Foreign Affairs Committee on April 10th, 2008

[David Mozersky]

I'll be frank in my response.

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

That's why you're here and that's why we're here. We're all frank. We're frank all the time here.

[David Mozersky]

There are two points. The first is that I think Sudan is quite an extreme case. You have a government that is not moved by many of the mechanisms and levers available in the international system. They're not moved by naming and shaming. They're not moved by public outcry, and the threats, which the international community, including the Security Council, has made over the last four years related to its activities in Darfur, have largely gone unfulfilled. Therefore, the credibility of our threats, the degree to which our leverage has clout, just by our words, is quite low.

The second point to make is that the government, or specifically the ruling National Congress Party, is threatened by a peaceful transformation of the country. They're maintaining power. They are embedded in the status quo. They are opposed to peaceful transformation, peace and stability in Darfur. They're opposed to the national level reforms included in the CPA. That provides the context.

Economic sanctions, particularly those that have already been authorized by the Security Council, make sense as a disincentive, as a political tool to hold the government accountable, hold the parties accountable, to their commitments, but they'll only work if they have sufficient clout to create a real change in the government's calculations.

The short answer is that Canada alone will not make that difference. Canada is a minimal player in Sudan's economy. This leads to the broader point I tried to make in my presentation, that if we're going to be effective, there needs to be a more coordinated international approach to Sudan.

I'll leave off there with that point. If we're to see significant change, recognizing the difficulties of the context we're working in, it's only going to come with a heavy push from the international community and probably not from unilateral actions.

The U.S., for example, far bigger than Canada and a much bigger player economically, has had a robust set of sanctions on Sudan since 1997. The Sudanese government is not unaffected, but they've been operating perfectly fine with those in place for more than 10 years.

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

If you take Talisman as an example, the effect of the steady campaign against Talisman was not that oil exploration or oil production ceased in Sudan, it was that somebody else did it.

Obviously, what you're saying is in order for sanctions to be effective, they have to be applied by everyone. Until that's the case, I take it your view would be--not to put you on the spot--that Mr. Amyot's company could continue to operate in the Sudan.

[David Mozersky]

I think it's a moral call. I can answer from a position in principle, but I don't know the specifics of La Mancha and what it's doing or not doing.

I think the damage that Talisman did in Sudan, not only to Canada's reputation but to the civil war itself, is that Talisman was the enabling factor in the development of Sudan's oil sector and was part of that initial consortium that saw the displacement of as many as 300,000 people in block 1 and block 2.

The fact that Talisman sold its operations in 2004 and that ONGC Videsh bought them is almost a secondary point. The point is that in 1999, 1997, when they bought their stake from Arakis, I think, they were there and they had the technical expertise to build the pipeline and develop the oil sector, and we can't undo that.

For sanctions to be effective, everyone needs to be on board, and that means thinking outside the usual players and including China, Malaysia, and those who do have--

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

There's no sign that China or Malaysia are the least bit interested in participating in sanctions.

[David Mozersky]

I think there's an argument to be made there. We haven't engaged them sufficiently yet. The argument is, particularly for China, that they're active in Sudan's economy, but they're disengaged for the most part from the political activities of the international community and are essentially providing almost blanket support to the National Congress Party and the UN Security Council.

The implication is that they're putting all their eggs in the basket of the National Congress Party. Now, it's increasingly clear that the policies of the National Congress Party are going to lead to renewed conflict, and potentially a collapse of the CPA. In that scenario, China's oil investments and its investments in the hydro-energy sector will be threatened. If there's a new war in Sudan, nobody will benefit.

The military situation is not what it was in 1999 and 2000, when Talisman was there and the government was able to protect its investments. Those troops have pulled out of the south. The SPLA is there; that's the new front line.

So there's an argument to be made that it's actually in China's national interest to see a stable transition. And it's in Malaysia's national interest to see the CPA implemented, to reduce the risks of a return to war. But again, that takes a level of coordination and a level of cooperation that we haven't seen yet.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

We'll go to Madame Deschamps.

You have seven minutes.

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Will we have time left for committee business, Mr. Chair?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Pardon?

Yes, we are over time. But there are no votes today, so we'll save some time for committee business at the end.

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Good afternoon, gentlemen.

I have a question or a comment. Mr. Mozersky, after your presentation, you painted us a general picture of the situation in Darfur, as opposed to the one in Sudan. You tentatively suggested a plan for lasting peace that contained three points that you emphasized. For example, we need better coordination in order to send a consistent message from the international community.

You mentioned a national strategy but hardly mentioned Canada's presence or role. Could you explain how a national strategy would be established? Who would take the lead? How would the strategy be able to resolve the underlying issues like poverty, drought, famine and wealth distribution. Could you tell us more about that vision, please?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Madame Deschamps.

Mr. Amyot, did you want to respond to her question, or Mr. Mozersky?

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

My question...

[David Mozersky]

Just to clarify, the question was where is this strategy outlined more clearly, where was it developed, and how does it lead to dealing with humanitarian issues and issues fuelling conflict and poverty. Is that it?

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

The second point in your presentation mentioned a common national strategy. In the international community, who could be in the best position of leadership to resolve the underlying issues like poverty, drought, famine and wealth distribution?

[David Mozersky]

You hit the nail on the head. It's an excellent question. Part of the problem is that there hasn't been a leader within the international community in developing policy in Sudan. After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, many people assumed that the UN would take the lead. They set up a 10,000-person peacekeeping mission, and other bilateral actors who had previously had the lead in the peace process took a step back. The U.S., Norway, the U.K., and other international partners ceded some of the political direction to the UN mission. What happened was that the UN mission became sidetracked with the conflict in Darfur and failed to provide an adequate balance.

With the deployment of UNAMID in Darfur, we have two separate missions. The UN mandate has been bifurcated. UNMIS, the UN mission in Sudan, has a mandate for monitoring the North-South Peace Agreement exclusively, and UNAMID has a mandate for monitoring Darfur exclusively. So we can't rely on the UN to provide national leadership because they've taken themselves out of the game.

I think we have to look at other places, at other countries that have not traditionally been leaders in Sudan. This brings me to the point I made about Canada's having an opportunity to play that role. We have been heavily involved in Sudan in supporting humanitarian activities in Darfur, under the African Union and UNAMID. But we haven't been leaders in the political process. So there's a gap right now. No one is leading in the political process in the international community. The traditional countries—the U.S., Norway, and the U.K.—have not stepped up to fill the vacuum. I think Canada is well placed to push the process forward, to develop the necessary coordination and consensus.

There are efforts. There was a meeting in December that Italy hosted, a preparatory meeting, through the framework of the IGAD Partners Forum, which was the international support body for the north-south peace process. That meeting could be revived, and I think it's a forum that Canada could easily take the lead in.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Mozersky.

We're going to go to the government side.

I would like to ask Mr. Amyot a question first, if I can have the prerogative of the chair.

[Deepak Obhrai, Conservative, Calgary East, AB]

Don't take my time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

You said there were a number of things that have changed since Talisman left Sudan in 1999 and 2000. We noticed that when Talisman left, China moved in. One of the positive things that took place was that Talisman, according to a number of witnesses we've had, has become much more socially responsible. In fact, we've had witnesses appear before our committee who have stated that Talisman, PetroCan, and other firms are now world leaders in social corporate responsibility.

Mr. Amyot, in response to what Mr. Mozersky said, how have you and your company, since 2000, improved your social responsibility record?

[Martin Amyot]

I'd say that the entire national resources sector has been improving drastically in that domain for the past 10 or 15 years. These days, in the organizational chart of most of the mining and oil and gas companies, you'll find at least one officer responsible for social development and community relationships. Developing a mine or an oil field has become impossible in almost any part of the world without good communication and good relationships with the local authorities and the local populations.

Reputational risk is now a big weight in the way a company is valued on the stock market. It is a concern that all natural resource companies have in mind whenever they decide to start a project in a foreign country, or even locally.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Amyot.

We'll move to the government side with Mr. Obhrai.

[Deepak Obhrai, Conservative, Calgary East, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair, for your information, my daughter worked for Talisman in corporate social responsibility. They do have a very good division of that. It's a conflict; I agree.

David, I'm going to respectfully tell you that I disagree with your analysis. I know from looking at your.... I just came back from Sudan. I was there with the minister, and we went to Darfur. We went to south Sudan and we met with the Government of Sudan, and although the general analysis of the attitude of the Government of Sudan is interesting, a lot of other factors are taking place. Your analysis is very negative; I would say we would have to look at the positive side. I've just come from south Sudan, and it is an amazing situation. You see the birth of a nation taking place in south Sudan, the birth of a little nation starting from ground zero, and they are working around that. What we found was that although we talk about the CPA and its breakup, and it is a possibility, the realization is coming that south Sudan is probably going to be an independent nation in due course, with its own president and all these things. Sure, politics are always part and parcel of the game. Tugs-of-war are always going on, but that is part of it.

An important aspect in that country is the oil revenues, although they will be shared equally, it does provide a basis for a zero economy to move up, for south Sudan, although for the government.... The situation in Darfur is very different. The governor of Darfur met us and said he was very grateful to have NGOs and everybody come to address the humanitarian crisis, but what about the development of that region? No development people will come, because in these refugee camps they're able to find food and everything, so more and more people are coming, just for economic reasons.

We passed a motion for investment in Sudan, and colleagues were tough with that. We have come back to revisit this question, to say you cannot penalize these regions that are growing now, like south Sudan. When we put a blanket sanction on Sudan to punish the Government of Khartoum, we are punishing the government of Juba as well. When we were there, sanctions were biting. You can't use visas and other things. Quite interestingly, I am seeing the Government of Khartoum using the Government of Sudan to go to the international states and try to work within the sanctions.

I'm not going to comment on this mining issue, on your company, at this stage, but I think from the international crisis aspect of it, you will have to change your analysis and say there is a lot of progress and good things happening at a very slow pace. The international community needs to focus on getting south Sudan and all these things moving forward, not as an international basket case but moving forward because they have the potential, and in Darfur, addressing the humanitarian crisis of the war going on.

In the long term, how is the economic development of Darfur going to take place? If you're not going to do economic development in Darfur, I can tell you those IDP camps will never disappear in Darfur.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Obhrai.

There are a couple of questions for both our guests.

Very quickly, we have about 30-second answers each, Mr. Mozersky and Mr. Amyot.

[David Mozersky]

I have a brief response to that final point. I agree with much of what you said. Certainly southern Sudan is a different case and should not be penalized for the actions of the National Congress Party in Khartoum. I glossed over it in a brief presentation, but we've discussed it in detail in our report. Both the governments of southern Sudan and Khartoum rely on oil revenue. If you cut off the oil revenue, the CPA collapses and the south collapses.

Having said that, the risk of the CPA collapsing is not coming from southern Sudan or from the SPLM. It's coming from the National Congress Party, who are systematically undermining elements of the agreement, and that's where there's a need for pressure. They've signed up for things. They've committed themselves to things. They are refusing to implement because they view it as a threat to the status quo. That's where the international community needs to push.

I respectfully disagree with you on the need for economic development in Darfur. Yes, it's absolutely part of the solution, but it's not the solution today. It's a solution down the road when you have a government that is willing to provide the political space for Darfurians to come together, turn off a military offensive, and allow access for the UN and for humanitarian communities. We need progress on the political process in order to get there. We need equal attention given to reviving the peace process that we're giving to the peacekeeping force if we're going to get to a position where we can talk about development, because certainly it's fuelling conflict in Darfur. It's part of the solution, but it's not the solution tomorrow; it's the solution a couple of years down the road.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Mr. Mozersky.

I'm pleased to have Mr. Marston here today. Mr. Marston serves on the human rights committee and one of our subcommittees, and he's been quite outspoken, certainly, on the mining issue and others, so we appreciate your being here.