Thank you very much.

The ongoing crisis in Sudan represents one of the greatest challenges to the Horn of Africa region and the international community today. Despite significant high-level international attention and engagement over the past several years, we're still far from a sustainable peace in a country that still hosts multiple active or simmering conflict areas and plays a role in regional conflicts in Chad, the Central African Republic, and northern Uganda, among others.

Progress is possible, but it will require a significantly more coordinated and consistent approach from the international community and possibly a radical change in the way we've approached policy making in Sudan. We've done a commendable job of averting catastrophe and helping to keep people alive through humanitarian support in Darfur and elsewhere and through support to the various peacekeeping operations in Sudan, but this alone is not enough. This is treating the symptoms of the problem, while leaving the causes of Sudan's multiple wars intact.

Sudan today has an active war in the western provinces of Darfur; a fragile peace, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, in south and central Sudan, which has seen increased military clashes over the past three months in the contested area of Abyei; a weak and largely unimplemented peace agreement in eastern Sudan; and new potential conflicts in the central region of Kordofan and in the far north where local communities, unhappy with the construction of the Merowe and Kajbar dams, are threatening to take up arms against the government.

This pattern of civil war, which is more than 50 years old in the case of southern Sudan, yet new to equally underdeveloped regions like Kordofan in the far north, stems from a common set of problems relating to poor governance, centralized and opaque decision-making, and the control of resources and power by a small and ruling elite at the expense of the broader population.

We must understand that the current regime in Sudan is benefiting from today's status quo despite the international outrage over Darfur, a conflict that the regime has fuelled and continues to fuel. The ruling National Congress Party is selling its oil on the open market; has had consistent protection in the UN Security Council from China, Russia, and others; and views the political reforms that address the core governance problems in Sudan as a threat to its survival.

Despite having committed to many of these reforms in the 2005 CPA and enshrining them in the Interim National Constitution, it has resisted the codification of these reforms through new legislation. Thus, tackling the deeper causes of conflict in Sudan requires not only addressing technical issues like establishing a functioning and inclusive federal state, or complex issues in Darfur related to traditional land tenure systems and grazing rights, but doing so in a context where the ruling National Congress Party will resist progress each step of the way if it determines it somehow threatens its political survival.

Darfur remains the most urgent and tragic crisis in Sudan. Yet despite the past four years of international attention and engagement, the outlook for civilians and for an end to the conflict remain negative. Civilians continue to face a myriad of threats on a daily basis.

The National Congress Party remains the main driver of conflict in Darfur, but the situation is further hampered by significant rebel divisions, a proliferation of armed groups, and an escalated proxy war between Sudan and Chad. UNAMID is slowly deploying, held up by government obstruction, UN bureaucracy, and tepid support from troop-contributing countries. What is far more worrying, however, is that the political process is completely frozen, with little urgency seen anywhere in the international arena.

Without progress on the political track, the peacekeeping mission, even if fully equipped and deployed, can at best provide increased civilian protection for static populations in IDP camps and increased humanitarian access. But these are symptoms of the larger problem.

A resumption of peace talks in Darfur will probably require a significant amount of time to carry out preparatory work, focusing on rebel unification and broadening of participation, to give the talks even a minimal chance of success. This is not happening and it is not being prioritized. The joint African Union-UN mediation team is stuck, and therefore we see attention shifting once again to the peacekeeping force at the expense of the more difficult, but ultimately more important, political process.

The 2005 CPA is the bedrock upon which peace and national reform can be based. Its provisions include a significant governmental reform agenda, as well as a democratization process that is supposed to lead to elections in 2009. Yet the pattern of implementation more than three years into the agreement is one of systematic undermining of national-level provisions by the ruling NCP and uneven implementation by the southern-based SPLM.

In October, the SPLM suspended its participation in government due to these NCP violations and the parties came close to returning to war on several occasions in November and December. Although the suspension was resolved peacefully between the parties without external intervention, and the SPLM returned to government in late December, the fundamental challenges remain.

The NCP's ruling clique view implementation as a threat to its survival, while the SPLM is challenged by internal divisions and capacity issues. The most volatile issue, the contested area of Abyei, remains unresolved and has seen a series of deadly clashes in the surrounding areas since late December.

This is not a recipe for sustainable peace, but instead carries a high likelihood of an eventual collapse of the peace agreement and a return to war, unless something changes. A collapse of the CPA would have devastating consequences for all of Sudan and torpedo any peacemaking efforts in Darfur. It would have significant negative ramifications on each of Sudan's nine neighbouring countries.

So what must change to improve the chances of sustainable peace in Sudan? I believe the answer, or at least part of the answer, rests with the approach of the international community. Three things must happen for a more effective international response.

First, there must be a consistent, coordinated message from the international community to the Sudanese government and other actors. This requires a common international strategy towards Sudan, but this is currently lacking and poses a significant challenge in the context where the UN Security Council is sharply divided.

Second, such a strategy must be comprehensive and address Sudan as one country with multiple conflicts stemming from a common set of causes. We must understand the inter-linkages between Darfur, the CPA, and the greater region, and adapt our policies accordingly. For the past three years, most international actors have viewed Darfur and the CPA as two separate conflicts, have developed two separate sets of policies, and, in trying to balance these agendas, have ultimately ended up undermining both. For example, the CPA holds the seeds to begin to address some of these structural issues, but these are not sexy, do not make headlines, and have too often been ignored.

Finally, we must build leverage with the parties. In some cases, this means just backing up threats already made in existing UN Security Council resolutions and using it to push the parties down the path that will lead towards peace. This does not mean regime change, but we must be more effective at holding the parties to their commitments in the CPA and in Darfur. By doing so, we support the political transition and reform agenda already embedded in the CPA. By creating political and economic costs for non-compliance, the international community can make a peaceful transition the best political option available to the parties and greatly reduce the risk of renewed conflict or be prepared to better manage renewed hostilities.

Canada has an important role to play. In addition to the crucial support that Canada is providing in Darfur on the humanitarian side and through support to UNAMID, as well as in southern Sudan in the transitional areas, Canada is a consensus-builder in the international arena. The Sudan file needs leadership and vision in developing a comprehensive strategy and an international consensus around that strategy if we are to make progress on consolidating peace in Sudan.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Mr. Mozersky.

In fact, you came in under the time. Not very often do we have that, but we appreciate it. We look forward to your comments in the questions and answers.

Mr. Amyot.

[Martin Amyot, Vice-President, Corporate Development, La Mancha Resources Inc.]

Thank you very much.

When the decision is made to impose sanctions on a country, economic sanctions are often those that first come to mind. We are one of the few companies currently conducting activities in Sudan. In the document that has been distributed to you, we try to describe for you the vision of a mining operation in Sudan. I should say at the outset that the comments in the presentation are made from the perspective of a resource company. It is of course possible that the various economic sanctions that could be imposed might approach the question from various angles, depending on whether mining companies, the oil and gas industry or any other operation were involved.

Let me now quickly put things into context. Currently, supply and demand of natural resources are not in balance. This is true for practically all kinds of minerals, and for oil. As we show in slide 3, this is also what explains the significant rise in demand for gold in recent years. According to Bank of Montreal economists, among several others, the demand is going to last for some time because of the time needed to increase capacity to match the sudden spike in demand. This spike, as you know, is often attributed to the rapid development of the economies of China and India. So it is likely to last for some time yet.

A little less known is the fact that, previously, operators and producers of natural resources, certainly mining resources, essentially all came from the big four countries, namely Australia, Canada, the United States and South Africa. Very recently, that old order has changed. Whether in mining or oil and gas, the producers are increasingly new players that we have identified on slide 4. They are China, Indonesia and Russia. They are playing an ever more active role in the production of natural resources. They are homes to growing companies that are making a greater and greater mark on the world stage. It is important to remember this. Any freeze in Canadian activities in Sudan, for example, whether in mining or in oil and gas, could benefit the emerging players in China, Russia and Indonesia.

With the context now set, I would quickly like to introduce the company that I represent today, La Mancha Resources Inc. La Mancha is a Canadian company headquartered in Montreal. It is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, the TSX, has a market capitalization of $61 million—as of last March 31—and is presently operating two mines, one in Côte d'Ivoire and another in Sudan. The latter is the Hassaï mine, 150 km northeast of Khartoum.

The Hassaï mine has been in operation since 1992 and has produced over 2 million ounces of gold to date. The forecast production for 2008 is about 100,000 ounces of gold. Once produced, every ounce is sent to Canada where it is refined and sold on the international market. We presently employ 850 people, of whom 20 are expats, and 830 are locally hired and trained, Sudanese, that is. The mine is presently the only one in operation in the country. But we must remember that there is a lot of exploration going on at the moment and, unfortunately, it is not being done by Canadian companies, but exclusively by companies from China and Indonesia.

As a producer, La Mancha has a relatively short history. We began production activities after having acquired the assets of AREVA, a company based in France. A few months after we had acquired the Sudanese assets, the Sudan Divestment Task Force (SDTF), which appeared before this committee a few weeks ago, placed La Mancha on its highest offenders list because of our company's operations in Sudan. The objective of the Sudan Divestment Task Force is to provide financial markets with information about the operations of various public companies conducting activities in Sudan.

Their initial recommendation, based on information available in the public domain, was rather damaging. The organization put us on its highest offenders list simply because of our presence in Sudan.

However, the dialogue that came after August 2007 allowed us to describe the benefits resulting from La Mancha's presence in Sudan, the type of operations we had, our positive influence on the local population because of the training and instruction we provide, the working conditions in place at the site, the company's environmental policy, and so on. As a result, the Sudan Divestment Task Force reviewed its position and removed La Mancha from its highest offenders list.

This position was confirmed in November, when consultants appointed by the Sudan Divestment Task Force came to visit our operations in Sudan to confirm the statements that had been made to the Sudan Divestment Task Force committee.

A little more practically, not preventing companies like La Mancha or other Canadian producers from operating in Sudan has a number of advantages. I describe them in a few of these slides. First, it creates favourable working conditions. I can mention no discrimination in hiring and promotion, workforce training, respecting workers' human rights, and their religions, and so on. Most Canadian companies observe these policies and continue to do so outside the country. We do so in Sudan.

The same goes for environmental policies. It is important to know that the people developing the resources of a country are doing so responsibly. Again, blocking access for Canadian companies runs the risk of opening the door to companies whose environmental policies are less dynamic than is the norm among publicly traded companies in Canada.

Looking at regional development, many Canadian companies, including La Mancha, continue to have policies that are very socially oriented in their actions and their overseas operations. This deserves to be highlighted; several schools and hospitals have been built thanks to funding provided by our company, for example. We have provided water and electricity to a number of places.

In a few words, that is our position. If economic restrictions are to be imposed that would limit commercial links between Canada and Sudan, it is important that companies developing natural resources be exempted from those restrictions. Once again, the present great demand for natural resources means that any space vacated by Canadian companies would be immediately taken by Chinese, Indonesian or Russian companies.

As the example of Talisman Energy very recently showed, this is not necessarily beneficial for the local population. In the folder you have received, you will find an article describing what has happened since Talisman Energy left Sudan several years ago. Clearly, this special case is not necessarily representative of everything that can happen in those situation, but it is still an important example to keep in mind.

Of course, we are ready to take your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Mr. Amyot and Mr. Mozersky.

We'll move into the first round of questioning, and we will go to Mr. Rae, please.

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

Thank you, gentlemen.

It's an interesting “two ships passing in the night” presentation from Mr. Mozersky and Mr. Amyot. I'd like to try to bring the two together and ask you both to comment on each other's testimony today, just to get a sense of how Canada can be successfully engaged.

David, if I may just ask you directly, since you talked about leverage with Sudan, would you recommend continuing a disinvestment program with respect to Canadian activities in Sudan, or would you recommend the type of engagement that Mr. Amyot talked about?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Rae.

Mr. Mozersky.